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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Regulation of the Franchise Relationship 
in Australia: 
A Contractual Analysis 
 
 
This dissertation examines whether the regulation of the franchise sector is effective 
in achieving two of the stated goals of the Franchising Code of Conduct.  These two 
goals are redressing the imbalance of power in the relationship and increasing levels 
of certainty for participants in the sector.  Based on the ‘new learning’ in regulation, 
this dissertation takes an expansive approach to the concept of regulation.  It considers 
how, in a ‘multi-layered system of governance’, the layers of regulation of the 
franchising sector contribute to these goals.  The results of the analysis suggest that 
private, self-regulation through the layers of market and contract sets up a relationship 
where there is an imbalance of power in favour of a franchisor and uncertainty for a 
franchisee.  The market interaction between the parties establishes these conditions, 
which are reinforced by the contract, in particular by the interaction of the standard 
form and relational qualities of the contract.  A public layer of governance, direct 
intervention in the form of the Franchising Code of Conduct, relies largely on self-
regulatory tools such as disclosure and is also ineffective in addressing the imbalance 
of power in the relationship and in increasing levels of certainty for franchisees. 
Because neither self-regulatory mechanisms nor legislative intervention achieves the 
stated goals of redressing imbalance of power and uncertainty in the franchise 
relationship, the analysis concludes that a reframing of regulation is necessary.  The 
recommended revised regulatory program features collaborative, participative, 
democratic process to gather and assess good measurements that inform the 
identification of problems and the selection of tools appropriate to address those 
problems. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Regulatory theory, regulatory process, instruments and tools of 
regulation, regulating contract, standard form contract,  relational contracting, 
franchising,  imbalance of power, uncertainty in franchising relationship, discretion 
in franchise contracts, regulation of franchising, lack of information about the 
franchising sector, use of contract as tool to measure effectiveness of regulation, use 
of disclosure in regulation of franchising 
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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
1.1 HYPOTHESIS AND OBJECTIVE  
Since World War II the franchise sector has grown rapidly in many countries in the 
world.1   In Australia franchising was estimated to be worth $128 billion in turnover 
per year to the national economy, or about fourteen percent of Gross Domestic 
Product.2   Australia reports more franchises per capita than any other nation in the 
world, three times higher than the number in the United States.3  The sector employs 
over 600,000 people, a figure that between 2002 and 2004 increased by about fourteen 
percent and between 2004 and 2006 by about thirteen percent.4   Extrapolating from 
these figures, about one in ten households in Australia is connected with franchising 
and the number continues to grow.5    
Franchising is important to the Australian economy and to individual Australians, but 
more evidence is needed to inform discussion about the sector and its regulation. 
Franchising is portrayed by industry groups as a vehicle to transform inexperienced 
                                                 
1 Today the franchise sector employs over 8.5 million people in the US at about 320,000 locations, and 
accounts for an estimated $1 trillion in annual retail sales in that country alone; an estimated 40 percent 
of all retail sales  See <http://www.newbusinesscentre.com/statistics.html>.     See also the ‘Economic 
Impact of Franchised Business’ study conducted for the International Franchising Association 
Education Foundation by PricewaterhouseCoopers at 
<http://www.franchise.org/content.asp?contentid=542>.   The French Franchise Federation website at 
<http://www.franchise-fff.com/> has links to trends in franchising in Europe.  In many countries, not 
only in developed economies where the sector is maturing, but also in developing economies in Africa, 
South America and Asia, the sector is expected to continue to grow over the next 10 years. 
2 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven and Owen Wright,  Franchising Australia 2006 Survey, Franchise 
Council of Australia Survey, Griffith University and the Franchise Council of Australia Ltd., 
<http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=182> at 14 September 2007.  See also 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Website_information_PDF_version_final_14
Jul0620060714161438.pdf>.  Note that reporting of statistics about franchising generally includes the 
significant contribution of the beverage, oil and automobile manufacturing industries.  Even so, it is an 
important and rapidly growing sector. 
3 Franchising Council of Australia, Facts at a Glance. accessed at 
<http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=15>. 
4 According to IBIS World's general manager quoted at <http://www.expense-
reduction.com.au/LicencePressClippings.php?clippingsID=54>, at 18 June 2005.   Projections indicate 
that growth in the sector will moderate, but that it will continue to expand at the rate of 6-8 percent per 
year over the next several years.  The 2004 to 2006 growth rate is taken from the Franchising Australia 
2006 Survey. 
5 See <http://www.thefranchiseoffice.com/wst_page4.html> at 1 April 2007.   
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people into successful business owners. These groups generate surveys, how-to 
guides, articles and educational materials to promote the benefits of franchising as a 
way of doing business to prospective franchisees.6  On the other hand there seems no 
shortage of disappointed, would-be entrepreneurs whose experience of franchising 
leads them to claim it is a form of predation or servitude.7   Lee Anstice, a former 
franchisor and franchisee who now runs a franchise consulting company on the Gold 
Coast, estimates that over 30 percent of franchise units in Australia fail to turn a 
profit.8 Perhaps not coincidentally, Rupert Barkoff, a franchise lawyer and 
commentator in the US, has estimated that about a third of franchises in the US fail to 
make a profit.9   
Of course, these are only estimates; in fact, no one actually knows.  Myths persist in 
franchising due to a lack of reliable, objective information about the sector.  
Franchising is an important part of the economy.  There is regulation of the franchise 
relationship in the form of the Franchising Code of Conduct,10 but it is unclear to what 
ends and with what results.  Because franchising is important and because there is 
little reliable evidence of its efficacy, the regulation of the sector has been for many 
years and remains controversial.  In 1999 UK lawyer and franchising expert Martin 
Mendelsohn wrote that, ‘Australian regulation makes Australia the least desirable 
destination in the world for franchise systems…(they) should avoid Australia until 
                                                 
6 See the FCA website at <http://www.franchise.org.au/> at 17 September 2007. See also Deloitte, 
Touche and Tohmatsu, Franchisee Satisfaction Survey (2004) 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,sid%253D5632%2526cid%253D83113,00.html> for the 
2004 Franchisee Satisfaction Survey carried out in part by the firm of the State Chapter VP of the FCA.   
7 Websites in the US devoted to the topic of problems in franchising are common, though they are often 
short-lived.  One example has been the www.quiznossucks.com website.  See also 
<http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/ripoff1602.htm accessed 26 May 2004. A few websites have 
appeared in Australia as well, despite franchisors’ threats of defamation.  A website about Pedders has 
disappeared. In a telephone interview its author, a former Pedders franchisee, says lawsuits related to 
the franchise and the website have changed his life.   
8 Personal interview with Lee Anstice, Gold Coast, September 2006.   
9 Consider also Barkoff’s ‘rule of thirds’ that attracted press attention and controversy in the US.  
Personal interview with Rupert Barkoff,  Brisbane, May 2007. 
10 Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (No 162) (Cth) The Code is 
available at  
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/LegislativeInstrumentCompilation1.nsf/0/406979E8E
5E0FAD7CA256F71004E4CCF/$file/TradePracIndCodeFran1998.rtf > at 10 September 2007. 
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they have nowhere else to go and even then it would be a close call.’11   Professor 
Andrew Terry, on the other hand, has characterized the regulation of franchising as, 
‘the world’s most comprehensive and protective regulatory regime for franchisees’.12     
However one might characterize it, regulation of the franchise sector has not been 
proven to be effective.  A Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) was prepared prior to 
the enactment of the Franchising Code of Conduct but no Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) has been conducted since the regulation has been in effect.  Officials at the 
Franchise Council of Australia (the FCA) declare that the Code is doing its job, but 
another industry group, the Motor Trades Association of Australia (MTAA) does not 
share this view.  The MTAA Small Business Charter of Fairness calls for ‘the 
strengthening of the Franchising Code of Conduct.’13    Some journalists have also 
suggested that the regulation of franchising could be improved,   
‘[T]he current federal Government -- or a future one -- needs to ensure that 
franchisees are given better protection. …[there is] is no excuse for 
governments not to strive for best practice in franchising. We are a few rungs 
short of that.’14 
Pursuant to publicity of disputes involving Midas, 7-Eleven and Quizno’s Sub 
franchisees, the effectiveness of the Code again has come into question. In May 2006 
a group of Lenard’s franchisees paid a visit to the Minister of Small Business to 
discuss the problem of misleading or deceptive conduct in franchising.  Together with 
public awareness of problems in other franchise systems, their concerns led the 
Government to initiate a comprehensive review of disclosure requirements under the 
Code.15   
                                                 
11 Martin Mendelsohn, ‘Franchise Regulation – Has the World Gone Mad?’ (1999) 8(1) Franchise New 
Zealand, at 49. 
12 Andrew Terry, Fending Off Franchise Failure (2006) Franchising and Own Your Own Business, 
<http://www.franchise.net.au/articles/00/0C03ED00.asp> at 17 May 2006.   Because businesses have 
the perception that the Code imposes onerous obligations on the franchisor, they may seek structures 
that do not fall within the Code definition.  They may, for example, purport to operate simply as 
licences, distributorships or managed service agreements.  
13 Item 7, for full charter see <http://www.mtaa.com.au/policies/MTAA-Charter.pdf> 28 November 
2006.   
14 Peter Switzer, ‘ACCC to rule on Quizno controversy’, The Australian (Sydney), 29 August 2006.   
15 2006 Review of Disclosure, June 27, 2006 (The Australian Financial Review - ABIX via COMTEX). 
See also <http://minister.industry.gov.au/index.cfm?event=object.showContent&objectID=F08371CB-
ACEF-0A67-AC0803BB65BECAUSE514F 30 Oct. 06.  Submissions for this review closed 15 August 
2006.   
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In light of such controversy the objective of this thesis is to provide information to 
stakeholders and regulators about the effectiveness of regulation.  This dissertation 
tests the hypothesis that the Franchising Code of Conduct is effective by assessing 
whether the regulation of franchising is successful in achieving two of its stated goals, 
addressing the imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees, and reducing 
risk and generating growth in the sector by increasing the level of certainty for 
participants.16     
In 2000 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) Submission 
to the Task Force on Industry Self-Regulation noted that ‘one of the most useful items 
the taskforce process might produce would be a flowchart or checklist to help assess 
what form of regulation is most appropriate in any given circumstances’.17   The Fair 
Trading Codes of Conduct and the Codes of Conduct Policy Framework have made 
some progress toward this goal, but there is still no ‘clear guide on how to assess the 
suitability of particular forms of regulation’18 for practical commercial application.  
The aim of the research is to provide information which will be useful in decision-
making about future directions for regulation of the sector.   
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT       
Franchising is an important sector of the Australian economy, but its regulation 
remains a contentious issue.  Years of experimentation with the regulation of 
franchising, as well as numerous reports, revisions and ongoing tinkering with the 
regulation of franchising have not led to a satisfactory regulatory program for the 
sector. The most recent evidence of this is the 2006 Review of Disclosure undertaken 
by the Office of the Minister for Small Business in response to numerous complaints 
and publicity about abuses in the sector.   
This dissertation examines the effectiveness of regulation by asking whether it has 
achieved the objectives that were established when the Code was first promulgated in 
1998.  It considers the nature of regulatory activity, and sets out a framework for 
                                                 
16 Explanatory Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 No. 162 
(Cth) 
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawithLegislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/framelodgmentattach
ments/77630AD9222B25BCCA256F73000E7654> at 9 December 2006. 
17 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Submission to the Taskforce on Industry Self-
Regulation (2000) 16. 
18 Ibid. 
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assessing regulation that involves a broad contextual approach encompassing multiple 
layers of governance of the relationship, in particular, market, contract and statutory 
layers.  The market layer of governance is characterized by imbalance of power and 
uncertainty for a franchisee.  The contract layer of governance, both in theory and in 
practice, is also characterized by imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee.  
This dissertation argues that it is difficult to overstate the significance of the standard 
form and relational attributes of the contract as these attributes impact on the 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee.  Statutory intervention is another layer 
of governance. Among its stated goals are the redress of imbalance of power and the 
provision of greater certainty for participants. The principal tool relied upon by 
statutory intervention, disclosure, however, is not adequate in theory or in practice to 
accomplish these goals.  Here, too, the standard form and relational nature of the 
contract and a variety of other factors detract from the efficiency of disclosure. 
This dissertation concludes that regulation cannot reinforce or rely upon existing self-
regulatory measures to achieve ends that run counter to the conditions that inhere in 
these instruments such as imbalance of power and uncertainty.  Disclosure is a tool 
that is also self-regulatory in nature, and is insufficient to meet the stated goals.  The 
reliance on self-regulatory measures assumes that participants can support their roles 
in the regulatory process.  This dissertation demonstrates that a franchisee is not a full 
participant at any stage in the governance of the relationship, and is not properly 
equipped to fulfil its role in the regulation of the relationship. Given these conditions, 
abuse is likely to continue.  The regulation of the sector is only likely to be effective if 
it can be reframed according to a process-oriented approach that includes all 
participants, fully equipped to fulfil their roles at all stages of the governance of the 
relationship.   
1.3 RESEARCH APPROACH  
This dissertation began as an exploratory study of the role of contract in the regulation 
of the franchise sector in Australia.  Background research involved an in-depth 
examination of the regulation of the franchisor/franchisee relationship (hereinafter the 
franchise relationship) in Australia and the ways in which contracting parties and 
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regulators govern their interactions.19  This exploratory part of the research included a 
review of the business and economics literature about franchising generally, about 
regulation theory and theories of contract law. It also included a review of court cases 
and undertakings involving disputes in the franchise sector in Australia, the current 
sector-specific legislation governing the franchise relationship in Australia, and a 
review of the literature about the regulation of franchising in Australia.   Finally, this 
aspect of the study was informed by attendance at industry events, conferences, and 
consultative panels of the regulator, as well as by conversations with industry 
participants and regulators.   
The exploratory aspect of the research led to the development of the hypothesis that 
the Franchising Code of Conduct is effective.  A comparative content analysis of 
franchise contracts was used to test this hypothesis.  The process involved dividing 
the content of each contract into its distinct terms that could be more easily compared 
with the equivalent contract terms of the other contracts in the sample.  Given the 
small size of the sample and the diversity among contract terms, the analysis was 
primarily textual and discursive.  Some content analysis uses coding to transform raw 
data into a standardized form that is amenable to analysis.20  Analysis can be based on 
the coding of either manifest content (concrete terms) or latent content (underlying 
meaning), or a combination of the two.   It can be a useful method for legal research 
into contracts because of the importance of written documentation of legal 
relationships.21  In this study, while coding was not the primary component analysis, it 
was used to test for the frequency and context of certain words or phrases such as 
reasonableness, good faith and discretion. See Chapter Five for the results of the 
contract terms analysis. 
A purposive sampling method was used in selecting the contracts for analysis.22   
Though there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ franchise system, here the aim was to 
                                                 
19 Extended case study tries to lay out what is expected prior to conducting research.  Equipped with a 
thorough grounding in the literature, the researcher looks for conflicts with existing theories and seeks 
to fill ‘theoretical gaps and silences’.  See Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (10th ed, 2004) 
293 and Yin, Case Study Research, Design and Methods (1984).    
20 See <http://www.gslis.utexas.edu/~palmquis/courses/content.html> at 10 April 2007.   
21 One of the questions in the initial stages of this research was whether the contract is sufficiently 
important to parties in franchising that it would provide an accurate reflection of their interests.   
22 A purposive sample is selected by the researcher subjectively with the goal to obtain a sample that is 
representative of the population.  See Robert Ferber, ‘Research by Convenience’ (1977) 4(1) Journal of 
Consumer Research, 57-58.   
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sample franchise contracts from a selection of different types and sizes of franchise 
systems in Australia.   In this case the sample was an opportunistic sample, selected 
from membership of the Franchise Council of Australia.  The contracts for the content 
analysis were obtained through written requests to franchisors.  Given the small size 
of the sample as an exploratory study, this purposive sampling method does ensure 
that there is some qualitative range included in the sample.  A total of 45 franchisors 
on the east coast of Australia were contacted with requests to share their contracts. Of 
those contacted twelve systems agreed to supply contracts for the study.  These 
contract samples were supplemented with seven contracts obtained from franchisors’ 
solicitors for a total of nineteen contracts in the sample. 
The contracts in the sample are from established franchise systems; several in the 
sample are among the best known franchises in Australia, but they are not the largest 
multi-national franchises; McDonald’s, Hungry Jack’s and Kentucky Fried are not 
among the sample.  Nor do the contracts in the sample represent the smallest and 
newest franchise systems, many of which may not exist in a year’s time.23  The 
contracts collected for the sample represent several types of industry.  An effort was 
made to obtain more than one contract for each type in order to gain a sense of the 
variability of contracts within industry types.  The contracts analysed represent the 
following retail or service categories:  pizza (two contracts), ice cream (two 
contracts), retail athletic shoes (two contracts), mobile services (two contracts), 
mortgage brokers (two contracts), juice bar (one contract), cookies (one contract), 
bakery (one contract), book-keeping (one contract), business services/coaching 
agreements (two contracts), popcorn (one contract), coffee shop (one contract),  and 
healthcare services (one contract). 
As a legal study of the regulation of the franchise sector, this research contrasts with 
economic analysis which is the common method of assessing the impact of regulation.  
Over-emphasis by governments on economic analysis of regulation is misguided 
because economic measurements cannot be expected to be highly accurate due to the 
lack of reliable and objective data.  This is a particular problem in the franchising 
sector in Australia, where any economic analysis of the impacts of regulation would 
lack baseline measurements.  Cost-benefit analysis can be applied, but there are 
                                                 
23 It is, however, the case that a system represented in the sample may no longer be operating. 
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innumerable variables, for which there is no way to control.  As Julia Black points 
out, at the end of the day the formulation of regulation ultimately boils down to a 'best 
guess'.24  There can be no certainty, even in strictly economic terms.  Reliance on 
economic measurement also fails to take into account social welfare considerations 
and normative principles such as the concept that regulation should be broadly 
democratic and participative.  For these reasons the discourse of regulation should 
include social and legal research as well as economic analysis. 
The normative component of this dissertation draws from emerging trends in 
regulatory theory.  It highlights the gaps between what regulatory theory suggests 
should happen and what is actually happening in the regulation of the franchise sector, 
and posits some approaches to bridging these gaps. (See Chapter Seven) 
This dissertation thus employs a combination of methods to evaluate the role of 
contract in regulation.  The methods are low-intervention, as they involve almost no 
involvement with human subjects in the franchise operations under study, but instead 
rely largely on the content of contracts to examine the nature of the relationships.  
While the small, purposive sample would need to be broadened to provide statistically 
significant results, benefits of the methods employed here include low cost due to the 
relative availability of the documents needed and economy of time due to the 
omission of survey and interview processes.   
Perhaps the greatest value in the methods used here lies in the fact that contracts are 
used by virtually all participants in the sector to lay the ground rules for the franchise 
relationship.  There is therefore a high level of credibility in the use of contracts, as 
the subjects themselves draft, use and rely upon these documents  
Ethical clearances 
The Bond University Ethics Committee has advised that ethical clearances are not 
required.  This research involves only the analysis of contracts, which were provided 
with consent from the franchise systems for this theoretical analysis of the regulation 
of the franchising relationship.   All references to the systems in the study are 
anonymous and there are no human subjects.   
                                                 
24 Julia Black, comments at her lecture entitled ‘Principles Based Regulation’, the University of 
Sydney, 28 March 2007. 
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is arranged as eight chapters. 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the research.  It sets out the objectives and 
hypothesis, that the regulation of the franchise sector in Australia is effective at 
achieving two of its stated goals, addressing imbalance of power and uncertainty in 
the franchise relationship.  Chapter One provides a thesis statement, and describes the 
methodology and terminology used in the dissertation.  The introduction also outlines 
the contributions this research makes to theory and practice.  Finally, it summarizes 
the results and recommendations of this research, as well as its limitations. 
Chapter Two explains both the theoretical basis and the structure for this analysis of 
the regulation of franchising.  This chapter describes new conceptions of regulatory 
activity to which the regulation of franchising might ideally conform.  Chapter Two 
provides an overview of the shift in regulatory theory toward a ‘multi-layered’ 
approach, and outlines these layers which include public regulation by statute and the 
courts as well as by private regulation through markets and contract.  The structure of 
this dissertation is organized according to three of these layers of regulation, market, 
contract and statute; this structure ensures a relatively thorough examination of the 
regulation of the sector.  Chapter Two notes some of the strengths and weaknesses of 
each layer; it affirms the need for regulatory process to comprehend all these layers as 
they interact together; and it suggests that there should be no initial preference for one 
regulatory layer over another.  Finally, Chapter Two describes how current theories of 
regulatory procedure suggest that selection of tools of regulation take place within 
regulatory process that is democratic and participative.  By describing this trend, 
along with the ‘layers of regulation’, this chapter presents a picture of how regulatory 
theory has evolved and it advocates a ‘multi-layered’ and process-oriented approach 
in the regulation of the franchise sector.   
Chapter Three provides an overview of the nature of the franchise sector in Australia 
in order to orient this research in the particular context in which the regulatory process 
takes place.  Chapter Three demonstrates how the market interaction in the franchise 
sector sets up imbalance of power and uncertainty, the two conditions that legislation 
is intended to address and that are tested in this dissertation.  As this chapter outlines 
the fundamental nature of the franchise structure; it can also be read as an overview of 
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regulation of the sector by the parties themselves through the market layer of 
regulation.   The chapter explains some of the social and economic conditions that 
support franchising, the reasons why franchisors choose this structure for their 
businesses, and the reasons why franchisees choose to buy franchises. This discussion 
shows that imbalance of power and uncertainty, particularly for a franchisee, are 
characteristic of the franchise relationship.  Chapter Three considers the lack of 
balanced, reliable information about the sector.  This lack of information is a source 
of problems, in particular for franchisees, but also for outsiders, such as regulators.  It 
indicates a need for regulatory intervention such as disclosure, but it also means that 
disclosure, or indeed any regulatory choice for franchising, is made as part of a 
process that does not conform to current standards of practice in regulatory activity, 
standards that require good information and measurement.   In fact, in the absence of 
‘meaningful measurements’ the regulatory process itself reflects and perpetuates 
imbalance of power and uncertainty in the franchise relationship. 
Chapter Four continues the analysis of the layers of franchise regulation by 
introducing the contract, a self-regulatory, private layer of regulation.  The chapter 
begins with an introduction to the franchise agreement and the role it plays in the 
franchise relationship.  It then considers in some detail two features of the franchise 
contract that are designed to reduce transaction costs; these are the standard form and 
relational qualities.  Standard form contracts are prevalent across many species of 
contracting relationships.  Relational contracts are also common.  This chapter 
describes the essential attributes of each of these types of contracts.  This chapter 
explains the significant implications of these qualities as they contribute to the 
imbalance of power and the uncertainty in the relationship.   Six synergistic effects of 
these qualities are also identified and explored; the most significant of these is the 
high level of discretion to a franchisor that leads to greater power imbalance and 
greater uncertainty for a franchisee.  Chapter Four concludes that, because of the 
standard form and relational characteristics of the contract, self-regulation of the 
relationship through contract exacerbates conditions of imbalance of power and 
uncertainty in the franchise relationship. 
 Chapter Five continues the analysis of private regulation through the franchise 
contract by analyzing a sample of nineteen Australian franchise contracts.  It presents 
an analysis of eight contract terms that appear frequently in franchise contracts. The 
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analysis outlines the purpose of each of these terms and the interests of both a 
franchisor and a franchisee with respect to each term.  Each section provides 
examples of the different versions of the term from across the sample, unless the 
length requires that they be provided in an appendix.   The analysis shows that these 
terms reflect and reinforce imbalance of power in the relationship.  On balance the 
sample indicates that contract terms protect the interests of a franchisor over those of 
franchisees.   The sample also indicates that contract terms confer higher levels of 
discretion upon a franchisor than upon a franchisee, which reflects a power imbalance 
in favor of a franchisor, and heightens uncertainty for franchisees.  There is also a 
description of the applicable Code provisions with respect to each contract term.  
Because the results of the sample indicate that imbalance of power and uncertainty 
persist in the relationship, direct intervention, public regulation through statute, does 
not achieve two of its stated goals. 
Chapter Six focuses on direct intervention.  This chapter outlines the three principal 
components of the statutory regulation of franchising, disclosure, mediation and some 
substantive provisions, but the focus is mainly on the operation of disclosure.  Chapter 
Six evaluates the effectiveness of the use of disclosure as a regulatory tool.  The 
analysis reveals that disclosure is not as effective as it could be because there is 
insufficient information about the sector to accurately gauge the risks; because 
reliable information about franchise systems may not be provided to franchisees; and 
the information that is provided may not be accessible to and useable by a franchisee.  
Most importantly, because of the nature of the contract and the relationship, a 
prospective franchisee is unable to act on the information.  Therefore, the principal 
tool used in the statutory regulation of franchising, disclosure, is not effective.  
Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of some ways to improve the function of 
disclosure as the principal regulatory tool.   
Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation and is divided into two parts.  It begins 
with a summary of the current nature of the franchising relationship, the franchise 
contract and contractual obligations of the parties as these private instruments of 
regulation establish and reinforce the imbalance of power and uncertainty in the 
relationship.  Contract terms indicate the ineffectiveness of regulation in addressing 
imbalance of power and uncertainty because they continue to manifest, and indeed 
reinforce these conditions.  The imbalance of power at all levels of the franchising 
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relationship is so pronounced that self-regulatory measures to redress this imbalance 
and the problems of uncertainty for franchisees cannot be relied upon.  Franchisors do 
not implement such measures because they have a greater interest in protecting their 
high levels of control and discretion than in including franchisees. Franchisees do not 
implement them because they lack the information, understanding and the power to do 
so.  The second part of Chapter Seven offers some recommendations.  In order to 
improve the performance of both private and public levels of regulatory governance, 
Chapter Seven proposes reframing regulation, first by instituting collaboration that 
includes franchisees in all stages of regulation.  Secondly, it recommends a process-
oriented approach in order to ensure better measurements and better information about 
the sector.  Finally, this chapter offers some ideas as to how this information can in 
turn be used by stakeholders and the regulator to identify problems and to select the 
appropriate regulatory tools to address them. 
Chapter Eight is a brief epilogue. It emphasizes the importance of appropriate 
regulation to enhance competitiveness and highlights some key factors in the 
reframing of regulation. These include the importance of accurate, reliable 
information to inform regulatory process as well as to inform participants; the impact 
of the standard form and relational contract characteristics in the regulation of the 
franchise relationship; and the deficiencies of disclosure. Chapter Eight also 
highlights the problems with relying on self-regulatory tools where, as in franchising, 
half the participants are constrained from effectively playing their roles.  Because of 
the imbalance of power that pervades the relationship, the regulator should take the 
lead in making the required changes.  Taking into consideration all these factors, and 
because best practice in regulation dictates it, participation and transparent and 
democratic procedures are needed in the regulation of franchising.  Finally, the final 
chapter reiterates the point that regulation no longer equates simply with direct 
intervention through legislation, and rules imposed by a regulator. The ‘new learning’ 
on regulation implies instead a collaborative process at all layers of governance, all 
stages of interaction, encompassing all participants. Without such a reframing of the 
regulation of franchising, this dissertation concludes that it is likely that franchising 
will remain a sector where franchisors are free to abuse their power and from which 
discouraging stories of failed business will continue to flow. 
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1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Academic studies of franchising worldwide have tended to focus on franchising as a 
marketing channel and other topics related to management and marketing.  There is 
less research in economics and the law.25  The first book on the economics of 
franchising anywhere in the world was published in 2005.26   There is no single book 
devoted to the law of franchising in Australia, though Franchising Law and Practice 
is a looseleaf reference that is updated regularly, providing a useful reference on legal 
developments in areas of law that affect franchising.27  
This dissertation cuts across disciplines of regulation and regulatory theory; 
franchising as marketing channel; institutional economics and franchising as an 
organizational form; the economics of franchising; theories of contract, the purpose 
and enforcement of contracts, efficient contracts, good faith, fairness and default rules 
analysis; bargaining power; risk; certainty and discretion.  A comprehensive review of 
these many and varied fields of academic literature is not possible, but some 
introduction to theory is offered where appropriate in the respective chapters of the 
dissertation. 
1.6 TERMINOLOGY  
1.6.1 Franchising 
Franchising is a way of structuring business relationships that takes many different 
forms.  While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to survey the many 
permutations of the franchise form, some basic elements of the structure of 
franchising are introduced briefly in Chapter Three.  Because more than 95 percent of 
all franchise systems in Australia are business format franchises, in this dissertation 
the term ‘franchising’ and related terms such as franchise, franchisor and franchisee 
                                                 
25 See Andrew Terry, ‘Franchising, Relational Contracts and the Vibe’ (2005) 33(4), Australian 
Business Law Review 289; Andrew Terry, Franchising in China, Franchising Magazine (Nov- Dec 
2004); and Andrew Terry, Franchise Network Expansion: Options, Opportunities, Challenges, 
Australian Franchise Directory, 2004.  
26 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005).   
27 This looseleaf is written by Stephen Giles the Chairman of the Franchise Council of Australia (the 
FCA) with Andrew Terry and other colleagues who are also long-standing members of the FCA.  There 
is less than a handful of volumes on franchising law in the US or the UK,  notably Martin Mendelsohn, 
Franchising Law (2nd ed, 2004) and W. Michael Garner, Franchise Law Desk Book: Selected State 
Laws, Commentary and Case Annotations (2nd ed, 2001). 
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are used in reference to the practice of business format franchising, unless stated 
otherwise.   
The focus of this dissertation and of its regulation through the Franchising Code of 
Conduct is the interaction between a franchisor and a franchisee. In this dissertation 
the phrase ‘the franchise relationship’ is used to refer to the relationship between 
franchisor and a franchisee.  In keeping with a convention instituted by the Franchise 
Law Journal, the terms ‘franchisee’ and ‘franchisor’ are preceded by the article, ‘a’; 
‘the’ is generally reserved for reference to a certain franchisee or franchisor. 
1.6.2 Regulation 
The term, ‘regulation’ has a diversity of meanings. ‘Traditional regulation’ is a term 
sometimes used to describe a democratically elected legislature making laws which 
are then enforced through the civil or criminal procedure of the courts.28    
Traditionally, the term ‘regulation’ and related terms such as ‘regulatory practice’, 
‘regulatory process’, ‘regulatory reform’ and so on, refer to regulation by direct 
intervention, that is by an outside regulator.  This form of regulation is also referred to 
as ‘statutory’ or ‘legislated’ regulation or intervention, or simply as ‘legislation’ or 
‘statute’. It may also be referred to as ‘hard law’; by contrast ‘soft law’ is a term that 
can be used to refer to any regulatory process other than the traditional process. 29  
In the academic literature on regulation, the term ‘regulation’ is often used in the 
broad sense of governance of the relationship, ‘the intentional activity of attempting to 
control, order, or influence the behaviour of others’.30  As part of a detailed discussion 
of the definitions of regulation in her paper, Critical Reflections on Regulation, Julia 
Black observes that, ‘conceptual confusion is indicated by definitional chaos.’31   
Black lists three alternative textbook definitions:   
1) promulgation of rules by government, usually specialized agency, including 
enforcement and monitoring;  
2) any direct state intervention in the economy; or 
                                                 
28 ‘Soft Law and the Consumer Interest’, European Consumer Law Group, ECLG/071/2001 - March 
2001  <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/policy/eclg/rep03_en.pdf> at 22 May 2007.   
29 Ibid. 
30 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1. 
31 Id., 11. 
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3) all mechanisms of social control or influence, affecting all aspects of behaviour, 
intentional or not. 32 
Black notes that, ‘academics use the different meanings with varying amounts of lack 
of discipline’, sometimes using all three meanings within the same document.33  In 
advocating a broader approach to regulation the editors of the recently launched 
journal, Regulation and Governance, describe their mission as one of opening 
regulatory studies toward governance and moving ‘the boundaries of regulation 
toward the boundaries of governance.’34  Indications are that it has not yet become 
widely adopted practice to refer to regulation in as broad a sense as governing.  This 
may be why Hugh Collins uses the term, ‘meta-regulation’ to refer to the collection of 
forces and actors that contribute to regulatory process.35    
Because of the expanding diversity of meanings of regulation, it is becoming 
increasingly important when speaking of regulation and regulatory activity to describe 
precisely what form and what meaning of regulation is intended.  Qualifiers of the 
term help to distinguish the intended meaning, as well as to represent different 
approaches to regulatory activity.  Throughout this dissertation the term ‘regulation’ is 
intended to be construed in the broad sense unless qualifiers are used to narrow the 
meaning, or the text specifies another meaning, or the context clearly indicates 
otherwise.  ‘Regulatory process’ is used in this dissertation to refer to determining 
what regulatory action is needed, selecting the appropriate mix of tools and 
implementing and monitoring that regulatory action.  These and other terms 
connected with regulation and regulatory theory are dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter Two.   
1.6.3 Contract and agreement 
The term ‘contract’ is used in this dissertation to refer to the written document binding 
a franchisor and franchisee in a franchise relationship in business format franchising.  
Other documents, including the Franchising Code of Conduct, sometimes employ the 
                                                 
32 Id., 13. 
33 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, 
13. 
34 John Braithwaite, Cary Coglianese and David Levi-Faur, ‘Can regulation and governance make a 
difference?’ (2007) 1(1) Regulation & Governance, 1–7.   
35 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract’ in C. Parker et al (eds), Regulating Law (2004) 13.  
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term, ‘agreement’ to refer to the contract, and in those cases the original ‘agreement’ 
remains in this text.  Infrequently in this text the word ‘agreement’ is used 
interchangeably with the term ‘contract.’  This is for purposes of style, convenience 
and/or consistency with quoted text only.   No nuance in meaning is intended.    
1.6.4 Efficient and effective 
In this dissertation ‘efficient’ is defined as ‘achieving maximum productivity with 
minimum wasted effort or expense'.36   Adam Smith argued that state and personal 
efforts to promote social good are ineffectual compared to unbridled market forces.  
His legacy persists today in the idea that self-interest guides the most efficient use of 
resources in a nation's economy, and that public welfare is a by-product of an efficient 
economy.  This dissertation takes exception with Smith to the extent that according to 
broader conceptions of regulation, there is no such thing as ‘unbridled market forces’; 
every private market interaction is itself a form of regulation. 
This dissertation, however, is not about efficiency, but rather effectiveness of 
regulation.  Because of the complexity of the concept of efficiency (not only in 
economic terms) and the concomitant difficulties in defining and measuring 
efficiency, this dissertation evaluates only whether the regulation is ‘effective’, in the 
sense of ‘successful in producing a desired or intended result.’37  In evaluating 
effectiveness in achieving intended results, the results are the stated objectives of 
regulation of franchising in Australia.  Specifically, the question this analysis 
addresses is whether the Franchising Code of Conduct achieves two of its stated 
objectives, addressing the imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees 
and increasing the level of certainty for all participants.  This dissertation does not 
engage in evaluating whether the goals of regulation are the right ones, such as 
whether there should be more balance or certainty in the franchise relationship.  More 
research is needed about the nature of the franchise relationship to address this 
question as part of a reframed regulatory process.  These are the goals; this 
                                                 
36 The Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed, 2005).    
37 Synonyms are effective and efficacious. The Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed, 2005).  Efficiency 
is of course related to effectiveness in that the assessment of effectiveness of statutory regulation does 
help to assess its efficiency.  In order for regulation to be efficient, it must be effective; it must produce 
the desired result(s).  If it does not, then regulation is not only ineffective, because it is not ‘successful 
in producing a desired or intended result.’ but it is also inefficient because it does not achieve 
productivity. 
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dissertation for the most part confines itself to the question of whether they have been 
achieved. 
1.6.5 Imbalance of power, discretion, and uncertainty  
This dissertation assesses the effectiveness of statutory regulation in achieving two of 
the stated goals of regulatory intervention, overcoming imbalance of power and 
uncertainty.  Power is defined as, ‘Strength in arranging the terms of one's dealing 
with other firms or people.’38   Imbalance is defined as ‘lack of proportion or relation 
between corresponding things.’39  Imbalance of power is, then, a lack of proportion or 
relation between parties’ strength in arranging the terms of dealing that, 
‘depends on the losses failure to agree is likely to cause to the various parties to 
a negotiation. In the absence of agreement, each party has a fall-back position: 
the less uncomfortable this is, and the longer any party can afford to stay in it, 
the stronger is their bargaining power. A party with a very uncomfortable fall-
back position and an urgent need for an agreement has very little bargaining 
power. Bargaining power is increased by unity, financial reserves, and a 
reputation for toughness, and is decreased by division, shaky finances, and a 
reputation for being willing to compromise.’40 
Discretion is defined as ‘the power or right to decide or act according to one's own 
judgment; freedom of judgment or choice.’41  A franchisor’s discretion to act equates 
to a ‘right of action’.42  The disadvantages of discretion are that it usually facilitates 
action on improper considerations, and permits the substitution of subjective, personal 
standards for accepted or agreed upon ones.   Hawkins writes that ‘discretion is 
power, with all its corrupting implications’.43    
This dissertation argues that not only is there imbalance of power between parties to a 
franchise contract at the time of entering the relationship, contract formation, but also 
throughout the performance of the contract.  The balance of power at formation 
                                                 
38 John Black, A Dictionary of Economics. (2002). Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press,  
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e2399 20 
November 2006. 
39 The Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed, 2005). 
40 John Black, A Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, 2002. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press.  Bond University.  20 November 2006   
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e185. 
41 Random House Unabridged Dictionary, (2006). 
42 William L. Killion, ‘Putting Critical Decision-Making Where It Belongs: Scouring the Franchise 
Agreement for the “D” Word’ (2005) 24 Franchise Law Journal 228. 
43 K. Hawkins, The Uses of Discretion (1992) 4.    
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influences the balance throughout because it sets the tone of the relationship, and also 
because the contract formalizes the levels of discretion accorded to the parties to deal 
with uncertainty throughout performance.  The flexibility that is built into the contract 
to accommodate the uncertainty of the longer term mainly accrues to the drafter.  This 
means that there is imbalance of power not only in terms of bargaining power at the 
time of contract formation, but also an imbalance of power throughout the 
performance of the contract.   
A franchisor has the greater power throughout the performance of the contract, 
including the power to deflect uncertainty, and with it risk, to a franchisee.  Thus, in a 
contract that is both standard form and relational power and certainty are linked; the 
link is discretion.  The party that has discretion has the power and the certainty that it 
can make choices to benefit itself.  The party that gives discretion, a franchisee, bears 
the uncertainty and increased risk.  
The following economic definition of uncertainty underscores the link between risk 
and uncertainty: 
‘A consciousness of lack of knowledge about present facts or future 
possibilities. …Some writers distinguish between risk and uncertainty…Many 
authors, however, simply use risk and uncertainty interchangeably.44   
Another definition of uncertainty states that it, 
 ‘arises when decisions have to be made about the future where it is not possible 
to assign probabilities to the various outcomes.  Often used as a synonym for 
risk.’ (sic)  Risk is defined as ‘the possibility of large price or rate movements in 
assets or liabilities, usually computed using probabilities. Most commentators 
and market practitioners associate risk with adverse, or the downside, effects of 
price or rate movements’ 45 
Uncertainty will be used in this dissertation to refer to the inability of a franchisee to 
predict, and, is closely related to flexibility in the contract, grants of discretion to a 
franchisor, and risk to a franchisee. 
                                                 
44  John Black, Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, 2002. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press.  Bond University.  20 November 2006   
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e3223. 
45 The Handbook of International Financial Terms. Peter Moles and Nicholas Terry. Oxford University 
Press 1997. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  Bond University.  20 November 2006   
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t181.e8049. 
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1.7 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION  
1.7.1 Contribution to research  
Industry groups and politicians alike call for more empirical research.46  No study of 
the terms of franchise contracts has been conducted in Australia, and only a handful of 
studies have appeared in the US literature on contractual provisions, mostly from 
economics and marketing perspectives.47 A 1990 article by Gillian Hadfield 
considering the relational aspects of franchise contracts is still quoted today among 
academics in Australia.48    This dissertation adds to the literature; it is the only 
available research at this time that:  
•  Provides new empirical information about the contents of franchise 
agreements; 
• Constructs and applies a model for evaluating regulation of franchising 
based on a ‘multi-layered’ governance approach that considers both private 
and public governance; 
• In the context of changing approaches to regulation, describes the role of 
contract as both a tool and an object of regulation of the franchise sector; 
• Identifies the synergistic effects of standard form and relational qualities of 
franchise contracts;  
• Includes a comprehensive content analysis of several terms in franchise 
contracts as they reflect the interests of the parties, as they are subject to 
regulatory requirements, and as they reflect the attainment of regulatory 
goals; 
                                                 
46 The IFA (3.4.1.6) and Mehta and Pelton, ‘Limitations of Existing Theories: A Need for “A General 
Theory of Franchise Relationships’ (Paper presented at the 14th Annual International Society of 
Franchising, San Diego, February 19-20, 2000).  
47 See, for example, Janet Bercovitz, ‘An Analysis of the Contract Provisions in Business Format 
Franchise Agreements’, International Society for New Institutional Economics (1999) accessed at  
<http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE00/Papers/Bercovitz.pdf> 8 December 2004; Antony W Dnes., ‘A Case-
Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (June, 1993) XXII Journal of Legal Studies 367; and Francine 
Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade, ‘Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision’ in Chatterjee, 
Kalyan and Samuelson (eds) Game Theory and Business Applications (2001) 134.    
48 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927. 
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• Evaluates whether contract terms reflect the stated goals of regulatory 
intervention; 
• Analyses the effectiveness of disclosure as regulatory strategy for 
franchise contracts and assesses the suitability of disclosure as the 
principal tool in regulating the franchise sector; and 
• Applies a simple prescription for best practice in regulating franchising, 
utilising three ‘core elements’ as follows: 
o better information about franchising; 
o alternative means of regulating the sector, based on results of its 
analysis, regulatory theory and comparisons with regulatory 
regimes in other jurisdictions; and 
o implementation of collaborative process in the regulation of 
franchising. 
1.7.2 Contribution to theory  
With respect to theories of contract the dissertation reinforces the importance of 
contract.  It refutes the idea that contract is of secondary importance, and it does so in 
a business sector where many ancillary agreements can and do support the 
relationship.  Instead, contract plays major roles as a tool for regulating the 
relationship by the parties themselves and as an object of public regulation in the legal 
recognition, interpretation, regulation and enforcement of the relationship.  
It has not been the aim here to prove or disprove any theoretical argument about the 
role of contract in regulation, but rather to apply a practical approach in exploring the 
role of contract in the regulation of the franchise relationship. Therefore, while the 
debate about the underlying values of contract law is beyond its scope, this 
dissertation adds to the body of evidence about the roles played by contract in 
commercial relationships. 
With respect to regulatory theory the dissertation situates its analysis of the the 
franchise contract in the context of the ‘new learning’ on regulation.  In this context 
contract serves as but one component in a ‘multi-layered system of governance’, 
through which states achieve regulatory goals of social justice, social cohesion, 
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augmenting wealth or other goals.49  At the same time as the scope of regulatory 
activity is defined more broadly, with increasing trade liberalisation there is an 
increasing emphasis on the law of particular market sectors.  As Collins notes, ‘In 
order to achieve adequate contextual understanding of transactions, the regulatory and 
adjudicatory bodies will become established on the basis of market sectors rather than 
political demarcations.’50  This dissertation comports with this pattern as it considers 
regulation in the context of a particular market sector. 
Contract as regulation is also addressed in this dissertation. This dissertation is the 
first of its kind to examine the synergistic impacts of the standard form and relational 
qualities of the franchise contract. In the past commentators have undertaken separate 
discussions of standard form and relational contracting, some with respect to 
franchising in particular.51 In franchising, the nature of the contract prevents its 
optimal function as a reflection of the true intentions of the parties, and it impedes the 
function of disclosure, the principal tool used in statutory intervention.    The author is 
not aware of any other scholarship with respect to the interaction of these qualities, 
even though such interaction would occur not only in franchising, but in many types 
of contracting scenarios.   
Finally, this dissertation tests the idea that contract as a private means of governance 
is preferable to regulatory intervention.  It suggests that in practice over-reliance on 
regulation by contract can be counter-productive.  There is, in fact, a reliance and 
confidence in self-regulation that is misplaced, given the characteristics of the 
franchise contract and the context of the franchise relationship. 
1.7.3 Contribution to practice  
This analysis of content and context of specific contract terms offers an expansive 
view of the nature of the contract, as it reflects the needs of the parties and responds to 
                                                 
49 For a discussion of multi-layered governance see Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract’ in C. Parker et 
al (eds), Regulating Law (2004).    Multi-layered governance and the new learning on regulation will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
50 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 360. 
51 On relational contracting see  V.L. Taylor, ‘Contracts with the Lot: Franchises, Good Faith and 
Contract Regulation’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 459;  I. MacNeil ‘Relational Contract Theory: 
Challenges and Queries (2000) NWULR 877;  David Goddard, ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and 
Economics Perspective’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 423 on relational contracting and James 
Jordan and Judith Gitterman, ‘Franchise Agreements: Contract of Adhesion?’(1996) 16 Franchise Law 
Journal 1 on the standard form aspects of franchise contracts. 
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regulation.  Such information can be useful to the parties themselves and to the 
solicitors who represent them as well as to courts in interpreting and legislators and 
their delegated bodies in regulating.  Further, the analysis informs a discussion of 
possible alternative approaches to bring the ‘layers of governance’ into more 
harmonized and effective operation. It recommends, however, that the proper locus of 
ongoing regulatory activity is a democratic, participative and transparent process. 
Analysis of the statutory regulation of the franchise sector in Australia is relevant not 
only in Australia, but in many other countries, as well as for harmonization of 
regulation across jurisdictions.  The Australian experience with the regulation of 
franchising is instructive for several reasons.  First, regulatory practice in Australia is 
of a generally high standard;52 second, the fact that several different approaches have 
been tested means Australia has greater depth of experience than many countries; and 
third, as Australia has a relatively high number of franchises per capita,53 its 
regulation is tested in a significant and growing sector of the economy.54  While this is 
Australian-based research, other jurisdictions appear to exhibit similar conditions; in 
these jurisdictions as well, it may be necessary to re-evaluate the use of disclosure.  In 
addition to the usual advantages to consistency in regulation across jurisdictions, the 
importance of uniformity in franchising is a further, sector-specific reason why 
consistent regulation is particularly desirable.  
Franchising in Australia offers opportunities for many people who have and will 
continue to invest their money, time and aspirations into franchising.  There are 
indeed healthy franchise systems, which offer excellent opportunities to franchisees.  
There are franchisors whose business practices are of the highest standards and 
beneficial to their franchisees.  There are also franchisors that persist in taking unfair 
advantage of franchisees.  Regulation should be tailored as precisely as possible to 
encourage the former while at the same time curtailing the opportunistic activities of 
the latter.    If the franchise sector is to evolve in a salutary fashion, if it is to deserve 
the image that it goes to some lengths to maintain, it cannot afford to believe its own 
                                                 
52 Telephone conversation with Paul Bek (Office of Regulation Review, Canberra), 19 October 2004.    
53 The Franchising Australia 2002 Survey reports that Australia has three times the number of systems 
per capita than the US. Frazer and Weaven, Franchising Australia 2002 Survey, Griffith University and 
the Franchise Council of Australia Ltd. (2002) 
54 Though the US may have a wider and more varied record of franchise regulation, both at the state 
and federal levels, the complexity of legislation in the US at state and federal levels limits its role as a  
model regulatory environment. 
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marketing slogans when they become insupportable by the facts.  The future hopes for 
the success of the franchise sector depend on its ability to take an accurate account of 
itself and to look beyond what it wants to see.  This research indicates a need for a 
change in attitudes and approaches in the sector, in particular for a reframing of 
regulation.  Healthy systems would not be threatened by this shift and the sector as a 
whole could benefit.55 
1.8 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This dissertation considers whether the regulation of franchising is effective in 
meeting two of the stated goals of legislated intervention.  Theories of regulation have 
evolved beyond direct intervention; therefore, this dissertation adopts the ‘multi-
layered’ approach, focussing particularly on contract and legislation.   It concludes 
that in the market interaction a franchisor is more experienced in franchising than a 
franchisee.  A franchisee often fails to understand the nature of the relationship, and 
may be getting into a franchise business for the wrong reasons, with major 
misconceptions.  A franchisee is not an effective and informed participant, but rather 
takes on the qualities of a consumer in a market transaction that involves a standard 
form contracting relationship.  Market regulation is therefore not effective because of 
lack of information, power imbalance, and franchisee inexperience. The market 
interaction is in fact characterized by imbalance of power, as well as high levels of 
uncertainty for a franchisee.  
Second, in the regulation of the franchise relationship by means of contract, a 
franchisee is also not an equal and active participant.  The synergistic effects of the 
standard form and relational qualities of the franchise contract lead to the erosion of 
bargained-for-exchange, increased imbalance of power and increased uncertainty for a 
franchisee. A franchisee is not a party to the drafting of the contract, is not able to 
negotiate the contract, and cannot participate in determining how the contract is to be 
performed.  Self-regulation through the contract thus reinforces the imbalance of 
power and uncertainty of the arrangement for a franchisee.   
                                                 
55 Jim’s Services, for example, has already simplified its contract and made changes that reflect some 
of these principles.   
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Third, in regulation of the franchise relationship by statutory intervention a franchisee 
is once again constrained from playing its role.  A franchisee is responsible for 
carrying out the function of the principal tool used in the regulation of franchising, 
disclosure.  A franchisee cannot do this effectively because it is not ensured receipt of 
reliable information in a form and at a time when it can best use the information.  
Also, disclosure as a regulatory strategy is inconsistent with standard form and 
relational characteristics of the contract and for this reason may be less effective than 
with other types of contract.  Finally, a franchisee does not play its proper role in 
regulatory process generally.  While franchisors are well-represented to the regulator, 
franchisees play a negligible role; they are not equal participants in the process of 
regulatory intervention. 
While market and contract as private means of governance are, in theory, considered 
preferable to regulatory intervention, self-regulation cannot be relied upon in 
franchising.  Direct intervention, too, relies on a low-intervention form of regulation 
that is self-regulatory in that it puts the onus on the parties to effectively implement.  
Thus, every layer of regulation of franchising emphasizes self-regulatory layers that 
are not optimally effective because of the pervasive marginalization of a franchisee.  
The sample of contract terms shows that the stated objectives of the Franchising Code 
of Conduct, certainty and balance of power, are not reflected in the contractual terms, 
principally because of the high levels of flexibility and discretion accorded to a 
franchisor. The dissertation therefore indicates that the self-regulatory layers relied 
upon in the regulation of the franchise sector are ineffective at achieving the goals of 
regulation.  The dissertation turns its attention towards a possible solution.   
This dissertation makes the following recommendations with respect to the regulation 
of franchising in Australia in order to better achieve the stated objectives of 
addressing the imbalance of power and increasing certainty for participants in the 
sector: 
• Ensure that there is accurate and reliable information  about the sector to 
provide a basis for identifying problems, setting goals, selecting tools and 
evaluating the performance of the sector and its regulation 
• Revise the approach to self-regulation. The current heavy reliance on self-
regulatory layers fails not because self-regulation is inherently flawed, but 
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because reflexive processes cannot function correctly without the full 
participation of all stakeholders.  In franchising they fail due to the 
marginalization of franchisees.  This does not mean that self-regulatory layers 
should be abandoned.  First, they cannot be abandoned, as parties continue to 
regulate themselves through market and contract layers. Secondly, they should 
not be abandoned because of the greater contextual understanding of the 
participants themselves of the complexities of the arrangement. Regulatory 
activity requires particularized knowledge and experience that underscores the 
importance of self-regulatory layers. Instead, as current processes are 
insufficiently participative and democratic because of inadequate 
representation of franchisees, it is recommended to ensure full franchisee 
participation in regulatory processes.  This dissertation has demonstrated that a 
franchisee is marginalized in every aspect of the regulatory process, both 
private and public, while a franchisor is consistently in control of, better 
informed, and/or better represented in all aspects of regulation dominates the 
governance of the relationship.  If the marginalization of a franchisee in the 
regulatory process can be addressed, self-regulation can be expected to 
function more effectively.  
• Implement collaborative process to address the limitations in the current use of 
tools as follows:    
o A participative process should be used to address the problems in the 
current disclosure requirements, specifically to: 
 ensure accurate reliable information is provided to franchisees; 
 ensure that information is provided in a form that a franchisee 
can use, at a time and place that enables its optimum use; 
 address inconsistency with statutory provisions prohibiting 
misleading or deceptive conduct; and 
 emphasize the objective of empowering franchisees to make 
decisions rather than the objective of enabling franchisors to 
reduce their risk of liability. 
o A participative process should be used also to explore: 
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 the potential application of regulatory tools and strategies in 
addition to disclosure; 
 tools and strategies to address the problems that arise in the 
context of standard form and relational contract characteristics; 
 with respect to particular contract terms, strategies for 
addressing imbalance of power and certainty that may not 
unduly compromise and indeed may enhance the benefits of the 
business structure.   
To summarize, in order for regulation of franchising to be more effective, revision of 
the current regulatory approach should involve 1) enhanced involvement of parties as 
participants in self-regulation and collaborative processes 2) improvements to and 
increased support for the disclosure strategy already in place, and 3) expansion of the 
range of tools and regulatory strategies that could be employed in the sector in 
addition to disclosure. 
1.9 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation is limited to an analysis of the regulation of the franchise sector in 
Australia, in particular through the lens of contract.  It is subject to limitations. 
• The research, while it has applications for other jurisdictions, is particular to 
Australia.   
• With respect to regulatory process, this research assesses the role of contract in 
meeting regulatory goals, but it does not evaluate or analyse these goals.  The 
problems in franchising have been introduced but not analysed.   
• This research offers a review of regulatory process in the franchising sector in 
Australia, but disclosure is the focus of this analysis.  The two other principal 
tools in the regulation of franchising, mandatory dispute resolution procedures 
and the limited substantive regulation provided for in the Franchising Code of 
Conduct,56 are not dealt with in detail in this dissertation.   
                                                 
56 These substantive regulations concern transfer and termination procedures, a cooling-off period, and 
prohibitions against general indemnity of franchisor and against franchisor prevention of franchisee 
association. 
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• The analysis of the standard form and relational characteristics of contract 
focuses on three synergistic effects of these characteristics, and introduces but 
does not explore some other important implications, such as their effect on the 
role of trust in the relationship.    
• This dissertation does not engage in the ongoing debate over the role of 
contract; many aspects of the role of contract remain to be explored.  While 
franchising is typically characterized by a series of interrelated contracts 
governing a wide range of dynamic issues, what is not sufficiently understood 
is how these agreements function together over time and how they reflect and 
affect both the relationships of the parties involved and the business and 
regulatory environments in which they operate.  What we lack, it seems, is an 
understanding of the ecology of contract in franchising. 57   
• The layers of regulatory governance that provide structure to this dissertation 
include private layers of market and contract as well as the public layer of 
legislation.  The court interpretation of the contractual relationship is also 
considered a form of regulation, public or quasi-public.  While this layer was 
introduced in Chapter Two, in the interests of containing the scope of this 
dissertation, it does not contain an analysis of this aspect of regulation.  Court 
interpretation of contractual relationships is informed by cues provided by the 
context of the relationship and by legislation, which are the focus of this 
dissertation.   
                                                 
57 In practical terms, these may be more important than the franchise agreement. The franchise 
agreement fixes the foundation; the Operations Manual is how the franchisor controls the relationship.  
This study concludes that the intrinsic relationship cannot be excluded from the consideration of the 
terms.  As the extent of the intrinsic relationship is generally contained in these ancillary documents, 
more research is needed in this area. 
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This research has a number of implications for future research: 
• More analysis is needed of the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, for 
example cost-benefit analysis of regulatory measures.  Most pressing is the 
need for ‘meaningful measurements’,58 including baseline measurements to 
track the effects of regulation. These would include, for example, better 
measurements of the experience and levels of satisfaction of participants, more 
complete information on the nature and disposition of dispute processes, and 
reliable economic indicators of the health of the sector over time. 
• There is a need for more research on franchising as an organizational form, 
how it comprises elements of employment, agency, partnership, and how it 
compares with licensing and distributorship. Work is currently being done also 
on the property rights implicated by these relationships. Also, a franchisee’s 
role as investor and consumer should be further examined.   
• With respect to the agreement, more research is also needed to determine the 
role played by ancillary arrangements, for example how far these parallel 
arrangements may be effective to vary or supplement the principal agreement.  
• There is a need for further analysis of tools available for regulating franchising 
and how they can be employed.  A comparative framework of the tools used in 
various jurisdictions would be useful for the ongoing analysis of these tools 
and their effectiveness.  
• With respect to regulatory tools, it would also be interesting to consider further 
the role played in the regulatory scheme by court interpretation of the 
franchise contract. 
• More work remains to be done on the roles of the contract in franchising on a 
theoretical level, for example, on how the balance is struck between promoting 
efficiency as opposed to fairness in the contracting and regulatory processes.  
A balance must continually be struck between franchisor control in the 
                                                 
58 See Malcolm Sparrow ‘PLENARY 4: Effective Regulation’ (Paper presented at the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University at 25th annual conference of the International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)  Sydney, 14-19 May 2000)  
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/plen_4_sparrow.pdf/$file/plen_4_sparrow
.pdf> at 14 September 2006. 
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interests of trademark and brand maintenance and the interests of individual 
franchisees which are often sacrificed for the sake of that control. 
• The role of industry associations also should be explored. 
 
 
 
This dissertation deals only with the common law of contract in Australia and the 
United States.  It makes no attempt to explore the law of franchising in civil law 
systems or indeed in any other legal system, though some parallels may fairly be 
drawn with other common law systems.  As the author has not had the benefit of 
practical experience in franchise law, this dissertation is theoretical, though it is 
hoped that it will have practical application.  The law is stated as at 1 April 2007. 
 
 
 30
 31
Chapter Two 
The Regulation of Franchising 
and the ‘New Learning’ on Regulation 
‘Self-regulation, a venerable tradition in UK consumer law, is now the plat du 
jour in studies of regulation and a central focus in the new learning.’59 
 
‘[R]esponsive regulation needs to respect the 'paramount values' of democracy, 
participation, and citizenship…[G]overnance arrangements in both economic 
and social spheres should be decided through careful consideration of the 
various interests and conditions obtaining in different settings, following full 
public and local debate about policy goals and the best means to their 
achievement.’ 60 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION                
There is a public lack of confidence in regulation, but a change in attitude is 
warranted for two reasons.  One is the potential benefit of effective regulation, which 
is discussed briefly in this chapter, the second is the changing conception of what 
regulation is, and this is the main focus of this chapter.   
This chapter explains the development of theoretical approaches to regulation that 
have evolved from interest-based to process-based to systems-based approaches.  
These systems approaches encompass a wide range of organizational structures and 
inputs, and so represent a departure from traditional conceptions of regulation.  
Systems approaches are more inclusive and rely more heavily on principles of self-
regulation, reflexion and responsiveness.  They stress the importance of process that is 
both participative and democratic. Along with this wide range of organizational 
structures and inputs has come an expanded conception of the range of regulatory 
layers, both public and private, in a ‘multi-layered’ system of governance, and here 
too, there is a departure from traditional distinctions between private and public 
regulation.61 
                                                 
59 Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law Review 
9 (2006). 
60 Peter Vincent-Jones, ‘Contractual Governance: Institutional and Organisational Analysis’ (2000) 20 
Oxford Journal Legal Studies 317, 351. 
61 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 358. 
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Chapter Two introduces the Franchising Code of Conduct and places it in the context 
of the development of theories of regulation.  It first traces briefly the development of 
statutory regulation of franchising in Australia and the studies, reviews and revisions 
of this regulation that have lead to the current regulatory regime.  
 The concept of a ‘multi-layered system of governance’ provides the structure for the 
analysis of the regulation of franchising.  Throughout this dissertation the function of 
the Franchising Code of Conduct will be evaluated in the context of a multi-layered 
system of governance that encompasses regulation not only by statute, such as the 
Code itself, but also by other public or quasi-public layers of regulation, such as the 
courts, as well as private layers of regulation, such as market and contract.  
Subsequent chapters will build on this theoretical framework. Chapter Three 
represents regulation by market forces; Chapters Four and Five, regulation by means 
of contract; and Chapter Six focuses on regulation by direct intervention.   
Because of the important role it plays in the franchise relationship, particular attention 
is given in this research to the franchise contract. This chapter outlines the role of the 
law of contract as a component of regulatory process.  The chapter also examines 
Hugh Collins’ preference for the use of contract as a regulatory tool and suggests that 
such a preference is only valid to the extent that it, or any other regulatory measure, is 
selected as part of a participatory regulatory process.    
The final section of this chapter outlines some models of best practice in regulating 
and introduces Malcolm Sparrow’s model which is adopted in this dissertation as a 
possible model for the process of regulation of franchising in Australia.  Such a 
process of regulation encompasses a diverse range of participants and a wide choice 
of tools to regulate; the trend is toward a conception of regulation the capacity of 
which is greatly increased because it can involve virtually any form of governance.  In 
an era where ‘regulatory studies have emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic 
change in the social sciences’,62 there is hope that public confidence in regulation can 
be re-established. 
2.1 PUBLIC MISTRUST OF REGULATION 
In 2001 the US Office of Management and Budget estimated the cost of federal 
                                                 
62 John Braithwaite, Cary Coglianese and David Levi-Faur, ‘Can regulation and governance make a 
difference?’ (2007) Regulation & Governance 1 (1), 1–7. 
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regulations at $380 billion per annum, or about ten percent of America’s gross 
domestic product (more than half the output of the US manufacturing sector).63  The 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (the ACCI) estimates that regulation 
costs the economy about ten percent of gross domestic product, or $86 billion.  These 
figures are probably underestimates, as many of the costs of regulation are hidden in 
the prices of products and services, reduced innovation, and lost opportunities.   
The public mistrust of regulation is related to two misconceptions. The first is that 
regulation ‘does more harm than good’.  A 2004 World Bank study found that heavier 
regulation is generally associated with higher unemployment and corruption and 
lower productivity and investment.64   Inefficient regulation has the potential to erode 
confidence, to impede the growth of successful business, and to retard needed change 
in the sector or in individual industries within it.  Further, it may limit the expansion 
of consumer choice, reduce entrepreneurial initiative, and often advantages some 
unfairly at the expense of others.65   The costs of bad regulation exceed benefits and 
because many regulatory costs fall disproportionately on small businesses,66 if 
regulation is ineffective, small business feels it first.  The ACCI reports that about 75 
percent of businesses are concerned about the costs of regulation.67 
                                                 
63 James L. Gattuso,  Reforming Regulation to Keep America’s Small Businesses Competitive (2001) 
The Heritage Foundation  
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Regulation/tst052104a.cfm#_ftn2#_ftn2> at May 21 2004.  
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<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/21/2733617.pdf> at 29 December 2005. 
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67 Peter Switzer, ‘Glowing reports on regulation ignore the ugly truth’, The Australian, 28 November 
2006. 
 34
While regulation that is poorly conceived and badly implemented can be harmful to 
economic health, however, appropriate regulation can enhance economic growth and 
competitiveness.68  Properly targeted and implemented regulatory measures can 
reduce costs of unfair practices and failed businesses, reinvigorate consumer 
confidence and stimulate investment.  In an age of increasing international trade an 
effective regulatory scheme can attract foreign investment and facilitate local 
expansion overseas.69   
Some experts advise businesses to seek out areas with progressive regulation in terms 
of concern with social problems, and to set internal goals that meet or exceed 
regulatory standards because this ultimately leads to advantage as other jurisdictions 
modify their regulations to follow suit.70  If they are right, then the franchising sector 
in Australia will want to promote an effective regulatory scheme as a competitive 
advantage for the sector.   
Public mistrust of regulation persists because of the lack of definitive proof of the 
benefits of regulation.  Experts cannot agree on what regulation is, nor have they 
agreed upon a methodology for evaluating regulation.  Until such determinations can 
be made, regulation remains a ‘best-guess’ exercise.  It is inappropriate and imprudent 
that such a complex and value-laden activity should be the exclusive province of 
economists.    
The second misconception that leads to mistrust of regulation is the narrow view of 
what regulation is. The public still thinks in terms of regulation as opposed to ‘no 
regulation’.  A broader definition of regulation, however, requires recognition that 
there is actually no such thing as ‘no regulation’.  There may be different conceptions 
                                                 
68 Sveinbjörn Blöndal and Dirk Pilät, The Economic Benefits of Regulatory Reform (1997) 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [30]  
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and means of regulation, but, in the broad sense, regulation is inescapable; we are 
‘enmeshed within an elaborate web of regulatory requirements’.71   If regulation 
cannot be eliminated, the question, then, is not whether there will be regulation, but 
rather what forms it should take.   
2.2 NEW THEORIES OF REGULATION: TOWARDS SYSTEMS-BASED 
APPROACHES  
The evolution of regulatory theory tracks the developments leading to the current, 
expanded view of regulation, and provides some useful insights about how current 
approaches to regulation have borrowed from the biological and social sciences in an 
evolution towards systems-based approaches. 
Early theories of regulation focus on the nature of the interests involved and on the 
question of whose interests prevail in the regulatory process.  The ‘public interest’ 
theory,72 for example, considers regulation as a state response to abuses in a regulated 
sector.73  Stemming from the public choice theory of law and economics, it focuses on 
the implementation of law as the result of political process.74  Public interest 
regulation requires a disinterested, efficient, expert and competent regulator.  
Problems with this approach stem from the clash of values in determining what is in 
the ‘public interest’, as well as problems due to lack of funding and training of 
regulatory administrators. 75    
‘Private interest’76 theory de-emphasizes ideology and policy goals. Instead, it regards 
regulation as a reflection of the private interests that influence regulatory process.77   
The purpose of regulation, according to this theory, is to serve the special interests of 
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74 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law (1997) 84. 
75 Baldwin and Cave suggest that the public interest vision may really only be viable in the early stages 
of the regulatory ‘life-cycle’.  Life cycle theory is introduced below.  For more information see Robert 
Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 20. 
76 Also known as Chicago or economic-libertarian theory. 
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the individuals who shape it.78   Interest group theory, like private interest theory, 
views regulation as the result of the inputs of interested parties. It encompasses 
competing interests and considers the relationships among private interests as well as 
between them and the state.  Regulatory process is a negotiation of interests, and the 
resulting regulation represents a compromise of both public goals and private 
interests.  Competing groups engage in a struggle for power in which the prevailing 
groups formulate regulations that may exclude other legitimate interests.79    
‘Capture’ and ‘life cycle’ theories focus less on who regulates and more on the 
process of regulating. ‘Capture’ theory concerns itself with economic and political 
influence over the regulator, where industry may take advantage of being ‘regulated’.  
For example, an industry or sector can use regulation to protect itself from 
competition or to insulate itself from further government scrutiny.  In the franchise 
context this might, for example, take the form of the Franchise Council of Australia 
(the FCA) influencing the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the 
ACCC) to help moderate and harmonize state fair trading and retail tenancy 
legislation.  While cooperation between the regulated industry and the regulator may 
result in legislation that carries greater force of buy-in, capture theory highlights the 
risk of the regulator becoming subject to the influence of the regulated interest.  
The ‘life-cycle’ theory of regulation, as conceived by Bernstein, identifies four stages 
in the life cycle of a regulator; these stages are gestation, youth, maturity, and old 
age.80   Each stage is characterized by the role of the regulator, but also by the 
changing nature of legislation and enforcement, and third party influence.  This theory 
views the confluence of regulated and regulator interests as a natural step in the 
institutional development of the regulator.  At some stage the regulator may even take 
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a protective and proprietary stance vis à vis the regulated industry.  Therefore, in the 
interests of legitimacy and transparency, regulation can be successfully implemented 
by an outside agency only if it is subject to regular, independent monitoring and 
review.81   
The ‘institutional’ and ‘force-of-ideas’ theories represent a shift from the calculus of 
‘who regulates’ and alter conceptions about processes of regulation.  Institutional 
theories emphasize the roles of organizational structures and rules in shaping 
regulation as the entire process of designing regulation is informed by institutional 
context.82    Before looking at the rule-making process, therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the institutions of both the regulator(s) and regulated interest(s), including 
their history and development, their evolution from other institutional relationships, 
and the perceptions of effectiveness that different types of regulation have had in that 
context.  The force-of-ideas theory suggests that regulation is influenced by economic, 
technical, social, and institutional pressures.83  Force-of-ideas explains why some 
goals and values are favoured in determining objectives of regulation at any given 
time.84  The ‘institutional’ and ‘force-of-ideas’ theories reflect a further expansion of 
the conception of regulation, and the growing interest in systems-based approaches, 
self-regulation, and reflexive and responsive regulation.85  Disillusionment with the 
burden and inefficiencies of substantive regulation has also fuelled the development 
of these approaches, 
 ‘Günter Teubner articulated his famous regulatory 'trilemma' of 'circumvention, 
perversity and negative feedback' that resulted in a pathology of increasingly 
elaborate and legalised regulation that was ultimately ineffective. Julia Black 
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summarises these critiques of regulation:  [t]he instruments used (laws backed 
by sanctions) are inappropriate and unsophisticated (instrument failure), ... 
government has insufficient knowledge to be able to identify the causes of the 
problems, to design solutions that are appropriate, and to identify non-
compliance (information failure), ... implementation of the regulation is 
inadequate (implementation failure) and/or ... those being regulated are 
insufficiently inclined to comply (motivation failure).’ 86 
Iain Ramsay writes that these critiques stimulated a “new learning” on regulation’.87 
Whereas traditional theories of regulation centred on whose interests prevailed in the 
regulatory process, criticisms of substantive regulation have created an impetus for 
the development of self-regulatory mechanisms that are more reflexive and 
responsive.  Later theories, such as the institutional theory, began to take a broader 
view and more recently, ‘systems’ theory has shifted the focus to communications and 
organizational principles, feedback and responsiveness.88   Adapted from biology and 
based on communications and organizational principles, systems theory signals a 
further shift in emphasis from direct intervention to process.  It conceives of the 
organization as a system made up of complex sets of interdependent parts that interact 
as they adapt to constantly changing environments.89    Feedback within the system is 
critical to enable regulation to be responsive and adaptable.90  Consultation and 
responsiveness to a wide range of interests in regulation are important in the interests 
of transparency and building trust.  Participation also reduces regulatory risks and 
curbs ‘information monopolies’.91     
The concept of self-regulation is, like systems theory, derived from the biological 
sciences. Self-regulation is part of the process of homeostasis by which a system 
regulates its internal environment to maintain a stable, constant condition by means of 
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multiple equilibrium adjustments, carried out by interrelated regulatory mechanisms.92  
Multiple, inter-related mechanisms within a system regulate the system itself.  ‘Self-
regulation’ is now used generically to refer to any mechanism whereby a subject 
exercises control over itself to maintain the stability of its function.93  Ogus argues for 
a wider perspective on this regulatory alternative in order to fully tap its potential.94   
Self-regulation in business can be defined as ‘internal regulation of the industry by the 
industry through its own procedures.’95  Gunningham and Grabosky write that, ‘Self-
regulation is not a precise concept but, for present purposes, it may be defined as a 
process whereby an organized group regulates the behaviour of its members.’96   In its 
application to business regulation, self-regulation was originally identified with ‘the 
professions’ where rules of conduct and rights of practice for professions were set and 
enforced by professional organizations.  Today self-regulation has extended to other 
areas, most notably financial regulation.97  
Self-regulation is also related to the concept of ‘decentred’ regulation described by 
Julia Black, among others.98  Black proposes decentred regulation as an alternative 
diagnosis for ‘failures’ of state-centred regulation,99  noting that, 
‘…complexity, fragmentation and construction of knowledge, 
fragmentation of the exercise of power and control, autonomy, interactions 
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and interdependencies, and the collapse of the public/private distinction: all 
are elements of the composite ‘decentred understanding’ of regulation.’100 
As opposed to a centralized, top-down process, decentred regulation is derived from 
the grassroots level, 
‘In the area of consumer policy decentred approaches appear in a heightened 
emphasis on self-regulation, the creation of greater opportunities for consumers 
and others to participate in policy making and implementation…’101 
Cooter suggests that centralized law is ‘not even plausible for a technologically 
advanced society.’102   He states that ‘efficiency requires that as economies develop, 
the enforcement of custom in business communities becomes more important as part 
of the regulation of business.’103    
The terms responsive and reflexive regulation are both used in connection with self-
regulation.  Reflexive law and responsive regulation are emerging concepts that 
suggest new theoretical perspectives with respect to the function of industries, sectors, 
and ‘systems’.  They imply a need for revised processes of regulatory intervention 
that involve not only greater emphasis on procedure but also greater inclusiveness and 
participation by all stakeholders.104   
‘Reflexion’ is a process through which specialised subsystems of society mediate and 
integrate their functional role in the larger society as a whole; it establishes processes 
and procedures for private actors to determine their own substantive outcomes.105  
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Reflexive regulation prescribes inclusive procedures for encouraging parties to 
recognize existing and future problems and to develop their own solutions.106   The 
imposition by the regulator of rules and standards is replaced by ‘process, 
organisation, and the distribution of rights and competencies’.107  Reflexive law is 
self-regulation in that the private actors determine substantive outcomes through the 
reflexive process.108    
‘Responsive’ regulation refers to a collaborative process between a regulator and the 
regulated interest where the cooperation of the regulated interest offers a better chance 
of finding a solution.  This approach to regulation is also thought to be more inclusive 
than government intervention alone, and to better represent stakeholder interests.109 
There are several advantages attributed to self-regulation, reflexive and responsive 
regulation. First, equipped with better knowledge about technical problems in 
regulating a particular market and a surer sense of what standards are practical, 
participants are in a better position to tailor rules to a particular market sector.110  
Reflexive procedures ensure that various interests and externalities are taken into 
account111  and allow for gradual adjustments.112   Finally, it is thought that values 
such as individuality and autonomy, formerly protected by formal law, may find a 
new means of expression.113    
Many governments (for example, Canada and Australia) have espoused the benefits 
of self-regulation.114  Self-regulation taps into the expertise and technical knowledge 
of the regulated activity and directly involves the parties who have the best 
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institutional knowledge about the need for action and about the relative merits of 
alternative types of action.115  There are several related advantages.   Self-regulation 
may be better targeted to the problems of the industry, not over-broad or under-broad 
and working with market forces to deliver greater benefits where business is prepared 
to promise more than the law requires; it is less likely to stifle innovation or 
excessively limit consumer choice; and it is quicker to develop and more flexible than 
other types of regulation.   Self-regulation can also engender greater mutual trust.  
Finally, regulatory costs tend to be lower than for more ‘heavy-handed’ forms of 
government regulation.116  This is because the process incurs lower information 
search costs while other costs of self-regulation can often be internalized in the 
industry, reducing the requirements for public funding.117  Self-regulation involves 
less formalized processes and rules which in turn lead to further cost savings and it 
can reduce monitoring and enforcement costs as well as the costs to practitioners in 
dealing with regulators.    
Self-regulation can offer flexibility, expert design, and sensitive enforcement, where 
statutory regulation can be bureaucratic, inexpertly designed, and rigidly enforced.118  
Self-regulation, where the regulator ‘agrees to stay out of the detail’, while the 
regulatee ‘agrees to go beyond the mere letter of the law’, can increase the 
effectiveness of statutory regulation and at the same time reduce costs and 
inefficiencies of government intervention.119  Julia Black credits self-regulation with 
the potential to take the issue of compliance into the boardroom, helping executives 
‘see the moral wood from the technical trees’.120   
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2.3 THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGULATION OF FRANCHISING 
2.3.1 Developments leading to the current Franchising Code of Conduct 
The statutory regulation of franchising, the Franchising Code of Conduct, has a self-
regulatory element in the involvement of the trade association in its own regulation.  It 
is also self-regulatory in its choice of tools such as disclosure and mandatory 
mediation that rely heavily on the parties themselves to carry out the regulatory 
program.  The operation of the Code of Conduct also reflects some of the issues of 
capture, and institutional and force-of-ideas theories of regulating.   
Franchising first attracted the attention of regulators in Australia in the mid-1970s; the 
attention has been continual and the attraction has not stopped yet.  In 1976 the Trade 
Practices Act Review Committee (the Swanson Committee) expressed its concern 
over the termination of franchise agreements.  In 1979 the Trade Practices Act 
Consultative Committee (the Blunt Committee) recommended a general law with 
respect to franchising, pursuant to which the Petroleum Retail Franchise Act was 
enacted in 1980.  There were at that time no other laws in Australia specific to 
franchising.  In 1990 the Beddall Report (Commonwealth) called for a reinvestigation 
of franchising, especially with respect to issues of ‘fairness’.121  In December 1990 the 
Federal government set up a Franchising Task Force to report on the potential of self-
regulatory codes to counter market failure in franchising.  In 1993 the Task Force 
introduced a voluntary Franchising Code of Practice (the Code of Practice).122   From 
1993 to 1996 this voluntary Code of Practice applied to all members of the Franchise 
Council, but franchisors were not subject to any requirement to become members of 
the Franchise Council.123  
In 1994 a Review of the Franchising Code of Practice (the Gardini Report)124 was 
charged with ‘identifying best practice in franchising and enhancing the effectiveness 
of the Code to promote an environment which will guarantee the continued growth 
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and success of franchising in Australia and fair treatment to parties involved’.125   The 
Gardini Report concluded that the unconscionable conduct provisions of the voluntary 
code were inadequate, and it indicated the need for a mandatory code.  Though the 
Report did not expressly recommend that the voluntary code be made mandatory, its 
recommendations would make compliance effectively mandatory because exemption 
from the Corporations Regulations would only be available to franchisors in 
compliance with the Code of Practice. 126  This measure addressed the Report’s 
finding that, ‘the main weakness of the Code had been its failure to provide sufficient 
coverage across the franchising sector.’127  
The Gardini Report also recommended the following measures: 
• Random audits of disclosure documents; 
• Protection against defamation for the investigator; 
• Establishment of an independent disciplinary committee; 
• Extension of unconscionable conduct to apply to conduct not only at formation 
of the contract, but also during the course of franchise contract; 
• Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures and an organization to 
oversee ADR for franchising; 
• Notification by disputing parties to the ADR organization when unsuccessful 
in resolving a dispute by negotiation; 
• Provision by a franchisor of key financial information; 
• Annual reporting on the administration and operation of the Code, also for use 
as an educational document for the franchise sector; 
• Funding by Commonwealth, state, and territory governments for educational 
and promotional materials on the Code; and 
• Review of the Code within five years. 
Though the Gardini Report provided a comprehensive review of the voluntary Code 
of Practice, its recommendations were not implemented as changes to that code.128   In 
1996 the Franchising Code of Practice and the Franchise Council were abandoned.  In 
                                                 
125 Id.,1. 
126 Andrew Terry, ‘The Regulation of Franchising in Australia: Reviews, Roundabouts and Realpolitik’  
(Paper presented at the International Society of Franchising 1996 Conference, Honolulu, 17 – 18 
February 1996)  10. 
127 Robert Gardini, Review of the Franchising Code of Practice, Canberra: A.G.P.S., October 1994. 
128 Some of the Gardini Report recommendations (for example recommendations 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10) 
have since found their way into the current mandatory Code of Conduct. Others have not; these are 
outlined in the Table 2.1. 
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response to some high-profile failures in franchising,129 the Minister for Small 
Business and Consumer Affairs requested a report on the adequacy of existing 
protection for small firms against unfair conduct in commercial relationships.  This 
inquiry, known as the Reid Report, suggested the following measures: 
• With respect to retail tenancy, full disclosure to franchisees who sublet from a 
franchisor; 
• Compulsory registration (with a fee) of franchisors; 
• Compliance with Codes of Practice; 
• Representation of franchisees in merchants’ associations; 
• Adequate disclosure documentation generally;  
• A new administrative body to oversee the voluntary Code of Practice; and, 
• Dispute resolution procedures funded through compulsory registration fees. 130 
Pursuant to the Reid Report a nine-member panel was set up to formulate the current 
Franchising Code of Conduct.131  The Reid Report met with greater regulatory 
response than the Gardini Report, but its recommendations were implemented only in 
part.  Table 2.1 below summarises the recommendations of both reports and the 
implementation status of these recommendations. 
                                                 
129 See, for example, Novamaze v Cut Price Deli (1995) 128 ALR 540. 
130 Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia (1997) House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology - Parliament of Australia  
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/Fairtrad/report/appends.pdf> at 4 December 2006. 
131 The Panel included three representatives each from government, franchisors and franchisees (that is 
the regulator, regulated and the ‘protected interest’).   
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Table 2.1:  Implementation Status of Gardini & Reid Report Recommendations 
Gardini and Reid Report Recommendations Implemented 
 
Registration of franchisors (in effect compulsory) No 
Provision in Code for adequate representation of franchisees in 
merchants’ associations 
No 
Random audits of disclosure documents No 
Protection against defamation for investigator No 
Independent disciplinary committee No 
Extend unconscionable conduct to apply to conduct during course 
of franchise agreement 
Yes 
ADR procedures and ADR organization Yes 
Disputing parties to notify ADR organization if unsuccessful in 
resolving dispute by negotiation 
Yes 
Franchisor must provide key financial information Yes 
Administering organization must provide annual report regarding 
administration and operation of the Code, also for use as an 
educational document for the franchise sector 
No 
Commonwealth, state, and territory governments to fund 
educational and promotional materials on the Code 
Partially  
Review of the Code within five years Yes, but not 
transparent 
With respect to retail tenancy, full disclosure in cases of franchisees 
who sublet from franchisor and adequate representation of 
franchisees in merchant associations 
Yes 
Compulsory registration (with a fee) of franchisors and compliance 
with Codes of Practice 
No 
Adequate disclosure documentation generally and  Yes 
A new administrative body to oversee the voluntary Code and, No 
Dispute resolution procedures funded through compulsory 
registration fees 
No 
 
A mandatory code, recommended by both reports, was put into place only after the 
Reid Report findings.  Other key recommendations of the Gardini and Reid Reports 
that were never implemented include the following: 
• registration of franchisors,  
• compulsory registration fees,  
• funding of dispute resolution by registration fees, 
• a new administrative body to oversee the regulation of the sector,  
• adequate franchisee representation in industry groups; and  
• annual reporting on the administration and operation of the Code.   
 47
As there is no registration, there can be no funding of dispute resolution by 
registration fees.  There is also no provision to ensure franchisee representation in 
industry groups.132   
The Franchising Code of Conduct 
The finding by both the Gardini and Reid Reports that the voluntary Code of Conduct 
did not adequately address the regulatory objectives led to the conclusion that the 
voluntary code should be replaced with a mandatory code.  Promulgated in 1998 
under section 51AD as part of amendments to the Trade Practices Act (the TPA), the 
Franchising Code of Conduct (‘the Code’) was the first mandatory Code of Conduct 
in Australia.133   
The Franchising Code of Conduct might be seen as an example of Gunningham and 
Grabosky’s observation that regulatory regimes often develop in an ad hoc manner, 
rather than as intentional, integrated systems.134   When John Braithwaite wrote that, 
‘Australia has allowed itself to be buffeted back and forth by the pre-packaged 
regulatory and deregulatory solutions fashioned in the US and England’,135 he might 
well have been thinking of the Franchising Code of Conduct.  The mandatory Code of 
Conduct was modelled largely on the former voluntary code which itself was 
modelled largely upon US legislation relating to franchising.136  The Code also 
reflects trends prevalent in regulation in the UK,   
‘In the field of consumer policy, the OFT [Office of Fair Trading] historically 
favoured informal methods of regulation and its main output during the 1970s 
                                                 
132 Pengilley argues that the Reid Report erred in focussing on problems in specific industries, 
particularly the motor vehicle trade, and generalising them to apply to all types of franchised enterprise 
See Warren Pengilley, ‘The Franchising Code of Conduct:  Does Its Coverage Address the Need’ 
(1999) 3 Newcastle Law Review 1, 18. 
133 A Grocer’s Code will be the second mandatory code; it is due to be put in place in late 2006. A 
Horticulture Code http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/hort-crops-wine/hort-policy/code-of-
conduct and an Oil Code are also now mandatory codes. 
134 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Evironmental 
Policy (1998) 13. 
135 Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite (eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s Future (1993) 97. 
136  ‘Australia’s prior disclosure provisions are closely modelled on the US Uniform Franchise Offering 
Circular (UFOC) model.’ - Deacons on Franchise Legislation (2006) Franchisebusiness.com.au 
<http://www.franchisebusiness.com.au/articles/FC/0C0402FC.aspx> at 10 July 2006.  For a summary 
of regulations in Australia, see Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising (2000) 
UNIDROIT  
<http://www.unidroit.org/English/guides/1998franchising/country/Australia.htm#NR5#NR5> at 4 
December 2006. 
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and early 80s was codes of practice--a form of self-regulation… By 1998, 49 
trade association codes had been approved….’ 
Ramsay notes that capture is a problem in this regulatory formula, 
‘The development of codes emerged from a process of bargaining between the 
OFT and the industry. There was no formal process for approval of a code and 
the Office did not initially issue guidelines for trades interested in developing a 
code… [and one trader commented that] “the trade quickly learned how to 
handle OFT officials”.’137 
The nature of institutions and the interests they represent are also significant, 
‘During the 1970s, trade associations had been eager to sign on to codes as a 
defensive strategy to the possibility of legal regulation and as a method of 
raising the trade's image’.138  
                                                 
137 Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law 
Review 9 (2006). 
138 Ibid. 
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In the UK in recent years there has been a trend away from these trade association 
codes,  
‘In 2001 the OFT withdrew support from all existing codes and adopted a new 
approach that emphasises the role of codes in enhancing competitiveness …This 
new approach adopts a more standardised, transparent and measurable process 
for developing codes that is more demanding than the old process.  Consumer 
groups, enforcement agencies and advisory services must be adequately 
consulted and codes of practice must deliver benefits to consumers beyond the 
law. A more stringent monitoring process will exist and performance of codes 
will be subject to review ….’139 
In Australia, however, the Franchising Code of Conduct has not been significantly 
changed, despite the multiple processes of review.  The provisions in the former 
voluntary Code of Practice and the current mandatory Code of Conduct are very 
similar (See Appendix A for a comparison).   Instead of diagnosing the reasons why 
the voluntary system was falling short, and making the appropriate adjustments, one 
overarching adjustment was made, namely in enforcement.  The original code was 
voluntary; it was not perceived to be effective. The new Code is mandatory, and is 
therefore expected to function in a superior fashion. Unfortunately, the fact that the 
Code is now enforceable by the ACCC does not mean that it is enforced.  (The lack of 
established procedures for monitoring and review of the Code and franchisees’ 
concern about ACCC handling of claims of breaches of the Code of Conduct by 
franchisors will be discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven).   
There was strong political motivation for the institution of the Code.140  Political 
pressures often lead to statutory regulation, but this is not necessarily the best 
formula.141  Warren Pengilley observed that, ‘The way in which the Franchising Code 
of Conduct was introduced has all the hallmarks of that which a democracy should try 
to avoid.’142   Pengilley notes that early drafts of the Code were distributed to select 
interested parties in confidence, foreclosing any general discussion or debate.  When a 
draft code was publicly released, only eleven working days were allowed for 
                                                 
139 Ramsay notes that the codes project is influenced by Porter's ideas of global competitiveness, where 
the regulatory agency helps industry achieve higher standards.  Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism 
and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law Review 9 (2006).   
140 Warren, Pengilley, , ‘The Franchising Code of Conduct:  Does Its Coverage Address the Need’ 
(1999) 3 Newcastle Law Review 1, 2.   
141 Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (1997) 59.   
142  Warren Pengilley, ‘Competition Regulation in Australia: A Discussion of a Spider Web and its 
Weaving’ (2001) 8 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 2, 101. 
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commentary.  The final code, introduced by a regulation under ministerial power with 
no Parliamentary debate, was proclaimed as law simultaneously with its public release 
in June 1998, even though it was not the same draft as the one that had been released 
for comment.  There was no public-private debate as the quotation from Peter 
Vincent-Jones at the start of this chapter suggests is required.  Pengilley concludes,  
‘When laws as all-encompassing as franchising, with its vast commercial 
ramifications on the law of contract, employment and agency, to mention just a 
few areas, are brought into effect in this manner, one must expect disaster. This 
is what the Franchising Code is.’143   
Decades of experimentation with the regulation of the franchise sector in Australia 
has yielded a wealth of experience.  A voluntary Code of Practice was briefly 
attempted and rejected and replaced by a mandatory Code of Conduct.  The Code of 
Conduct, its provisions borrowed largely from similar legislation in the US, has been 
subject to extensive review and commentary, but key recommendations of these 
reviews, such as greater franchisee participation and registration, have not been 
accepted by government.   
Franchising regulation has been the result of political pressure to regulate.   The 
regulatory response, therefore, is likely to be a political rather than a comprehensive 
solution.  The development of franchising regulation has involved a progression from 
voluntary to mandatory, both employing essentially the same Code (See Appendix 
A).  Key Reid and Gardini Report recommendations were not followed, and so 
franchisees remain under-represented in the regulatory process, there is no separate 
administrative body to oversee the Code, and there is no registration requirement.  
Further, there is no discernable delineation of regulatory process and procedures.  The 
procedures used to select the current regulatory measures were inconsistent with best 
practice (executive fiat, low levels of consultation, limited evaluation of alternative 
methods, for example no cost-benefit analysis144).  To the extent that there has been 
                                                 
143 Warren Pengilley, ‘Competition Regulation in Australia: A Discussion of a Spider Web and its 
Weaving’ (2001) 8 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 2, 100-103. See also See generally Warren 
Pengilley, ‘The Franchising Code of Conduct:  Does Its Coverage Address the Need’ (1999) 3 
Newcastle Law Review 1, 48. 
144 Fred Anderson et al, ‘Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Judicial Review’ (2000) 11 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 89, ‘Regulatory 
agencies use a variety of analytic tools, including comparative risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, 
and cost-effectiveness analysis, to inform their decisions and provide a degree of credibility to the 
decisions that are made. When multiple hazards are assessed within a common framework and 
combined into a single report, the phrase comparative risk assessment is used.  Cost-benefit analysis is 
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any discernable regulatory process, it has, for the most part, been opaque,  and has 
lacked full participation and transparency. Resources allocated to enforcement are 
limited.145  Currently there are only ad hoc procedures for monitoring, review and 
evaluation (partly due to lack of funding for these functions which could have come 
from registration fees).  Finally, there is little education or assistance for prospective 
franchisees, or for operating franchisees who encounter problems. Nevertheless, the 
Code is now claimed to represent world’s best practice by industry leaders and is held 
out as a model for other countries seeking to regulate the sector.146 
2.3.2 Regulatory objectives and tools of the Franchising Code of Conduct 
The Regulatory Impact Statement for the Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code) 
lists the ‘objectives of government action’ as raising standards of conduct in the 
franchising sector without endangering the vitality and growth of franchising; 
reducing the cost of resolving disputes in the sector; reducing risk and generating 
growth in the sector by increasing the level of certainty for all participants; and 
addressing the imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees.147  To 
achieve these objectives, the Code relies primarily on three regulatory tools:    
• First, there are several substantive provisions.  The Code mandates a seven-
day cooling-off period for franchisees.148  A franchisor must obtain from the 
prospective franchisee signed statements that a franchisee has been given 
                                                                                                                                            
a tool developed by economists and scientists to determine whether a proposed course of action is 
efficient compared to alternative courses of action. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost of a project 
is divided by a quantitative (yet non-monetary) measure of effectiveness, such as the number of years 
of human life saved or tons of pollution removed. The terminology, as defined above, is not universally 
accepted. Sometimes the phrase "risk analysis" is used to refer to all of these tools. It is well accepted 
that tools such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis offer insight and intellectual discipline to 
the decision-making process. They can help to identify and evaluate decision options, and achieve more 
benefits at less cost than otherwise would occur. However, it is also recognized that use of these tools is 
not a substitute for human judgment in decision-making. Although these tools will have a stronger 
influence on some decisions than others, there is a broad consensus that they should be used to inform 
major regulatory decisions by federal agencies.’   
145 Trust more important when enforcement budget is low.  See Coulson, Andrew, Trust and Contracts: 
Relationships in Local Government, Health and Public Services (1998). 
146 Andrew Terry, Fending Off Franchise Failure (2006) Franchising and Own Your Own Business, 
<http://www.franchise.net.au/articles/00/0C03ED00.asp> at 17 May 2006.    
147 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) 
No. 162 at   
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawithLegislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/framelodgmentattach
ments/77630AD9222B25BCCA256F73000E7654.> at 24 August 2005. 
148 Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (No 162) (Cth), Clause 13. 
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advice, or has been told to seek advice but has decided not to seek it prior to 
signing the franchise contract.149  There can be no general indemnity of 
franchisor by franchisee.150  There can be no prohibition on franchisees’ 
freedom to associate with other franchisees.151  Procedural provisions are 
required with respect to transfer and termination.152   
• Second, there are mandatory dispute resolution procedures; all franchise 
contracts must contain Code-prescribed provisions that require mediation.   
• Third, the Code requires extensive information disclosure, particularly at the 
time of contract formation.  A franchisor that intends to enter into, extend or 
renew a franchise contract covered by the Code must provide to the 
prospective franchisee at least 14 days prior to signing the contract a copy of 
the Code, a copy of the franchise contract, and a disclosure document that 
provides information about contract terms.  The Code comprehensively details 
a franchisor’s obligations in relation to disclosure in Annexure One of the 
Code.  Annexure One prescribes a 21-item disclosure document provided to a 
franchisee 14 days before signing a contract.  The following items of 
information must be included:  1) A seven-day cooling-off period;  2)  Details 
of the franchisor; 3) Franchisor business experience; 4)  Litigation proceedings 
and judgments; 5)  Payments made by a franchisor to recruiting agents; 6) 
Numbers of existing franchises and numbers of franchisees terminated by a 
franchisor in the last three years; 7)  Description of a franchisee’s right to use, 
and judgments pertaining to trademark, patent, design, copyright; 8) Site or 
territory, exclusivity and franchisor right to change; 9) Supply of goods or 
services to franchisee; 10)  Supply of goods or services by franchisee; 11)  
Sites or territories; 12)  Marketing and other cooperative funds; 13)  Payments; 
14) Financing arrangements; 15) Franchisor obligations; 16) Franchisee 
obligations; 17) Summary of other conditions of the franchise agreement; 18)  
Obligation to sign related agreements; 19) Earnings information; 20) Financial 
                                                 
149Id., Clause 11(2). 
150 Id., Clause 16. 
151 Id., Clause 15. 
152 Id., Clauses 20-23 and Part 4. 
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details; 21) Updates; 22) Other relevant disclosure information; 23) 
Acknowledgment of receipt. 153   
o With disclosure a franchisor must also provide a copy of the Code and 
a copy of the franchise contract.  The disclosure process also requires a 
prospective franchisee to attest that it has consulted with legal and 
accounting professionals prior to signing the franchise contract or that 
it has been advised to but has declined to seek such assistance.154   
o In addition to the requirements of Annexure One for disclosure at the 
time of contract formation, a franchisor must on an ongoing basis also 
provide financial statements for marketing or other cooperative funds 
to which franchisees have made financial contributions.155  
(Table 6.1 in Chapter Six  details the disclosure requirements of the Code and 
their relationship to the provisions of the contract.) 
2.3.3 Evaluating the Code of Conduct 
Monitoring regulation is a complex task; it integrates a range of concerns about 
maximising compliance, political support, and efficiency, for example, cost/benefit 
analysis.  It is a major undertaking simply to select and prioritize from among the 
myriad benchmarks that may be used to evaluate regulation. Among the many 
principles or values that are proposed to guide best practice in regulation are 
consistency; substantive clarity and simplicity; procedural cost-effectiveness; 
efficiency and expediency; transparency; accountability; credibility; commitment; 
fairness; and international harmonization.  It is also recommended that there should be 
predictability as well as flexibility and consultation as well as independence.156  
                                                 
153 The Code is available at  
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawithLegislation/LegislativeInstrumentCompilation1.nsf/0/4FA9F2
1A9489DC27CA256F71004E4CCB?OpenDocument at 30 July 2006.   
154 Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (No 162) (Cth), Clause 13. 
155 Id., Clause 17.  Note that The Code applies concurrently with the Petroleum Retail Marketing 
Franchise Act 1980 (Cth) (PRMF Act);  see Stephen Giles and FionaWallwork, Franchising and Co-
operatives – The Franchising Code of Conduct (2002) Australian Centre for Co-Operative Research 
and Development   <http://www.accord.org.au/social/infobriefs/franchising_code_of_conduct.html at 1 
August 2005. 
156 S. Berg, Developments in Best Practice Regulation: Principles, Process and Performance, Public 
Utility Research Center, University of Florida and Principles of Good Regulation, Better Regulation 
Task Force London, 2003 at www.brtf.gov.uk, and EASA Best Practice Principles for Self-regulatory 
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Finally, there should be educational initiatives and mechanism(s) for appeal, 
monitoring and review.157   Baldwin and Cave offer a five-part approach to evaluating 
regulation by identifying ‘arguments’ that they claim to ‘have force’ in debating 
whether a regulatory scheme is worthwhile.  These arguments ask whether the scheme 
is supported by legislative authority; whether there is an appropriate process of 
accountability; whether the procedures are fair, accessible and open; whether the 
regulator is acting with sufficient expertise; and whether the scheme is efficient.158   
To answer some of these questions with respect to the Franchising Code of Conduct 
there are commentaries, reviews and studies, just as there were reviews and studies of 
the regulation of the sector leading up to the current Code.   First, the Franchising 
Policy Council (FPC) was set up in 1998 for a two-year period to monitor the function 
of the new, mandatory Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code).159  The Council 
conducted an official review of the Code which began on 1 December 1999, eighteen 
months after the Code came into effect.  The review process finished six months later 
on 31 May 2000.160   The following excerpt is taken from the Media Release by the 
                                                                                                                                            
Systems at  <http://www.adconsult.info/bestpractice/bestpractice.cfm?menulink=true accessed April 
2004.   
157 Studies, cases decided and rules promulgated are regulation inputs, industry performance is output – 
see S. Berg.  Levi lists the principles that ought to guide the design of effective sectoral regulation as 
follows: 1. independence - to guard against direct political meddling but also against regulatory 
capture; 2. accountability  3. credibility - the credible threat of financial penalties; 4. transparency - 
crucial if a regulatory regime is to be credible; 5. clarity -  to avoid ambiguity; 6. speed - otherwise the 
position of some firms could be jeopardized; 7. appeal mechanisms - to ensure confidence in a 
regulatory regime but not compromise the speed of decision-making; 8. simplicity - facilitates 
transparency, speed and clarity; 9. periodic review - crucial to enable improvements to be made to 
regulatory regimes, but it also complements any day-to-day accountability procedures; 10. consistency 
- without consistency regulatory credibility will be compromised; 11. commitment – to a system of 
rules and procedures enabling flexibility but which ex post are adhered to by competition authorities; 
12. fairness –  by clear statements of how efficiency and equity considerations are weighted in decision 
making.  adCONSULT <http://www.adconsult.info/bestpractice/bestpractice.cfm?menulink=true> 10 
April 2004, Silvana Sciarra, ‘Franchising and Contract of Employment: Notes on a Still Impossible 
Assimilation’ in Joerges, Christian (eds), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 242.  Levi’s list supports the elements enumerated 
by Berg; as another example of suggested benchmarks.  See also Red Tape Task Force – ACT 
Government, From Red Tape to a Blueprint for Regulatory Reform (1995) 79-94. See 2004 
communique at  <http://www.pc.gov.au/orr/reform.html>  at 12 October 2005. 
158 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 
77.  
159 This was renewed for another two years to 2002. 
160 Office of Small Business, Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct: Report of the Franchising 
Policy Council (May, 2000),  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/ReviewofFCoC.pdf> at 1 April 2007.  See 
also  
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Office of the Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business to 
explain the purpose and nature of the review: 
‘(T)he Franchising Policy Council will … evaluate the effectiveness of the Code 
in meeting its objectives and its impact on the franchising industry in Australia. 
The Council will also estimate the costs incurred in complying with the Code's 
requirements and identify options for minimising the compliance burden 
wherever possible.… 
Shortly, the Government will commission a survey of the franchising industry's 
views of the Code and its effects, and on the basis of this survey develop an 
issues paper for release at the beginning of the review. The Government will 
call for submissions on the Code at that time…. 
The Franchising Policy Council will hold public consultation meetings for 
stakeholders during February and March 2000, and will report to the 
Government by the end of May 2000.’161 
The Terms of Reference of the Review were to identify the level of awareness of the 
Code within the franchising industry;  evaluate the range of business arrangements 
covered by the Code, and the appropriateness of this coverage; evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Code in raising the level and standard of industry disclosure;  
evaluate the effectiveness of the Code’s dispute resolution procedures;  estimate the 
indicative range of costs for the franchising industry in complying with the Code, 
evaluate the extent to which compliance has changed the operating procedures of 
franchise systems and identify options for minimising the compliance burden 
wherever possible;  evaluate whether the current statutory protections contained in the 
Code are appropriate; and evaluate any other relevant issues pertaining to the 
operation of the Code. 
As there were no baseline measurements, the results were based on opinions and 
anecdotal information gathered from surveys and submissions.   The Review process 
was brief; it was announced in December with results reported in May.  There was 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre/AllReleases/1999/August/FranchisingCodeOfConductRe
viewAndAmendments.htm at 26 May 2006.  
161 The Hon Peter Reith MP ‘Franchising Code Of Conduct Review and Amendments’ (Press Release 
26 August 1999),  
<http://mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre/AllReleases/1999/August/FranchisingCodeOfConductRe
viewAndAmendments.htm at 26 May 2006. 
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little data on or discussion of franchisee concerns and few of the submissions came 
from franchisees.162   
The final product of the review, the Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct: 
Report of the Franchising Policy Council, concluded that the Code could be 
improved, but only in minor ways; no major problems were identified.  Key findings 
of the review are summarized here.   With respect to awareness of the Code within the 
franchising industry the report recommended further measures to raise franchisee 
awareness.  The Report indicated a diversity of views on the appropriate coverage of 
the Code, and the definition of franchising.163 It found that ‘Franchisors have 
responded well to the disclosure requirements of the Code’ and that ‘the real issue is 
the quality of the information and not necessarily the number of categories of 
information that must be disclosed’.  The Report indicated a need to lift awareness of 
dispute resolution procedures.  On the effectiveness of the Code’s dispute resolution 
procedures, the report repeatedly makes claims to the effect that review of [the Office 
of the Mediation Adviser] was excluded from the Terms of Reference (ToR) even 
though ToR 4 and ToR 7 indicated that it should not be excluded.164  The Franchise 
Policy Council (the FPC) did ‘urge’ the Office of Small Business to issue a paper on 
mediation in the franchising industry.  This author has not found such a paper.   
The costs for the franchising industry in complying with the Code were found to vary 
widely.  Costs of compliance took into account several submissions and two 
independent surveys as well as the survey commissioned for the study.  The range of 
estimated cost per year was $2000-$65000.  The Franchise Council of Australia (the 
FCA) reported an average annual cost per system of $52,000.  Based on this average, 
if there are approximately 750-800 franchise systems in Australia, the annual cost of 
compliance to the industry is between $39,000,000 and $41,600,000 per year.  ‘On 
balance’ benefits were considered to outweigh costs.   
                                                 
162 Of 46 submissions roughly 15 percent were from franchisees. 
163 For discussions of the appropriate definition of a franchise see Warren Pengilley, ‘The Franchising 
Code of Conduct:  Does Its Coverage Address the Need’ (1999) 3 Newcastle Law Review 1 and also 
Andrew Terry, ‘Comparative Analysis of Franchise Regulation in Asia’, 2002 Proceedings of the 
International Society of Franchising.  Note the exemptions from the Code for employer/employee, 
partnerships, landlord/tenant, mortgagor/mortgagee, and lender/borrower relations. 
164 See  <http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/ReviewofFCoC.pdf> at 27 May 
2006. 
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The FPC concluded that the overall statutory protections associated with the Code 
were appropriate and they were producing beneficial practical outcomes.  It was 
recommended that breach of the Code should not attract fines, that there could be a 
need to address termination by franchisees, and that the cooling-off period should be 
retained with possible conditional waiver for low-value service franchises.165 The 
Report also suggested broader powers to the ACCC with respect to enforcement, 
monitoring, and possible registration of franchises. 
Finally, in 2006 yet another review of the regulation was commissioned by the 
government, this time a Review of Disclosure conducted by the Office of the Minister 
of Small Business.  The results were published in 2007 with the Government 
response. The principal changes to the Code that will be implemented in 2008 are 
summarized by various sources.166  What is important to note here is that 
recommendations of the Review that would have been useful in obtaining information 
about the sector and in achieving the stated goals of regulation were not accepted by 
the government, in particular, registration of disclosure documents and an enhanced 
role for the ACCC in enforcement.  These will be discussed further in Chapters Six 
and Seven. 
In addition to government reviews of the regulation of the franchise sector, there have 
also been academic publications.  In 2001 a study was conducted by Jolene Lim and 
Lorelle Frazer, The effect of regulation:  An analysis of the Australian Franchising 
Code of Conduct.167   This study was conducted in two stages.  In the first stage of the 
study, a mail survey of franchisors compared responses with those of a survey 
conducted prior to the introduction of the Code.168  Based on these responses, the 
study concluded that there were fewer substantial disputes, greater resolution of 
                                                 
165 Franchising Policy Council, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 
Review of Franchising Code of Conduct (2000) at 50-53. 
166 See government information at 
http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmsindexpage.cfm?objectid=48A33B79-20E0-68D8-
ED9772A05DDC83D5&indexType=Consultative%20forums FCA summary at 
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167 Jolene Lim and Lorelle Frazer, ‘The effect of regulation:  An analysis of the Australian Franchising 
Code of Conduct’ (Paper presented at the 15th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference, 
Las Vegas, February 24 – 25 2001). 
168 Colin McCosker and Lorelle Frazer (1998). Franchising Australia 1998 – A survey of franchising 
practices and performance, Franchise Council of Australia. 
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disputes through mediation than litigation,169 fewer franchise agreement terminations, 
fewer transfers and slower growth in the number of franchisors and number of 
franchise units.  A second stage used a multiple case study approach (interviews with 
six franchisors and six of each of their franchisees across three types of industries) to 
evaluate the effect of the Code on franchise relationships, through questions about 
five issues.170   This part of the study concluded that trust, commitment, 
communication, power balance and mutual goals are important at all stages of the 
franchise relationship.  
Surveys of franchisors funded by the Franchise Council of Australia have been 
conducted bi-annually since 2000 by Professor Lorelle Frazer.  The survey questions 
vary with each survey, but included some questions designed to examine attitudes 
about the Code of Conduct.171  The 2002 Franchising Australia Survey specifically 
addressed attitudes about regulation.  The high cost of complying with the Franchising 
Code of Conduct and the difficulties and uncertainty surrounding Code compliance 
were perceived as the main problems.172  Other responses were that the Code has no 
power and/or is inadequate, that excessive disclosure documentation is required and 
that there is over-regulation of the sector generally.  Part C of the 2000 Survey 
specifically addressed the effect of regulation, in particular the Franchising Code of 
Conduct. Franchisors reported benefits of the Code such as improvements in 
franchising relationships, greater care in franchisee selection procedures and more 
detailed record keeping concerning franchisees.  As stated above, the survey 
                                                 
169 The 2002 FCA Survey shows opposite result, more disputes reportedly being resolved through 
litigation. 
170  These five issues were 1) What concerns do franchisors and franchisees have in relation to the 
Code?  2) Do franchisors and franchisees see the Code as beneficial or as an impediment to their 
franchising process? 3) What changes have franchisors made to the operational aspects of their 
franchise systems as a result of the introduction of the Code? 4) What are the critical factors 
influencing the various phases of the franchising relationship in relation to the Code? And 5) How does 
the Code enhance or impede these critical factors in the various phases of the franchising relationship?  
171 It is assumed that these surveys were carried out diligently.  Nevertheless, they have limitations. 
First, they inevitably direct responses according to how the design and administration of the survey.  
Just as it is difficult to prove a negative, it is difficult to survey a negative.  If no questions are asked 
about a particular issue or of a particular group, the survey is not likely to contain much, if any, related 
information.   In this case, in addition to the fact that the surveys were sponsored by the franchisor-
dominated industry group, the subjects of the survey were mostly members of that industry group.  
Though the surveys provide valuable information for understanding the industry from the point of view 
of franchisors, it is doubtful whether they can adequately reflect the attitudes of the other half of the 
industry, the franchisees.    
172 Franchising Policy Council, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 
Review of Franchising Code of Coduct (2000). 
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participants were primarily franchisors; therefore the findings of the report reflect 
franchisor concerns, but even so they are inconsistent. 
There is further analysis and commentary about the Franchising Code of Conduct in 
the academic and professional literature.173 In particular, Andrew Terry’s 
commentaries offer an invaluable legal perspective on the regulation of franchising 
based on the author’s years of experience and research.  Similarly, Warren Pengilley 
writes from years of experience in commercial law and regulation; his work offers 
interesting insights on the scope of the coverage of the Code.  Frank Zumbo has 
written reviews on the Code, in particular with respect to changes and refinements.  
The brief article by Derek Sutherland in 2001 summarized legislated changes to the 
Code in that year, while the NADRAC review focussed on the mediation 
requirements of the Code.174    
These articles provide useful insights but none has dealt with the effectiveness of the 
Code in meeting its stated goals.  Even in the official reviews there is only anecdotal 
evidence, surveys and testimony, mostly from franchisors.  Measurement is difficult 
due to the lack of baseline measurements against which to evaluate any changes in the 
sector.  Having identified what the existing regulatory program consists of; what the 
studies and reviews have addressed; and how the existing regulatory reform has 
responded to suggestions for change, this dissertation employs a contractual analysis 
to evaluate the extent to which regulation is effective.  While it is not a 
comprehensive assessment of all the diverse aspects of regulation that might be 
                                                 
173 See, for example, Des Giugni, ‘Standards of Franchising Disclosure: The Disclosure Document’ 
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174 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Review of Franchising Code of Conduct 
(2002), at 
<http://www.nadrac.gov.au/wwwithdisputeresolutionHome.nsf/Web+Pages/4C00de78C.htm> 27 April 
2003. 
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monitored, this dissertation does offer some insights into the question of whether 
regulation achieves its goals. 
The regulatory program for franchising in Australia has taken advantage of the 
benefits of self-regulatory measures, but there are disadvantages as well.  Despite its 
many potential positive qualities, self-regulation and related principles cannot be 
considered a regulatory panacea.  There are disadvantages and pitfalls.  Because self-
regulators can exploit their power to protect their own interests with measures that 
exclude others from the market and establish anti-competitive conditions, self-
regulation risks subverting regulation to certain private interests, ‘with self-regulation, 
regulatory capture is there from the outset’.175   There is also a failure of separation of 
powers if self-regulatory functions cover such areas as policy formation, rule-making, 
rule interpretation, adjudication and enforcement.176   Self-regulation in the traditional 
sense may be perceived to offer too much autonomy to the regulated interests, which 
leads to issues of control, accountability and fairness.177  In contrast to direct 
intervention ‘which gets its legitimacy from the democratic process…self-regulation 
has to get its legitimacy from somewhere else’.178  There is potential for abuse 
especially with respect to under-represented interests and the interests of third parties.  
There are no provisions, for example, designed to protect third party interests in 
Australia’s franchising regulation.   
The issue of participation is critical in self-regulation, as the Vincent-Jones quotation 
at the start of this chapter points out.  This dissertation aims to assess the regulatory 
program for the franchise sector in a way that reflects the ‘new learning’ on 
regulation.  The next section explains the layers of governance that will serve as the 
theoretical and structural framework for the balance of this dissertation. 
2.4 ‘LAYERS OF GOVERNANCE’ 
Wider conceptions of regulation expand the range of potential actors in regulatory 
processes beyond regulatory activity as the province of watchdog government 
                                                 
175 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 107-108. 
176 Id., 108. 
177 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 
126. 
178 From Soft Law and the Consumer Interest, European Consumer Law Group, ECLG/071/2001  
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/policy/eclg/rep03_en.pdf> at22 May 2007. 
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agencies.179  As more diverse actors are included in the regulatory process, so, too is a 
greater range of layers, strategies and mechanisms considered part of the regulatory 
mix.  Under the rubric of regulation is a growing literature that explores and defines 
these processes, participants, strategies, and tools of regulatory activity, as Table 2.2 
below illustrates. 
 
Table 2.2:  Components of Regulatory Intervention180 
Steps in 
Regulatory 
Process  
 
Participants in 
Regulatory 
Process 
‘Layers of 
Governance’ 
Processes/ 
Strategies 
Instruments/  
Tools of 
Regulation 
Goal setting 
Design and 
drafting      
Interpretation 
and   
Enforcement 
Monitoring 
and Review 
The parties 
   Franchisor 
   Franchisee 
Third parties 
   customers 
   suppliers 
   banks and 
investors 
   insurers 
Regulator(s) 
Courts 
Market 
Contract 
Court 
interpretation 
Legislation  
Types of 
Rules 
Linguistic 
Structure 
Cost of Service  
Incentives 
Standards  
  Prescriptive 
  Procedural 
  Performance 
 
 
Some of the influential research and writing in this area emanates from Australian 
institutions,  
‘The Australian “school” of regulation has pioneered the study of “meta-
regulation”--the relationship between different layers of regulation--in particular 
the relationship of external (eg, law) and internal compliance mechanisms.’181 
Hugh Collins’ book, Regulating Contracts, recently served as the point of departure 
for a conference about law as regulation and the regulation of law at the Australian 
National University Regulatory Institutions Network.  The papers presented at the 
                                                 
179 Stewart Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity 
and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ (2003) 66(1) Modern Law Review 44-79. The work of S. 
Macaulay and I. MacNeil among others underpins Collins’ conception of the contractual framework, 
the relationship, and the deal.  
180 Table assembled from the work of Julia Black, Hugh Collins, Baldwin and Cave, and Gunningham 
and Grabosky. 
181 Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law 
Review 9 (2006). 
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conference have been collected in the volume, Regulating Law.182  The introduction to 
this volume notes that Collins’ book is ‘the most systematic treatment we have of any 
field of law as an institution that regulates and is regulated.’183  Because they raise 
issues that are central to the role of law in the regulation of business relationships, 
fundamental principles and questions raised by Collins’ work have informed parts of 
this inquiry into the mechanisms of the regulation of franchising.  
Collins refers to a ‘multi-layered system of governance’ of contractual 
relationships.184  ‘Layers of governance’ is not a unique term; it is commonly used in 
reference to the Internet and information systems technology.185  Collins uses the term 
in a particular sense, however, to denote regulation that involves less reliance on the 
judicial system and legislation and greater emphasis on markets and contracts.186    
Based on the work of Collins and others, this dissertation divides regulation into four 
layers.187   The first layer of governance consists of private, non-legal mechanisms of 
regulation through market interaction.  The second layer consists of private, non-legal 
and legal mechanisms of regulation through contract.  The third layer is a public or 
quasi-public layer, court interpretation of contract, and the fourth layer is also public, 
regulation by statute.  Within each regulatory layer, both private and public, there is a 
range of instruments, processes and strategies.  Each of these layers functions 
interdependently with the others. As the law is said to be a seamless web, so, too, 
regulation is a web of instruments and interactions. 
                                                 
182 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract’ in C. Parker et al (eds), Regulating Law (2004).   
183 Id., 8.  Many others commentators in the fields of regulation of contract include, for example, I. 
Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:  Transcending the Regulation Debate (1992) and S. 
Macaulay, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions’ (Paper presented at a Symposium in 
Honor of Ian R. MacNeil:  Relational Contracts:  Floating on a Sea of Custom?) (2000) 94 
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184 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in Christine Parker (ed), et al, Regulating Law (2004) 29. 
185 There are four ‘layers’ to the internet:  the physical network layer; the logical layer ; the application 
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<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Webflyer.asp?docID=7680&intItemID=1528&lang=1, 15 
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186 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in Christine Parker (ed), et al, Regulating Law (2004)  29. 
187 Alan Schwartz, ‘Contract Theory and Theories of Contract Regulation’ in Eric Brousseau and Jean-
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This chapter offers a brief description of the layers of governance that serve as a 
structure for this dissertation, including both private and public layers of governance, 
by means of the market, contract, the judiciary and the legislature.  The chapter also 
outlines some of the instruments and strategies that can be employed within them.   
There is also a connection between private layers of regulation and self-regulation.  
‘Private regulation’ is the term used by Hugh Collins to refer to parties’ regulation of 
their own activities through interactions in the market and through the use of private 
contractual agreements.  Self-regulation is not always private regulation, but private 
regulation is always self-regulation.  ‘Public regulation’ is carried out by public 
institutions such as the judiciary and the legislature.  Public regulation includes quasi-
public regulation through court interpretation of the private arrangement as well as 
regulation through statutory intervention.  
Self-regulatory mechanisms can be used in public forms of regulation, for example, 
voluntary codes of conduct or ethics or statutory intervention that dictates self-
regulatory tools which the parties themselves are responsible for implementing, such 
as disclosure and mediation.  The use of self-regulation in conjunction with public 
regulation is sometimes referred to as ‘co-regulation’. 188   In the interests of greater 
contextualization Collins argues there should be greater emphasis on the market and 
on contract as negotiated by the parties in the regulation of commercial 
arrangements.189   While private law does not take the place of public regulation, its 
role takes on new significance.  In theory private regulation vests control over a 
commercial relationship in those best equipped to interpret it, the parties themselves.  
Collins argues that private regulation should be preferred to public, substantive, 
command-and-control regulation because it is more contextualized, sophisticated and 
efficient.  Collins’ preference for private layers of regulation is supported by the work 
of Braithwaite and others, as, for example, self-regulatory mechanisms populate the 
base of Braithwaite’s ‘enforcement pyramid’.190  This preference for private 
                                                 
188  Julia Black, Rules and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1997) at 50. 
189 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999). 
190 John Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation for Australia’, in Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite 
(eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s Future (1993).  
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regulation is, however, balanced by acknowledgement that it must work in concert 
with public regulation.191   
2.4.1 Market regulation  
‘Markets, both domestic and international, are greater potential instruments of control 
than governments and investors, and financiers in particular, and may have a 
profound influence.’ 192   ‘The market’ as a layer of regulation includes a variety of 
mechanisms, sometimes referred to as non-legal sanctions.193    
Non-legal sanctions may be appropriate in the case of flexible or vague commitments, 
where it makes sense for the participants in a market to self-regulate rather than for 
courts or regulators that are not experts to intervene; or where the stakes are low 
relative to litigation costs; or where the sunk costs of the sanctioning system mean 
that the mechanisms for enforcing the bond are already in place to serve some other 
social or economic function.  They may also be appropriate in certain market 
situations, such as where transactors closely monitor each other, so that information 
and competition contribute significantly to the effectiveness of self-regulation; or in a 
market that involves highly sophisticated transactors, whose knowledge and 
information allow them to effectively play a significant role in the regulation of 
market behaviour.194  In all these instances it may be more appropriate for contractual 
behaviour to depend on ‘reputation, ethnic and family connections, and other 
elements of non-legal regulation and not on detailed and carefully written contracts 
enforced by disinterested courts.’195   
Transaction-specific investment is a non-legal means to control the relationship,;  it 
binds the party making the investment, and gives greater leverage to the contracting 
party who has not made such investment.  Another mechanism is the manipulation of 
a relationship-specific advantage, such as the posting of a ‘hostage’, that is an asset a 
                                                 
191 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in Christine Parker (ed), et al, Regulating Law (2004). 
192 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (1998) 22. 
193 David Charny, ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships’ (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 
375, 392. 
194 For a detailed discussion of non-legal sanctions, see David Charny, ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in 
Commercial Relationships’ (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 375, 425. 
195 Eric Posner quoted in Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the 
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party exposes to the control of the other party.196   Regulation by the market also 
occurs through market competition for terms and competition for fair complaint 
mechanisms.197  The ‘repeat deal’ is another method, but it is of limited utility to 
franchisees.  Because of long-term nature of the franchise contract, there is not likely 
to be a repeat deal.   
Market regulation also has a collective dimension that includes reputation as well as 
recognition, interpretive communities, corporate social reporting, and codes of 
ethics.198  Reputation is particularly effective when information is available in the 
market and participants have the ability to utilize it.  The International Franchise 
Association (the IFA) has recently added recognition/awards to its program; the 
Franchise Council of Australia (the FCA) also has awards program for franchisors, 
but recognition is based primarily on financial success. Interpretive communities are 
another collective measure; they can provide a shared understanding of rules and 
context so that less precision and specificity is required in regulatory intervention.199  
Corporate social reporting is ‘[a] means of assessing the social impact and ethical 
behaviour of an organization in relation to its aims and those of its stakeholders.’200  
Finally, many franchise organizations use codes of ethics and/or practice, for 
example, the British Franchise Association, the Italian Franchise Association, the 
International Franchise Association (US), the Franchise Association of South Africa, 
as well as organizations in Canada, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong.  Internationally, the European Franchise Federation also has a Code of 
Ethics. 
Increased emphasis on market regulation offers several practical advantages.  As a 
form of self-regulation it reduces direct legislated intervention.  Firms seeking 
competitive advantage through innovation and development of new products and 
                                                 
196 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’ (1983) 73(4) 
The American Economic Review 519-540. 
197 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 288 and 352-355.  Such sanctions are used by the 
franchisor and franchisee, whose relationship is the focus of this paper, but may also be successfully 
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services are considered to have the strongest incentives to give customers what they 
want in terms of price and quality.   Of all the mechanisms of regulating contractual 
relationships, it is in theory the market that best ensures participation of all 
stakeholders.  Because it represents the highest potential for stakeholders’ 
participation consistent with current conceptions of best practice in regulatory 
process, market regulation is proposed as a starting point in any selection process of 
appropriate regulatory mechanisms.   
Despite the advantages of regulation by means of market mechanisms, however, 
market inefficiencies due to information asymmetry, externalities, and imperfect 
competition occur in the franchise sector as they do in most commercial contexts.201  
Market relationships do not always represent a balance of interests of all stakeholders.  
In franchising these inefficiencies may necessitate the use of other regulatory 
intervention by government agencies. Chapter Three will outline why the market 
interaction between franchisor and franchisee sets up conditions of imbalance of 
power and uncertainty.  Later chapters will explain the regulation of the relationship 
by contract and through regulatory intervention, and will assess how these layers of 
regulation function together to address stated goals of regulation. 
2.4.2 Contract as regulation 
Contract is a layer of self-regulation designed, drafted and agreed to by the parties, 
‘Many contracts are therefore analogous to regulation themselves, for they purport to 
establish binding standards for future conduct…The private law of 
contract…delegates to the parties a substantial power to fix the rules’.202  Contract is 
also integrally related to market and non-legal methods of regulation, so there is some 
overlap in discussing market and contract as means of self-regulation.   
As part of the new multi-layered system of governance, the contract is used by the 
parties to regulate procedurally in the drafting and negotiation of the contract.  Once 
the contract is signed, the standards set by the parties constitute a form of self-
                                                 
201J.Wallace, D. Ironfield and J. Orr, ‘Analysis of Market Circumstances where Industry Self-
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regulation.203  Contract regulates substantively through the contract attributes, such as 
the standard form and relational attributes.   The standard form, for example, is cost-
effective and efficient for mass transactions, but has potential to impose terms on the 
non-drafting side that may erode commitment to the deal and the relation. Contract 
duration is another example; shorter duration may benefit a franchisor at the expense 
of a franchisee. For this reason some jurisdictions use direct intervention to impose 
minimum duration for franchise contracts.   
Another instrument of regulation by the parties themselves is the negotiation of 
express contract terms, including hostages and restraint of trade clauses, and terms 
that specify dispute resolution procedures. Here, effectiveness depends on the 
bargaining power of the parties and their ability to place a value on terms.204  There 
are also contract terms implied, for example, by consumer protection legislation such 
as sale of goods legislation. Standards can be agreed upon also by terms implied by 
course of dealing.   The parties may not specify some terms per se, but in the process 
of contracting they are taken to be aware of mandatory and default rules imposed on 
them by courts and legislatures.205   
Specificity of contract is a regulatory strategy available to the parties themselves; 
specificity establishes certainty, but sacrifices flexibility. On the other hand, the use 
of vague terms such as ‘reasonableness’ may be combined with a permissive 
character to increase discretion in application and interpretation.  Vagueness is 
consistent with relationships where trust is important.  The use of discretion in 
contracts risks opportunism and hold-up, but is often necessary due to future 
uncertainty.  Trade-offs for granting discretion may include lower costs and price 
breaks, or they may be less tangible, as they are in franchising contracts.    
Not only in entering the contract, then, but also in performing the terms of an 
agreement the parties ‘control’ their own interaction. The standards in the contract 
comprise a form of self-regulation that develops throughout the performance of the 
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contract.  Contractual terms are typically used by individual parties, but are amenable 
to collective regulatory initiatives, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven  
Contract is important in many aspects of regulation, but it is only one piece of the 
regulatory process.  Like every other layer of regulation, it has drawbacks as well as 
strengths. One issue that will be addressed further in this dissertation is the extent to 
which the contract as a form of regulation represents the views of all stakeholders. In 
franchising the contract is drafted and controlled by a franchisor.  As a regulatory tool 
it serves the interests of a franchisor, which are often not aligned with the interests of 
franchisees (or those of other stakeholders).  A franchise contract therefore may not 
represent the interests of all stakeholders.206  Where private mechanisms fail, public 
regulation may be needed to fulfil the necessary regulatory function.  
2.4.3 Court interpretation 
The judiciary is another layer of regulation; its primary role lies in interpretation and 
enforcement of contracts and statutes, as the judiciary supports both the private self-
regulation of the contract as well as legislated rules,207  ‘the court system, generally 
regarded as having nothing to do with regulatory activity, can be a regulator as well as 
enforcing laws compelling market activity. 208   
Court interpretation of contract involves express and implied terms, using literal and 
contextual interpretation.  Courts may employ particular methods for the 
interpretation of certain species of contract (for example the standard form and 
relational) and courts may regulate through default rules of contract.   Implied terms 
include good faith, unconscionable conduct, fiduciary duties, and/or a duty of care.  
Courts thus engage in evaluations of fairness, both procedurally (of the process, 
formal requirements and criteria for validity) and substantively (of the intentions of 
the parties, taking into account explicit terms as well as context and implicit 
understandings).    The extensive debate over default rules analysis209 underscores the 
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uncertainty over the circumstances under which parties’ intentions should be 
considered insufficiently clear or not to be enforced.210    
When courts do interpret contracts based upon extrinsic values, there is no definitive 
and immutable determination of collective interests and no procedure to establish 
which competing values and interests should guide the courts’ interpretations and 
interventions.  The inevitable vagueness of principles of unfairness, unreasonableness, 
good faith and unconscionable conduct results in uncertainty for contracting parties’ 
planning purposes.211  They are all subject to wide variation in judicial application, 
and the courts exhibit varying degrees of restraint or lack of restraint in interpretation.  
Günter Teubner observes,  
‘Law lost its formalism as the politicization of contract law has increased since 
the 1960s... Judges often corrected and rewrote contracts in order to translate the 
policy goals of legislation into contracts.’ 212   
Extra-contractual duties such as promissory estoppel, restitution, and duty of care 
further compound problems of interpretation.213  In interpreting contract law the 
courts may be forced to rely upon the same filtering devices as tort law, for example 
proximity, duty, causation, remoteness, but with these devices come the same 
problems of subjectivity and indeterminacy.214    
Collins agues that private regulation by the parties is less effective due to lack of 
particularity in contracts and courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable interpretation of 
fairness, reasonableness, and good faith. This is why courts need access to reliable 
data to inform their deliberations.   The courts have a role in regulatory process, but a 
role that relies upon and must be informed by the other tools in the multi-layered 
system.   
                                                                                                                                            
Incomplete Contracts’, University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics Working 
Paper Series (2004) Paper 2; and  George Dent, ‘Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances’ (2002) 58 
The Business Lawyer 45.  
210 Juliet Kostritsky, ‘When Should Contract Law Supply a Liability Rule or Term: Framing a Principle 
of Unification for Contracts’, 32 Arizona State Law Journal 1283 (2000). 
211 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 232. 
212 Günter Teubner, ‘Law as An Autopoietic System’ (Paper presented at the LSE Complexity Study 
Group Meeting No 3, London, 18 June 1997). 
213 See David Charny, ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships’ (1990) 104 Harvard Law 
Review 375. 
214 Extra-contractual duties that arise with promissory estoppel, restitution, and tort further compound 
problems of interpretation of contracts.  See D. Charny, ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial 
Relationships’ (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 375. 
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2.4.4 Statutory intervention  
Statutory intervention (also known as state, legislative or direct intervention – see 
definitions in the Introduction) is regulation in the commonly-used sense of the term, 
formal, legislated regulation by a governmental organization or agency. The term 
‘command-and-control’ is also sometimes used to refer to this type of regulation.215    
Statutory regulation may impose substantive requirements, such as prescriptive and/or 
performance standards.  It may also involve procedural standards such as information 
disclosure; cooling-off periods, licensing and registration. Procedures may also be 
prescribed for example for dispute resolution and public education programs. 
There are two fundamental purposes for statutory intervention in commercial 
enterprise; the first is to promote efficient markets, and the second is to protect the 
public welfare (including franchisees as consumers and as small businesspeople, and 
third parties such as end-user consumers, suppliers, and creditors).   
While markets, through competition, are generally considered to be the most efficient 
means of allocating society’s resources, competition does not lead to efficient and 
equitable outcomes when its operation is hindered by information asymmetry, 
externalities, moral hazard and transaction costs.216  Statutory intervention in 
commercial activity ‘corrects’ these market imperfections in the interests of economic 
efficiency and social values.217  Regulation helps to ensure efficient markets by 
balancing unequal bargaining power and information asymmetry, and it can reduce 
the impacts of transaction costs, moral hazard and externalities.   
Statutory intervention addresses a variety of forms of market failure in the 
construction of markets and in the distribution of outcomes of market interactions. 
Regulation may, for example, be used to ensure provision of socially desirable 
products and services where free market competition fails to provide continuity and 
                                                 
215 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (1998) 39.   This text includes a discussion of the pros and cons of direct 
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<http://www.consumersonline.gov.au/downloads/selfreg/taskforce/ConsultantReport/ch1.pdf>  at 22 
Aug. 07. 
217 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 
17. 
 71
availability of a good or service; to prevent anti-competitive and predatory pricing 
practices in order to promote efficient market function;218 to allocate scarce goods in 
the public interest; and/or to ensure the availability of a public good.219 
Some market inefficiencies occur in the franchising sector, but do not form part of the 
objectives of the Code of Conduct, though they may be subject to regulation by other 
legislation, such as competition law.   The reduction of transaction costs to improve 
efficiency. for example, is sometimes a regulatory objective.220  While the franchise 
structure itself is a form of governance used by the parties themselves to contain 
transaction costs, the Code of Conduct does not address this problem.  Monopoly is 
another market inefficiency that is often the object of direct intervention to improve 
economic efficiency or social welfare, and, though franchising has monopoly 
characteristics, it is not the aim of the Code to correct these problems.  Externalities 
and spill-over effects, both positive and negative, cause inefficient markets because of 
costs or benefits not accounted for in the price of goods or services.  These, too, are a 
common problem in the franchise relationship not addressed by the Code.   
The Code of Conduct is aimed primarily at the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees and is used to address moral hazard and several other types of market 
failure in that relationship.  Moral hazard is defined as, ‘the lack of incentive to guard 
against risk where one is protected from its consequences’.221  Moral hazard exists 
where there are incentives to act in ways for which others will bear the cost, for 
example when the price of a resource is set below its cost. Externalities set up one 
type of moral hazard, but moral hazard can also be independent of the problem of 
externalities, as where parties allocate costs equally, though their shares are not equal; 
or where one party bears the risk, but the costs of risk avoidance are on the other, so 
that the cost saving does not accrue to the benefit of the party who avoids the risk (an 
example is the classic moral hazard in insurance contracts).  Regulation seeks to 
contain risks of moral hazard through incentives or monitoring.  Other forms of 
governance to address moral hazard are reputation, pricing, and tie-ins to sales.  
                                                 
218 Regulated through the Trade Practices Act, not the Code. 
219 These categories are taken from Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 17. 
220 Note that regulation can also increase transaction costs. 
221 Soanes and Stevenson, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of English (2d Revised edition, 2005). 
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Regulation of franchising addresses moral hazard through substantive provisions with 
respect to termination and transfer.  
Another type of market failure the Code addresses is unequal bargaining power. 
Where one party to a transaction has greater bargaining power so that the transaction 
has a reduced likelihood of fairness, regulation can protect vulnerable interests.  
Another market failure in franchising that is addressed by the Code is asymmetric 
information; here regulation aims to correct problems caused by information 
imbalance.222   
Purposes of regulation not only involve correcting market failure but also risk 
management, also access to justice, legitimacy, social justice.223  Commercial 
regulation advances public welfare interests, including fairness and distributive 
justice; restrictions on the exercise of private power; consumer protection; assurance 
of provision of public goods; and other welfare goals.224  Consumer protection is 
intended to reduce the social and economic costs of business’ predatory behaviour and 
‘sharp practice’.  Regulation that provides legal protection to consumers and other 
business participants can benefit business enterprises because parties can be more 
confident in making investments.  Regulation therefore adds stability and can improve 
the potential of business to raise equity.   
Commercial regulation thus has a dual role to play, first, in alleviating market failure 
and second, in advancing public welfare interests.  Regulatory measures often serve 
both purposes.225  There are, of course, drawbacks of direct intervention.  Statutory 
regulation can be bureaucratic, inexpertly designed, and rigidly enforced.226    
Substantive law relies on purposive and outcome-oriented direct intervention, for 
example, it may require that certain contractual outcomes be reached.  Direct 
                                                 
222 This information adapted from Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) at 17.   This list is very similar to that provided by Levi, whose 
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intervention may fail to elicit socially responsible behaviour from corporations 
because society has become too complex for effective control by intervention.   
Another criticism, known as the ‘juridification’ problem, is that there is ‘too much 
regulatory law’.227  The result is that direct regulation can be too complex and 
distanced from its subjects, overly burdensome, over-broad or under-inclusive.  
Related to the juridification problem are issues concerning implementation, such as 
the concern that the regulatory system has become so complex that the legislature 
must delegate a large degree of discretion to the regulatory agencies.  This compounds 
the problem of ‘normative legitimacy’, that lawmaking procedures have become 
distanced from the democratic procedures that establish legitimacy.228  Finally, 
substantive regulation can encroach on individuality and autonomy, key values 
formerly protected by formal rules.229   
The principal features of the Code of Conduct, disclosure and mediation, both have 
potential to advance market efficiency and to provide consumer protection.   Both are 
low-intervention, and have a self-regulatory flavour, as much of the effectiveness of 
the operation of the regulation depends upon the parties themselves.  The burden on 
the parties in the regulation of this sector in this way, however, must overcome some 
significant market inefficiencies with respect to information asymmetry, power 
imbalance and moral hazard. These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three 
and subsequent chapters. 
2.5 TOWARDS A MODEL OF BEST-PRACTICE FOR REGULATION 
Determining best practice in regulatory process for regulation of any particular sector 
or industry is a complicated task. With the rapid developments in concepts of best 
practice in regulation, there is a wide range of approaches to tailoring best practice for 
regulation of specific types of activities or sectors, for example workplace health and 
safety, utilities, environmental regulation, and regulation of professional services. 
There is, as yet, no formulation of best practice for regulation of the franchise sector, 
so this research looks to some general principles of best practice in commercial 
                                                 
227 David Hess, ‘Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness’ 
(1999) 25(1) Journal of Corporate Law 41, 135. 
228 Id., 50 and 139. 
229 Sanford E. Gaines and Cliona Kimber, ‘Redirecting Self-Regulation’ (2001) 13 Journal of 
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regulation.  A reliance on general principles of best practice in regulation is 
problematic, however, not only because regulation should ideally be tailored to the 
needs of the activity being regulated.  Another problem is the diversity of 
formulations of best practice in regulating.  Three different, respected authorities offer 
three somewhat different conceptions of how to design regulatory process. 
The first is based on the work of Neil Gunningham, a lawyer, together with social and 
political scientist, Peter Grabosky.  Gunningham and Grabosky have written that 
regulatory process should use a complementary instrument mix, as varied methods 
can reinforce and support each other. It should prefer less intervention, because direct 
intervention is not as efficient, effective or as politically acceptable as self-
regulation.230   It should also allow for escalating regulatory response up an 
instrument pyramid that should include government, business and third parties (and 
that builds in regulatory responsiveness and triggers); and for use of third parties as 
surrogate regulator.  Finally, they recommend that regulation should encourage 
business to move beyond compliance.231  Often, this is accomplished through 
increased self-regulatory measures. 
The second conception of regulatory best practice is supplied by the work of Professor 
Anthony Ogus.  Ogus makes some recommendations for regulatory process: 
1) Identify the issue – keep regulation in proportion to the problem; 
2) Keep it simple – go for goal-based regulation; 
3) Provide flexibility for the future – set the objective rather than the detailed 
way of making sure the regulation is kept to; 
4) Keep it short; 
5) Try to anticipate the effects of regulation on competition or trade; 
6) Minimize costs of compliance; 
7) Integrate with previous regulations; 
8) Make sure it can be effectively managed and enforced; 
9) Make sure it will work and that you will know if it does not; and 
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10) Allow enough time.232 
 
The third source is taken from the OECD principles for best practice in regulation. 
These principles are as follows: 
1) Serve clearly identified policy goals, and be effective in achieving those goals; 
2) Have a sound legal and empirical basis;  
3) Produce benefits that justify costs, considering the distribution of effects 
across society and taking economic, environmental and social effects into 
account;  
4) Minimise costs and market distortions;  
5) Promote innovation through market incentives and goal-based approaches;  
6) Be clear, simple, and practical for users; 
7) Be consistent with other regulations and policies; and  
8) Be compatible as far as possible with competition, trade investment-
facilitating principles at domestic and international levels.233 
Australia has adopted the OECD principles.  In addition, a 2006 Taskforce report, 
‘Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business’, has also endorsed the following 
‘Principles of good regulatory process’: 
1) A case for action should be clearly established (includes evaluating and 
explaining why existing measures are not sufficient to deal with the issue); 
2) Policy options need to be assessed within a cost-benefit framework 
(including analysis of costs and risk); 
3) Only the option that generates the greatest net benefit for the community, 
taking into account all the impacts, should be adopted; 
4) Guidance should be provided to regulators and regulated parties to ensure 
that the policy intent of the regulation is clear, as well as what is needed to 
be compliant; 
                                                 
232 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 339.  See also Regulatory 
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5) Mechanisms such as sunset clauses and periodic reviews need to be built 
into legislation to ensure that regulation remains relevant and effective 
over time; 
6) There needs to be effective consultation with regulated parties at the key 
stages of regulation-making and administration.234 
This is a sampling of the many proposed approaches to best practice generally.  There 
are many variables and inconsistencies.  Sorting through the many formulations of 
best practice in regulatory process is confusing and lends itself to picking and 
choosing from among them in order to arrive at the conclusion that whatever the 
nature of a regulatory program may be, it complies with some formulation of best 
practice.  There are, however, some common themes and concepts that recur across 
many of the various formulations of best practice.  They include, for example, 
simplicity, identifying the problems, orientation to ends and goals, choosing the right 
tools, inclusive and self-regulatory process, less intervention, more responsiveness, 
and greater participation. Julia Black summarizes the new ‘normative propositions’ of 
regulatory strategies, suggesting that, ‘they are hybrid (combining governmental and 
non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a number of different strategies 
simultaneously or sequentially), and indirect.’235  The impetus for these strategies 
derives from systems theories, involving a process of coordinating and balancing 
interactions between actors and systems using a variety of techniques.236   
2.6 CORE ELEMENTS OF REGULATORY PROCESS 
Emerging empirical research on regulation offers some fresh perspectives on the 
variety of means and processes available for any particular regulatory purpose.237  No 
one instrument or layer of regulation is always the right one, but greater legitimacy 
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can be achieved if all layers of governance are considered as part of a process of 
regulation that is participative, democratic and reflexive.  Thus, current theories of 
regulation have shifted in focus from interests and outcomes to process.  Within these 
democratic, participative processes there are choices to be made among different 
levels of regulatory action, different instruments, and different strategies within each 
layer.  This implies also a need to consider synergies and contra-indications for the 
various mechanisms and tools used in regulation.238  Equipped with a more 
comprehensive perspective of how each layer of regulation works and how the 
mechanisms of regulation work within them, it should be easier to identify the 
interactions and synergies among them.  It should also be easier to evaluate the need 
for adjustment in any particular mechanism in the layers of governance.    
While much of what is written about new conceptions of regulation is devoted to the 
instruments of regulation, it must be remembered that these new conceptions of 
regulatory activity call for a broader range of actors.  Braithwaite’s ‘enforcement 
pyramid’ is populated by tools, but as he himself explains,  
‘There is no standard or optimal pyramid advanced here as providing a simple 
model for solving all our regulatory problems. …The important conclusion is 
about the need to move our regulatory institutions away from the simplistic and 
mechanistic models of economic rationalism, legalism and government 
command-and-control. This means genuine empowerment of all the 
stakeholders in a regulatory dialogue where each stakeholder comes to 
understand the concerns of the other and stands ready to respond positively to 
them so long as their own concerns are responded to positively by others.’239 
 
The regulatory pyramid might better be thought of as a matrix.  Regulatory process 
now encompasses various levels and tools of regulation, but the relationships among 
them are not linear.240  Regulation may be voluntary, or it may involve self-regulation.  
It may involve direct intervention or co-regulation.   The challenge is, through 
designing and refining a matrix of regulatory tools, to identify the most efficient and 
effective mix of tools to accommodate the dynamic requirements of any given 
                                                 
238 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (1998). 
239 John Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation for Australia’, in Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite 
(eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s Future (1993). 
240 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation,  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/39/33947759.pdf> at 22 August 2007. 
 78
context, whether that context is environmental regulation, financial services, or the 
franchising sector.241    
Given the lack of information to inform regulatory policy, legitimacy through 
expertise by third party regulators is not a solution for the regulation of franchising 
due to the low likelihood of generating the required level of interest and funding and 
harnessing the required expertise.242  It is unrealistic to expect a regulator to formulate 
a regulatory program that comprehends the interaction of all these layers of 
regulation.  Instead, the focus on tools should be balanced by a greater emphasis on 
the participants and the process of regulating.    
Malcolm Sparrow, a leading researcher in theories of regulation and author of The 
Regulatory Craft,243 has written and lectured extensively on the topic of regulatory 
process. Sparrow reduces his recommendations to one phrase, ‘Pick important 
problems, and fix them.’244   The key points of the principles of good regulatory 
process, such as determining the nature and scope of the problem; consideration of 
cost-benefit; making the regulation clear in terms of policy and compliance; review; 
and consultation with parties are themes that recur in Sparrow’s work, but are reduced 
to a simple prescription, according to which Sparrow identifies three ‘core elements’ 
in reformed regulatory process:   
• The first element is a focus on results, which involves rejecting reliance on 
output measures in favour of ‘more meaningful’ impact measures.  
• The second element is to adopt a problem-solving approach that includes 
systematic identification of important problems, risk assessment and 
prioritization.245  Sparrow claims that regulatory craftsmanship requires the 
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use of many different tools, which should be employed to suit the task, not 
vice versa; ‘[t]he essence of craftsmanship is having them all, knowing how to 
use them, and being quite judicious when you will use each one.’246   Sparrow 
notes that enforcement in particular should not be overlooked or neglected.    
• The third element is to invest in collaborative partnerships to form a shared 
purpose through collaborative agenda setting.  Engagement of multiple parties 
can lead to more effective interventions, and optimal leveraging of scarce 
public resources.247   
Sparrow’s prescription is supported by the process recommended by Gunningham and 
Grabosky in Smart Regulation; that process includes determining objectives, defining 
the character of the problem, and generating the range of available options to address 
problems and achieve objectives.  As the authors note, this process raises the need to 
build in better consultation and participation.248    
Despite its simplicity, Sparrow admits that his prescription is not easy, it has been 
‘experienced by those who have grappled with it’ as different, intellectually 
demanding, analytically demanding, organizationally awkward and ‘unrelentingly 
difficult’.249   It usually calls for a change in regulatory style, and here, Sparrow’s 
model is not so far from Black’s formulations.  According to Sparrow, the ‘old 
model’, characterized by enforcement was ‘reactive, adversarial, incident-driven and 
‘hard’.  The new, ‘soft’ model, characterized by a re-orientation toward compliance 
assistance and customer service, is about prevention, partnerships, and problem-
solving.250 The substantial challenge for regulatory agencies is ‘to construct a 
framework, so that… innovative methods come forward at the right time, in the right 
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place, for the right job.’251    This dissertation suggests that the adoption of such a 
framework is the first step toward creating an effective and durable regulatory process 
for the franchising sector. 
2.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter establishes a theoretical foundation for an analysis of the effectiveness of 
the regulation of the franchise sector.  Regulation lacks public confidence; the 
common view of regulation is that it is an undesirable phenomenon.  Such attitudes 
about regulation, however, tend to overlook the importance of regulation in 
establishing competitiveness. They also lag behind current theories of regulation that 
have evolved to encompass a broader conception of what regulating is, more diverse 
actors, and a wider range of regulatory instruments at all the levels upon which they 
operate.   This chapter provides an overview of the current regulation of franchising 
by the Franchising Code of Conduct and of the reviews of this regulation, not only as 
an introduction to the subject of this dissertation , but also to situate it in the context 
of theories of regulatory activity.  Next, the chapter introduces the concept of a ‘multi-
layered system of governance’ including statute, court interpretation, markets, and 
contract.  In this scheme private and public regulation work together; no one tool is 
better than another.  Regulatory theory has shifted its focus from determinations such 
as whether public or private is best to an acceptance that they can work together, 
‘The insights of the reflexive capacity of private law combined with the 
collective policy orientation of public regulation can provide the springboard for 
more productive regulation.’252  
Sometimes market works well to achieve all the objectives, sometimes there is a need 
for something more, even for substantive regulation.   Such an all-encompassing 
system presents a challenge to any regulator to formulate a regulatory program that 
comprehends it.  This is why the ‘new learning’ on regulation also places a greater 
overall emphasis on process and why current theories, that continue to be refined with 
ongoing research, emphasize the importance of self-regulatory and participative 
processes.  This dissertation makes no assumptions regarding the suitability of 
regulatory tools, as tools are properly selected as a result of process to achieve, for 
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any given sector at any given point in time, the optimal mix, selecting from the full 
range of options, methods, strategies, techniques, and rules.253   What this dissertation 
does argue is that, in theory, participative, democratic process helps to improve 
understanding and enhance legitimacy.   
Of the many formulations of best practice in regulation, this dissertation presents one 
formula, to ‘find problems and fix them’.   The three core elements of this formulation 
of regulatory practice are obtaining meaningful measurements, selecting tools, and 
instituting collaborative process. At the same time as Collins’ conception of layers of 
governance comprises the underlying structure of this dissertation, these three core 
elements are recurrent themes through this dissertation; for example in the discussion 
of the need for better information in Chapter Three, in the exploration of a range of 
regulatory tools in Chapters Four, Five and Six, and finally, in the discussion of 
collaborative process in Chapter Seven.  Chapter Two thus provides a theoretical 
foundation for evaluating the effectiveness of regulation and a direction for the 
reframing of the regulation of the franchising sector. It is a foundation that rejects 
casting regulatory activity in a limited role as a necessary evil in favour of a more 
multi-faceted and versatile role that expands the meaning of regulation; expands the 
range of instruments, tools and participants; and is truly worthy of public confidence.  
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter has provided a theoretical framework that will be used in this dissertation 
to assess the regulation of franchising in Australia.  The main points and 
recommendations are as follows:  
• While it is commonly thought desirable to keep regulation to a minimum, such 
thinking is based on an outdated perception of regulation.  There will always 
be regulation.  The choice not to regulate is therefore a choice in favour of the 
existing regulation.  Instead of aiming for less regulation, it would be more 
helpful to acknowledge that appropriate choices in regulation can be beneficial 
to the economy; for this reason avoiding regulation can represent a missed 
opportunity.  
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• New theories of regulation also frame regulation as a broader function than the 
traditional view of regulation as rules imposed by government.  They have 
also evolved from outcomes to process.  A systems approach to regulation 
incorporates the advantages of reflexive regulation, self-regulation and 
responsive regulation, and a range of tools, both private and public.  While it 
does not recommend a particular process, this dissertation does suggest a 
process-oriented approach to regulation that is relatively simple for all 
participants to be aware of and to understand. 
• Franchising regulation has been the result of political pressure to regulate.   
Legislation with respect to the sector has been politically motivated and, when 
implemented, has been borrowed largely from other jurisdictions.  It is 
questionable whether regulation represents a calibrated response to the 
particular problems and concerns in the sector in Australia, because, as 
Chapter Three will explain, there is a lack of information about the sector 
generally, and there are compelling interests in maintaining a positive image 
of the sector as opposed to obtaining accurate data.  The regulatory response, 
therefore, is more likely to be a political rather than a comprehensive solution. 
•  The development of franchising regulation has involved a progression from 
voluntary to mandatory.  Both voluntary and mandatory schemes employed 
essentially the same Code, though there is arguably less enforcement and 
monitoring procedure in the mandatory version.  (See Appendix A). 
• Key Reid and Gardini Report recommendations were not followed.  
Franchisees are still not represented, there is no separate administrative body 
to oversee the Code, and there is no registration requirement.  Without 
registration compliance may still be an issue.  Also there can be no funding of 
initiatives by registration fees. 
• A brief overview of the development of franchise regulation in Australia and a 
review of the literature on the regulation of franchising shows that, while there 
has been considerable study, there is still no consensus about the effectiveness 
of the current regulatory program for franchising. This dissertation is a small 
step toward filling this gap as it assesses the regulation of franchising using the 
framework outlined in this chapter. 
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• In this broad sense of governance, regulation is carried out in many quarters 
on a range of levels, through a range of mechanisms.   An expanded view of 
regulation means that there are more ways to ‘get it right’.  ‘Layers of 
governance’ replace reliance on statutory intervention. These include the 
market, the contract and the courts as well as legislated regulation. 
• At the same time that its capacity is expanded, however, the complexity of the 
task is increased.  While there are many different conceptions of best practice 
in regulation, given this complexity and the diverse interests represented in 
regulatory activity, and in particular in franchising, this dissertation argues that 
it is difficult to overstate the importance of collaborative process in obtaining 
good measurements, identification of problems and selection of tools.    
• Objectives of the Franchising Code of Conduct include redressing imbalance 
of power and improving conditions of uncertainty.  In order to achieve these 
goals the regulatory process has the potential to provide a framework for 
balanced power relationships and enhanced understanding among participants 
in the franchising sector. 
• The next chapters consider how regulation currently operates across layers of 
governance.  Chapter Three considers regulation by the market, Chapters Four 
and Five examine the regulation of the relationship through contract.  Chapter 
Six considers the current statutory regulatory regime.   
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Chapter Three 
Regulation by the Market: An Interaction Characterized by 
Imbalance of Power and Uncertainty  
 
‘No strategy for resolving conflicts of interest in firms can proceed without 
extensive knowledge of the firm’s organizational structure and 
behaviour...institutions come in many different forms, and most of them are 
complex organizations that are often barely understood, even by those who 
spend their entire lives in them.  To determine how these organizations are 
likely to respond to different stimuli, we need some systematic knowledge that 
goes beyond mere intuition.’254 
 
‘Knowledge is power.’255 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Proceeding from the recommendation in Chapter Two of a process-oriented approach 
to multi-layered regulation, Chapter Three now explores the first of these layers, 
regulation by the market.  Chapter Three provides an introduction to the nature of the 
franchise sector in Australia in order to orient this research in the particular context to 
which the regulatory process applies.   
This chapter provides the foundation for subsequent chapters of this dissertation in 
four ways.  First, it outlines the fundamental nature of the franchise structure. Chapter 
Three introduces the legal relationship between a franchisor and franchisee and 
explains the development of franchising historically as a business form.  The chapter 
then explains some of the social and cultural conditions conducive to franchising, and 
the economic reasons that underlie a franchisor’s choice of the franchise business 
model. It also explores the complex motivations behind a franchisee’s choice to 
participate in franchising.  Some of these motivations may be based upon myths about 
the form; these are also explored in this chapter.  Second, this chapter describes the 
regulation of the sector by the parties themselves through the market, and indicates 
that imbalance of power and uncertainty, particularly for a franchisee, are conditions 
                                                 
254 Edward L. Rubin, ‘Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation’ (2005) 6 The Cegla 
Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law 347, 348. 
255 Sir Francis Bacon, Religious Meditations, Of Heresies (1597). 
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characteristic of the market interaction in the franchise relationship.  Third, this 
chapter demonstrates that there is a need for more reliable data about the realities of 
franchising.  It outlines the reasons why information about the sector is currently 
difficult to obtain and suggests that the lack of balanced, reliable information about 
the sector presents important problems, in particular for franchisees, but also for 
outsiders, including researchers and regulators, as it hampers research and impedes 
the design of appropriate regulation.  This lack of information also explains why 
disclosure appears to be a solution, but insufficient information also means that 
process is deficient, as the first element in Sparrow’s regulatory process is to obtain 
meaningful measurements.  Thus, the obvious regulatory solution, disclosure, lacks a 
solid justification.  Fourth, the chapter lays the foundation for later analysis of 
regulation via the contract because understanding the role of the contract as both an 
instrument and an object of regulation requires an awareness of the motivations, 
perceptions and experiences of the contracting parties.  This aspect of regulation was 
introduced in Chapter Two and will be developed further in Chapters Four and Five.   
3.1 A BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 
Franchising is an evolving business form.  The traditional taxonomy of franchising 
includes three categories of franchise system, product, manufacturing, and business 
format franchising.256  The attributes of these types of franchising reflect the historical 
development of franchising.  As with any process of evolution, the lines are not 
distinctly drawn; a franchise system may fall into more than one of these categories.   
The first and simplest is the product franchise.  Here, a franchisor is a distributor who 
supplies goods to a retailer with the understanding that the retailer will have the 
exclusive right to sell goods in a particular area of the market. This market is usually, 
but not always, defined in geographic terms.257  Gas stations, car dealerships, and 
some clothing companies are examples of this type.  Early examples of franchising 
were product franchises, for example the beer franchises in England and Germany of 
the 1800s, some of which still persist today.  The second category, sometimes 
collapsed into the first, is the processing or manufacturing franchise.  Here, a 
franchisor provides the particular specifications or a specific element which a 
                                                 
256 Andrew Terry and Des Giugni, Business, Society and the Law (3rd ed, 2002). 
257 Today, the Internet poses a challenge in defining the parameters of a given market. 
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franchisee uses in producing the product. Soft drinks are the classic example of the 
manufacturing franchise.  The third type, the business format franchise, developed in 
the post-war period from the mid 1950s.  In this type of franchise arrangement a 
franchisor licences to a franchisee a comprehensive, often extensive operating system. 
A franchisee must comply with a franchisor’s requirements in operating the system or 
risk losing the franchise. Fast food restaurants such as Subway, hotel chains such as 
Wyndam, video rental such as Blockbuster, and travel agents such as Flight Centre are 
all examples of this type.  Business format franchising is the most common form of 
franchise in Australia.  Of a total of about 708 franchise systems reported in Australia 
in 1999, 677 were business format franchises.258   
Within the rubric of business-format franchising generally there are many variations.  
In her award-winning analysis of franchise contracts as incomplete contracts Gillian 
Hadfield observed, ‘[t]he threshold problem of defining "franchising" plunges us 
immediately into the complexity of this modern organizational form.’259  ‘Direct 
franchising’ includes both ‘unit franchising’ (franchisor to individual franchisees) and 
‘development agreements’ (where a franchisee is a ‘developer’ who secures the right 
to open a number of units in accordance with predetermined schedule and area.).  
‘Master franchise’ arrangements might involve a foreign franchisor, a local sub-
franchisor and local franchisees.  There is multi-unit franchising, as well as various 
forms of licensing and managed-service agreements.  The list of possible models of 
franchising continues to expand.  This dissertation deals with the relation between a 
franchisor and franchisee in its most common form, unit franchising, but it must be 
acknowledged that even within this category, there is wide scope for variation.   There 
are as many kinds of franchising as there are permutations of licensing, their number 
and diversity only seem to continue to grow.    
This diversity within franchising complicates the problem of defining and governing 
the sector.  Within any jurisdiction there may be legislation that attempts to define 
franchising.  Section 9 of the Corporations Act defines franchise as ‘an arrangement 
under which a person earns profits or income by exploiting a right, conferred by the 
owner of the right, to use a trademark or design or other intellectual property or the 
                                                 
258 Frazer and Weaven, Franchising Australia 2002 Survey, Griffith University and the Franchise 
Council of Australia Ltd. (2002) at 3. 
259 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, 930. 
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goodwill attached to it in connection with the supply of goods or services.’260  
Effectively, a franchisor grants to a franchisee the ability to sell or distribute products 
or services which are closely associated with a franchisor's business system, 
trademark, or other commercial symbol(s).  The Franchising Code of Conduct (the 
Code) contains its own definition.  The Code provides that a franchise is 1) a grant by 
a person to another person of the right to carry on the business of providing goods or 
services under a system determined or controlled by a franchisor;  2) the operation of 
the business must be substantially or materially associated with a trademark, 
advertising or commercial symbol owned or specified by a franchisor, where there is; 
3) a payment from a franchisee to a franchisor, for example, an initial capital 
investment fee; a payment for goods or services; or a fee based on a percentage of 
gross or net income.261   
A franchise is a transfer of a right, a type of licence. 262   Often it represents the most 
effective means for an owner of a trademark and other intellectual property relating to 
a business system to obtain revenue from that intellectual property, while at the same 
time maintaining the requisite control to preserve and enhance the value of the 
intellectual property.  Despite efforts to define it, a cogent, consistent legal definition 
of franchising has so far proved elusive.  Legal approaches to franchising are rarely 
straightforward.  The franchise relationship has been compared to a joint venture, 
employment, investment, distributorship, marriage, and sharecropping to name a few.  
Hadfield writes, ‘Such an odd-shaped beast tangles in many areas of the law,’263  
sometimes with grotesque results.     
The franchise relationship takes many forms and within each of these forms a 
franchisor and franchisee play various roles.  These multiple roles add to the 
confusion over the legal nature of franchising.  The role of a franchisee is often 
explicitly stated in the contract, or, more precisely, the contract explicitly states what 
                                                 
260  Robson, Annotated Corporations Act 2002 (2002) at 92.  
261 Clause 4 of the Franchising Code of Conduct, prescribed by the Trade Practices (Industry Codes — 
Franchising) Regulations (1998). 
262 The Federal Court in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Ewing [2004] FCA 5 
considered the distinction between a licence and a franchise. Some commentators have touched upon it, 
but there is no clear legal distinction. Some distinctions that are noted are that franchising is a licence 
for the entire system, and that there is greater participation and control by the franchisor than would be 
the case in a non-franchising licensing arrangement.   
263 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, 928. 
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a franchisee is not.  A typical clause might read, ‘Nothing in this agreement will be 
construed so as to create a partnership or any other relationship between the 
parties’.264  Table 3.1 shows how the sample contracts define the role of a franchisee.   
                                                 
264 Often in a clause under the heading ‘Franchisee Independence’.  The particular clause cited here is 
from the System F19 contract. 
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Table 3.1:  Contractual Provisions Specifying the Franchisor/Franchisee Legal 
Relationship (‘Franchisee Independence’ Clause) 
 
Franchise 
System 
Franchisee is a(n) Franchisee is NOT a(n) or in 
F1 independent 
contractor 
agent, fiduciary 
F2 licensor/ee partner, joint venturer 
F3 independent fiduciary, not employee, agent or partner 
F4 franchisor and 
franchisee 
partner, agent, subsidiary, legal representative 
or employee 
F5 franchisee and 
franchisor 
agent, representative or employee 
F6 independent 
proprietor 
partner, joint venturer, agent or employee 
F7 not specified partner, joint venturer, agent or other form of 
fiduciary 
F8 independent 
proprietor 
partner, joint venturer, agent, representative or 
employee 
F9 independent 
contractor 
agent, representative, master or servant, 
partner, joint venturer, fiduciary or any similar 
relationship 
F10 independent agent, partner or joint venturer 
F11 independent 
contractor 
agent, employee, partner  
F12 independent 
proprietor 
partner, employee or joint venturer 
F13 independent 
proprietor 
Franchisee must clearly exhibit at the location 
that Franchisee operates under Franchisor. 
F14   independent 
proprietor 
partner, representative, agent or joint venturer 
F15 not specified partnership or agency or employment 
F16  independent business partner, joint venturer, agent, employee or 
fiduciary 
F17  independent 
contractor 
agent, partner, joint venturer, employee, 
subsidiary. No fiduciary relationship duties 
owed by franchisor 
F18 independent 
proprietor 
partnership, agency, joint venture or 
employment 
F19 not specified partnership, cannot bind the other 
 
As the table indicates, the emphasis is on what a franchisee is not.  Most franchise 
contracts expressly provide that a franchisee is not an agent, subsidiary, 
representative, legal representative, legal representative, employee, nor in a fiduciary 
relationship, partnership or joint venture.  A contract may include additional language 
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that further negates an agency relationship such as, ‘[n]either party has the power to 
obligate or bind any other party except as authorised by this Agreement.’265   
That this contract term is often labelled, ‘franchisee independence’ offers an insight 
into the drafter’s capacity for irony; in actual practice a franchisee is not independent 
of a franchisor in its operation.  Despite these contractual disclaimers, the contract and 
the relationship in many ways suggest that a franchisee is like an employee, a 
distributor, an agent, and/or a joint venturer.   There are also many similarities in the 
role of a franchisee to the role of an investor and also to the role of a consumer of 
goods and/or services. 
Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, a franchisor wants to avoid the legal 
burdens of such relationships, and includes an express term that says the relation is 
none of these things.  A franchisor has control, and it uses that control to draft terms 
like this one to avoid obligations and liabilities and to ensure favourable outcomes 
when subject to judicial interpretation or legislation.266   
3.2 SOCIAL CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR 
FRANCHISING 
3.2.1 Social and cultural explanations  
Social and economic explanations for franchising can help to explain the nature of this 
‘odd-shaped beast’. When Ray Kroc began selling the business format for 
McDonald’s restaurants in the mid 1950s, the social, economic and cultural conditions 
in America were ideal for growth in the sector.  Such conditions include positive 
attitudes, both politically and socially, toward small business; highly-developed 
communications systems that facilitate pervasive advertising;  and high levels of 
tertiary activities, such as service and knowledge-based industries with heavy 
customer interface as well as retail and services that are best served by small, 
                                                 
265 System F7. 
266 There is no regulation in the form of disclosure or any other regulatory tool with respect to this 
contract term.  It may be appropriate for a court (or a regulator) to find that one or more of these 
relationships does exist, even in the face of an express term that states all the relationships that 
franchising is not.  The challenge in interpretation is to comprehend the multiple roles played by the 
franchisee in the franchise relationship, to consider not only the clause that neatly proclaims the 
franchisee to be an independent contractor, but to look at all the contract terms, and beyond the contract 
to consider the entire relationship. 
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dispersed outlets.267   Television enabled nationwide (and international) brand-name 
recognition.  Increased consumer mobility and an increase in the real income of 
consumers were further driving factors in the post-war boom in franchising in the 
US.268   The increased prevalence on a global scale of these conditions has probably 
contributed to the increase in international franchising in recent years.   
3.2.2 Economic explanations  
Most of the literature about the economics of franchising deals with the motivations 
for franchising from the point of view of a franchisor and a franchisor’s decision to 
franchise, specifically why businesses choose to operate as franchises rather than 
expand through company owned and operated outlets.269    While there is no single, 
accepted theory of franchising in the marketing and economics research, the two most 
frequently cited motivations in the choice to franchise are transaction cost efficiency 
and resource acquisition theory.270  Both are introduced briefly in this chapter. 
Because the former has been the subject of greater discussion in the literature, more 
attention is devoted here to transaction cost theory.  This chapter will deal first and 
more briefly with resource acquisition theory.  As it deals with reducing the 
accessibility and the cost of capital, resource acquisition theory might be seen as an 
aspect of transaction cost theory. 
                                                 
267 Some of the factors described here are derived from the work of Stanworth and Curran.  See John 
Stanworth and James Curran, ‘Colas, Burgers, Shakes and Shirkers: Towards a Sociological Model of 
Franchising in the Market Economy’ (1999) 14(4) Journal of Business Venturing 323, 344. 
268 G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter, ‘Competition Policy and Vertical Exchange’ (1985) 7 
Collected Research Studies. 
269 Williamson describes franchising as a hybrid, federated structure. See also Paul H. Rubin, ‘The 
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’ (1978) 21 Journal of Law and 
Economics 223; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, ‘An Agency Perspective on Franchising’ (1991) 20 
Financial Management 27; and Mathewson and Winter, ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’ 
(1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 503. For a thorough review of theories of franchising see 
Sanja S. Mehta and Lou E. Pelton,  ‘Limitations of Existing Theories:  A Need for a General Theory of 
Franchise Relationships’, (Paper presented at the 14th Annual International Society of Franchising, San 
Diego, February 19-20, 2000). 
270 There are other theories for the franchise structure. One is the information search theory.  See 
Antony W. Dnes, ‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 Journal of Legal Studies 
367, 391.  According to Dnes the franchise contract can be about bonding or screening or a 
combination of both.  Another aspect pertains to relationship management and the desire to keep 
conflict at manageable levels.  Finally, see also entrepreneurial theory in Alanson P. Minkler, ‘An 
Empirical Analysis of a Firm’s Decision to Franchise’ (1990) 34(1) Economics Letters 77. 
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3.2.2.1 Resource acquisition 
According to ‘resource acquisition theory’ the phenomenon of franchising can be 
attributed to its advantages in capital-raising.271  Franchising is a business structure 
that helps a franchisor raise capital because franchisees provide a source of both start-
up and working capital in exchange for the right to use a successful business concept 
and to operate the franchise unit.  A franchisee pays an initial fee, the ‘franchise fee’, 
as well as royalties and other ongoing service fees.   A new franchisee also commits to 
a lease if applicable, purchases the plant and equipment, pays for the stock and 
secures the start-up capital to operate the business.  Because a franchisee accepts 
virtually all financial responsibility and risk for establishing and running the new unit,  
this business structure offers a uniquely effective method of harnessing the financial 
equity (as well as the ‘sweat equity’) of a franchisee to fuel rapid expansion and 
increase market penetration for the franchise system.   
Franchising enables rapid, steady growth for a franchisor with reduced exposure to 
business risk. The capital investment of a franchisee provides a franchisor with a low-
risk means to meet the capital costs of rapid expansion. A viable business concept in a 
highly dynamic and competitive market must be implemented quickly, due to the 
danger of losing market share and brand awareness in markets where new ideas are 
quickly replicated by competitors.272  Franchising thus enables a business to 
efficiently manage exponential growth by providing access to capital to fuel 
expansion in collapsed time frames. 
3.2.2.2 Transaction cost theory  
The transaction cost theory of economics considers franchising from a principal/agent 
perspective. While resource acquisition theory has been well-supported in the 
literature, many studies emphasize transaction cost and agency theory as explanations 
for franchising.  This may be attributable in part to the importance of transaction cost 
theory in new institutional economics, where it is used in analysis of the governance 
                                                 
271 For an overview of economic theories of franchising see Mehta and Pelton, ‘Limitations of Existing 
Theories: A Need for “A General Theory of Franchise Relationships’ (Paper presented at the 14th 
Annual International Society of Franchising, San Diego, February 19-20, 2000).  See also Sue Birley, 
Benoit Leleux, Stephen Spinelli, ‘Franchising your Way to Riches?  An Analysis of Value Creation in 
Public Franchisors’, http://www.babson.edu/entrep/fer/papers97/birley/bir1.htm at 20 July 1997. 
272 See for example, John J. Gillman, ‘Broken Sticks – Why Mergers may fail to Garner Market Share’ 
(1992) 13(5) Managerial and Decision Economics 453, 455.  
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and structure of the firm.  Transaction cost economics uses the transaction as the basic 
unit of economic analysis, and applies this economic analysis to organizational theory, 
the law of contracts, and the contracting process to explain the economics of 
organizations.273 
Transaction costs can be defined as the,  
‘heterogeneous costs that arise in economic activity. In many deals, parties have 
to find each other, communicate, measure and inspect the goods that are to be 
purchased, draw up the contract using lawyers, keep records, and so on. In some 
cases, compliance needs to be enforced through legal action. All these entail 
costs in terms of real resources and time, termed transaction costs. The reality 
of these costs contrasts with the frequent assumption of a perfectly clearing, 
frictionless market.’274   
The term is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘agency costs’ because most 
transaction costs are related to agency relationships.  Transaction costs can be divided 
into two broad categories. Coordination costs arise from coordinating agents’ 
activities such as costs of obtaining information and coordinating input in 
production.275 Motivation costs include the costs of motivating agents to align their 
interests to avoid cheating or other opportunistic behaviour as well as costs of 
monitoring.276  Transaction costs may also include liability for other obligations that 
arise in connection with the relationship, such as franchisor liability for the tortious or 
contractual liability of franchisees.     
Institutional economics types organizational structures as adaptations to economize on 
transaction costs. Oliver Williamson identifies three critical variables in determining 
transaction type; these variables are asset specificity, opportunism, and bounded 
                                                 
273 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law (1997) 147. 
274 Craig Calhoun, ed., Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press 2002. Oxford 
Reference Online.  Bond University. 24 August 2007, 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t104.e1700>. 
275 See Henrik Mathiesen, Decomposing Costs Into Transaction Costs and Production Costs  (2005) 
Encycogov.com: The Encyclopedia About Corporate Governance  
<http://www.encycogov.com/b11researchtraditions/tce/exhi_1decomposetc.asp> at 15 July 2007 which 
cites the work of George J. Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961) 69 Journal of Political 
Economy 213; A. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information, Costs and Economic 
Organising’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777; and Yorman Barzel, ‘Measurement Cost and 
the Organization of Markets’ (1982) 25 Journal of Law and Economics 27, respectively.     
276 Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analyses and Antitrust Implications (1975); Oliver 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985). 
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rationality.277   According to the concept of ‘asset specificity’, some contractors enjoy 
advantages over others because they control certain assets, locations or intellectual 
property.  Any potential new contractor must make a start-up investment to attain the 
same level of advantage and is therefore at a competitive disadvantage.  Asset 
specificity can impair competition in contracts, because of the advantage(s) enjoyed 
by those ‘advantaged’ contractors, who may at the same time be ‘disadvantaged’ by 
increased dependency on the specific investment and so on the relationship.  
‘Opportunism’ describes behaviour resulting from moral hazard, such as lying, 
cheating, stealing, incomplete disclosure, misleading conduct, and distortion of 
information.  A party may promise to perform in good faith, but may still succumb to 
the temptation to benefit its own interests at the expense of the other.278  This makes 
the promise aspect of contracting inherently unreliable. ‘Bounded rationality’ 
describes the inability of contracting parties to consider every contingency that may 
arise in the course of the contracting relationship. Contractors’ rationality is limited by 
knowledge, communication and future uncertainty.  It is impossible to have perfect 
knowledge because human communication is imperfect and there is no way to 
perfectly predict the future.  Bounded rationality means that contract planning is never 
entirely effective because it is not possible to predict or to address all contingencies.279  
Asset specificity, opportunism and bounded rationality together create conditions that 
inform the selection of an organization’s governance structure.  Certain business 
structures minimize the transaction costs of producing and distributing a particular 
type of good or service.  Effectively the transaction type determines the choice of 
governance structure.280  The transaction type is reflected in the contract, or set of 
contracts binding the participants in the business structure, and this is why these 
                                                 
277 Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Lange, Law and Economics, Volume I (1992)  xvii. 
278 Ethical relativism comes into play here: In the case of incomplete disclosure, for example, the 
opportunistic party may not see the situation as would the party not receiving the information.  Parties 
to contracts do not necessarily share the same ethical standards, let alone the same standards of good 
faith and fairness in the deal. 
279 Oliver Williamson, ‘Why Law, Economics, and Organization?’ [14] (Working Paper No 37, 
University of California Berkley, 2000) 
<http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oewithwleaorg17b121800.pdf> at 9 November 2006.  See also 
Andrew Coulson, Trust and Contracts: Relationships in Local Government, Health and Public Services 
(1998) for an interesting application of Williamson’s principles. 
280 Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 
Journal of Law and Economics 22(2) 233, 233-261.  For his thoughts on the implications of 
Williamson’s work on regulation of contracts see Collins (1999) at 259. 
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structures are categorized not simply by the transaction type but also by the kind of 
contract involved.281   
Based on the configurations of these styles of contracting, Williamson distinguishes 
several ‘theories of the firm’, classical, neoclassical, behavioural (also known as 
forbearance or relational).282   Williamson groups these into categories of enterprise 
from market to hybrid to hierarchy.  The hierarchical is large and vertically integrated, 
while at the other end of the spectrum, small to medium-sized enterprise displays little 
vertical integration.283     
According to the ‘classical’ theory, contracting parties and investment characteristics 
are fungible.  There is no asset specificity.  Contract terms can be fully specified, so 
there is no bounded rationality.  Remedies can be clear and prescribed, so there is no 
opportunism.  This is the theoretical ideal market transaction, suited to market 
governance.   
Under the ‘neoclassical’ theory, performance is longer term, so there is greater 
uncertainty.  There are specific assets, but the transactions are relatively infrequent.  
Bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity here create a need for a more 
specialized governance structure than the market of the classical model.  But because 
the transactions are infrequent, the parties themselves will be less inclined to invest, 
and will instead prefer to leave governance to third party supervision.   Trilateral 
governance, for example arbitration or any process where a third party is involved to 
assist in the governance of the relation, is therefore the norm to assist with governance 
and at the same time economize on the costs of neoclassical contracting.   
                                                 
281 Regarding the ability of parties to contract in a way that adapts to these variables, Williamson 
identifies four contracting ‘mechanisms’, planning, promise, competition and governance.  Where there 
are problems of inadequate knowledge or information asymmetry, communication and future 
uncertainty, planning can be used.  Promise limits the scope for opportunism and improves reliability.  
Competition can be a source of mechanisms to redress imbalance created by asset specificity.  
Governance provides for greater integration of the activities within the structure of a firm, so that more 
unified governance can be a solution to many of the transaction cost problems in contracts.   
282 Oliver Williamson, ‘Why Law, Economics, and Organization?’ [16] (Working Paper No 37, 
University of California Berkley, 2000) 
<http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/bpp/oewithwleaorg17b121800.pdf> at 9 November 2006.  
Williamson also identifies agency, evolutionary and transaction cost theories of contracting, but most 
law and economics commentary focuses on the first three for which Williamson adopts Macneil’s 
classification, which identifies three traditions of contract law.  
283 Sciarra criticizes Williamson for being too static, not accounting for changes in relations over time.  
Silvana Sciarra, ‘Franchising and Contract of Employment: Notes on a Still Impossible Assimilation’ 
in Christian Joerges (ed),  Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in 
Europe and the United States (1991), 256. 
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Finally, under ‘behavioural’ theory contracts involve specific investment.  As with the 
neoclassical model, the relation is long-term and uncertain, but in this case the 
transactions are recurrent and involve higher levels of investment. If the investment is 
not idiosyncratic, a bilateral governance structure may be appropriate. Uncertainty 
does not matter in market transactions where idiosyncratic investment is low and 
substitutability is high.  Where there is high uncertainty as well as high idiosyncratic 
investment and recurrent transactions, however, there is a need for unified governance 
structures.284   As the investment becomes highly idiosyncratic, investment in more 
specialized governance structures by the parties is justified,285 and there is likely to be 
greater integration of buyer and seller under a more tightly-controlled, unified system 
of governance.286    
Williamson suggested that franchising conforms to a hybrid model which he 
described as ‘federated’, where large and small entities are linked.  The federated 
model takes advantage of the disparate economies of scale of linked production and 
marketing processes, and saves on coordination costs.287   A franchisor can achieve 
economies of scale of a large operation in cooperative infrastructure for purchasing, 
product development, and promotion for the system as a whole, all of which can 
become more cost-effective as a franchise group expands. 
This model seems especially apt for larger, more established franchise systems.  
McDonald’s, for example, can contract for beef on a massive scale in Brazil, while 
retaining the local ‘touch’ of individual franchise units.  The per-unit cost of 
developing a franchise system may be less than the amount required to open one 
additional company store.  At the same time, through the development and operation 
of small units, a franchisor is freed of day-to-day unit operation and local market 
                                                 
284 Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 
22(2) Journal of Law and Economics 233, 254. 
285 Id., 245. 
286 There are three additional theories that are not discussed here, the agency, evolutionary,  and 
transaction cost theories. 
287 See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analyses and Antitrust Implications (1975); 
Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985);  Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction-
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ (1979) 22(2) Journal of Law and 
Economics 233, 233-261.  The original concept is based on the work of Ronald Coase, which has been 
developed by Oliver Williamson.  Williamson posits that enterprises can be organized along a 
continuum; from ‘hierarchical’ (that is large and vertically integrated) to ‘market’ (ie small to medium-
sized enterprise with little vertical integration).  Williamson suggests another category of enterprise 
along this continuum, or perhaps somewhere alongside it. 
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concerns, while still receiving information about these functions.288  Thus, franchising 
allows a business to simultaneously secure the advantages of both large-scale and 
small-unit operations.   
The costs of coordinating specialized agents such as costs of obtaining information, 
coordinating input in production, and costs of monitoring and measurement are 
mainly caused by bounded rationality (imperfect knowledge).289  In franchising this 
means that information asymmetry and uncertainty over future conditions lead to 
coordination costs, for example, in recruitment and transfer with respect to the 
selection and substitutability of franchisee.  The franchise form helps contain 
coordination costs by allowing a franchisor to enter into an employment-like relation 
with a franchisee without the usual costs and risks associated with employment.  A 
franchisee pays to set up the unit, enjoys fewer compensatory benefits, fewer statutory 
protections and takes on more of the operating risk than would an employee.    
Franchising also keeps motivation costs down because a franchisee, unlike an 
employee, has a financial interest in the performance of its unit. A franchisee’s equity 
investment thus ensures a strong commitment to the success of the business so that a 
franchisor can reduce costs of incentives and monitoring.  Most franchisees directly 
manage their businesses themselves (as an added assurance they are often required to 
do so according to terms of the contract). The level of motivation of a typical 
franchisee is therefore high as it is easier in smaller, specialized firms to motivate 
agents by closer monitoring and by offering compensation schemes that reward good 
work.290   
Screening of an agent is a coordination cost that can save monitoring costs.  A 
franchisors’ investment in screening can reduce motivation and monitoring costs 
                                                 
288 This function gave rise to the ‘information search theory’ of franchising.  
289 See Henrik Mathiesen, Decomposing Costs Into Transaction Costs and Production Costs  (2005) 
Encycogov.com: The Encyclopedia About Corporate Governance  
<http://www.encycogov.com/b11researchtraditions/tce/exhi_1decomposetc.asp> at 9 November 2006 
which cites the work of George J. Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961) 69 Journal of 
Political Economy 213; A. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information, Costs and 
Economic Organising’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777; and Yorman Barzel, ‘Measurement 
Cost and the Organization of Markets’ (1982) 25 Journal of Law and Economics 27, respectively.     
290 George Dent, ‘Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances’ (2002) 58 The Business Lawyer 45, n20. 
 99
because it selects franchisees who are highly motivated to achieve greater returns on 
their own equity investments.291   
The screening process in franchising in Australia is probably deficient both in the 
screening of franchisees by franchisors and in the screening of franchisors by 
franchisees. In the former case, the short supply of franchisees in the market for 
franchises in Australia means that franchisors are more likely to accept franchisees 
that are less qualified, perhaps even unqualified for the role.  In the latter instance, the 
prospective franchisee is ill-equipped to evaluate franchise systems for a variety of 
reasons that will be explained in Chapter Six.   
To the extent that they can substitute for the screening function, the costs of other 
methods of controlling transaction costs, such as monitoring, may increase.292  A 
franchisor may impose tighter monitoring controls to ensure the protection of its 
brand. The result of ineffective screening is that opportunistic behaviour such as 
franchisee free-riding, a form of moral hazard where a franchisee shirks on the trade 
name or brand, may be more prevalent.     
For this reason, transaction costs in relation to recruitment and the limited pool of 
available, qualified franchisees in the Australian market can lead to a choice to 
integrate, hiring managers for company-owned stores rather than selling franchise 
units to be operated by franchisees.  However, if resource acquisition, information 
search, or other motivating factors are important, a franchisor may be inclined to 
accept under-qualified franchisees rather than make the shift to company-owned 
units.293 
                                                 
291  The franchise relationship in fact presents a double-sided moral hazard.  While the accepted theory 
is that the franchisee is an agent of the franchisor, providing one of the central reasons behind the 
decision to franchise, the franchisee is also in some respects a principal and the franchisor is an agent 
who must be screened and monitored before assuming a role where he is able to exercise extensive 
control over assets provided by the franchisee. B. Elango and Vance H. Fried, ‘Franchising Research:  
A Literature Review and Synthesis’ (1997) 35(3) Journal of Small Business Management 68, 74. 
292 The franchise contract needs to reflect the reality of franchising’s bi-directional agency and to 
protect against the double-edged moral hazard it creates.  This monitoring function will require more 
than contract because the monitoring of a franchisor requires collective action by franchisees:  E. Rubin 
as cited by B. Elango and Vance H. Fried, ‘Franchising Research:  A Literature Review and Synthesis’ 
(1997) 35(3) Journal of Small Business Management 68, 74. 
293 Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade, ‘Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision’ in 
Chatterjee, Kalyan and Samuelson, William F.(eds) Game Theory and Business Applications (2001).  
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There are still other ways that franchising allows a franchisor to economize on 
transaction costs.  One is in the drafting and negotiation of contract.  Here, as will be 
described in greater detail in Chapter Four, the contract attributes can reduce costs.  
For example, a franchisor’s use of standard form contracts reduces transaction costs in 
formation of contract while the relational qualities of contract reduce costs of re-
negotiating and resolving disputes.  Another transaction cost benefit of franchising is 
the savings in the cost of obtaining information.  As Williamson’s ‘federated’ model 
highlights, franchising is a way for a franchisor to guarantee free access to market 
information from many independently-owned local units.  
The choice to franchise is thus motivated largely by franchisor considerations of 
capital efficiency and transaction costs.   The infusion of outside capital together with 
cost savings allow for expansion over widely dispersed markets geographically.   
Under favourable conditions, such as the adequate supply of well-qualified 
franchisees, a well-run franchise structure successfully facilitates the rapid 
recruitment and training of qualified, motivated management.  It also contains 
transaction costs such as coordination, motivation and monitoring costs; drafting and 
negotiation of contracts; and it facilitates intra-organizational information-sharing and 
innovation.   
3.3 FRANCHISEE PERCEPTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS  
Franchisor motivations to franchise are well-documented.  Economic justifications 
dominate the reasons given for the choice to franchise by franchisors. Economic 
theories of franchising describe why the firm is structured the way it is from the point 
of view of the organizers of the firm.  Economics is less helpful in understanding 
franchisee motivations because economic theories of organizational structure 
generally do not give much weight to the extent to which the structure benefits the 
consumer of the product of the firm, or suppliers or creditors with whom the firm does 
business.  As Louise Sylvan noted, 
‘Because of the way industrial economists work, all over the world, the focus in 
terms of competition outcomes has tended to be on the supply side – in other 
words, the focus has been on firms.’294   
                                                 
294 Louise Sylvan, ‘Consumer Regulation – How do we know it is effective?’ (Speech delivered at 
National Consumer Congress, Melbourne, 15 March 2004)  
<http://www.atug.com.au/other/ACCCNationalConsumerCongressMarch04.pdf> at 26 September 
2006. 
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The choice of franchising as a business model can be attributed largely to its risk 
reduction for a franchisor because a franchisee puts its own resources and capital at 
risk instead of those of a franchisor.  When a franchisor’s risk is transferred to a 
franchisee, however, it is not clear that a franchisee understands the bargain.  
Generally, in market transaction, including investment transactions, the party that 
undertakes higher risk is compensated; there is a trade-off between risk and return.295  
If a consumer or investor in a transaction fails to understand the nature of the risks, it 
will also probably fail to ensure it is adequately compensated for assuming risk.296 
This may be the province of regulation, but theories of regulation only consider this 
aspect of a firm’s operation as part of an overall program that asks first, whether the 
operation is efficient.  The primary motivation for regulation generally is to correct 
market failure.  If there is market failure, then regulation is warranted.  Whether the 
operation, business structure or the relationship is fair is a harder question, and is not 
considered an economic one.297  Regulatory activity has traditionally been more 
dominated by economists than regulators, and the question of fairness has been less 
prominent as economists have devoted less attention to the consumer, in this case the 
franchisee, side of the equation.    
While a franchisor has a variety of legal and economic reasons for franchising, 
individual franchisees may not benefit from all the same factors that contributed to a 
franchisor decision to franchise.  A  franchisee’s reasons to participate in this business 
form are less dominated by economics, and are more likely to encompass a complex 
mix of personal, social and financial considerations.  In the competition for fewer and 
fewer qualified franchisees, research into franchisee motivations has been conducted 
                                                 
295 Steven Wu, Ohio State University Fact Sheet, The Economics of Contracts for Non-Economists at 
www.ohioline.osu.edu/ae-fact/0010.html>.  
296 Ruben (1978; 1990) notes that the risk sharing benefits of franchising that are initially conceived at 
the franchisor level are negated at the franchisee level. See Sue Birley, Benoit Leleux, Stephen Spinelli, 
Franchising your Way to Riches?  An Analysis of Value Creation in Public Franchisors 
http://www.babson.edu/entrep/fer/papers97/birley/bir1.htm at 20 July 1997. 
297 Personal interview with Albert Jolink, Director Erasmus Center for History in Management and 
Economics, Rotterdam at Sophia-Antipolis September 2006.  Though this may be changing slowly as 
the economics of the firm is beginning to look at the impact of the firm’s structure.  See Michel 
Aglietta, ‘Corporate Governance and the Long-Run Investor’, (Paper presented at the Third Meeting of 
the European Network on the Economics of the Firm (ENEF)  GREDEG, CNRS and University of 
Nice Sophia Antipolis, 7-9 September 2006). 
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primarily for and by consultants to the sector.   Less attention has been devoted to the 
topic in the academic literature.298     
As will be described in the next section of this chapter, extensive lists of reasons to 
purchase a franchise are disseminated by franchisor industry groups as well as 
individual franchisor systems.  Many of a franchisee’s reasons to franchise are based 
on perceptions that are generated and/or reinforced through franchisor marketing.   
They include trademark-related benefits such as high levels of brand awareness; a 
track record that helps assess prospects for performance; collective marketing and 
advertising; better cooperation from lenders; the possibility for small entrepreneurs to 
compete with national and international firms; and training, management support, and 
technical assistance.299  Frequently, these reasons are repeated, but often not proven, 
in the marketing and management academic literature.   
There are also cultural and socio-political factors that contribute to the attraction 
franchising holds for prospective franchisees. The rise of the entrepreneur to the status 
of a cultural icon is one intangible aspect of the appeal of franchising to franchisees. 
On a psychological level franchising combines values of entrepreneurial 
individualism and independence with the cooperative appeal of a communal/team 
enterprise.  Franchising is seen as a path to making one’s own fortune, while enjoying 
the benefits of both independence and security.  Mothers with school-aged children 
and retirees are ‘lifestyle franchisees’, attracted to the flexibility and independence of 
the structure, and to the idea captured in the industry slogan, ‘in business for your self, 
but not by yourself.’300    
                                                 
298  See the website of Greg Nathan, <http:// www.franchiserelationships.com> and Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Franchisee Satisfaction Survey Benchmark 2004, 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/franchise_survey_lo-res.pdf> at 29 December 2005. See 
also Kaufman. and Stanworth, ‘The Decision to Purchase a Franchise: A Study of Prospective 
Franchisees’ (1995) 33 Journal of Small Business Management 22. and  Stanworth and Curran, ‘Colas, 
Burgers, Shakes and Shirkers: Towards a Sociological Model of Franchising in the Market Economy’ 
(1999) 14(4) Journal of Business Venturing 323. 
299  Franchisors may choose to avoid offering this and other services unless they generate additional 
fees. 
300 Working for yourself not by yourself: are you suited? Franchisebusiness.com.au 
<http://www.franchisebusiness.com.au/articles/C9/0C03BFC9.aspx> at 15 July 2007; Be in Business 
for Yourself, not by Yourself!!! (2006) Blue Horizon Group 
<http://www.bluehorizongroup.biz/page/page/1682226.htm> at 4 July 2006. 
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Franchising is often portrayed as a safer route into self-employment with or without 
prior self-employment.301  Franchisors market franchising as a sensible option for 
middle-managers who have been made redundant; for semi-retired people turning to 
‘lifestyle’ franchises to fill a gap and provide a needed boost to income; and for 
divorced women, widows, and others with poor employment prospects but a small 
‘nest egg’ who see franchising as a safer way than independent small business for a 
less experienced person to get started in business ownership.  These prospective 
franchisees believe they are ‘buying themselves a job’, and ensuring their future 
incomes.  
The perception is that the existing successful name and reputation of the franchise 
system increase a franchisee’s chances of success and that the ‘tried-and-tested’ 
quality of the business system reduces the risk to a franchisee in the new unit 
operation. The industry commonly cites information about success rates for 
franchising as compared with independently operated small business. A US 
government website advises, ‘If you are concerned about the risk involved in a new 
independent business venture, then franchising may be the best business option for 
you.’302  Australian franchisors claim that, ‘Franchising is 2.5 times more successful 
than non-franchised business.’303  A franchisee’s perception of the reduced risk of a 
franchised business may be one of the most important components of the promise of 
franchising.   
In some cases, however, the element of reduced risk may be more perception than 
reality.  A 2006 article in Fortune Magazine re-ignited debate in the US over franchise 
success rates.304  The relative success of franchising as a method of doing business has 
not been conclusively measured, for example, using failure rates for franchises as 
compared to those of independent small business, but some research indicates that, 
‘franchising is not a low-risk form of business enterprise, for franchisors or 
                                                 
301 B. Elango and Vance H. Fried, ‘Franchising Research:  A Literature Review and Synthesis’ (1997) 
35(3) Journal of Small Business Management 68, 71-72.  
302 See <http://www.business.gov/phases/launching/buy_franchise/franchising_overview.html> at 26 
September 2006.  This claim is so often repeated in franchise circles, including by academics, that it 
has become axiomatic. 
303 <http://www.users.bigpond.com/warren13/in_australia.htm> at 31 March 2007. 
304 Author unknown, ‘Think Buying a Franchise is Safer than Starting a Business? Think Again’ 
(December 2005/January 2006) Fortune Small Business. 
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franchisees.’305   Blair and Lafontaine are the authors of the authoritative academic 
text on the economics of franchising, The Economics of Franchising.  They conclude 
that the data available from various studies does not support the assertion that 
franchising is less risky than independent business, ‘the data contradict that investing 
in a franchise is a risk-free or very low-risk endeavour…failure rates suggest that 
joining a young or new franchise system is probably more risky than starting one’s 
own business.’306  This refutes one of the main advantages claimed by franchisors 
when marketing to prospective franchisees and by franchisees for buying franchises.  
This is one of the myths of franchising; franchisees entertain this and other 
fundamental misconceptions about franchising that lead to disappointment when the 
reality of franchising fails to match its promise. 
The promise of franchising comprises other myths as well.  The following comparison 
of industry association claims compared with the potential realities of the franchising 
experience underscores some of the common areas of franchisee misunderstanding.  
The following claims, in italics, are made on the Franchise Council of Australia 
website: 
The Industry Association Claims307  
(Industry Association claims are reproduced below in italics, followed by discussion 
of each claim after the heading, ‘Information the Industry Association does not 
provide’)   
‘There are countless benefits to becoming a Franchisee, which is why 
Franchising is one of the fastest-growing sectors of the Australian economy. 
Here is a short list of eighteen advantages of Franchising over stand-alone 
forms of small business:’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  The initial premise here 
deserves closer examination.  The FCA presents franchising as alternative to starting 
your own business.  More research is needed to provide a better understanding of how 
franchising actually compares with independent small business ownership. According 
to Blair and Lafontaine, ‘In reality, owning a franchise is not at all the same as 
independent small business ownership.’  Blair and Lafontaine note a common 
                                                 
305 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005) 294.   See also the ABA 
franchising listserv discussion of December 2005 that notes studies comparing success rates of 
independent small business and franchised businesses report conflicting results.    
306 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005)  44. 
307 See <http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=185> 26 September 2006. 
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misperception about the nature of franchising that is perpetuated by franchisor claims 
that this business structure provides the opportunity for a franchisee to ‘be your own 
boss’.  They stress that a franchisee must see the arrangement as a contractual 
agreement of fixed duration.  A franchisee is contracting for the right to use a 
particular trademark in a particular location for a particular time period; it should not 
see itself as establishing its own independent business that can be fully transferable.  
Franchising, therefore, is not comparable to independent small business ownership.  
This view is not cultivated by franchisors, however, because it would change the 
attitude of franchisees toward the enterprise, requiring different contractual and other 
devices to manage a franchisee. 
‘1. The Franchisor provides detailed training.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  This claim is true in some 
systems. The quality and extent of this training varies widely from system to system 
as do the costs that a franchisor charges to a franchisee for this service. 
 ‘2. The Franchisee has the incentive of owning their (sic) own business with the 
additional benefit of continuing assistance from the Franchisor.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  Again, the quality and 
extent of this assistance varies widely from system to system as do the costs that a 
franchisor charges to a franchisee for franchisor support. 
 ‘3. The Franchisee benefits from operating under the name and reputation 
(brand image) of the Franchisor, which is already well established in the mind 
and eye of the public.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: The franchisor’s 
trademark/brand is indeed important but the quality varies significantly.  Not all 
brands are well-established, and it can be hard to quantify and ensure maintenance of 
the brand, as this is left to the discretion of the franchisor.  Also, the franchisee may 
lose this benefit and be left without legal recourse in the case of franchisor sale of the 
system or insolvency.   
‘4. The Franchisee will usually need less capital than they would if they were 
setting up a business independently because, through their pilot operations 
and buying power, will have eliminated unnecessary expense.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: A franchisee may in fact 
need more capital than to set up an independent small business.  It must pay the 
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franchise fee, its franchisor’s as well as its own legal costs, and other upfront charges 
to a franchisor.   
‘5. The Franchisor provides the advice and/or help in identifying suitable 
trading locations or operating territories for the Franchisee.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  A franchisee may benefit 
from such advice and/or help but its interests are not the same as those of a franchisor.  
(For examples of conflicts of interest between a franchisor and a franchisee see further 
discussion in this chapter and in Chapter Five).  
‘6. The Franchisor helps the Franchisee obtain occupation rights to the trading 
location, comply with planning (zoning) laws, prepare plans for layouts, 
shopfitting and refurbishment, and provide general assistance in calculating the 
correct level and mix of stock for the opening launch of the business.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: Depending on the nature 
of the property rights in the premises and who holds them, a franchisor may provide 
these services, but will charge a fee, for example 25 percent of the total for franchisor 
management of shop fit-out.  
‘7. The Franchisor trains the Franchisee (and very often, the Franchisee's staff 
as well) in all areas of the business such as; manufacture, preparation, 
accounting, business controls, marketing, promotion and merchandising.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: A franchisor may or may 
not offer these services. If so, a franchisor in most instances charges for them, usually 
at a profit to franchisor.  The training of a franchisee and its staff can be a hidden 
expense, one not incurred in independent small business.  
‘8. The Franchisor may negotiate better rates of finance, or more favourable 
conditions, for Franchisees with financial institutions.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: Anecdotal evidence from 
franchisees indicates that this may not be as easy or as beneficial to the interests of a 
franchisee as a franchisor might claim.  There are also privacy issues; the franchisee 
may find that the franchisor is privy to information that the franchisee had disclosed 
only to its bank.308 
‘9. The Franchisee receives the benefit on a national scale (if appropriate) of 
the Franchisor’s advertising and promotional activities at a lower cost than if 
they were to attempt such marketing themselves.’ 
                                                 
308 Personal interview with Westpac franchise consultants suggest an interesting tripartite banking 
arrangement that may compromise a franchisee’s confidentiality and increase a franchisee’s and a 
franchisee’s guarantors’ vulnerability. 
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Information the Industry Association does not provide: This claim is true, but a 
franchisor has discretion to advertise and offer promotions that may cost the 
franchisee but may not benefit it or may even accrue to its detriment. (See discussion 
of advertising spending in Chapter Five.)  
‘10. The Franchisee taps into the bulk purchasing power and negotiating 
capacity made available by the Franchisor by reason of the size of the 
franchised network.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: This claim is true, but 
there is also the risk that franchisor receives kickbacks from suppliers and other 
businesses in the franchisor’s network.  Again, this can add to a franchisee’s cost. 
‘11. The Franchisee can call on the specialised and highly-skilled knowledge 
and experience of the Franchisor's head office organisation, while remaining 
self-employed in their business.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: The accessibility and 
availability of assistance varies in different systems.   This claim also raises the 
question of what it means to be ‘self-employed’ and still under the control of a 
franchisor.  
‘12. The support and benefits provided by a Franchise system greatly reduce a 
Franchisee's business risks.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: Not proven, in fact Blair 
and Lafontaine assert that the opposite is often true in the case of new systems.309  
‘13. The Franchisee has the services of the field operational staff of the 
Franchisor who are there to assist with any problems which may arise from 
time to time in the course of business.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide: This claim is true, but 
here, too, the interests of a franchisor and a franchisee are different. The role of field 
staff is primarily to ensure compliance and franchisee productivity of the franchisee.  
‘14. The Franchisee has access to use of the Franchisor's patents, trade marks, 
copyrights, trade secrets, and any secret processes or formulae.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  This claim is true; this is 
what a franchisee is essentially paying for, as Lafontaine points out, but only for the 
time specified in the contract at the unit premises. The franchisee needs to understand 
what it owns and what it can sell at the end.  
                                                 
309 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005)  44. 
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‘15. The Franchisee has the benefit of the Franchisor's continuous research and 
development programs, which are designed to improve the business and keep it 
up-to-date and competitive.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  This claim is true to the 
extent the system has such programs. But a franchisor and a franchisee have 
conflicting goals.  Not all of a franchisor’s new programs will benefit the franchisee.  
‘16. The Franchisor provides a knowledge base developed from their (sic) own 
experience, as well as that of all the Franchisees in the system, which would 
otherwise be impossible for a non-franchised business to access.’  
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  A franchisor has such 
knowledge, but is not required to provide it to the franchisee.  A franchisee has no 
right of access to information about the franchise system in which it participates.  
‘17. Defined territories of operation within the Franchise can help protect the 
Franchisee from competition.’ 
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  The franchisee may be 
protected from competition from other franchisees within the system, but not against 
franchisor encroachment or against competition from other competitors. A franchisee 
may be subject to contractual restraints while vulnerable to franchisor encroachment.  
Because the franchisee cannot trade outside its scope, but the franchisor can develop 
its business as it likes, the protection from competition accrues mostly to the 
franchisor. (See Chapter Five.) 
‘18. A Franchisee can always speak to their Franchisor or a fellow Franchisee 
to discuss their business challenges or problems - something a non-franchised 
business can almost never do.’  
Information the Industry Association does not provide:  This may be true, 
however, dissatisfied franchisees are often told that problems are their fault. They 
may be required to repeat training.  They also may be threatened with defamation for 
communications with other franchisees, despite Code provisions that prohibit a 
franchisor from stopping franchisee association, and there is the potential of anti-trust 
violations if franchisees try to act collectively in a way that impacts a franchisor.310 
                                                 
310 For some discussion of the general nature of the issue, see Warren Pengilley, ‘Trade associations 
and collective boycotts in Australia and New Zealand : a mistranslation of the Sherman Act down 
under’,  32 Antitrust Bulletin 1019 (1987). 
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All of the above claims made by the franchisor trade association represent many of 
the reasons why franchisees buy franchise businesses.  To summarize the motivations 
of a franchisee, franchising represents an opportunity to realize ideals such as 
autonomy, independence, material rewards, entrepreneurship, creativity, and 
flexibility, but with perceived levels of risk that are lower than starting a new business 
independently.  In franchising, independence and autonomy coexist, though 
sometimes uneasily, with security and employment.   
In a sense perhaps all franchisees are ‘lifestyle franchisees’ due to the strong 
intangible appeal of the lifestyle franchising seems to offer.  This intangible appeal is 
an unquantified contributor to the success of franchising.  It is also the source of 
conflict in the franchise relationship.  A franchisee enters franchising for complex, 
often emotional reasons.  Many of these reasons, though they are strenuously asserted 
by franchisors and repeated so often as to seem axiomatic, may not be supported by 
the facts.  Myths that are commonly held about franchising lead to problems when 
reality fails to meet expectations.   Misguided franchisee motivations are a source of 
misunderstanding about franchising and, ‘when expectations are set unrealistically, 
conflict almost invariably arises’311   
3.4 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN FRANCHISING 
A prospective franchisee needs information about franchising generally with respect 
to the structure, economics and performance of the sector.  Because reliable 
information about franchising is not plentiful, however, it is difficult for a prospective 
franchisee to form an unbiased view of the nature of this business form and how the 
franchise sector operates.  A recent survey of Australian franchisees asked, ‘Has the 
reality of owning a franchise lived up to the promise?’312  This survey pre-selected for 
positive responses, as it only included the most satisfied of franchisees, those still in 
business; former franchisees that had left the sector were not included in the survey.313    
Even so, the survey reported that 52 percent of franchisees believe that ‘the reality of 
                                                 
311  Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005)  221-222. 
312 The ‘promise’ is not defined by survey design; the mystery of what comprises the ‘promise’ of 
franchising persists.   
313 Forty-eight percent of those franchisees surveyed; the survey did not include failed franchisees that 
are no longer in operation. 
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owning a franchise has lived up to the promise.’314   For a slight majority of 
franchisees still operating, the survey suggests that their experience with franchising 
meets expectations.  It is less encouraging that for almost half of franchisees still in 
operation it does not.    
3.4.1 Reasons for lack of information about the sector 
Misleading or deceptive conduct is a common complaint of franchisees.315   
‘franchisees say that the Disclosure Provisions do not prevent a franchisor from 
including misleading information in their disclosure documents. In particular, 
franchisees have raised concerns that franchisors misrepresent profit 
expectations, the viability of a franchise and the level of work required for the 
franchise to be successful. While the provisions of the TPA prohibit such 
misleading conduct, franchisees claim that if such behaviour does take place, it 
is too expensive and time consuming for them to take action against the 
franchisor, and some accuse the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Cooperation (ACCC) of failing to take timely steps to prosecute the franchisors 
on their behalf.’316 
Litigation involving misleading or deceptive conduct is discussed further infra at 
3.4.1.5.   
Franchising is a significant sector of the Australian economy, but the scarcity of 
reliable information about the franchise sector impedes useful discussion and analysis 
of the operation of the sector, creates uncertainty for a franchisee, and contributes to 
an imbalance of power in the franchise relationship.   
There are five principal reasons for the lack of balanced, reliable and accurate 
information about franchising.   The first and most fundamental is that the sources of 
information about the sector are limited and the available information is dominated by 
franchisors’ interests.  Second, franchisors are selling the franchise product and so 
have a strong interest in projecting a positive image of the sector.  Third, not only at 
                                                 
314 The study report does not list the range of responses to this question, nor is it known how the 
franchisees were chosen who participated in this franchisor-funded survey. 
315  As indicators of the high level of franchisee concern/complaint in Australia in the area of 
misleading or deceptive conduct see information provided by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, FCA surveys and keywords in litigation in the franchise sector.  In a sample of 
‘matters the ACCC has pursued since 2004 Outcomes’ 7 of 11 list misleading or deceptive conduct is 
an element of over half.  See the ACCC release on ‘Franchising Complaints, Investigations and at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/tag/franchisinginvestigations/ 24 January 2008. 
316 See Price Waterhouse Coopers Legal ‘Australian Government reviews the Franchising Code of 
Conduct’ at  
 http://www.pwclegal.com.au/legal/pwclegal.nsf/pages/FDDC77FC52668E2DCA2572100007F54D at 
24 January 2008. 
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the beginning, but throughout the relationship, franchisors and franchisees have 
conflicting interests, and so do not readily share information as readily as an outside 
observer might expect. Fourth, defamation and competition law are both of concern 
for franchisees that may wish to communicate to others their experiences with 
franchising.  Fifth, it is difficult to garner evidence from dispute processes.  Because 
mediation, the Code-mandated dispute resolution procedure, is a confidential process, 
no information is available to those outside the dispute.  Each of these factors is 
explained in more detail in the following sections. 
3.4.1.1 Franchisor interests dominate limited sources of information  
Past reports such as the Gardini and Reid Reports no longer reflect the state of play in 
the mandatory Code era since 1998.  Most statistics about franchising in Australia 
have been generated by studies funded either directly or indirectly by franchisor 
organizations or interests.  The Franchise Council of Australia (the FCA) is the only 
active industry group in Australia.  It consists almost entirely of franchisors.317  When 
a franchise system joins the FCA, the franchisor becomes a member but the system’s 
franchisees do not also become members.318  Most franchisees do not join on their 
own because membership is expensive and franchisees do not perceive sufficient 
benefit for the high cost of membership. 
In Australia the bi-annual FCA surveys are essentially the only source of empirical 
data about the sector.  These surveys are funded by the FCA, allowing the 
organization to play a major role in framing the questions.  As most of the 
respondents are drawn from FCA membership, the surveys tend to represent the point 
of view of only one side of the sector’s participants.  When an FCA survey reports 
that the existing regulatory scheme is working well, one must ask whether it is 
working well from all perspectives.  Perhaps it is working well from the point of view 
of franchisors, as they represent the majority of survey respondents.  Or perhaps the 
favourable response is due to franchisors’ desire to avoid incurring further outside 
scrutiny of the sector and further regulatory intervention.   
                                                 
317 The franchisees that are members are often the franchisees who are also franchisors; whose 
membership is predominantly connected with the latter role. 
318 Some associations operate on a different model, for example when a franchisor joins the French 
Franchise Federation, its franchisees do automatically become members. 
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Surveys not directly funded by the FCA suffer from the similar deficiencies.  A recent 
survey of franchisee satisfaction, the 2004 Deloitte ‘Franchisee Satisfaction Survey’, 
in fact contains no information with respect to reasons for franchisee satisfaction or 
lack thereof, and no information about conflict within the sector. There are no 
questions with respect to problems encountered by franchisees, though such 
information is critical to a comprehensive understanding of franchisee satisfaction and 
of the health of the sector.  The nature of the survey instead displays the qualities of a 
marketing initiative rather than an information-gathering exercise, but this is not 
surprising as the Deloitte survey, though not directly funded by the FCA, was 
commissioned and carried out in part by the firms of board members of the FCA.319 
Some franchisee associations in the US and elsewhere and websites representing 
franchisee viewpoints offer another side to the story.320  While the American 
Franchisee Association321 and the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers 
offer advice and support for franchisees, there is at this time no similar service or 
support available to franchisees in Australia.  There have been attempts to set up state 
and national franchisee industry groups, but such groups have not been successful.  
The most recent attempt to organize franchisees in Australia, the Australian 
Franchisees Association Incorporated had little funding at its inception and is now 
defunct.  In Australia such organizations have never attained a level of stability or 
success to allow them to gather or provide information about the sector from a 
franchisee point of view. 
3.4.1.2 Franchisors must project a positive image to make the sale 
As in the US, so too in Australia, ‘[t]he franchise industry has been relatively 
successful in keeping from the public and legislators the true nature of what goes on 
                                                 
319  Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Franchisee Satisfaction Survey Benchmark 2004, 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/franchise_survey_lo-res.pdf> at 29 December 2005.  
Alan Branch, a partner at of Donaldson Walsh Lawyers, one of the firms responsible for the survey is 
also a director of the FCA.  
320 See, for example, <http://www.ripoffmerchant.net/> at 18 March 2004, 
<http://www.licenceenews.com/ethics1.html> at 15 March 2007, and <http://www.toastedsubs.info> at 
15 March 2007 and <http://www.QuiznosSucks.com> at 18 March 2004. 
321  See the American Franchisee Association (AFA)  <http://www.franchisee.org/> , a Franchisee 
Voice <http://www.aafd.org/publications/franchisevoice/> and the American Association of 
Franchisees and Dealers <http://www.aafd.org/> respectively. 
 113
in franchising…’ 322  Franchisors’ interest in the dissemination of only the sunnier 
aspects of the sector is due not only to their motivation to avoid further scrutiny and 
intervention by regulators, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to their interest in 
marketing franchising to potential franchisees.   This interest prevails over the need to 
analyse the sector through an objective lens in order to ensure and improve the quality 
of franchising generally.   
Franchisors have a collective interest in promoting the franchise product.   A supply 
of new franchisees is the ‘life blood’ of franchise systems, so it follows that 
franchisors want to stifle news of conflict or of unsuccessful franchisees.323  The 
Deloitte 2004 ‘Franchisee Satisfaction Survey’ notes that 25 percent of franchises 
have been owned for one year or less, and that ‘Extraordinarily, close to two-thirds of 
franchises have been owned five years or less.’324   The survey attributes this figure to 
‘an extended growth phase’ which it does not explain.325  Surveys show growth to be 
steady at about thirteen percent per year.326  If a quarter of franchises have been 
owned for under a year, two-thirds less than five years, these figures must be 
explained by factors other than thirteen percent annual growth.  The obvious answer 
would be high turnover of franchisees.  As there has been no research on franchisee 
failure rates in Australia, there is no data to resolve this question. 
When one considers that franchise fees are a principal source of revenue for many 
franchise systems, it is perhaps not surprising that two-thirds of franchises have been 
owned for less than five years.  High turnover can be profitable for franchisors.  
Marketing the franchise as a product to prospective franchisees is uppermost in 
franchisors’ minds.  Exploring and publicising the difficulties that may arise in the 
course of the relationship is not.   
                                                 
322  Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn St. Law Review 105, 316. 
323 Personal interview with Lorelle Frazer, Professor of Marketing, Griffith Business School, Logan 
campus (March 2004). 
324 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Franchisee Satisfaction Survey Benchmark 2004, Item 7 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/franchise_survey_lo-res.pdf> at 29 December 2005.  
325 Ibid.  
326 Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven and Owen Wright,  Franchising Australia 2006 Survey, Franchise 
Council of Australia Survey, Griffith University and the Franchise Council of Australia Ltd., 
<http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=182> at 14 September 2007.   
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3.4.1.3 Franchisor and franchisee conflicts of interest 
Different conditions lead to different stresses and strains on the relationship at 
different stages in its progress, and that the character of the relationship varies with 
the stage of operation of both the individual franchise unit and the system, in addition 
to external influences.   There are several stages of a franchise system’s operation; 
these might be arranged chronologically as system development, recruitment, 
negotiation, unit start-up, adolescence, maturity, exit and post-termination.  As they 
impact on information exchange and the availability of information, the first six of 
these are introduced briefly here. Exit and post-termination issues will be discussed 
further in Chapter Five. 
System development:  In the academic literature system development is not a 
commonly identified stage in the franchise relationship.  It is important, however, 
because of its formative influence on the relation.  Typically, a franchisor develops a 
franchise system, and assumes the business risk in the development of pilot stores, 
company-owned stores and the system as a whole.  A franchisor invests time, money 
and effort in formulating, developing, testing and marketing the franchise concept and 
system.  If a franchisor invests sufficient resources in the development of the system, 
the product is more likely to be satisfactory to a franchisee and less susceptible to 
problems as the relationship between franchisor and franchisee develops in later 
stages.  The system development stage underscores the fact that a franchisor bears the 
risk of system failure, and also that a franchisor has control over the system and 
knowledge that is superior to that of a franchisee. 
Recruitment:  Also not a commonly identified stage, it is included here because 
interviews with franchisors indicate that they consider the selection of franchisees a 
critical factor in the success of the system.  The nature of the recruitment of 
franchisees varies depending on market and demographic conditions.  One of the 
problems franchisors face in Australia is a shortage of qualified franchisees, ‘The 
main constraint we are facing is a shortage of good franchisees.’327  Because a 
franchisor is less vulnerable to each single unit failure than is the individual franchisee 
operating that unit, a franchisor bears less risk of poor selection than a franchisee.   
                                                 
327 Richard Evans, CEO of the FCA quoted in Derek Parker, ‘Franchising’, The Australian, (Sydney) 
30 June 2006.,See also Lorelle Frazer and Scott Weaven, FCA Franchise Survey 2004 (2004) Griffith 
University and the Franchise Council of Australia <http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=198> at 
15 July 2007. 
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Apart from the risk to a franchisor’s reputation, a franchisor’s risk is contained 
because the franchise fee is designed to cover a franchisor’s costs of establishing the 
new franchise unit.  If qualified franchisees are in short supply, franchisors may be 
tempted to accept franchisees lacking the proper qualifications to make a success of 
the business,328  and may fail to adequately screen and select franchisees.  Information 
exchange is critical at this stage, but may not be as candid as it should be, as each 
party seeks to make the best impression possible in order to meet its market 
requirements as well as to secure a strong bargaining position in the subsequent 
negotiation stage.   
Negotiation:  A franchisor holds the power in franchise negotiations; it is a 
franchisor’s business and it is a franchisor that draws up the contract and writes the 
operations manual (the OM).   A franchisor has both the opportunity and the 
responsibility to set the tone of the relationship; as will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
a franchisor used this opportunity to establish its authority and control in the interests 
of system uniformity.  A franchisor firmly establishes its power in the relationship at 
this stage by presenting the terms of the contract as drafted by the franchisor with no 
possibility of negotiation.   This is not a time for the exchange of information about 
parties’ positions and needs.  
Unit start-up: Analyses of the relationship in marketing and management literature 
typically start with this stage, which consists roughly of approximately the first six 
months to the first year of unit operation.  Just as a franchisor usually makes a major 
investment in developing the system, a franchisee also makes a large up-front 
investment, in time and effort as well as money at the start-up of a new unit.   The 
average investment at start-up for a new franchisee in Australia is $85,000, but a 
required investment of $785,000 to $1 million is not uncommon to buy into the better-
known brands and best-performing franchise systems.329   
Franchising involves the exchange of the information and expertise of a franchisor for 
the entrepreneurial effort of a franchisee.  The gap between expertise and enthusiasm 
is most pronounced at start-up and in the early years a franchisor has the greater levels 
                                                 
328 For studies correlating qualities of franchisees with success of the franchise please refer to 
<http://www.franchiserelationships.com> at 30 December 2005. 
329 What a Quiznos Franchisee Makes (2005) Franchise Pundit 
<http://franchisepundit.com/index.php/2005/04/10/what-a-quiznos-franchisee-makes> at April 10, 
2005.  
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of know-how and control.  A franchisor often provides a franchisee with training, 
guidance, information, reassurance and psychological support.  Franchisor support at 
start-up is therefore considered an important factor in avoiding future problems.  This 
role means that a franchisor enjoys considerable influence over a franchisee.   
Adolescence:  This stage involves extends roughly from middle to late in the first 
year into the second or third depending on the system.  At this stage a franchisee 
becomes more comfortable with the operation of the franchise. Having gained 
experience and information which in many respects may surpass that of a franchisor, a 
franchisee becomes more confident in asserting ideas and opinions.  This increased 
confidence may reduce a franchisee’s dependence upon a franchisor; a franchisee may 
even feel strong enough to challenge a franchisor.  It is around this time that a 
franchisee senses that he understands the market and the business at a local level 
better than a franchisor.  In addition, he may be frustrated that his innovations cannot 
be easily implemented, if at all.  Information flows in the direction of a franchisee to a 
franchisor may become more important at this stage.  Also, the focus of a franchisor 
contribution to the relationship may shift from training and support to a franchisor’s 
role in coordination of the franchise system and the services provided in that context, 
most importantly brand maintenance.330   A franchisee continues to pay the costs of 
the franchise but this may be with a decreasing appreciation of the benefits of the 
relationship.  Here a franchisor may rely more on the contract, field visits and other 
means to ensure control. 
Maturity: This stage extends from mid to late in the second or third year to the end of 
the term.  The ‘growing pains’ of adolescence often level off as the franchise unit 
matures; the relationship may enjoy a relatively harmonious and profitable period.  As 
at any stage, however, the relationship is threatened by a range of issues with 
disruptive potential.  Franchisee-driven pressures may arise from any of a number of 
sources of stress and challenge, even unexpected levels of franchisee success.   
Franchisor-driven pressures occur when a franchisor introduces new products and 
services, marketing initiatives,331 distribution channels, or plant and equipment.332   
                                                 
330 Phillip Phan, John Butler and Soo Lee, ‘Crossing Mother:  Entrepreneur-Franchisees' Attempts to 
Reduce Franchisor Influence’ (1996) 11 Journal of Business Venturing, 370, 402. 
331  These are external, but to a greater or lesser degree are a recognition of, and response to, new 
customers and markets. 
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Pressures on franchising systems may also be external, caused by demographic, 
technological, legal, or supply chain changes.333   
There are many potential conflicts of interest in the operation of the franchise.  A 
master franchisor wants to maximize system revenue, while a master franchisee will 
want to maximize territory or unit revenue and a franchisee wants the best unit 
profits.334  A franchisor seeks growth in sales, while for a franchisee sales growth may 
be undesirable if it comes at the expense of profits.  Also in relation to profits, a 
franchisee may want to skim off profits while a franchisor wants them reinvested, for 
example in capital assets and local advertising.  General conflicts of interest include 
the following: 
• A franchisor wants control; a franchisee wants independence and autonomy.  
• Franchisor interest in uniformity and strength of trademark against franchisee 
interest in managerial autonomy. 
• A franchisor’s roles as administrator and supplier conflict with its other roles 
such as that of partner and trainer.   
•  A franchisor may be maintaining relationships with investors while a 
franchisee has to contend with employees. 
• A franchisor must guard against franchisee free-riding, while a franchisee 
must guard against franchisor opportunism.    
Related to many of these conflicts is information-sharing.  Both sides will be tempted 
to withhold information for their own advantage.  For example, at the start of the 
relationship a franchisor may be selective in information he chooses to disclose to a 
franchisee.  Later, a franchisor may not share future business plans including 
expansion and marketing plans. A franchisee on the other hand, may not give accurate 
accounts business results or market conditions.   
                                                                                                                                            
332 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), UNIDROIT Guide To 
International Master Franchise Arrangements (1998) above n 26 at 145-146.  The UNIDROIT Guide 
does not address the issue of franchisee initiated disputes such as those reported by OMA and the 2002 
Survey, perhaps because franchisees are seen as reacting to rather than initiating change. 
333 For a discussion of the problems encountered in the course of the franchisor/franchisee relationship, 
through the terms of the contract please refer to Chapter 5 
334 B. Elango and Vance H. Fried, ‘Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis’ (1997) 
35(3) Journal of Small Business Management 68, 73. 
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Throughout the relationship, conflicts of interest mean that franchisors and 
franchisees do not share information.  This is a particular problem for a franchisee, 
because, while a franchisor generally has the right to access all of a franchisee’s 
information about its business (see Chapter Five, Minimum Performance and 
Reporting Requirements), the reverse is not the case.  A franchisor has full 
information and control over that information, but a franchisee must rely on a 
franchisor to provide whatever information a franchisor wants a franchisee to have.  
The difficulty that is encountered by franchisees in uncovering information sets up 
heightened uncertainty for a franchisee entering a franchise relationship.  And because 
a franchisor exercises control over much of this information, there is an imbalance of 
power in favour of a franchisor.   
3.4.1.4 Risk of defamation, breach of confidentiality and competition law 
The fourth reason for the lack of information about the sector is that franchisee 
communications are chilled by the perceived risk of defamation.  In early May 2006 a 
group of Lenard’s franchisees visited the Office of the Minister for Small Business in 
Canberra to discuss problems common to franchisees in that franchise system.335  
Several of these franchisees had been threatened by a franchisor with defamation 
suits.  In New Zealand a franchisee of Dymock’s, an Australian franchise system, was 
found to have shown a lack of good faith in contacting other franchisees about its 
dissatisfaction with the system, despite the fact that he did so with the franchisor’s 
express permission.336  The Franchising Code states that, ‘a franchisor must not 
induce a franchisee not to form an association or not to associate with other 
franchisees for a lawful purpose.’337  There is no guarantee, however, that franchisees 
who associate to discuss topics other than how delighted they are with the system will 
not be threatened with defamation proceedings or found to have breached the 
agreement though a lack of good faith.  Franchisees also are often required to sign 
confidentiality agreements that prevent them from communicating with other 
franchisees; if they do they risk breach of the contract.  Not only do they risk action 
by a franchisor, but there is the added risk that they may find themselves in breach of 
                                                 
335 These franchisees were advised by the Minister’s office to take their concerns to the Franchise 
Council of Australia for assistance.   
336 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd and Others [2002] UKPC 50.  
337 Franchising Code of Conduct s15 Association of franchisees: A franchisor must not induce a 
franchisee not to form an association or not to associate with other franchisees for a lawful purpose. 
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the competition law provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the TPA).  Few franchisees 
have the resources and the time to take on the risk of defending an action for 
defamation or breach of competition law; they are by nature risk-averse, their 
perception of franchising as low-risk is one of the reasons they enter franchising in the 
first place.  Most prefer to keep quiet.338 
3.4.1.5 Scarcity of information from conflict resolution processes  
Because conflicts arise more frequently when there are problems with the operation 
and/or profitability, the incidence of conflict in the sector can provide a valuable 
barometer of the success of the relationship.  Generally speaking, information about 
litigation and other forms of dispute resolution can be useful in shedding light on the 
problems in a sector or industry, or type of relationship.  Dispute resolution in 
Australia, however, yields relatively little useful information.  The fundamental 
problems are that mediation is mandated by the Code,  that there are problems with 
getting information through and about mediation;  that because mediation is mandated 
there is less case law; and, finally, that the case law that is available is often not very 
instructive.  There is little that has been done to remedy the situation, however, 
because the correlation between incidence of conflict and issues about the success and 
profitability of franchising, however, again leads to reluctance on the part of industry 
leaders to explore the reasons for conflict in the sector.  
According to Part IV of the Code all post-Code franchise contracts must provide that 
if one party to a dispute requests mediation the other must attend.  Mediation has 
advantages, but providing information about the sector is not one of them. The 
mediation procedure prescribed by the Code is opaque; the results are confidential.  
As parties’ resort to mediation in the franchising sector grows, therefore, the 
information available to guide parties in subsequent instances of similar disputes is 
decreasingly available.339  The reliance on mediation thus compounds the difficulty in 
tracking levels and trends in conflict. 
                                                 
338 Gillian K. Hadfield, Expert Testimony , Legislative Assembly of Ontario, March 8, 2000 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/gillian_hadfield_value_reputation_systems> at 9 September 2007. 
Hadfield testified to the Ontario [Canada] public hearings on the regulation of franchising in 2000, 
‘…there should be a real push for the government to make sure that information is flowing, that it's not 
made confidential by confidentiality agreements, that franchisees are protected against lawsuits in the 
event they talk about what's happened to them as franchisees.’  
339 In The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Baker Family Trust v Lenard's Pty Ltd (No 3) 
[2004] FCA 1570 (Mansfield J) however , even though parties to mediation had agreed that any 
 120
The confidentiality of the mediation process disadvantages franchisees far more than 
it does franchisors.  A franchisor may be in a number of disputes with its franchisees 
and so has the knowledge and experience of each dispute, including how it may have 
been settled, what payments and concessions may have been made and so on.  An 
individual franchisee has no such experience with the mediation process or the issues 
involved; further, a franchisee is not privy to information about how similar disputes 
may have been resolved.   There is also an issue of disparity in legal representation,  
discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Six. 
One of the key recommendations of the Review of the Code was to urge a full report 
on mediation,340 but to date no such a report has been undertaken; or if it has, it has 
not been made public. It is also worth noting that a franchisor is not required to 
provide information about mediation proceedings to prospective franchisees, despite 
the fact that mediation is the Code-mandated dispute resolution procedure.   
The FCA reports that in Australia ‘the current statistics are that well over 70% of all 
mediations are successful.’341  The following figures collected for this research, 
however, suggest a slightly different story:  
• Between its establishment in late 1998 and the collection of this information in 
the first quarter of 2004, the Office of the Mediation Adviser (OMA) had 
received 1078 dispute enquiries.  Of these inquiries only about one-third 
proceed to mediation; in total OMA had appointed mediators for 308 
mediations (roughly 70 per year since its inception in 1998);   
• About ten percent of these disputes settled after the appointment of a mediator 
but before proceeding to mediation; and  
• Of the disputes that were mediated, just over 62 percent resulted in 
settlement.342   
                                                                                                                                            
settlement proposal would be “privileged” and would not be tendered as evidence in any proceedings, 
the Court decided that evidence of the settlement proposals at mediation was admissible for purposes of 
the applicants' claim for indemnity costs. 
340 See Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources for links to report: 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?ObjectID=21E67F0D-0639-4616-
B4E1432B70363C13> at 11 April 2007. 
341 Letter from FCA Chairman Stephen Giles to American Bar Association Forum on Franchising 
listserv posted 05/04/06. 
342 Figures provided by the Office of the Mediation Adviser (2004). 
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Of those disputes that proceeded to the appointment of a mediator, the settlement rate 
is indeed high, about 72 percent.  Only 30 percent of all inquiries were referred to 
mediation, however, which means that in fact only about 20-25 percent of all inquiries 
to OMA achieved resolution through the mediation process.   This means that about 
75-80 percent of the conflicts that were serious enough to prompt a contact with OMA 
were not resolved through the mediation process, and, perhaps what is most 
significant, there is no data at all about the disposition of those disputes.343    
Case law as an avenue for the collection of accurate information about conflict in 
franchising is not very informative.  This is in part due to the fact that many franchise 
disputes are settled through mediation.   A 2001 study noted that, 
‘Soft law can… hinder the development of case law… if a code represents 
consumer protection in an area where the ‘real’ law is inadequate or incomplete, 
there is a need for consumers and their advisers to see how those who apply the 
code use it and develop its principles. Flexibility is another advantage often 
boasted for soft law, but if there is no transparency in how it is being applied, 
there is no scope for flexible development.’344 
Where franchising cases are litigated, the results are public and provide a potentially 
valuable source of information.  Even so, litigation may be a poor information source 
for several reasons.  One reason is that the diversity of state laws applicable to 
franchising impedes the formation of uniform precedent.  The New South Wales 
(NSW) Industrial Relations Act (1996), for example, has provisions upon which 
Courts may rely such as s84 regarding employment, and s106 regarding 
misrepresentation.345   In Queensland (QLD) there is no such legislation and similar 
cases rely on the TPA section 52, the Code and the contract.  There are also different 
state interpretations of, for example, the duty of good faith.  A further reason  
information is hard to glean from litigation is that franchise cases usually involve 
multiple issues, some of which may not relate specifically to the franchise sector, for 
example leases, unconscionable conduct, restraint of trade, and misrepresentation.  
These issues are determined by non-franchise specific laws and principles. Finally, the 
results of litigation are fickle; especially where the number of cases is small and 
                                                 
343 The FCA also makes the claim that ‘As a result of the regulatory regime the level of "substantial 
disputes" in franchising is around 1.8 percent and falling.  The report of a declining rate of disputes is 
based on a survey of franchisors who, for reasons already described, wish to avoid the appearance of 
problems in the sector.   
344 From ‘Soft Law and the Consumer Interest’, European Consumer Law Group, ECLG/071/2001 - 
March 2001  <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/policy/eclg/rep03_en.pdf> at22 May 2007.   
345 See <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nswithconsol_act/ira1996242/> at 11 April 2007. 
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where reliable information about the sector and the franchising relationship to inform 
judges’ decisions is difficult to obtain.   
The nature of litigation does, however, provide some clues as to the problems and 
sources of conflict in franchising.  Misleading or deceptive conduct under section 52 
of the Trade Practices Act is a frequently litigated complaint in franchising in 
Australia.346  In Australian Billboard Connections Pty. Ltd v Jansen347 it was 
determined that the franchisor must not estimate a prospective franchisee’s earnings 
without stating assumptions and that it should not disclose cash flow of other 
franchisees without giving details of franchisees in the same state as well as any other 
information which could affect that franchisee’s earning capacity.  In ACCC v 
Billbusters348 a Federal Court granted summary judgment declaring that a director was 
knowingly concerned in, or party to contraventions of misleading and deceptive 
conduct provisions of the TPA.349  In ACCC v Ewing350 the court considered whether 
licence agreements were really franchise agreements. The court held that the 
franchisor had engaged in unconscionable conduct and misleading or deceptive 
conduct in failing to disclose all documents.  In 2006 proceedings against Photo Safe 
Australia Pty Ltd the Federal Court declared that the managing director misled and 
deceived 37 small business investors in several ways, including failing to provide 
franchisees with disclosure documents and other information required under the 
Code.351  In Poulet Frais v The Silver Fox Company,352 however, agency principles 
                                                 
346 Post-Code cases are outlined here in the text.  Pre-Code cases include Pre –Code cases on 
misleading or deceptive conduct include ACCC v Ewing [2004] 2204 FCA 5; O’Dea v Casnot (1980); 
Bateman and Another v Slatyer and Others (1987) Fed Ct of Aust (Barbara’s House & Garden); Ducret 
v. Colourshot [1981]; Crawford v Parish (1991) 105 FLR 361; [1991] ACTSC 87 (18 October 1991); 
Novamaze Pty Ltd v Cut Price Deli and Others (1995); Haynes & Anor v Top Slice Deli (1995);  
Maiden & Ors v NZ Natl Pty Ltd (97). For a summary of ACCC litigation and undertakings from 2002 
to 2006 taken from ACCC annual reports see 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0006/71286/sub083attachmentb.rtf 
347 Australian Billboard Connections Pty. Ltd v Jansen [2000] VSC 471 
348 ACCC v Billbusters [2003] FCA 423. 
349 See http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/347410 at24 January 2008. See also the 
Armour Linings undertaking. 
350 ACCC v Ewing [2004] FCA 5. 
351 See 
http://www.pwclegal.com.au/legal/pwclegal.nsf/pages/FDDC77FC52668E2DCA2572100007F54D at 
24 January 2008.  See also 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/687893/fromItemId/761521 at 24 January 2008. 
Other misleading or deceptive conduct cases since the introduction of the Code include ACCC v Global 
Prepaid Communications Pty Ltd (ACN 095 154 108) (in liquidation) [2006] FCA 146; O’Connor v 
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applied to allow a franchisor to avoid liability for the misleading or deceptive conduct 
of a sales agent.   This sampling of the cases litigated since the adoption of the Code 
illustrates the nature of claims of breach of TPA section 52 in franchising which 
typically involve franchisors’ or franchisors’ agents’ representations that fail to 
materialize regarding earnings, payments and costs, advertising, lead generation and 
franchisor support. Franchisees have in some cases been able to recover payments, 
court costs, and also part payment of ACCC costs.   
This pattern of litigation seems to prove at least one thing for certain; getting accurate 
and reliable information about franchising is a problem for franchisees.  Though it is 
not clear whether the Code has impacted on the frequency of complaints of 
misleading or deceptive conduct, sources at the ACCC have reported an increase in 
disputes in franchising involving misleading or deceptive conduct, especially about 
anticipated earnings and territorial issues.353   
3.4.1.6 Summary of limitations on information about franchising 
A similar information problem was identified in the franchise sector in the US over 
fifteen years ago.  In its 1990 report on ‘Franchising in the US Economy’ the House 
of Representatives Committee on Small Business noted: ‘Despite its growing 
significance, there is a surprising lack of comprehensive and accurate information 
concerning all aspects of franchising nationally.’   At that time there had been a 
number of statistical reports.  The limitations of such reports, however, were noted by 
the Educational Foundation of the International Franchising Association (the IFA) in 
its 1998 ‘Profile of Franchising’: 
‘For years, those in franchising and those studying it have desired reliable data 
on the realities of franchising as seen in the business community. Until now, 
most attempts at such an overview have been based on survey results and, as all 
researchers know, the return rates on surveys tend to be discouragingly low.... 
Moreover, some felt that the picture painted by such survey returns was 
misleadingly positive because those having business difficulties would be less 
likely to take the time to complete and return surveys.’354 
                                                                                                                                            
Roadrunner Mobile Video Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 150; ACCC v Will Writers Guild Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 
1231; and ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491). 
352 Poulet Frais v The Silver Fox Company [2005]  FCAFC 131. 
353  Martin, John, Commissioner, The Health of Franchising from the Viewpoint of its Regulator, 
Address to the Franchising Council of Australia, 23 October 2001.  
354 ‘Deacons on franchise legislation’, <http://www.franchisebusiness.com.au/articles/>, 14 March 
2006. 
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The net effect is that it is not always clear how the different interests in the 
franchising relationship manifest themselves and why; what the risks are for the 
participants in the sector; and what aspects of problems encountered in the sector 
could best be addressed through what types of regulatory intervention. Experience 
shows that relationships are extremely difficult for those outside them to assess.  The 
commercial relationship in franchising is no exception.  The phrase, ‘the private is 
public for those for whom the personal is political’355 could be restated for franchising 
as ‘the private is public for those for whom the commercial relationship is political’.   
The commercial relationship is political because issues within the franchise 
relationship impact the business community as well as economies both domestically 
and globally.  The franchise relationship is not strictly a private one between 
franchisor and franchisee.  Though some franchisors may feel threatened by greater 
scrutiny, ultimately, the continued success of the sector depends on an accurate 
understanding of this relationship to inform its development, including its regulation. 
Answers are sorely needed to questions about the problems in franchising and about 
which problems are most significant to each of the parties at which stages in the 
relationship.  As long as information about the relation is kept private, or is controlled 
by only one side of the relation, the nature of the dynamic will continue to elude 
outsiders.  Disclosure as a regulatory tool makes sense, but as will be outlined in later 
chapters, in the context of the franchise sector in Australia it is not effective.  More 
importantly, as Chapter Six will explain, disclosure about particular franchise systems 
to franchisees as consumers is no substitute for the data that is urgently needed to 
inform regulatory process.  More meaningful measurements of the performance of the 
sector and the impact of regulation upon it are critical to any future regulatory 
initiatives.  
The 2006 Review acknowledged the problems of lack of franchisee awareness of the 
risks involved in franchising. The Review Item 3 recommended a requirement of 
franchisors to include a Risk Statement with the disclosure document. This was not 
agreed to by the government.  Its statement, ‘Decisions relating to the viability and 
associated risks of any business venture are ultimately the decision of the businesses 
                                                 
355  ‘The Personal is Political’ is a phrase from the New Left, a slogan of the old Students for a 
Democratic Society.  Dating  back to at least 1964, it is thought to have been inspired by C. Wright 
Mill's 1959 book, "The Sociological Imagination."  See 
<http://research.umbecause.edu/~korenman/wmst/pisp.html> accessed 29 June 2006. 
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themselves,’ seems to undermine the theoretical basis for the choice of disclosure as a 
principal tool of regulatory intervention in franchising.356   
3.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapter Three’s introduction to the sector establishes a foundation for the balance of 
the dissertation by explaining the self-regulation of the relationship by means of the 
market, by providing context for the analysis of contract and by explaining the 
information asymmetry that sets up conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty 
that regulation is meant to address. 
The self-regulation of the relationship by means of the market interaction is the first 
topic of the chapter. Franchising is a complex, multi-faceted and dynamic 
organizational form.  Though there is little consensus about the legal definition of 
franchising, at its essence franchising allows a franchisor to sell rights to its 
intellectual property while at the same time keeping strict control over the use of that 
intellectual property in order to maximize brand value.   A franchisor’s reasons to 
franchise are primarily economic.  The choice to franchise addresses problems of 
capital inefficiency and contains transaction costs.  Franchisors understand the nature 
of franchising; they know why they are there and often obtain extensive professional 
advice.  
A franchisor presents the licence to participate in a franchise system as a product to a 
franchisee as a consumer.  In addition to the dimensions of a franchisee’s role as, 
variously, investor, employee, and partner, a franchisee’s role as consumer tends to 
involve power imbalance and greater control to a franchisor.  Franchisee reasons to 
franchise are less tangible, more complex, and arguably less rational than the reasons 
a franchisor chooses to franchise.  They are based on perceptions of economic 
benefits of franchising, despite the fact that these benefits are in many cases unproven. 
A franchisee choice is also based on perceptions of personal and lifestyle benefits.   
This dissertation argues that a franchisee choice to franchise must necessarily be 
based less on fact because accurate, reliable data about the sector and about individual 
                                                 
356 See the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006, 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007 and the Australian Government Response to the Review of the 
Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2007, 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007.  
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franchise systems is difficult to obtain.  Significant gaps remain in the body of 
knowledge about the sector generally and knowledge about the sector in Australia,357 
Further, despite disclosure, prospective franchisees often lack information, not only 
the sector but also about the nature of the particular enterprise. (This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six)  
The franchising form is selected by a franchisor, to serve its objectives.  Thus, the 
self-regulation of the franchising relationship by means of the market tends to serve 
the interests of only one side of the relationship, that of a franchisor; it does not 
equally serve the interests of both franchisor and franchisee.  Market forces establish 
conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee in this business 
relationship. A franchisor has the knowledge, selects this business structure to suit its 
purposes, and markets the structure to prospective franchisees.  A franchisor wants to 
sell franchises; the information provided by franchisors and franchisor associations 
therefore is biased and, with no registration or monitoring, may be unreliable.  
Though one might expect the situation to be better for franchisees in a ‘sellers’ 
market’ where, as in Australia, qualified franchisees are in short supply, the increased 
intensity of marketing efforts by franchisors may actually exacerbate the problems of 
obtaining reliable information.  The market regulation of the franchise relationship 
indicates a strong tendency toward power imbalance in favour of a franchisor and 
high levels of uncertainty for a franchisee.  To the extent that knowledge is power, a 
franchisor has significantly greater power than franchisees. 
Reducing the mythology of franchising can help re-balance the power in the 
relationship and to reduce uncertainty for franchisees.  In making the decision to 
franchise a franchisee as a consumer of the franchise product should understand that 
product, it should understand what franchising is, what purposes it serves both parties 
and the nature of the contract and the relationship as well as details about the 
particular system.   In principle a franchisor would want to attract franchisees who are 
knowledgeable and who understand the nature of this business structure before 
agreeing to participate, in order to save on the costs associated with 
misunderstandings, such as monitoring and conflict management during the course of 
the relationship.   
                                                 
357 There are bi-annual franchisor surveys and a growing body of data, but not enough data to support 
or refute the efficacy of regulation.  
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Regulatory intervention is often used to address inefficiencies and inequities in market 
interaction.  The lack of information about franchising makes disclosure seem the 
perfect solution.  The use of disclosure, however, may not be effective, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Six.  Regulatory process requires meaningful measurements.  
Regulation of franchising is missing this first essential element of process; the result is 
that the regulatory program lacks accountability and a solid justification.  Chapter 
Three lays the groundwork for this discussion in Chapter Six by explaining the lack of 
information generally and also the information asymmetries within the franchise 
relationship.   
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the use of disclosure in regulating 
franchising, however, the next two chapters consider further the private regulation of 
the relationship by the parties, specifically through the instrument of contract.  
Chapters Four and Five assess how the regulation of franchising through contract as a 
layer of governance reflects and serves the interests of participants. They also discuss 
whether the private regulation through the contract achieves the stated goals of 
regulatory intervention that are tested in this thesis, balance of power and certainty.   
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Chapter Three provides an introduction to the sector; it explains the market interaction 
as a means of private, self-regulation of the relationship by the parties themselves.  
The main points and recommendations are as follows: 
• The choice of this market form is determined largely by franchisor economic 
interests. 
• Though the contract states that a franchisee’s role is limited to that of an 
independent contractor, the role of a franchisee is in many ways similar to that 
of a consumer, as well as an investor, employee, business partner, and 
distributor, among others.   
• A franchisee’s motivations are psychological and social, and are often based 
on the sales claims of franchisors. 
• Market interaction fails to protect the interests of stakeholders in franchising.  
In fact the market sets up conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty for 
a franchisee that extend across the life of the relationship. 
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• Lack of information is a problem for a franchisee because information about 
the sector is dominated by franchisors whose overriding concern is to project 
positive images of their systems and of the sector. Other reasons why 
information is hard to obtain, particularly for franchisees, are the conflicts of 
interest between franchisors and franchisees that keep them from sharing 
information with each other and third parties; the threat of defamation and 
breach of competition law; the confidentiality of mediation and the 
infrequency and inconsistencies of litigation.  
• Regulatory intervention is often used to address inefficiencies and inequities in 
market interaction.  The lack of information about franchising, however, 
deprives regulatory process of a crucial initial element.  The lack of 
information about franchising may make disclosure seem the perfect solution. 
There is evidence, which will be discussed in Chapter Six, that disclosure is 
not in fact the perfect solution to the problems in the franchise sector, but even 
if it were, it should be selected as a result of sound regulatory process. 
• The next three chapters explore other layers of governance that may 
ameliorate the problems of imbalance of power and uncertainty in the 
franchise relationship.  Chapters Four and Five consider the private regulation 
by the parties through contract.  Chapter Six considers the regulation of the 
franchise relationship by statutory intervention, and provides an analysis of 
disclosure as the principal regulatory tool used in the direct regulation of the 
sector. 
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Chapter Four 
Regulation by the Contract: The Standard Form and 
Relational Qualities of the Franchise Agreement 
 
‘The basic picture that emerges is that franchise contracts are long-term, 
standard form contracts.’358   
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two introduced the concept of layers of governance.  Chapter Three 
described the market layer of private regulation; it explained how market interaction 
can fall short of adequately protecting the interests of stakeholders in franchising.  In 
fact it establishes imbalance of power and uncertainty in the franchise relationship.  
Chapter Three also introduced Williamson’s conception of contract as governance as 
a model for understanding how business arrangements may be regulated through the 
market.  Here, Chapter Four discusses the contract as another layer of governance that 
is carried out by the parties themselves, a form of self-regulation.  This chapter begins 
with an introduction to the nature of the franchise contract and the role it plays in the 
regulation of the franchise relationship; it also explains the need for uniformity in the 
franchise relationship and in the contract.   
The remaining sections of this chapter explain the importance of the standard form 
and relational qualities of the franchise contract.  Standard form contracts are 
prevalent across many species of contracting relationships.  Relational contracts are 
also common. Both standard form and relational qualities of contract are designed to 
reduce transaction costs.  This chapter describes the essential attributes of standard 
form and relational contracts and explains why the franchise contract is both a 
standard form and a relational contract.  Two features are common to standard form 
contracts, unequal bargaining power and lack of negotiation.  Unequal bargaining 
power and lack of negotiation are both justified by the need for uniformity, which is 
the cardinal value in business format franchising.  Relational contracts can also be 
                                                 
358 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, 946.  Having made this observation, Hadfield focused the balance of her 
analysis primarily on the incompleteness of the contract rather than the standard form or the 
combination of the two. 
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defined by two features, incompleteness and longevity.  Relational contracts must be 
flexible, sometimes to the point of being vague.  They rely heavily on reciprocity and 
on the trust that develops over time.  Chapter Four explains how the unequal 
bargaining power and lack of negotiation of the standard form combine with the 
relational contract’s flexibility and trust to strongly reinforce imbalance of power in 
the relationship and uncertainty for a franchisee. 
4.1 THE FRANCHISE CONTRACT 
The franchise contract is one of several documents that may be used to define and 
support the franchise relationship.  In franchising it is common to find that the 
relationship is underpinned by multiple agreements.   Before considering further the 
attributes of the contract, it may be useful to introduce the franchise contract in its 
context as part of this family of documents that comprises the terms of the deal. 
Almost every franchise system has at least one operations manual as well as 
procedures and training manuals.   Other documents supporting the arrangement may 
include the lease, a business plan, a marketing information brochure, manuals for site 
selection, franchise performance review, and the Franchising Code of Conduct (the 
Code) and Trade Practices Act (TPA) compliance materials.359  Ancillary to the 
contract or part of the contract itself may be the financing agreement, letters of credit, 
a non-competition agreement, guarantee and indemnity, release, supply agreement, 
equipment purchase or lease agreement, software licence, letters of intent, methods of 
payment, trademark licence, and registered user agreement.   One other document is 
essential; although a written contract is optional, the Code requires that a disclosure 
document be provided in every sale of a franchise.   
The range of agreements used in franchise arrangements underscores the diversity and 
complexity of the franchise relationships.   These ancillary agreements can allow for 
both greater specificity and flexibility to accommodate change that may be imposed 
by external forces as well as change initiated by the parties.  The scope of this 
research is, however, limited to the franchise contract. 
The franchise contract may be as ‘bare bones’ as the regulatory environment and 
norms of business practice will allow, or it may be lengthy and complex.  In Australia 
                                                 
359<http://www.franchisealliance.com.au/index.php?module=Websiteandaction=Textandcontent=10988
63189250-6954andparentContent=1098840720125-6130> at 14 May 2005. 
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there is no requirement that the contract be in writing, but franchise contracts in 
Australia generally are written.  While some are very brief, especially those for very 
small or new systems, franchise contracts for established systems often run to 60 
pages or more.  Franchise contracts sampled for this research ranged from about 50 to 
100 pages in length, averaging about 70 pages in length.360  This dissertation 
examines the terms contained in the contracts sampled.   While there is no typical 
franchise contract, a ‘sample’ franchise contract is contained in Giles and Terry, 
Franchising Law and Practice.361   
4.2   THE MULTIPLE ROLES OF CONTRACT 
The role of contract is controversial in theory; debate continues over the significance 
of contract in commercial relations.   Hugh Collins notes that, ‘the law of contract is a 
fundamental mechanism of social order’, but at the same time ‘the evidence from 
empirical studies of contractual behaviour indicates the marginal and sometimes 
socially disintegrative effects of the law of contract’.362   This debate has been fuelled 
by research indicating that the paper document is not of primary importance to 
business people.363    
Macaulay claims that business people fail to plan and draft carefully, to consult legal 
advisors, to consider their rights, and to utilize the courts with the result that the 
importance of contract in business relationships is overstated,  ‘Contract law in action 
is a defective product, promising far more than it can deliver.’364   
The role of contract in franchising has been explored to a limited degree in 
management and economics.  Much of this research explores how contract is used to 
                                                 
360 A franchisee’s solicitor commented that this research ‘only represents the deep end of the pool’, as 
licence agreements caught by the Code may be only two pages. 
361 Franchising Law and Practice,  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/au/legal/results/pubTreeViewDoc.do?nodeId=TAAK
AAF&pubTreeWidth=23%25 at 2 March 2007. 
362 Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999). 
363 See, inter alia,  Stewart Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of 
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ in David Campbell, Hugh 
Collins, and John Wightman, (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network 
Contracts (2003) and Ian R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under 
the Classical, Neo-classical, and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 (6) Northwestern University Law 
Review 854. 
364 Macaulay in  Joerges, Christian (ed)  Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 189.  
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govern the relationship, as, for example, it establishes an organizational structure that 
reduces transaction costs.365  The role of the franchise contract has also been 
considered in legal research of relational contracts, and as part of analysis of the 
franchise contract as a standard form contract.366  Some general treatment of the 
franchise relationship has included commentary on the contract throughout its 
analysis.367  These articles provide a foundation for further analysis in this dissertation 
of the role of contract in the regulation of the franchise relationship. 
Some argue that contract is indeed of small significance in franchising.  Contract is 
only one of many documents that support the relationship.  Many franchisors say that 
it is true that the contract only comes out of the drawer in the case of a dispute, a view 
that supports the idea that more intimately bound firms behave in a less strictly 
contractual way.368 Franchise systems, because of the closeness of the association 
between franchisor and franchisee, might be expected to put less emphasis on 
contract.369    The long-term relationship means parties are likely to rely on other 
means to regulate.  There is a widespread view that the contract ‘only comes out of 
                                                 
365 See generally, Deepak Agrawal and Rajiv Lal, ‘Contractual Arrangements in Franchising: An 
Empirical Investigation’ (1995) 32(2) Journal of Marketing Research 213;  James A. Brickley, 
‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’ (1999) 42 Journal of Law 
and Economics 745;  Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L Shaw, ‘The Dynamics of Franchise 
Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data’ (1999) 107 Journal of Political Economy 1041;  Francine 
Lafontaine and Margaret E.Slade, ‘Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision’ in Kalyan 
Chatterjee and William F. Samuelson (eds), Game Theory and Business Applications (2001); G. Frank 
Mathewson and Ralph A.Winter, ‘Territorial Restrictions in Franchise Contracts’ (1994) 32(2) 
Economic Inquiry 181;  Andrew C. Selden  Principles of Effective Franchise Contracts (2000) Briggs 
and Morgan <http://www.briggs.com/CM/Articles/article83.asp> at 1 November 2004; Janet 
Bercovitz, An Analysis of the Contract Provisions in Business Format Franchise Agreements (1999) 
International Society for New Institutional Economics 
<http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE00/Papers/Bercovitz.pdf> at 8 December 2004; and S. Watson and G. 
Gunasekara, ‘Regulating Business Format Franchising: Familiar Solutions for Novel Problems’ (2006) 
12 NZBLQ 174. 
366 See, for example, Antony W. Dnes,‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 
Journal of Legal Studies 367;  Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 927;  James Jordan and Judith Gitterman, 
‘Franchise Agreements: Contracts of Adhesion?’ (1996) 16 Franchise Law Journal 1; Goddard, David, 
‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New Zealand Law Review 423; 
Andrew Terry, ‘Franchising, Relational Contracts and the Vibe’ (2005) 33(4) Australian Business Law 
Review 289; and Günter Teubner, ‘Beyond Contract and Organisation? The External Liability of 
Franchising Systems in German Law’ in Christian Joerges (ed),  Franchising and the Law: Theoretical 
and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 105. 
367 Steinberg and Lescatre, ‘ Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ (2004) 109 
Penn State Law Review 105. 
368 George Dent, ‘Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances’ (2002) 58 Business Lawyer 45, n 120. 
369 They are, for example, treated in competition law as being more closely bound, and therefore 
granted certain exemptions from its requirements. See Alan Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) 
Coasian World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Michigan Law Review 111 (1996). 
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the drawer in case of a dispute.’  There is also the view, put forward by the Executive 
Director of the Franchise Council of Australia, that the franchise contract is largely a 
reflection of regulatory requirements.370    
Yet, despite such evidence, franchisors continue to go to the considerable expense of 
drafting contracts, franchisees continue to sign them; legislators continue to address 
them; and courts continue to interpret them.  Commentators continue to explore the 
roles that the contract plays in a commercial relationship.371  Much of the current legal 
research proceeds from an acceptance that contract is not only about the paper deal, 
but it is also the ‘real deal’ and the relationship.372  As Hugh Collins’ analysis in 
Regulating Contracts amply demonstrates, though it may be controversial, contract 
retains its potential to play important roles both as an instrument and as an object of 
regulation.373  
This research affirms that contract is a versatile tool.  In the franchise relationship it 
plays several roles.  Not only is contract an instrument of self-regulation, but it is also 
an object of regulation.  Franchising is a concrete example of Collins’ observation 
that, ‘[t]he topic of Regulating Contracts requires us to view contracts both as the 
subject of regulation, and, at the same time, as a type of regulation governing 
contractual practices.’374   In this research contract plays yet another role as a tool to 
gauge the effectiveness of the regulation of the franchising sector.    
4.2.1 Contract as an instrument of self-regulation  
As an instrument of regulation, contract is an early point of contact and the subject of 
negotiation between the parties about the nature of their ongoing relationship.  
Negotiation of the contract can set the tone of the relationship, even if the parties are 
fortunate enough never to have to refer to it again.  Negotiation of the contract is 
                                                 
370 Telephone interview with Richard Evans, FCA Executive Director (2004.) 
371 R.A. Hillman, ‘The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory’, 67 Texas Law Review 103 (1988). 
372 See, for example, Stewart Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of 
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ in Campbell, David, Collins, 
Hugh and Wightman, John (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network 
Contracts (2003) 51;  Macneil, Ian R., ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1975) 48 Southern California 
Law Review 627; and Lisa Bernstein,  ‘Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115. 
373 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999). 
374 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contracts’ in C. Parker, C. Scott, N. Lacey and J. Braithwaite, (eds),  
Regulating Law (2003) xxvi. 
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therefore critical to the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.  What is most 
interesting about this aspect of the role of contract in franchising is that, due to the 
standard form nature of the contract; with this sort of contract there is very little 
negotiation.  A franchisor does not permit negotiation of most contract terms, which 
are instead presented to a franchisee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.    
The contract also informs the structure of franchising as organizational form;  it is a 
form of governance of the franchise organization, as an alternative to planning, 
promise and competition.375  The contract as governance outlines a matrix of 
overlapping roles of franchisor and franchisee, serving both as a means for parties to 
organize themselves and as a guide to public entities (courts and regulators) on how to 
interpret the relationship.   The contract puts in place the regulatory mechanisms for a 
franchisor to monitor a franchisee, to provide performance incentives, to allocate risk, 
manage externalities, information asymmetry, and facilitate information search, 
entrepreneurship and interdependence.  Much of the nature of the relationship as 
described in Chapter Three is reinforced and codified through the contract.  
The contract as a commodity is a piece of the package for which the franchisee is 
paying.  As such, the contract has potential to play a role as a sales tool; it can signal 
to the buyer that the seller’s entire package is an attractive one.  Jim Penman writes 
that it should be ‘an offer too good to refuse’.376  It appears, however that it is unusual 
for a franchisor to view the contract in this way.  ‘An informed consumer is our best 
customer’ is not the approach usually taken in the marketing of franchising.  There is, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, little current application of a ‘market for 
terms’, though this mechanism could be developed through better information, 
participation and collaboration. 
The contract prescribes methods of conflict management and resolution, and so has 
the potential to promote the long-term strength of the relationship.  Even if the 
contract only comes out of the drawer in case of a dispute, that role alone is an 
important one.  Disputes are critical to the relationship, and they can be handled in a 
variety of ways; the contract is central to processes of negotiation, mediation, and 
litigation, and it helps the parties to predict outcomes of dispute settlement processes.  
                                                 
375 See Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’ 
(1979) 22(2) Journal of Law and Economics 233. 
376 Jim Penman, What Will They Franchise Next?: The Story of Jim’s Group (2003). 
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The contract also outlines the parties’ rights and obligations at the end of the 
relationship by way of transfer or termination.   
The contract also impacts on third parties such as suppliers and investors.   Lawyers, 
lenders, prospective business partners, anyone with an interest in the relationship who 
is not a party to it, will also look to the contract for clarification of what is expected. 
Gillian Hadfield writes, ‘[T]he heart of franchising's legal structure is still contract.’377   
As Richard Evans of the FCA puts it, ‘It is a contract relationship, and needs to be 
understood as such.’378   
A ‘contractual relationship’ can, however, mean many things.  Blair and Lafontaine 
suggest that that a franchisee should,  
‘recognize his contract for what it is. It is not an opportunity to develop a 
business and invest in developing a brand in partnership with a franchisor, but 
rather a short-term licence from which the franchisee must derive short-term 
benefits…it makes sense to think of a franchise contract as a rental contract over 
an intangible asset, namely the brand, with the terms of the franchise contract 
clearly defining the relationship.’379  
Blair and Lafontaine stress that the arrangement is a contract of fixed duration.  A 
franchisee is contracting for the right to use a particular trademark in a particular 
location for a particular time period; it is not establishing its own fully-transferable, 
independent business.   
Blair and Lafontaine believe that this approach to understanding the relationship is not 
cultivated by franchisors; they speculate that this is because franchisors believe it 
would change the attitude of franchisees toward the enterprise.  Franchisees would no 
longer consider themselves as owners of their own businesses, as franchisors want 
franchisees to do to ensure franchisee effort and commitment and to reduce agency 
costs. Different contractual and other devices to manage a franchisee would then be 
required, 
‘Any franchisor that wants more than a local finite-term focus from its 
franchisees must embed extra franchise rights and expectations within the 
contract: verbal promises to the franchisee about future prospects should never 
                                                 
377 Gillian Hadfield,  ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, 939. 
378 Richard Evans, CEO of the Franchising Council of Australia, quoted in ‘Follow the Winning Plan’, 
The Australian (Sydney), 30 June 2006, 12. 
379 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005) 221. 
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suffice from the franchisee’s perspective (they are not worth the paper they are 
written on!), especially in light of the frequent use of integration clauses…’ 380 
 
The words from the quote above, ‘with the terms of the franchise contract clearly 
defining the relationship’ are significant because many contract terms provide for 
high levels of franchisor flexibility and discretion, but are poorly understood by a 
franchisee.  For example, the Scope of Grant term of the contract usually specifies 
that the contract entered into by a franchisee for the intellectual property is not an 
exclusive one, and misunderstanding about what this means can lead to problems 
throughout the course of the relationship.  The Scope of Grant and other contract 
terms are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.  For the purposes of this Chapter, 
the point is in Blair and Lafontaine’s message: an accurate understanding of the nature 
of the contractual agreement is critical to understanding the relationship.   
4.2.2 Contract as an object of regulation  
The distinction between contract and corporation influences the regulatory approach.  
The contract as the object of regulation assumes equality of partners, non-disclosure 
of preferences, ex ante definition of performances and immutable contractual duties; 
the corporation as object of regulation assumes corporate governance where there is 
latent inequality of partners, adaptation of performance and duties through majority 
vote, exit possibilities, and delegation of management to specialists who act as 
fiduciaries to capital owners.381   Though franchising is often spoken of as an industry 
or an industry sector, it is fundamentally a contractual relationship and the regulation 
of franchising is the regulation of a contractual relationship.  The sector-specific 
regulation of franchising in Australia, the Franchising Code of Conduct protects the 
contractual relationship, and the assumptions that support legal conceptions of that 
relationship. It may be appropriate to consider franchising as an organizational form, 
but that was not the approach taken in the drafting of the Code.382 
                                                 
380 Id., 292. 
381 Erich Schanze, ‘Beyond Contract and Corporation: The Law and Economics of Symbiotic 
Arrangements’ in Riis, Thomas and Nielsen, Ruth (eds), Law and Economics: Methodology and 
Application (1998) 113, 117. Schanze observes that such a distinction is consistent with differences in 
regulation in civil and common law.  The common law of contract tends to ignore duration and 
relational intensity. This deficiency of the common law of contract serves as a point of departure for 
McNeil and Macaulay’s criticisms of contract law.   
382 There is other commercial regulation in Australia that impacts upon franchising as an organizational 
form, such as the competition law provisions of the Trade Practices Act (the TPA), but this legislation, 
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As an object of regulation, contract is the means by which regulators impose 
requirements on the parties in the relationship. In the case of franchising, regulation 
imposes procedural requirements on a franchisor, such as allowing a cooling-off 
period, procedures to help ensure fairness in transfer and termination procedures, and 
disclosure. All of these requirements pertain to formation or performance of the 
contract. The contract also acts as a blueprint for and signals conformance with 
government regulation. 
What is most significant about the role of contract in the regulation of the franchise 
relationship in Australia is that disclosure, the one of the main tools used to regulate, 
is focussed on the contract. Of the approximately seventeen contract terms that are 
subject to Code requirements, most (twelve) of the requirements call for disclosure as 
the only form of regulatory intervention.  Table 4.1 outlines how the clauses typically 
found in a franchise contract are subject to regulation through direct intervention. It 
represents the applicable regulation, if any, for each term found in a typical franchise 
contract.  Its focus is on franchise-specific regulation of the relationship but does note 
where other regulation applies.  While the Table is not an exhaustive list of all the 
terms that may be found in franchise contracts, it covers most of the commonly used 
terms.  
                                                                                                                                            
is beyond the scope of this dissertation with its focus on the regulation of the franchise relationship 
through the Code.   
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Table 4.1:  Contract as an Object of Regulation/  
Applicable Regulation by Contract Term 
 
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS COMMONLY 
FOUND IN FRANCHISE CONTRACTS 
APPLICABLE 
REGULATION 
Clauses regulated by disclosure requirements (to 
be provided to franchisee at contract formation) 
 
Grant of Franchise (Scope of Grant) Disclosure 8 
Term and Renewal of Franchise Disclosure 17 
Franchisor’s Obligations Disclosure 15 
Franchisee’s Obligations Disclosure 16 
Fees/Payments   Disclosure 13 
Term (Duration) Disclosure 17 
Right of Renewal Disclosure 17 
Restrictive Covenants Disclosure 18 
Restraint of Trade  Disclosure 18 
Adjustments Disclosure 17 
Intellectual Property/Rights in the System (see Disclosure 18 – ongoing 
Disclosure requirements re 
change in  IP) 
Obligations on expiration or termination Disclosure 17 
Clauses with substantive regulation  
(Disclosure requirements may also apply) 
 
Products and Supplies  Disclosure 9,10; TPA 
45,47,48, 96 
Minimum Performance and Reporting Requirements Disclosure 16, 9,10; TPA 
45,47,48 
Area Development Plans   Disclosure, also section 51AC 
Franchisor Advertising and Marketing  FCC Clause 17 Reporting by 
franchisor, Disclosure 12 
Termination  FCC Clause 20-23 
Transfer  FCC 20,21, Disclosure 17 
Guarantee and indemnity FCC Clause 16, no general 
release of franchisor toward 
franchisee  
Meetings/Franchise Advisory Council FCC Clause 15 Franchisees’ 
freedom to associate  
Dispute Resolution  FCC Part 4 
Cooling-off FCC Clause 13 
 
 139
As Table 4.1 indicates, many of the key terms in franchise contracts are regulated 
through disclosure. Clauses not regulated through specific disclosure requirements or 
substantive Code provisions include operations manual; independent contractor; 
severability and construction; approvals and waivers; entire agreement; force majeur; 
applicable law; GST; acknowledgment; death, disability, mental incapacity; 
maintenance of the store/inspection; training; notices; accounts; insurance; and 
covenants.   
Contract is thus an important layer of self-regulation, it is also an instrument of public 
regulation by courts in interpreting the relationship, and a focal point of direct 
intervention, especially disclosure.  This dissertation argues that the contract plays 
such important roles that should be employed with care, with an awareness of the 
qualities of the contract itself, and of its prejudices and its limitations.  Later sections 
of this chapter outline how the standard form and relational qualities of the contract 
give rise to certain limitations on the use of contract to regulate the franchise 
relationship.  Before getting to those points, however, it is necessary to consider the 
importance of uniformity, an aspect of the franchise relationship that is critical both to 
the relationship and to an understanding of the franchise contract. 
4.3 UNIFORMITY: THE CARDINAL VALUE IN FRANCHISING 
One of the contracts in the sample contains the following clause, 
 
‘The Franchisee acknowledges that it is imperative the standards of quality and 
uniformity of the Franchisor System be maintained. Accordingly, the Franchisee 
agrees that the Franchisor has the right to set such standards of quality and to 
make such policies and rules from time to time, as the Franchisor may 
determine. The Franchisee agrees to abide by and be bound by all such 
standards, policies and rules and any non-compliance shall constitute a breach 
of this agreement…’383 
Uniformity is of critical importance in business format franchising; it helps a 
franchisor to achieve important objectives including brand maintenance, the reduction 
of strategic risk and risk related to externalities and moral hazard, and the containment 
of transaction costs.  It also helps protect a franchisor against franchisee claims of 
unconscionable conduct.  These are dealt with in turn in the following sections. 
                                                 
383 System F9. 
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4.3.1 Uniformity is crucial to brand maintenance 
Traditionally in franchising, uniformity (in products, levels of service, cleanliness and 
other standards) has been considered the key to a successful operation.  The 
economists Blair and Lafontaine write that, 
 ‘The strength of franchise systems does not lie in the absolute quality of the 
products offered.  Instead, it resides largely in the capacity of the franchised 
chain to offer a uniform product at reasonable prices.’384   
The following query posted on the American Bar Association (ABA) Forum on 
Franchising listserv illustrates the importance of uniformity to a franchisor.  Michael 
Seid’s reply to the listserv enquiry provides an insight into the zeal with which 
franchisor consultants defend uniformity: 
Enquiry to listserv:  ‘Can anyone cite me to the case (if it wasn't just 
someone's hypothetical) where a franchisor attempted to enforce system 
standards against a franchisee who was exceeding system standards by serving 
fresh squeezed real orange juice instead of reconstituted stuff out of a container, 
which led to complaints by other franchisees?’  
 
Seid’s Reply:  ‘They had not exceeded system standards.  For example, a 
McDonald's franchisee deciding to have less fat in their burgers would change 
the taste and texture.  Changing the brixing on Coca Cola could make it sweeter 
or less sweet.  Putting bigger desks in a Marriott Courtyard might make the 
working area bigger but the living area smaller.  Adding moisture content in 
cheese used for pizza might cause the bread to burn or the pepperoni to cup 
because the melt time and temperature needs to change.  They had not exceeded 
system standards - they had violated the system standards.’385 
 
As the court recognized in a noted Canadian case:  
‘...it is vital to the integrity and success of the entire franchise system that the 
standards be uniform and that they be enforced. Uniformity must be central to 
the identity of the system. And maintenance of identity and uniformity must be 
central to continued operation of the system for all.’386     
 
Uniformity is critical to effective brand maintenance.  Imbalance of bargaining power 
in the franchise relationship stems in large part from the strict control over the system 
that a franchisor exercises in the name of the need for uniformity in franchise 
                                                 
384 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005) 117. 
385 Enquiry posted on the ABA Forum on Franchising Listserv 1 February 2005 and replied to by 
Michael H. Seid 2 February 2005.  
386 Coordinated Corporate Services Ltd v National Video Inc (1984) 2 CPR (2d) 251, 755. The case 
also acknowledges the difficulties that can be encountered by franchisors in dealing with franchisees 
who may be in breach and who, by continuing to operate, may be damaging the goodwill of the 
franchise. 
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contracts.  It is the essence of franchising that the brand be clearly identifiable and 
that franchisees conform to a franchisor’s branding formula.  In order to ensure 
uniformity franchisors try to maintain absolute authority over the terms of the 
relationship.   One further quotation reinforces this point,  
 ‘Franchising is ultimately an extremely competitive industry…. To succeed, a 
franchisor must constantly watch its backside for approaching competitors, as 
well as learn how best to gain on the competitor in front of it. To win, or even 
be in, the race, the franchisor must have an absolute right to respond to market 
changes and set the direction of its system--right or wrong. It must be free to 
take all varieties of risks without a concern that the wisdom of its decision 
might be second-guessed in a courtroom.’387 
4.3.2 Uniformity reduces risk 
Risks for a franchisor include operating risk as well as strategic and reputational risks 
related to a franchisee.  Operating risk is defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external 
events.’388   The choice to franchise decreases a franchisor’s operating risk over that 
of a company-owned store, as a franchisee assumes the operating risk for the unit.  
The addition of a franchisee, however, can increase a franchisor’s strategic and 
reputational risks to the extent that a franchisee is able to exercise discretion in both 
the operation of the unit and the use of resources.389  To contain these franchisee-
related risks a franchisor imposes tight controls on the exercise of discretion by a 
franchisee.  Thus, a franchisor relies on uniformity to help contain risk. 
Uniformity in the system also reduces the negative impacts of externalities within the 
system.   Economists view voluntary exchange as mutually beneficial to both parties, 
but consumption and production often have external effects that can lead to moral 
hazard.  Franchisors are concerned with a form of moral hazard known as ‘free-
riding’ where a franchisee shirks on the trade name or brand.   In the case of a 
particular franchise unit, when repeat customers accrue to the benefit of that particular 
                                                 
387 William L. Killion, ‘Putting Critical Decision-Making Where It Belongs: Scouring the Franchise 
Agreement for the “D” Word’ (2005) 24 Franchise Law Journal 228, 230.  
388 According to §644 of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 
known as Basel II, “operational risk” is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems, or from external events. 
389 Phillip H. Phan, John E. Butler, and Soo H. Lee, ‘Crossing Mother: Entrepreneur-Franchisees’ 
Attempts to Reduce Franchisor Influence’ (1996) 11 Journal of Business Venturing 370. The Basel II 
definition in the previous note includes legal risk, but excludes strategic risk: that is the risk of a loss 
arising from a poor strategic business decision. This definition also excludes reputational risk. 
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franchisee, the externality is low and there are positive incentives for that franchisee 
to cultivate his customers.390   A McDonald’s unit located in a local shopping center 
may see a high percentage of repeat customers, and so that franchisee will be 
interested in offering high quality service to those customers, as it will directly benefit 
from the repeat business.  But where a franchise unit has a high number of non-repeat 
customers or its repeat customers accrue to the benefit of other franchisees in the 
system, such as in the case of a McDonald’s unit located at a busy metropolitan 
highway interchange, high externalities may tempt a franchisee to free-ride and under-
invest in its operation.391    
A franchisor employs a variety of means to protect the brand against the risks of 
franchisee free-riding.  Franchisee temptation to free-ride can be reduced through the 
use of incentives or a franchisor can step up its monitoring.  Alternatively, in the case 
of demand externality, for example, where the low price at one outlet increases 
demand at all outlets, a franchisor may impose uniform pricing, further eroding a 
franchisee’s local control.392  Franchisors may also respond to externalities through 
choice of organizational form.  High externalities can signal a need for greater vertical 
integration, as franchisee free-riding leads a franchisor to prefer to run the unit as a 
company-owned store and hire a manager, whose compensation may not be tied as 
directly to the performance of that particular unit.393 
                                                 
390 James A. Brickley, ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’ 
(1999) 42 Journal of Law and Economics 745, 749. 
391 Examples of high externality industries are: auto/truck rental, donuts/cookies/bakeries, ice cream, 
and take-out restaurants (eg pizza). Externalities are also higher when franchised units are located 
closer together.  Examples of intermediate externality industries are home furnishings and athletic 
wear.  Low externality industries include: auto products, health and fitness, dry cleaning, lawn care, 
travel agents, hair styling and other industries that involve relatively high customer-specific investment 
that reinforces repeat customers, in James A. Brickley, ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: 
Evidence from Franchising’ (1999) 42 Journal of Law and Economics 745, 755-756 
392 Competition law in many jurisdictions, including Australia, makes certain exceptions that allow 
limited forms of product tying and price maintenance practices in the franchising context. 
393 Lafontaine’s research on variation in the franchise contract found that most variables did not affect 
contract terms, but rather manifested themselves in a franchisor choice to vertically integrate, i.e. to 
operate a company-owned unit, rather than to segregate, i.e. to sell a franchise unit. With respect to the 
above example, a franchisor’s role in maintaining brand/TM is particularly important where business is 
transient, e.g. at highway locations.  The results also show that where brand/TM is more valuable, there 
is more vertical integration. Finally, Lafontaine expected to find that smaller outlets have greater 
tendency to franchise since they can internalize less of the externality.  She instead found that larger 
outlet size correlated with greater company ownership (and low power incentives to company agents)   
See Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade, ‘Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision’ in 
Kalyan Chatterjee and William F. Samuelson (eds), Game Theory and Business Applications (2001) 
146-157. 
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While uniformity reduces variation among stores and so helps to control externalities, 
it can also create market inefficiencies that lead to other types of moral hazard, for 
example, where responsibility for risk is assigned to one party, but the other party still 
has control over relevant risk factors.394  This situation arises where a franchisee 
makes contributions to advertising funds which a franchisor can spend at its discretion 
and where a franchisor has discretion to require franchisee to purchase from a supplier 
whose products are more expensive, but who will pay a franchisor a commission.  A 
franchisor benefits but will not suffer the costs, as a franchisor’s royalty is calculated 
on franchisee gross turnover, not franchisee net profit.   
A franchisor is also vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour on the part of a franchisee, 
such as free-riding, as well as cheating, inaccurate reporting, and withholding of 
information; or appropriation of intellectual property.  Unlike a franchisee, however, a 
franchisor is able to limit opportunistic behaviour of a franchisee through contractual 
terms such as accounting and reporting requirements, minimum performance 
requirements, vertical restraints, and shifting of risk to a franchisee.  This option of 
using the contract to contain the other party’s opportunistic behaviour is unavailable 
to a franchisee because a franchisee neither drafts nor is able to negotiate contract 
terms.  Moral hazard is thus a problem that only a franchisor can control through 
contract, crafting uniform contract terms to protect against risks, often by shifting 
them to franchisees. 
4.3.3 Uniformity contains transaction costs 
The franchise form exists largely to save transaction costs.  Uniformity in drafting of 
contracts contains the transaction costs of entry into the relationship.  A franchisor’s 
costs would soar if each franchisee were governed by a different contract with its own 
individually-negotiated terms and provisions.  Repetition of the same documents, 
processes and procedures with every franchisee in the system creates economies of 
scale in the preparation of the contract documents, administration and regulatory 
compliance.  If a franchisor negotiates a different term, not only will a franchisor have 
to draft and monitor different franchise contracts, but also it will have to prepare 
                                                 
394 The classic example of this type of moral hazard is insurance contracts.     
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different disclosure documents for each franchisee.  Disclosure is considered onerous 
by franchisors even without this added burden.395   
After the contract is signed, uniformity leads to ease of administration that also keeps 
transaction costs down, ‘If there is not a high degree of uniformity, there can be 
difficulties for a franchisor in administering the system.’396    Lower agent service 
levels, particularly lack of compliance with the system and failure to pay fees, 
correlate with higher monitoring costs, as a franchisor must spend more to ensure 
compliance.397  Generally, a franchisor seeks to contain these costs through unilateral 
governance and strict, uniform standards that are imposed through the contract as well 
as other documents supporting the relationship.  Uniformity is therefore a key tool for 
a franchisor to maintain the system standards, to keep costs down, and to control 
externalities. 
4.3.4 Uniformity protects a franchisor against claims of unconscionability 
Finally, uniformity in the form of a franchisor’s consistent treatment of franchisees 
can be an indication of fairness.398  If a franchisor negotiates the terms of the deal with 
each franchisee, the contracts will vary, leaving a franchisor open to claims of 
favouritism and unfair treatment of some franchisees.  The Trade Practices Act 1974 
(the TPA) section 51AC codifies this concern.399  Uniformity of the contract is 
addressed with respect to unconscionable conduct in TPA section 51AC(3).  TPA 
section 51AC(3)(f) considers ‘whether the stronger party’s conduct was consistent 
with its conduct in similar transactions’.  This provides another reason for franchisors 
to insist on consistency in contract terms, as regulation effectively mandates it.  Thus, 
                                                 
395 In the U.S material modification has to go into the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC), 
effectively mandating that such changes to the contract must apply to all franchisees.  See James V. 
Jordan and Judith B. Gitterman, ‘Franchise Agreements: Contract of Adhesion?’(1996) 16 Franchise 
Law Journal 1, 42:  ‘franchise agreements are often drafted as form contracts because of the constraints 
imposed on franchisors by state legislatures. For example, under the California Negotiated Sales Rule, 
the initial offer to a franchisee must be the offer that has been registered with the Department of 
Corporations. If the franchisor negotiates a change with a franchisee, the UFOC must be amended to 
disclose the negotiated terms. Additionally, the franchisor must attach all notices of negotiated sales 
within the past twelve months to the offering circular.’ 
396 Andrew C. Selden, ‘The Negotiated Franchise: A Trap for the Unwary’ (1983) 7 International 
Franchise Legal Digest 2. 
397 Deepak Agrawal and Rajiv Lal, ‘Contractual Arrangements in Franchising: An Empirical 
Investigation’ (1995) 32(2) Journal of Marketing Research 213. 
398 See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) section 51AC. 
399 Ibid. 
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TPA section 51AC reinforces a franchisor’s power and its refusal to negotiate contract 
terms.  Imbalance of power has been a cornerstone of the unconscionability doctrine; 
yet in this case imbalance of power may be reinforced by the statutory elements of 
unconscionability.400   
Uniformity is critical to the relationship, the system, and the brand.  It underpins the 
standard form and the discretion of franchisors and so the power imbalance and 
uncertainty for franchisees.  As the next sections will outline, the standard form also 
combines with the relational qualities of the contract to further increase imbalance of 
power and uncertainty for a franchisee. 
4.4 THE FRANCHISE CONTRACT: STANDARD FORM AND RELATIONAL 
4.4.1 The franchise contract as a standard form contract 
A standard form contract has been defined as, 
 ‘a contract that is not individually negotiated by the parties but is instead 
drafted by one party who uses a contract containing the same terms for all 
transactions of that type. The drafting party may be in the superior bargaining 
position and may offer the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Standard form 
contracts are sometimes called ‘contracts of adhesion’ because the party in the 
inferior bargaining position who wishes to contract must adhere to what is 
demanded by the party in the superior position, there being no room to 
negotiate.’401 
The essential defining elements of such contracts are the lack of negotiation of terms 
and unequal bargaining power.  The following section explains these two essential 
elements of the standard form as they are manifest in franchise contracts. 
                                                 
400 The problem is that section 51AC equates consistency with fairness.  Consistency and fairness are 
two distinct and not necessarily compatible concepts.  To the extent that ‘fair’ implies honesty and/or 
justice, a sharp practice does not become fairer because it is applied consistently.  For a discussion on 
the connection between unconscionability and balance of power see Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of 
Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law Review 139.  
401 Peter E. Nygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworth’s Australian Legal Dictionary (1997).  Note that the 
distinction between standard form and adhesion contracts is not clear; many writers and legal resources 
use the terms interchangeably. This article will use the term ‘standard form’ because of the negative 
connotations of the term ‘contract of adhesion’.  See Freidrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion - Some 
Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629. 
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4.4.1.1 Lack of negotiation of terms  
Interviews with franchisors, franchisees and their counsel suggest that it is widely 
accepted within the sector that franchise contracts are not negotiated.402  One or two 
minor adjustments may be countenanced, but in general the contract is part of the 
product that a franchisee can choose to purchase/invest in or not, but cannot expect to 
have custom-tailored to his particular requirements.  A franchisee’s lack of franchisee 
bargaining power is closely related to the fact that there is no negotiation of contract 
terms.  As Gillian Hadfield observed, 
‘The reputable company will not change its contract; it will rarely let it be 
examined until the prospective purchaser has made a deposit towards the 
purchase. It will not compromise or negotiate any part of it. The attorney 
representing a prospective purchaser need only determine with him if the client 
can live within the framework of the franchise agreement. If it is oppressive or 
confiscatory, the client is best advised not to sign.  If the franchise company 
offers to negotiate away any of its requirements to make the sale, it can only be 
an indication of the weakness of the company…. [There is] a clear ethic of non-
negotiation, not merely to boost the bargaining power of the franchisor, but also 
to define what, fundamentally, it is that the franchisee is purchasing. In other 
words, franchisors use the standard form contract to signal aspects of the 
relationship that the franchisee can expect -- the relational elements of company 
structure and philosophy. Buyers' guide authors echo this same norm. The clear 
message is that the refusal of the franchisor to negotiate -- the superior position 
of the franchisor -- is a hallmark of the relationship that the franchisee is 
purchasing.403 
Hadfield’s observations highlight several reasons why franchisors do not negotiate.  
Uniformity and the need for strict franchisor control is the most common justification, 
but franchisor unwillingness to negotiate also signals to a franchisee the nature of the 
relationship and the superior position of a franchisor.   Thus, there is a direct 
relationship between a franchisor’s failure to negotiation and power in the 
relationship.  Just as inequality of bargaining power contributes to the lack of 
negotiation, lack of negotiation reinforces inequality of bargaining power.  If there is 
no negotiation possible for the non-drafting party, the bargaining positions of the 
parties are by definition, unequal.   
                                                 
402  Franchisors’ solicitors meet at trade conferences and recount with a combination of amusement and 
horror their stories of franchisee solicitors submitting to them lists of changes to the agreement.   
403 Gillian Hadfield,  ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, 961 
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4.4.1.2 Lack of bargaining power  
Bargaining power is defined as, ‘The ability to get a large share of the possible joint 
benefits to be derived from any agreement. 404  Daniel Barnhizer discusses the concept 
of bargaining power in a 2005 University of Colorado Law Review article, 
‘As a distinct legal concept, the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is a 
relatively recent invention. Its provenance lies in the late 19th Century social 
and economic reactions to the perceived abuses of laissez-faire economic 
regulation… In the 1940s and 1950s, bargaining power became entrenched in 
contract law, particularly after adoption of Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C.") 2-302 which expressly authorized courts to assess the parties' 
bargaining power under the rubric of unconscionability.’405 
The standard form contract is typically entered into between unequal bargaining 
partners, ‘The consumer is not in a position to negotiate the terms and the company's 
representative often does not have the authority to do so.’406   The weaker party to the 
contract therefore has little voice in setting its terms.407   Barnhizer’s analysis of 
judicial approaches to bargaining power finds that, 
‘The judicial inquiry can be divided into two rough categories. First, many 
courts address inequality of bargaining power in terms of the weaker party's 
lack of meaningful alternatives, necessity, the nature of the good or service, or 
inability to negotiate terms. Second, courts often employ a host of potential 
factors relating to characteristics of the parties and characteristics of the 
transaction to imbue the inequality of bargaining power doctrine with standards 
to guide the exercise of judicial discretion. Typical characteristics of individual 
parties relied upon by courts  to support an inference of inequality of bargaining 
power include wealth, business sophistication, education or knowledge, race, 
gender, "size" of the parties, monopoly power, and consumer status. And as a 
final alternative, many courts eschew standards for assessing inequality of 
bargaining power, relying instead upon a "we-know-it-when-we-see-it" 
approach. The inconsistency with which different courts approach these separate 
analyses and the fact that few courts or commentators have analyzed the relative 
importance of these factors to the question of bargaining power disparities mean 
that there is no predictable judicial standard for determining inequality of 
bargaining power. As a result, "inequality of bargaining power" can be fairly 
                                                 
404 John Black, A Dictionary of Economics,  Oxford University Press, 2002. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press.  Bond University.  20 November 
2006  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e185> 
405 Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law 
Review 139, 194-195. 
406 Peter E. Nygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworth’s Concise Legal Dictionary (3rd ed. 2004) ‘standard 
form contract’, 406.  
407 Cubic Corp. v  Marty 229 2d 828 (Cal. App., 1986); Standard Oil Co. of California v Perkins, 396 F 
2d 809 (1969). 
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described as a doctrine in search of content and substance. After almost a 
century of searching, the doctrine remains obscure.408 
While traditionally courts have treated commercial agreements with a presumption of 
equal bargaining power, in the franchise context this is not a legitimate assumption,  
‘Although franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit many of 
the same attributes of consumer contracts. The relationship between franchisor 
and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing … inequality of economic 
resources between the contracting parties . . . The agreements themselves tend 
to reflect this gross bargaining disparity. Usually they are form contracts the 
franchisor prepared and offered to the franchisee on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.’409 
The main factor in the bargaining position equation is the need for franchisor control 
in the interests of brand maintenance, system administration and the containment of 
transaction costs and negative externalities. Uniformity is the main reason why 
franchisors do not negotiate contracts with franchisees; uniformity is also the 
justification for concentration of power in the hands of a franchisor. Franchisor Jim 
Penman has documented his experiments with democratic processes in his systems 
and concludes that while democracy sounds good, ‘benign dictatorship works 
better.’410 
The imbalance of power in the franchise relationship can also be due to inequality of 
economic resources.  In addition, many of the factors cited by Barnhizer, such as 
wealth, business sophistication, education or knowledge, "size" of the parties, 
monopoly power, and consumer status also contribute to the disparity in the franchise 
relationship.    
Added to the need for uniformity and to the factors outlined in Barnhizer’s article, 
there are several other reasons why bargaining power is not equal in the franchise 
relationship, such as franchisee inexperience, franchisee psychology, and disparities 
in legal representation.  These factors can also help explain the lack of negotiation of 
the franchise contract.   
As described in Chapter Three, franchisee inexperience contributes to a franchisee’s 
relative lack of power throughout the relationship.  First, prospective franchisees are 
                                                 
408 Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law 
Review 139, 199-201. 
409 James V. Jordan and Judith B. Gitterman, ‘Franchise Agreements: Contract of Adhesion?’ (1996) 16 
Franchise Law Journal 1, 16. 
410 Telephone interview with Jim Penman, CEO of Jim’s Franchise Systems (2003). 
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often new to business ownership.  A recent survey showed that only one in five 
franchisees in Australia make over $100,000 per year.411   A successful, experienced 
businessperson is not the prototypical purchaser of a franchisor’s product, which is all 
about the ‘tried and tested system’ and being ‘in business for yourself, but not by 
yourself’.  Franchisee individualism, optimism and naiveté add to the imbalance of 
power.  A franchisee is relying largely on perceptions created by the assiduous 
marketing efforts of franchisors and on the ‘trust us’ aspect of the relationship that 
franchisors require for the sake of control and uniformity.   
In addition, the timing of the presentation of the contract also affects a franchisee’s 
bargaining position.  Franchise contracts are confidential, often only provided to 
prospective franchisees at a relatively late stage in the negotiation process.412 A 
franchisee is asked to sign the contract at a time when entrepreneurial individualism 
and optimism are near their peak, not a time when he or she is interested in collective 
action or the need for caution.413  A franchisee who thinks the deal is almost done may 
be afraid to make waves, or seem the wrong kind of franchisee, or one who does not 
expect to be successful, or he or she may want to avoid bargaining with a franchisor 
as a sign of trust and cooperation.414 
Also, disparities in legal representation can be part of the imbalance of power between 
franchisor and franchisee.  Because they are typically inexperienced in owning and 
operating a business, franchisees need good legal advice, but often, they do not get it.  
A franchisee may not fully utilize the advice of counsel as this is a time when he does 
not want to hear about ‘the downside’.   Many franchisees are unaware of the need for 
                                                 
411  Deloitte Franchisee Satisfaction Survey (2004) Deloitte 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D5527%2526cid%253D83960,00.html> at 
15 August 2005.  Franchising as a sector is predominantly ‘small business’, despite its significant 
contribution to the economy.  Only a handful of the 800 or so franchise systems that operate in 
Australia are publicly listed companies on the ASX.  According to the 2002 Franchise Council of 
Australia/Griffith Survey, few franchise systems show signs of structural and procedural 
corporatisation.  Only a quarter of the businesses in the survey reported a company board of more than 
four members and fewer still have more than one external member or a franchisee appointed to the 
Board. 
412 Interview with Adfectare  representative, FCA Conference Melbourne (September 2003).  Counsel 
for franchisors advise that prospective franchisees be required to sign a confidentiality agreement 
before being given the contract.   
413 These psychological conditions are discussed in Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and 
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ 
(2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139. 
414 George Dent, ‘Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances’ (2002) 58 Business Lawyer 45.     
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or are unable to secure the quality of advice they need.415   In contrast to franchisors, 
for whom many deals riding on the drafting of one contract make paying top dollar for 
legal advice a necessity, franchisees often feel that they cannot afford to spend much 
on legal advice.  Even if a franchisee does understand, as a franchisor does, that the 
terms of the contract are crucial to the power in the relationship, a franchisee may lack 
sufficient resources to engage a solicitor with extensive experience in franchising, or 
one may not be available in the area, or if counsel experienced in franchising is 
available, he or she may well already act for a franchisor that creates a conflict of 
interest in representing that franchisee.  Finally, assuming a franchisee were 
perspicacious and financially capable of hiring the best legal advice, the experienced 
and zealous solicitor acting for a franchisee may still find a franchisor intractable in 
contract negotiations, claiming the necessity for uniformity in all franchise contracts.   
Even the most prudent franchisee might fail to see the reason to allocate resources to 
negotiation of a contract that is not negotiable. 
Many factors contribute to the inequality of bargaining power in a franchise 
relationship including franchisee inexperience, franchisee psychology and franchisee 
legal representation, as well as a franchisor’s need to maintain strict control.  While 
franchisors claim that franchisees can be more profitable and influential than 
franchisors themselves are, the weight of the evidence is that this is not typically the 
case.  In fact, for the purposes of maintaining uniformity and control, to maintain the 
system standards and to limit the costs of externalities and transaction costs, many 
franchisors have an interest in keeping franchisees in a subordinate position 
throughout the relationship. This disparity in bargaining power exists not only at the 
time of negotiation of the contract, but persists throughout the relationship.  
4.4.2 Summary of implications of the standard form 
There is wide variation in forms of franchising.  Not all franchises are business format 
franchises.  They may change in nature as the franchise system develops.  New 
franchise systems are qualitatively different in many ways from established systems; 
it may be that in a new franchise system a franchisor is not contractually or 
commercially significantly more powerful than a franchisee. Also, for established 
systems seeking to appoint multiple unit franchisees the bargaining power disparity 
                                                 
415 Ibid.     
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may be less marked.  Nevertheless, generally speaking, in business formation 
franchising, the imbalance of power in the relation from the outset, combined with the 
fact that franchise contracts are not negotiated, means that franchise contracts do 
satisfy the elements of the standard form contract.416   
In 1971 W. David Slawson estimated that, ‘Standard form contracts probably account 
for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made.’417  Standard terms 
are credited with helping to ‘democratize the marketplace’ because they afford access 
to market interactions for participants who might otherwise be excluded. They also 
offer consistency and a degree of anonymity.418  But the main reason the standard 
form contract is widely used is that it reduces transaction costs in several ways.  First, 
using the same contract many times eliminates the cost of drafting new contracts for 
similar transactions.  Second, standard form contracts reduce the cost of contract 
negotiations because they generally are not subject to negotiation.  Third, and perhaps 
most significantly in the franchising context, the standard form contract helps to 
contain a franchisor’s administrative costs through the course of the performance of 
an agreement; the standard form ensures uniformity in a franchisor’s dealings with 
every franchisee.  There is an obvious attraction of the standard form contract for a 
franchisor, therefore, in its relative expediency and low cost at the drafting and 
negotiation stages and in its containment of administration costs throughout the 
relationship.   
Standard form contracts are enforceable.  However, to the extent that the standard 
form deprives the contract of information exchange and consent, there may be no 
‘meeting of the minds’.  Consent becomes largely irrelevant; and ‘bargained-for 
                                                 
416  A study by Francine Lafontaine underscores the uniformity in franchise contracts. In her work on 
franchise contract variation Lafontaine hypothesized that the contract would vary depending upon 
variables of risk, agent effort, outlet size, cost of monitoring, franchisor effort, spillovers within chains, 
and several other factors.   She found, however, that contracts terms do not vary significantly for the 
tested variables.  But all of the factors tested did impact upon the franchisors’ decision to franchise; that 
is the choice to integrate through a company-owned store or to segregate through a franchised outlet.   
See Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade, ‘Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision’ in 
Chatterjee, Kalyan and William F. Samuelson (eds), Game Theory and Business Applications  (2001) 
162-168. 
417 John J. A. Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law [22] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 2003; 
also W. David Slawson, ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law Making 
Power’(1971)  84 Harvard Law Review 529, 529.  
418 John J. A. Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law [46] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 2003. 
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exchange’, once considered an essential element of a valid contract, is lost.  Deprived 
of the many benefits of the negotiation and consent, the contract becomes less reliable 
as an accurate reflection of the intentions of both parties; the standard form contract 
becomes a vehicle for the exploitation of unequal power relations and may encourage 
the imposition of unjust and/or inefficient terms. Ultimately, these conditions can 
negatively impact parties’ willingness to perform.  Some even suggest that because 
there is no meeting of the minds and no valid consent, the standard form contract is 
not a contract at all and that enforcement is not justified.419    
In the absence of bargained-for-exchange and negotiation, contract loses its function 
as a process.  Burke asserts that the standard form contract is not so much a means of 
governance as a commodity.420   The contract becomes part of the product franchisor 
is selling.  Though formal rules of interpretation are applicable in the context of the 
standard form, formal rules for determining validity such as offer, acceptance and 
consideration, are less relevant because contract has become product rather than 
process.  A franchisee’s role is analogous to that of a consumer with a need for 
consumer protections.  Courts and regulators, however, still treat commercial 
transactions such as the franchise contract as business relations between equals, and 
so no such protection is afforded.  The role of a franchisee is analogous to that of a 
consumer, but the regulatory approach is structured more toward a business and 
investor relationship. 
Collins has argued that the standard form need not cause problems in regulation.421  
He claims that contract is highly reflexive, and, though he acknowledges that this 
reflexivity caters solely to the needs of drafter, he claims that the qualities of the 
standard form are counter-balanced by markets for terms, markets for fair dispute 
resolution procedures, unfair contracts legislation,422 and democratic self-regulation 
within market sectors.  This research indicates, however, that the factors that Collins 
suggests save the standard form from the dangers of abuse are absent in the franchise 
context in Australia.  While Collins asserts that the standard form is not a problem if 
                                                 
419 John J.A. Burke, Standard Form Contracts (2004) Lex2k  
<http://www.lex2k.org/sfc/discussion.html> at 28 October 2006.  
420 Ibid. 
421 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating Contract’ in C. Parker et al (eds), Regulating Law (2004).   
422 Hugh Collins,’ Regulating Contract’ in C. Parker, C. Scott, N. Lacey and J. Braithwaite (eds), 
Regulating Law (2004) xxxv. 
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there are markets for terms and for fair dispute resolution procedures; there is neither 
in the franchising sector in Australia.  He suggests that problems that do persist will 
be addressed by unfair contracts legislation,  but there is no such legislation at the 
federal level or in most states in Australia. Collins also recommends greater reliance 
on democratic self-regulatory mechanisms within market sectors, but such 
mechanisms are non-existent in the franchising sector, and any efforts that have been 
made to establish them have been defeated.  Collins acknowledges this when he notes 
that a franchisee’s power to use non-legal sanctions, for example, to damage 
reputation of franchisor, is lacking.423  
Standard form contracts do present special problems, and these problems are 
heightened when the standard form contract is also a relational one. Collins also takes 
an overly sanguine view of the use of the standard form in franchising when he 
neglects to acknowledge the importance of the synergistic effects of the standard form 
combined with relational contract characteristics.  The combined effect is that the 
parties’ self-regulation through contract fails to advance the goals of regulation.  On 
the contrary, it is instrumental in creating these problems, and it reinforces them.  
4.4.3 The franchise contract as a relational contract 
Classical contract theory emphasizes the freedom of parties to contract, underscoring 
societal values of individualism and self-determination.  There is, however, a body of 
research on the inadequacy of classical contract theory to address commercial 
relationships of extended duration.424  Such extended contractual relationships may be 
labelled relational, incomplete or long-term contracts.   Various terms are used 
because there is a multiplicity of relationships and circumstances in which such 
contracts are used, and because there has as yet been no definitive synthesis of the 
ongoing research in this area.  Terms that were used interchangeably are now 
evolving to have more particularized meaning as this field of research develops.    
                                                 
423 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 244. 
424 For an outline of the development of this area of scholarship see Erich Schanze, ‘Symbiotic 
Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract and Corporation’ in Christian 
Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the 
United States (1991) 67, 78-90. 
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In 1981 Goetz and Scott wrote that long-term ‘relational contracts’ bind parties who 
are independent rather than integrated within a firm.425  This is similar to the relational 
or behavioural contract described by Williamson and discussed in Chapter Three.  
Such contracts may be referred to as complex, status, behavioural, hybrid, symbiotic, 
relational, long-term and/or incomplete contracts, with each writer supplying his or 
her own particular approach and emphasis.426  As the terms standard form contract 
and contract of adhesion are sometimes used interchangeably, so too are the terms 
relational contract, incomplete contract and long-term contract.   Whichever term one 
prefers, most contracts are not spot transactions; it is the relational contract that now 
prevails over the discrete contract in research about commercial interaction. 
Though technically long-term contracts need not be relational, long-term contracts are 
usually relational contracts.427   Hviid, in his analysis and summary of relational and 
long-term contracting theory, quotes the early work of Schwartz to the effect that 
‘[t]wo features largely define what lawyers mean by a relational contract: 
incompleteness and longevity.’428 The correlation between longevity and 
incompleteness is that the longer the term of the contract, the harder it becomes to 
predict all the conditions, preferences and requirements of the parties.  Contracts are 
incomplete when they fail to outline all the possible situations in the course of 
dealings of the parties, thus creating gaps where the parties’ obligations are not 
specified, 
‘A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing 
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive 
obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain future 
conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations 
                                                 
425 Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law 
Review 1089. 
426 Economists and lawyers also ascribe different meanings to the term ‘incomplete contract’.  
427 While the distinction between the long-term and relational contracts may be important in some 
applications, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the confusion in the use of the two terms. 
For more on the difference between relational and long-term contracts, and for an overview of the 
constitutive elements of each, see Morten Hviid, ‘Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts’ in 
Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Volume II: The 
Regulation of Contracts (2000) 46 <http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/pdf/textes_2002/Hviid2000.pdf> at 4 
November 2006. See also Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ 
(1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 1089. 
428 Alan Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
Judicial Strategies’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271. 
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adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in 
advance.’429 
This leaves courts to decide whether to enforce the contract, and in what ways to fill 
gaps with default obligations.430  Relational contracts must balance the need for 
specificity and control against the need to accommodate uncertainty through the use 
of flexibility, discretion, reciprocity, and contextual interpretation.431   
According to Hviid’s definition, franchise contracts are relational. They extend over a 
long period, commonly five, ten and sometimes twenty years.  Many aspects of the 
relationship between franchisor and franchisee, including motivation and 
commitment, change over time.  Such contracts cannot provide for every contingency 
during the period over which the contract extends; they are necessarily incomplete.432   
A review of the literature suggests that in addition to incompleteness and longevity, 
there are some several fundamental characteristics that are commonly found in 
relational contracts. These characteristics are that relational contracts are flexible; that 
they cultivate trust through reciprocity of obligation; and that they require contextual 
interpretation. 
4.4.3.1 Flexibility   
Relational contracts are flexible.  The benefit of flexibility is that it accommodates 
uncertainty, but relational theory holds that because parties cannot plan and allocate 
risks optimally in relational exchange, the contract is less accurate in documenting the 
                                                 
429  Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law 
Review 1091. 
430 See Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design’ (Working Paper No 23, University of Virginia, 2005).  According to Scott and Triantis, ‘The 
incompleteness of a contract has a different meaning to an economist than to a lawyer:…Economists 
use incompleteness in a different sense. A contract is incomplete if it fails to provide for the efficient 
set of obligations in each possible state of the world. Such a contract is “informationally incomplete” 
even though it is “obligationally complete” in the sense that it does not contain any gaps. Suppose that, 
in return for a payment of $10 000, the seller promises to deliver a blue widget to the buyer on a 
specified date. As just noted, this contract is obligationally complete. But if there are circumstances in 
which the widget costs more to produce than it is worth to the buyer, the performance of this contract is 
inefficient. Thus, the contract is incomplete in the economic sense.’    
431 For more on the calculus of ex ante vs ex post contracting costs see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertnert, 
‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’ (1992) 101 Yale Law 
Journal 729. 
432 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927.  Professor Hadfield wrote that the franchise contract is incomplete 
because of the ‘uncertain and long-term nature of the relationship’ and because it ‘fails to address a 
franchisee's problem of controlling franchisor opportunism.’ 
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parties’ intentions and so detracts from the efficacy of contract.433   Contracting as an 
incremental process where parties agree as they proceed means that the contract when 
formed cannot reflect a true meeting of the minds. According to Schanze, the term 
‘long-term contract’ was once considered to be an oxymoron.  Because by its very 
nature, contract is restrictive, Sauvigny believed parties would be reluctant to subject 
themselves to obligations on a long-term basis.434   
People do, however, enter contracts that involve relations over periods of years, and 
though practitioners draft contracts as specifically as possible, contract cannot 
anticipate every contingency in a long-term association such as franchising.435   
Parties do not know what conditions will be in five or ten years; even if they did, they 
might not know how they would respond to them.  Specific and rigid contract terms 
are incompatible with the flexibility necessary to maintain the parties’ relationship; 
they therefore include in their contracts flexibility and elements of discretion.436  One 
or both parties must sacrifice efficiency and certainty for the unpredictable exigencies 
of the longer-term relationship.437   
                                                 
433 See Weber on the status contract as opposed to the purpose contract;  Macneil on the relational 
context of contractual relations in Ian R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not 
Know’ (1985) Wisconsin Law Review 483;  Macaulay on the insufficiency of classical contract theory 
as applied to long-term business relationships in S. Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical 
Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ in Campbell, David, 
Collins, Hugh and Wightman, John (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and 
Network Contracts (2003) 51;  Schanze on symbiotic contracts in Erich Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: 
Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract and Corporation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), 
Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States 
(1991) 67; Stipanowich on dispute resolution and “the multi-door contract” in Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
‘The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities’ (1998) 13 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 
303; as well as earlier writings of Sauvigny (1851) and von Gierke (1914). 
434 Erich Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract 
and Corporation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 67. 
435 This inherent contradiction, that contracts are essentially about commitment, but that long-term 
contracts require flexibility over time explains why Sauvigny believed the term ‘long-term contract’ to 
be an oxymoron.  See Erich Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures 
between Contract and Corporation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical 
and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991). 
436 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 316. 
437 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia 
Law Review 1089, 1091:  ‘A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of 
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obligations 
may be impractical because of the inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of 
inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can 
be identified in advance.’ 
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As a practical matter, the use of the relational contract, like that of the standard form, 
is motivated largely by transaction costs.  The information costs of contracting can be 
divided into ex ante transaction costs that include the costs of anticipating future 
contingencies and writing a contract that specifies outcomes, and ex post enforcement 
costs that include the costs of monitoring and enforcement.  In seeking to avoid both 
ex ante and ex post contracting costs, contracting parties write incomplete contracts.438  
Such contracts reduce transaction costs because they provide an efficient strategy for 
contracting parties to accommodate the relational conditions of incompleteness and 
longevity.  Relational contracts economize on the ex ante negotiation of terms and 
permit the parties to determine the contours of the agreement incrementally over time.   
In franchising, however, the nature of the relationship and the use of the standard 
form combine with the relational incompleteness so that virtually all the power to 
determine the contours of the relationship over time resides with a franchisor.  A 
franchisee’s role is to agree in advance to go along. The contract terms are written to 
add up to this, but sometimes there is even a term that explicitly so states.439  As 
Schanze comments, the line must be drawn somewhere between ‘tolerable duration 
and dependency’ and ‘illegal restraints and ties.’440  Goddard observed that a 
relational contract may be more effective where the contract contains reciprocal 
commitments to help develop trust.441   Symmetry in discretion permits the parties to 
balance threats of opportunism and free-riding on each side.442  Symmetry in 
discretion, however, is not a common feature of franchise contracts.  Discretion as an 
element of franchise contracts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.  
                                                 
438 See Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract 
Design’ (Working Paper No 23, University of Virginia, 2005).   
439 The collective agreement clause, aka a ‘go along’ or ‘agree to agree’ clause. 
440 Erich Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures between Contract 
and Corporation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 67, 86. 
441 David Goddard ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New Zealand 
Law Review 423.  
442 Franchisee gives despite risks to franchisee of opportunism of franchisor hold-ups (demands for 
additional payments in exchange for consent). The franchisor, if opportunistic, risks franchisee’s exit 
(relying on express or implied terms) but this is partly balanced by franchisee’s reluctance to forfeit 
sunk costs and transaction costs.  See Hugh Collins, ‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’ in David 
Campbell, Hugh Collins and John Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, 
Relational and Network Contracts (2003) 226-231. 
 158
4.4.3.2 Reciprocity  
Reciprocity is another essential aspect of the relational contract.443  Relational 
contracts are designed to allow the parties latitude to maintain a dynamic balance 
between their shifting interests.  In a discrete contract the subject matter of the 
contract is relatively independent of the parties’ relationship.  In a relational contract 
the subject matter of the contract is the relationship. One party taking unfair 
advantage in the negotiation or performance of the contract has the potential to 
undermine the relationship.  While the opportunistic party may believe it is making a 
better deal for itself, it may also sacrifice reciprocity and erode trust. 
The role of the relational contract then is not to precisely define the rights and 
obligations of the parties, but to provide the framework, procedures and the points of 
departure for fair contract negotiation and adjustment over time.  The fundamental 
nature of relational contracts is therefore inconsistent with the standard form because, 
unlike the strict formality required by the standard form, relational contracts support 
‘the primacy not of the narrow contract provisions but of the wider franchising 
relationship’.444   
4.4.3.3 Contextual interpretation  
Courts have been slow to acknowledge relational contracts.   The legal nature of a 
franchise contract was considered in the New Zealand High Court.  In a dispute 
involving the Australian Dymock’s franchise system, Hammond J held that a 
franchise agreement represents an ongoing relationship, and that it is a relational 
contract rather than a simple bilateral contract.445   The significance of such a 
designation, however, is not entirely settled, ‘While the categorisation of franchising 
as a relational contract seems straightforward, the legal consequences that follow 
from the categorisation are highly controversial.’446  The proceedings of a contract 
law symposium held in 2005 began by noting that,  
                                                 
443 Ian R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under the Classical, 
Neo-classical, and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 (6) Northwestern University Law Review 854.  
444 Andrew Terry, ‘Franchising, Relational Contracts and the Vibe’  (Paper presented at the 
International Society of Franchising 2004 Conference, Las Vegas, 6-7 March 2004) 1. 
445 Bigola Enterprises Ltd v Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 169. 
446 Andrew Terry, ‘Franchising, Relational Contracts and the Vibe’ (Paper presented at the 
International Society of Franchising 2004 Conference, Las Vegas, 6-7 March 2004) 4. 
 159
‘Few developments in contracts scholarship in the past half-century have been 
more influential than relational contract theory.  Perhaps no other recent 
movement has seeped so deeply into the way we think of and discuss contract 
law than the notion that the things we think of as ‘contracts’ are rooted in larger 
relationships, and cannot be understood apart from those relationships…it is 
also fair to say that no other movement has managed to take so many different 
forms.’447   
Another commentator writes,   
 ‘Relational theory is not that useful...it is impossible to locate, in the relational 
contract literature, a definition that adequately distinguishes relational and non-
relational contracts in a legally operational way – that is in a way that carves out 
a set of special, well-specified contracts for treatment under special, well-
specified rules…’  
Relational contracts accommodate uncertainty by leaving terms unspecified and 
providing high levels of discretion.  Because they grant discretion and freedom, these 
documents often fail to provide clear and specific answers in case of dispute.  
Relational contract theory holds that every transaction is embedded in complex 
relations, and that combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions produces 
a more complete and accurate analytical product.448  This may be little comfort to a 
judge seeking to arrive at such an ‘analytical product’.449  Courts may be reluctant to 
embrace a theory that highlights the importance of the context of the relationship 
because context can be challenging to discern, especially in the case of franchising 
due to the difficulties in obtaining reliable information. 450   
                                                 
447 Franklin G. Snyder (ed), ‘Symposium:  The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force in Two 
Ages of Revolution:  A Conference Celebrating the 150th Anniversary of Hadley v. Baxendale’ (2005) 
11(2) Texas Wesleyan Law Review 675, 675-676. 
448 ‘Relational Contracting in a Digital Age’ (2005) 11(2) Texas Wesleyan Law Review 675, 675 –676. 
Panel Discussion at the Central Gloucester Initiative: The Common Law of Contracts as a World Force 
in Two Ages of Revolution, Gloucester, England, 7 –8 June 2004. 
449 The solution Hadfield proposed was that courts should imply a term of good faith in franchise 
contracts. The interpretation of good faith in franchise contracts is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
450 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, (1995)  ‘Relational Contracts’, in Beatson, Jack and Friedmann, Daniel 
(eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Oxford, Clarendon at 291 – in the Hviid article at [58] 
Morten Hviid, ‘Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De 
Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume III. The Regulation of Contracts, (2000) 
[631] <http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/pdf/textes_2002/Hviid2000.pdf>.   
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4.5 THE INTERACTION OF STANDARD FORM AND RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING  
The qualities of standard form and relational contracts both have been discussed in the 
legal academic literature, but they are discussed separately.451  The franchise contract 
presents an instance where these two contractual qualities co-exist.  This research is 
the first to examine the synergistic impacts of the standard form and relational 
qualities of the franchise contract.  It identifies six important effects of the interaction. 
First, the power imbalance of the standard form combined with the reliance on trust 
and reciprocity of the relational contract lead to increased inequality of bargaining 
power.  The drafter of the contract has power, while the non-drafting party must rely 
on trust, reputation and other means outside the contract. The relational contract is 
about creating a framework for trust and reciprocity, but trust may be undermined if 
the standard form gives inordinate discretion to drafter, depending on how that 
discretion is ultimately exercised. 
Second, the lack of negotiation of the standard form plus the flexibility, discretion, 
and vaguely defined obligation characteristic of the relational contract create a risk of 
inefficient risk-shifting.  The drafting party of the standard form contract can accord 
flexibility to itself, while imposing specified obligations upon the other.  Where a 
contract is relational and standard form, the drafting party can manage risk through 
contract, but the other party cannot.  
Third, it is a defining characteristic of the standard form that the drafter enters many 
contracts, while the non-drafting party contracts relatively infrequently.  Added to this 
are the inherent contradictions in approaches to interpretation of the relational 
contract, as it involves close interaction where the agreement takes shape over time 
through ongoing negotiation between the parties.  The result is that the standard form 
and relational conflict; the relationship cannot take shape over time, except according 
to the specific dictates of the drafting party. 
Fourth, a focus on formation of the standard form as opposed to a focus on 
performance of the relational quality of the  contract creates a dilemma for regulators.  
                                                 
451 For an article that touches on the interaction in the management literature, see L. Poppo and T. 
Zenger, ‘Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?’ 
(2002) 23 Strategic Management Journal 707. 
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Regulation (and to lesser extent court interpretation) tends to focus on contract 
formation with the result that the relational qualities lose meaning. Thus, the 
interaction of the standard form and relational contract characteristics create problems 
in regulating caused by the conflicting emphasis on formation versus performance of 
the contract. 
The fifth point is closely related to the fourth; formal interpretation required by the 
standard form conflicts with contextual interpretation appropriate to a relational 
contract.  These two different types of contract call for inconsistent approaches to 
interpretation and enforcement of the contract.  Here again, the standard form 
prevails; formal rules and express contract terms (a franchisee often does not 
understand because it did not draft or negotiate) trump contextual interpretation.   
Sixth, the ‘contract as commodity’ of the standard form as opposed to ‘contract as 
relationship’ of the relational quality of the franchise contract creates another conflict 
where the standard form prevails.  The non-drafting party takes on qualities of 
consumer of product, rather than an equal party to negotiation of terms.   
This chapter focuses on the first four of these synergistic effects as they are manifest 
in the franchise relationship.  These are represented in the following Table 4.2 and 
explained in more detail in the sections following the table. 
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Table 4.2:  Interaction of Standard Form and Relational Contract 
Characteristics  
 
Standard 
form 
contract 
characteris
tic 
 Relational 
contract 
characteristic 
 Result 
     
Imbalance 
of Power 
and no 
negotiation 
of contract  
+ Gaps and terms 
where there is 
future  uncertainty, 
flexibility requires 
discretion, vaguely 
defined obligation  
= High levels of uncertainty for a 
franchisee.  A franchisor can manage 
risk through contract, by according 
discretion to itself and uncertainty to its 
franchisees.  Because a franchisee is not 
able to participate in the drafting or 
negotiation of the contract, a franchisee 
cannot.  A franchisor accords flexibility 
to itself, with specified obligations 
imposed upon a franchisee. 
 
Drafter 
enters many 
contracts,  
non-drafting 
party 
contracts 
infrequently 
+ Involves close 
interaction, 
agreement takes 
shape over time as 
ongoing negotiation 
between the parties 
= Standard form and relational conflict 
because the relationship cannot take 
shape over time, except according to the 
specific dictates of the drafting party. 
Contract as 
commodity 
+ Contract as 
relationship 
= A franchisee takes on qualities of 
consumer of product, rather than an 
equal party to negotiation of terms. 
Power 
imbalance  
+ Reliance upon trust, 
reciprocity 
= A franchisor is assured of discretion 
written into the contract terms while a 
franchisee must rely on trust, reputation 
and other factors outside the contract.  
Trust, however, can be compromised by 
the standard form discretion to 
franchisor, if a franchisor does not act in 
a franchisees’ interest, a problem due to 
the inherent conflicts of interest in the 
relationship. 
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4.5.1 Loss of bargained-for-exchange 
Independently of each other, both the standard form and the relational qualities of the 
contract erode the element of bargained-for-exchange.  First, the standard form is 
characterized by an imbalance of power and lack of negotiation of contract; there is 
no ‘promise for a promise’.   The standard form thus deprives the parties of complete 
understanding of contractual terms because it eliminates negotiation.  The lack of a 
negotiated process for arriving at agreed terms makes the standard form susceptible to 
abuse for the purposes of imposing onerous terms upon a franchisee that a franchisee 
might not fully understand or to which it does not genuinely consent, ‘[Franchise 
contracts] contain provisions which are extremely difficult for franchisees to comply 
with. The result is that franchisees are constantly in peril of non-compliance.’452      
The relational contract is about accommodating uncertainty by building in flexibility, 
reliance upon trust, and contextual interpretation.  Relational contracts further erode 
the bargained-for-exchange because parties must leave the terms of the contract 
unspecified to accommodate uncertainty.  Where the relational contract is also a 
standard form contract, where a franchisor drafts the contract but does not negotiate, 
flexibility is given not reciprocally, but to one party, a franchisor.  The franchise 
contract, as it is both standard form and relational, accords the weight of its flexibility 
and discretion to a franchisor.   
The result is that the standard form and relational characteristics of the contract 
synergistically deprive the franchise contract of the essential element of bargained-
for-exchange.  The interaction of the two qualities means that a franchisor can take on 
greater risk and manage risk effectively through drafting and contractual risk-shifting, 
while a franchisee is not similarly able to manage risk through contract.  A franchisee 
is faced with the choice to unqualifiedly accept the risk assigned to it by a franchisor’s 
contract or to decline to enter the relationship altogether.  The loss of bargained-for-
exchange thus erodes the meaning of the contract for a franchisee and can reduce its 
commitment to perform.  This is true under conditions that are likely to test that 
commitment; high levels of discretion to a franchisor mean power to a franchisor to 
                                                 
452 California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk in a concurring opinion in E.S. Bills Inc. v. 
Tzucanow quoted in James V. Jordan and Judith B. Gitterman, ‘Franchise Agreements: Contract of 
Adhesion?’(1996) 16 Franchise Law Journal 1, 41.  
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act in its own interests and concomitantly low levels of power and high levels of 
uncertainty to a franchisee as depicted in Figure 4.1 below: 
 
Figure 4.1:  The Interaction of the Standard Form and Relational Qualities of 
Contract 
 
 
Type of Contract              Standard form                               Relational 
 
Qualities                 Imbalance of power        Flexibility  
  of the                        No negotiation         Reciprocity 
Contract                        Trust 
 
 
Combined                               Loss of bargained-for exchange 
  Results                     The contract may not represent genuine agreement 
       High levels of discretion to franchisor 
 
  
Consequences             Greater power to a franchisor 
   for                         Increased certainty to a franchisor 
Franchisor                   Reduced risk to a franchisor 
    
Consequences                                                         Less power to a franchisee 
    for       Increased uncertainty for a franchisee 
Franchisee        Increased potential risk to franchisee 
 
The erosion of bargained-for-exchange diminishes fundamental precepts of contract 
law such as consent and intention; leads to high levels of uncertainty for a franchisee 
as non-drafting party due to its combination with the relational contract’s flexibility; 
and contributes to the ‘commodification’ of contract, in which a franchisee takes on 
qualities of consumer of product, rather than an equal party to negotiation of terms.453  
                                                 
453 John J. A. Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law [51] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 2003. 
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4.5.2 Franchisor discretion increases uncertainty and risk for a franchisee 
Transaction costs saved in drafting and negotiation of a standard form contract can 
mean heavier transaction costs in monitoring performance, dispute management and 
liability.  This cost trade-off is of particular concern where the standard form is 
combined with relational contracting and performance obligations may be more 
flexible, thus adding to uncertainty.  One way franchisors address this problem is to 
require sunk investments by franchisees. Another way is to draft the contract to 
strictly specify franchisee obligations while retaining flexibility in their own 
obligations.  High levels of discretion to a franchisor mean that there are high levels 
of uncertainty for a franchisee, uncertainty that increases franchisee risk and 
undermines franchisee power, increasing the power imbalance. 
4.5.3 Motivations for granting discretion 
Imbalance of power and high levels of uncertainty contribute to increased discretion 
to the drafting party; the converse is in theory also true.  Because discretion is itself 
the ability to exercise power, greater discretion to one party does increase the 
imbalance of power.  Where one party has the discretion to determine the parties’ 
future interactions, uncertainty is increased for the granting party. The motivations for 
a contracting party to give discretion in contract include accommodating future 
uncertainty and securing lower costs, price breaks, and economies of scale.454   These 
and other potential benefits may make the decision to accord discretion to another 
party a reasonable one.  In franchising, however, the existing imbalance of power and 
lack of negotiation of the standard form generate pressure on a franchisee to give 
discretion to a franchisor. In addition, many of the same factors that contribute to a 
franchisee’s disadvantage in negotiating the contract contribute to a franchisee’s 
willingness to take on risk, namely inadequate franchisee legal representation, strict 
franchisor control, and a franchisee’s lack of confidence. 
The first factor in increasing the pressure on a franchisee to accept risk is the disparity 
in legal representation.  Lawyers representing sellers shift risks in contract to 
                                                 
454 Hugh Collins, ‘Discretionary Powers in Contracts’ in David Campbell, Hugh Collins and John 
Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts (2003) 
26-231. 
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buyers.455  Franchisor’s solicitors include terms they know or suspect would not be 
enforceable because a franchisee is likely to believe that they are enforceable and/or 
because such clauses may be useful to a franchisor in conflict management.456  Risk to 
a franchisor is minimal due to the low probability that the issue will lead to litigation.  
A busy franchisor may not even be aware of the problem or it may be that he or she 
leaves these concerns to a solicitor.  The contract comes to represent not so much a 
franchisor’s business judgment and experience, but rather a franchisor’s solicitor’s 
skill and zeal in shifting risk to a franchisee.  The potential result is that the contract is 
no longer an instrument of the true intentions of either a franchisor or a franchisee. A 
franchisee’s contractual intention may be ‘but a subjection more or less voluntary to 
terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood 
only in a vague way, if at all.’457   Adding to the pressure on franchisee to accept more 
risk is a franchisor’s rigid protection of its control and discretion for the sake of its 
ability to enforce uniform standards. 
Another reason a franchisee may take on too much risk is lack of confidence.  
Franchisee subordination to a franchisor helps to assure cooperation within the 
franchise system. This phenomenon is referred to by Lescatre and Steinberg as the 
‘infantilization’ of a franchisee.458   In the same vein Hadfield observed,  
‘The presumed, and preferred, inexperience of the franchisee introduces the 
reliance of the franchisee on the franchisor into the very heart of the franchise 
relationship. This imbalance is not just a consequence of imperfections in 
bargaining. Rather, it is in the very nature of what is being exchanged.’459 
The inherent dynamic in franchise relationship involves maintaining a franchisee in a 
subordinate position.  Its subordinate position increases a franchisee’s motivation to 
provide assurances of performance; taking on risk.  Thus, unequal bargaining power 
invites risk-shifting.  Even if it is overburdened with risk because of the standard 
form, a franchisee is faced with the choice of accepting the contract terms or giving 
                                                 
455 John J. A. Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law [51] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 2003. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Freidrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 
Columbia Law Review 629, 632.   
458 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 185. 
459 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927. 962 
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up on the deal entirely.  These factors increase the shifting of risk from a franchisor to 
a franchisee, often without a franchisee being fully aware of it.  In the context of 
franchising, while benefits can be obtained from according discretion to a franchisor, 
the balancing of costs and benefits may not be adequately carried out, if it is 
undertaken at all by a prospective franchisee.  The contract may go forward with a 
franchisee in reluctant or uncertain agreement to its terms, and once it does, a 
franchisor’s discretion is locked in.  A franchisee takes on high levels of uncertainty 
that increase its exposure to risk and increase the imbalance of power in the 
relationship. 
4.6 A NOTE ON THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF RISK 
While it would be tempting to refer to this issue as inefficient shifting of risk, this 
dissertation does not address the efficiency of risk allocation.  It is not proven that 
discretion, and the imbalance of power and uncertainty that attend it, must necessarily 
disadvantage the granting party.   
A variety of formulations for the concept of efficiency of contract have been proposed 
by economists.  Weber and Xiong suggest that in an efficient contract, the aggregate 
benefits to principals and agents (excluding consumers) are maximized.460  This 
would be a difficult formula to test, and consideration of consumers which is an 
important aspect of a franchisee’s role is excluded.  Alternatively, an efficient contract 
could be defined as one that provides optimal incentives for both investment and 
trade; ‘an efficient contract should contain incentives to encourage efficient effort 
and/or investment.’461   Not only is this definition circular, it is also general and 
difficult to measure.  Borrowing from the law and economics view of efficient breach 
of contract, a contract may be inefficient when the cost to the promisor of 
performance exceeds the value to the promisee.462  This, too, is difficult to measure, 
even in terms of pure economic benefit, and impossible to measure taking into 
account all the possible non-economic motivations for entering franchise contracts.  
Yet another approach that has been proposed is that, ‘Contracts are efficient when 
                                                 
460 Thomas A. Weber and Hongxia Xiong, Efficient Contract Design in Multi-Principal Multi-Agent 
Supply Chains (2006). 
461 Bruce R. Lyons, ‘Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: Inter-firm Contracts’ (1996) 
12(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Lyons does not define ‘efficient effort and investment’. 
462 Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design’ 
(Working Paper No 23, University of Virginia, 2005). 
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they properly align incentives; a good contract design is one that allows managers to 
raise capital cheaply and deploy it effectively’.463   This formulation combines 
elements of encouraging effort and investment, providing incentives and balancing 
costs, but it is a formula that is also vague and difficult to measure and does not take 
into account the franchisee side of the equation.   
Law and economics explores the efficiency of contract in the case of breach and the 
efficiency of default rules in court interpretation of contracts.  It is a harder task to 
determine what is ‘efficient’ in connection with contract generally, as in the formation 
or performance of contract, because one must first choose from among a multiplicity 
of competing theories of what contract is intended to do in any given context.  Courts 
wrestle with this problem, often relying on formal rules with respect to contract 
formation and on default rules and theories of relational and incomplete contracting 
with respect to performance. 
It is perhaps understandable that ‘many economists are uncomfortable with the 
efficiency arguments of law and economics.’464  Though the Chicago School of law 
and economics rests on the concept of allocative efficiency, it is precisely its 
conceptions of ‘efficiency as justice’ that ‘many of the critics of the Chicago approach 
find so troubling.’465  The institutional approach to law and economics rejects 
efficiency as a criterion for the assignment of rights, and instead holds that,  
‘Because efficiency is a function of rights, and not the other way around, it is 
circular to maintain that efficiency alone can determine rights….an outcome 
that is claimed to be efficient is efficient only with regard to the assumed initial 
structure of rights.’466   
The choice of rights, however, is a distributional issue.  Ultimately, efficiency cannot 
be separated from distributional issues, ‘the legal system must select the 
[distributional] result to be pursued: the definition of the efficient solution is both the 
object and the subject of the legal system.’467 
                                                 
463 Victor Fleisher, ‘Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of the Corporate Deal Structures’ (2006) 
104 Michigan Law Review 1581, 1583. 
464 Paul H. Rubin, ‘Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand’ (2005) 13 University of 
Chicago Supreme Court Law Review 19, 20. 
465 Nicholas Mercuro and Steven Medema, Economics and the Law (1997) 60-61 
466 Id., 118. 
467 Id., 119, includes a quote from Warren J. Samuels, ‘Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory’ 
(1978) 1 Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 100, 106. 
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One meaning of ‘efficient’ is ‘performing or functioning in the best possible manner 
with the least waste of time and effort...’468   It is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to consider all the competing theories of what contracts do or should do, or how they 
can function in the best manner with least waste.  Many commentators would agree, 
however, that a contract should give effect to the intentions of the parties.   In the case 
of the standard form, relational interaction, the potential for contractual efficiency is 
decreased due to the fact that one party to the contract is ill-equipped to understand 
the nature of the contract and the relationship.  To the extent that this is so, the 
contract does not represent the true consent of the parties to its terms.  The contract 
does not do what it is intended to do, and in this sense it is an inefficient contract.  It 
would seem to follow that the risk allocation in a franchise contract is inefficient if it 
is not fully understood and consented to by a franchisee.   
Because of the complexity of the topic of efficiency of contracts, this dissertation 
omits any further reference to the question of efficiency in the allocation of risk in the 
contract, and returns its focus to the question of whether regulation of franchising is 
effective at achieving its stated goals.  
4.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapter Four describes two important attributes of the contract, its standard form 
nature and its relational features.  This chapter demonstrates that, independently of 
each other, the standard form and the relational qualities of the contract contribute to 
imbalance of power and uncertainty.  The characteristics of the standard form reflect 
and reinforce an imbalance of power in the franchise relationship.  The relational 
contract is one of flexibility and discretion; it relies on trust and reciprocity over the 
long-term. Relational contracts require incompleteness and flexibility in order to 
accommodate unpredictable conditions and preferences over the performance of the 
contract.  While the standard form and relational attributes of the franchise contract 
independently contribute to the imbalance of power and the uncertainty in the 
relationship, the interaction of the two qualities exacerbates these conditions.  
To understand franchising, and so to appropriately regulate, it is essential to recognize 
that the interaction of the standard form and relational qualities of the contract has the 
                                                 
468 Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.0.1). Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © 
Random House, Inc. Dictionary.com <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/efficient> at 2 October 
2006. 
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following effects that together increase imbalance of power and uncertainty.  First, the 
power imbalance of the standard form combined with the reliance on trust and 
reciprocity of the relational results in increased inequality of bargaining power.  A 
franchisor has power, while a franchisee must rely on trust, reputation and other 
factors outside the contract.  Second, the lack of negotiation of the contract of the 
standard form combined with the flexibility, discretion, and vaguely defined 
obligation required by the relational quality of the franchise contract mean that a 
franchisor accords flexibility to itself, while at the same time it imposes specific 
obligations upon franchisees.  Thus, uncertainty for a franchisee is increased.  A 
franchisor can manage risk through contract, but a franchisee cannot. Third, the 
‘contract as commodity’ approach of the standard form as opposed to a ‘contract as 
relationship’ approach of the relational quality of the franchise contract creates 
another conflict where the standard form prevails.  A franchisee takes on qualities of 
consumer of product, rather than an equal party to negotiation of terms. 
The market interaction establishes imbalance of power and uncertainty in the 
franchise relationship. The nature of the franchise contract reinforces these conditions.  
Chapter Five will consider contract terms and whether they reflect the imbalance of 
power and uncertainty that will in theory exist in franchise contracts, or whether they 
reflect the effectiveness of regulation in addressing these conditions. 
4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter Four examined the parties’ self-regulation of the relationship through contract 
and it explained why the standard form and relational qualities of the franchise 
contract increase uncertainty and imbalance of power.   The main points and 
recommendations are as follows: 
• The standard form contract by definition creates an imbalance of power in the 
contracting relationship in favour of a drafter of the contract, a franchisor.  The 
standard form contract tends to impose higher levels of uncertainty and risk 
for the subordinate party, a franchisee.   
• Relational contracts contribute to imbalance of power in favour of a franchisor 
because a franchisor has a higher level of discretion to accommodate future 
uncertainty, and higher levels of trust are placed by a franchisee in a 
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franchisor.  Relational contracts contribute to uncertainty for a franchisee 
because conditions of the agreement are not specified. 
• Together, the standard form and relational qualities of the franchise contract 
contribute to imbalance of power and to uncertainty for a franchisee for the 
following reasons: 
o the drafter/franchisor has power, while the other party, a franchisee, 
must rely on trust, reputation and other factors outside the contract; 
o  a franchisor can manage risk through contract, but a franchisee cannot; 
and  
o the relationship can only take shape over time according to the specific 
dictates of the drafting party. 
•  A franchisee takes on qualities of consumer of product, rather than an equal 
party to negotiation of terms.   
• These problems are compounded by the fact that statutory regulation focuses 
on contract formation with the result that the relational qualities lose meaning.   
• Court interpretation of the contract lacks the contextual element because 
contextual interpretation is trumped by formal rules and express contract terms 
that a franchisee often does not understand because it did not draft or negotiate 
the contract.   
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Chapter Five 
Contract Terms Analysis   
 
‘“Standard franchise agreement” means the standard terms and conditions 
pertaining to the grant of a franchise by us as amended by us from time to time 
in our absolute discretion.’469    
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of contract terms as follows: 
First, by assessing whether these contract terms reflect imbalance of power and 
uncertainty in the relationship this chapter tests Chapter Four’s theoretical analysis of 
contract as a private layer of governance that reinforces these conditions.  It provides 
an analysis of ten contract terms from nineteen contracts sampled.   The purpose of 
each contract term is explained and the interests of both a franchisor and a franchisee 
are outlined with respect to each term.  Each section includes a table containing the 
different formulations of the term from across the sample, unless the length requires 
that they be provided in an appendix.  Secondly, this chapter will also explore how 
contract terms confer higher levels of discretion upon a franchisor than upon a 
franchisee. Thirdly, there is a description of direct intervention in each contract term, 
including the applicable Code provisions with respect to each contract term.  
(A discussion of regulation will then be taken up in greater detail in Chapters Six and 
Seven.)  Fourth, each section in this chapter also discusses case law that has dealt with 
the subject matter of that contract term.  Finally, each section includes a summary of 
the findings with respect to each term. 
                                                 
469 System F5. 
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5.1 CONTRACT TERMS ANALYSIS 
Contractual terms are sampled to measure the extent to which regulation is achieving 
its goals; through the content analysis it is possible to assess whether the regulation is 
‘effective’, in the sense of ‘successful in producing a desired or intended result,’ the 
result being the stated goals of regulation of franchising in Australia.  Table 5.1 lists 
the stated goals of regulation in the first column.  Contract is not amenable for use as 
a tool to measure all the stated objectives of regulation; the second column identifies 
goals that may be measurable through an analysis of the terms of the contract. 
 
Table 5.1: Stated Goals of the Regulation of Franchising 
Regulatory Objective Contractual Result 
1) Raise standards of conduct in the 
franchising sector without endangering 
the vitality and growth of franchising 
No direct and measurable 
contractual result 
2) Reduce risk and generate growth 
in the sector by increasing the level of 
certainty for all participants/ Provide 
an environment of certainty 
Contract terms will reflect 
certainty   
3) Address the imbalance of power 
between franchisors and franchisees  
Contract terms will reflect a 
balance of power 
4) Ensure minimum standards of 
disclosure   
No direct and measurable 
contractual result 
5) Ensure the sector a has strong role 
in the development and maintenance of 
its regulatory environment 
No direct and measurable 
contractual result 
6) Ensure suitable remedies and 
sanctions for breach of the Code 
No direct and measurable 
contractual result 
7) Reducing the incidence of disputes 
and litigation in the sector / Reduce the 
cost of resolving disputes in the sector 
No direct and measurable 
contractual result 
8) Reduce unfair commercial conduct 
by franchisors /Bring about cultural 
change that results in higher standards 
of commercial behaviour470   
No direct and measurable 
contractual result, but attainment 
of this goal may be indicated by 
levels of certainty and balance 
of power 
 
As the table illustrates, some objectives do not lend themselves to evaluation using the 
contract. For example, contract cannot be used as an indicator of compliance with 
                                                 
470 Explanatory Statement - Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) 
No. 162 
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawithLegislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/framelodgmentattach
ments/77630AD9222B25BCCA256F73000E7654> at 9 December 2006. 
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disclosure requirements.  In some cases contract may signal parties’ intentions to 
conform to disclosure requirements.  In other cases the Code requires disclosure of 
contract terms.  About eighteen of twenty-one disclosure items are or relate to 
contract terms, but only about half of the terms typically found in the contract are 
subject to disclosure.  It is not possible to discern from most contract terms whether 
there is compliance with disclosure requirements, because disclosure is a separate 
document, which was not supplied for the sample.  However, for most of the contract 
terms in the sample, disclosure requires disclosure of ‘conditions of the franchise 
agreement that deal with’ the particular issue. So, for most terms, it is possible to infer 
from the content of the contract that there is likely compliance with disclosure 
requirements.   
The analysis also omits consideration of ‘minimum standards’ (as in goal four) and 
‘higher standards’ (as in goal eight) as neither is defined in the regulation or 
regulatory impact statement.  It may be reasonable to infer, however, that they are met 
to some extent by the attainment of the goals of regulation that are measurable with 
respect to certainty and balance of power (see below).   
The two stated objectives that are measured in this content analysis are goals two and 
three; they appear in bold in the table.  The hypothesis is that, if the current regulatory 
regime is meeting its stated goals, the contract will reflect 1) a balance of power and 
2) certainty for both parties.  With respect to the first goal, contract can be used to 
evaluate the balance of power in the relationship by measuring rights and obligations 
of each party to the contract.   Balance of power in the contract is indicated by a 
contract that reflects the interests of both parties, the balance of rights and obligations, 
the reciprocity of obligation, and the reciprocity of flexibility and discretion.  Other 
factors that affect balance of power will be considered such as proportionality; 
availability of meaningful alternatives and relative fall-back positions; need for an 
agreement; unity as opposed to division; financial reserves; and reputation for 
toughness as opposed to reputation for being willing to compromise; necessity; the 
nature of the good or service; ability to negotiate terms; wealth; business 
sophistication; education or knowledge; race; gender; "size" of the parties;  monopoly 
power;  and consumer status.471 
                                                 
471 See definitions section for quotations relating to these qualities of bargaining power discussed in 
John Black, A Dictionary of Economics (2002)  accessed via Oxford Reference Online, 
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With respect to the second goal, contract can be used also to measure certainty.  This 
is done by measuring specificity; contractual terms that are specific provide greater 
certainty than contractual terms characterized by high levels of flexibility and 
discretion.  Uncertainty refers in this dissertation to the inability of a franchisee to 
predict, and so it is closely related to flexibility in the contract, grants of discretion to 
a franchisor, and risk to a franchisee. A party to a contract may gain a measure of 
certainty by controlling dispute resolution procedures and being granted discretion.  
Either party can do this by ensuring its ability to fill the gaps, by ensuring it has the 
power to decide matters left unspecified in the contract.  The analysis measures the 
reciprocity of that discretion.  A low level of reciprocal discretion in the contract 
indicates more certainty for the party that enjoys higher discretion, less for the party 
conferring the discretion. If the current regulatory regime for franchising in Australia  
is meeting its stated goals, the flexibility in contract terms will reflect both parties’ 
intentions.  Gaps in the contract will be understood and their implications agreed to by 
both parties.   This information in turn will be available to courts in interpreting 
franchise contracts. 
In the following sections eight contract terms are individually evaluated for the extent 
to which they reflect the two stated goals of regulation of the sector.  Each term is 
evaluated with respect to whether it reflects 1) a balance of power between the parties; 
and 2) certainty.  As the Table 5.2 below shows, balance of power will be measured 
through balance of rights and obligations, balanced flexibility and discretion and other 
safeguards or measures, if any.  Certainty will be measured by specificity versus 
flexibility and discretion in the contract terms and by reciprocal discretion in 
contractual terms.   
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e185 at 20 
November 2006; and Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 University of 
Colorado Law Review 139, 199-201. 
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Table 5.2:  Criteria Used to Test Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Criteria 
If the current regulatory regime is 
meeting its stated goals, contract 
terms will reflect a balance of 
power. 
Measure balance of power in the contract as 
indicated by  
  - balance of rights and obligations 
  - balanced flexibility and discretion 
  -  other safeguards or measures, if any 
If the current regulatory regime is 
meeting its stated goals, contract 
terms will reflect certainty   
Measure certainty in the contract:   
  - specificity versus flexibility and discretion 
 
5.2 CONTRACT TERMS EVALUATED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
The following contract terms are covered in detail in this chapter, offering a 
representative view of different stages of the relationship:472    
• Terms relating to the roles of the parties and the scope and duration of the 
agreement: 
o Scope of grant  
o Term and right of renewal  
• Terms relating to performance: 
o Franchisor obligations regarding advertising  
o Supply to franchisee    
o Franchisee minimum performance and reporting requirements    
• Terms relating to exit: 
o Transfer  
o Termination   
• Terms relating to adjustments to the contract and contractual restraints: 
o Restraint of trade 
o Adjustments to the contract/Collective agreement 
Two other terms are discussed in this Chapter, but in less detail.  The ‘independence 
of franchisee’ clause was introduced in Chapter Three and is included in some of the 
                                                 
472 Two terms from the original sample (i.e. lease and ownership of intellectual property and goodwill) 
have been omitted from this discussion because of the length and complexity a discussion of these 
terms would require and because neither term is governed primarily by the Code.  Franchisee 
Independence is one other term of the agreement discussed in Chapter Three and partly incorporated 
into the analysis in this chapter. 
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discussion in this chapter. This chapter also includes a discussion of the ‘collective 
agreement’ clause, a term that appears in some, but not most, contracts sampled.473 
                                                 
473 A complete sample franchise agreement can be found in Franchising Law and Practice,  
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/au/legal/results/pubTreeViewDoc.do?nodeId=TAAK
AAF&pubTreeWidth=23%25 at 2 March 2007. 
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 5.3 CONTRACT TERM:  SCOPE OF GRANT  
A franchise is a licence to operate the franchise unit at a specified location or 
geographic area, and to use the intellectual property, operations manual, and images to 
the extent permitted by the scope of the grant.  The Scope of Grant clause defines the 
scope of the licence a franchisor grants to a franchisee to use intellectual property 
rights and sets the limits on that use.474   Details of the grant may be found also in 
ancillary documents that licence specific rights to use intellectual property such as 
trademark.    
This term, like all franchise contract terms, reflects the balance of competing interests 
struck by the parties.  A franchisee wants to maximize the extent of the rights it is 
buying from a franchisor.   A franchisee prefers an exclusive right to use the 
intellectual property as extensively possible in order to ensure 1) that it will benefit 
from his own efforts to develop his business at a particular location and 2) that its 
investment is secure from franchisor encroachment, the trespassing on the rights of a 
franchisee by a franchisor.  A franchisor, on the other hand, wants to protect its 
flexibility and its options to expand and develop the system and brand awareness, to 
limit what it grants to a franchisee and retain, as far as possible, its own rights to use 
and sell the rights to the intellectual property to others.   
Encroachment, the act of entering ‘gradually or stealthily into the possessions or 
rights of another’,475 is a common concern for franchisees.  Encroachment by a 
franchisor can take a variety of forms, such as franchisor development of alternative 
distribution channels through supermarkets; kiosks; convenience stores; independent 
retailers; and non-traditional or seasonal locations, including universities, workplaces, 
and special events.   A franchisor may initiate a mail order operation or provide 
services from outside a franchisee’s area into his market through the use of the 
Internet (known as ‘virtual encroachment’).  Increasingly, encroachment occurs when 
a franchisor acquires a competing brand and shares information with franchisees from 
                                                 
474 For a general overview of grants clauses in intellectual property see Donald M. Cameron, The Grant 
Clause (1997) JurisDiction <http://www.jurisdiction.com/grant.htm> at 15 March 2006. 
475 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, Dictionary.com 
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/encroach> at 29 Jul. 2007. 
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the other brand.476  A 2003 survey carried out in the US showed that 24 percent 
franchisees had been "threatened, encroached upon or coerced into unwanted 
expansion by their franchisor."477 
Perhaps the most common form of encroachment involves a franchisor placing a 
competing unit close to an existing unit.  Franchisors are ‘obsessed’ with selling 
franchise units478  because initial entry fees are a critical source of franchisor income, 
and because each new unit adds to brand awareness, which in principle enhances the 
value of the franchise system.  Franchisees, however, do not share a franchisor’s 
enthusiasm for opening new stores.  The following hypothetical illustrates the conflict 
of interest between franchisor and franchisee: 
 A franchisee operates a unit that grosses $10,000/week. A franchisor decides to 
open another store two or three hundred metres away.  Within a few months the 
new unit grosses $7,000/week, but perhaps $3000 of that is pulling from the first 
store’s business.  For a franchisor, two stores each making $7000/week is 
preferable because a franchisor receives royalties on $14,000 rather than $10,000.  
But to the extent that the second unit does pull $3000 in business from the first, 
unless sales increases outpace the losses to encroachment, franchisees’ profit 
margins decline.479   The first franchisee loses business, and the second franchisee 
may never be as profitable as it might have been if the area development had been 
more carefully planned.    
 
                                                 
476 Co-branding involves a franchisor owning multiple franchise systems and brands, or franchisors 
agreeing to market together.  Co-branding increases royalty revenue for the franchisor, but, like other 
forms of encroachment, can dilute the value of the brand to the franchisee. Concise Legal Dictionary, 
(3rd ed, 2004). 
477 Tina Perazzini of Subway stated her employer's policy on encroachment during the 1990s: "We put 
them up any f***ing place we could.", Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: 
Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ (2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 185.  
478 Lorelle Frazer, Professor of Marketing, Griffith University, ‘Are Franchisees Potential Competitors? 
A Study of Franchisees Who Exit the System but Continue Operating’, (Paper presented at the 18th 
International Society of Franchising Conference, Las Vegas, 2004), 
<http://www.huizenga.nova.edu/business/abstracts/abstracts2004/Paper%2014_2004_Frazer_Abstract.
doc> at 30 December 2005. 
479 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 310. This is particularly of concern to franchisees in low 
margin industries such as quick-serve restaurants. 
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A franchisor can be expected to draft this contract term to protect its right to encroach 
and limit a franchisee’s exclusive rights.  Table 5.3 below provides the results of the 
sample. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Scope of Grant Terms in Contracts under Review 
 
Franchise 
System480 
Scope of Grant 
F1 Non-exclusive (franchisor can construct, operate and sell anywhere in 
franchisee’s territory except Premises) 
F2 Non-exclusive licence to use the Franchise System only in the Business; 
…rights granted to the Franchisee are exclusive only for the Premises 
located within the Territory. 
F3 Exclusive licence at the location… does not  affect franchisor’s right to 
appoint other franchisees with rights to sell the products except with respect 
to territory or to sell within territory as long as not thru a trademark 
restaurant 
F4 Non-exclusive, subject to Clause 9, does not  affect franchisor’s right to sell 
to any person at any location or appoint other franchisees with rights to sell 
the products 
F5 Franchisee has the exclusive right to operate the franchise in the territory   
F6 Not an exclusive franchise territory 
F7 Non-exclusive licence as a franchisee to establish and operate using the 
Marks, Image, System and other Intellectual Property on the terms and 
conditions set out in this Agreement…. The Franchise granted pursuant to 
this Agreement is not an exclusive franchise and the Franchisor may grant 
other Franchises 
F8 The Licence hereby granted is not an exclusive Licence and the Licencee 
acknowledges that the Licensor may grant licences to other licencees to: 
   (a) establish an operation in other locations; 
   (b) use the Marks and Intellectual Property within the Territory 
F9 
 
 
The Franchisee shall use the rights solely and exclusively in connection 
with the Business and the Franchisee specifically acknowledges and agrees 
that it will not pursue in any manner any sales whatsoever in respect of the 
Business other than in, at or from the Premises, and it will not pursue any 
wholesale sales anywhere without the Franchisor's written consent and if 
such consent is given, any wholesale sales shall be carried out and Products 
produced therefore only from the Premises. The Franchisee agrees that it 
shall conduct its Business only from the Premises and at no other place. The 
Franchisee shall conduct the Business in accordance with all rules, 
regulations and procedures prescribed or promulgated by the Franchisor 
from time to time.…The Franchisor agrees that during the term of this 
                                                 
480 Industry codes for each system are as follows:  System F1- 11, System F2- 11, System F3- 11, 
System F4- 11, System F5- 12, System F6- 11, System F7- 11, System F8- 10, System F9- 11, System 
F10- 10, System F11- 10, System F12- 9, System F13- 12, System F14- 11, System F15- 12, System 
F16- 9, System F17- 11, System F18- 10, System F19- 7. 
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agreement it will not grant to any other person the right to use the 
Franchisor System within 500 metres of the Premises without the prior 
consent of the Franchisee. 
F10 
 
Complex structure for service franchise (lawn mowing and garden services)  
Non-exclusive, flexible 
 F10* As in F10 above 
F11 
 
Non- Exclusivity – The parties acknowledge: 
 (a) Franchisor may grant other Franchisees to other persons to 
establish and operate businesses similar to the Business anywhere in the 
world; 
 (b) the (franchisee) is restricted to carrying on the business in 
Australia 
F12 Subject to the Franchisee’s strict compliance with the terms of this 
agreement, the Franchisor grants to the Franchisee a licence to use the 
Systems and the Intellectual Property in the operation of the Business for 
the Term.   
F13 …the right to establish and operate a business at the location …(“the 
location”).  
F14 
 
 
The licence … does not grant you possession of the Business Premises to 
our exclusion nor does it give you any property rights in or over the 
Business Premises. 
 
We may retain keys to the Business Premises and have unlimited access to 
the premises for the purposes of this Agreement or the Manual. 
 
You do not have any right to seek an order for possession of the Business 
Premises or commence proceedings for trespass or nuisance - such rights 
rest solely with us. 
 
…We will not, during the term of this Agreement open another store or 
grant a franchise to operate a store within the Territory. 
 
The licence hereby granted is personal to you. You must not assign, 
transfer, subcontract or otherwise dispose of, in whole or in part, your rights 
and obligations under this Agreement to any person or part with possession 
of the Business Premises without our prior written consent 
F15 …not an exclusive franchise territory. The Franchisor grants to the 
Franchisee the Franchisee Right of First Refusal, (which may only be 
exercised in writing if the Franchisee is in full compliance with this 
Agreement), over any franchise it proposes to offer in respect of the 
establishment of a Shop at a site which is within the distance of the 
Premises specified as the First Right of Refusal Zone at better than or at 
least on the same terms as the proposed franchise offer.  
F16 
 
Except as permitted by this Agreement, the Franchisor must not during the 
term, itself operate or licence another to operate the Business within the 
Master Franchise area or itself  operate or licence others to operate 
Franchises. 
 
Without limiting its rights elsewhere under this Agreement, if the Master 
Franchisee does not meet his obligations under Part 5, the Franchisor may at 
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any time thereafter: 
(a) by itself or by licensing or by a joint venture with other persons, 
operate within the Master Franchise Area a number of 
Franchises not exceeding the different between the number of 
Franchises which must be developed and in operation for that 
year of the Term and the number of Franchises actually 
commissioned by the Master Franchisee during that year; or 
(b) reduce the size of the Master Franchise Area and licence another 
to operate a Franchisor Master Franchise within the former 
Master Franchise Area in respect of which the Master Franchisee 
no longer retains exclusivity. 
 
Franchisee acknowledges that the Franchisor may, outside or within the 
Master Franchise Area, develop and establish other systems, using the name  
and proprietary marks which are similar to the marks, or any other 
proprietary marks, and grant licences or franchises therefore without 
providing any rights therein to the Master Franchisee or Sub-Franchisees. 
 
F17 Subject to this agreement we give you, and you accept a non-exclusive 
franchise during the franchise term at and from the store, to: 
- use the system to develop the store and to run your business; 
- use the trade marks in connection with your business; and  
- use the Franchisor food and beverage menus to supply the approved foods 
and beverages. 
 
Protected franchised area 
Subject to you complying with the transaction documents. during the 
franchise term we will not in the protected franchised area give anyone else 
other than you the right to set up or run a (unit) without your prior written 
consent so long as the protected franchised area is not to apply in respect of 
any store that already exists or is under development at the date of this 
agreement in the protected franchised area. Nothing in this agreement 
prevents any existing operator of a store in the protected franchised area 
from redeveloping or expanding its existing business or relocating its 
business to new premises within the area. However, the right to a protected 
franchised area will end if at any time during the franchise term you make 
default under this agreement and do not remedy the default within 30 days 
of getting written notice from us to do so. 
 
Right of first refusal area 
Subject to you complying with the transaction documents during the 
franchise term, we give you a right of first refusal in respect of the grant of 
a Franchisor franchise for one extra Franchisor store within the right of first 
refusal area on the basis that the Franchisor franchise will be granted on the 
then current franchise agreement and transaction documents applicable to 
the type of Franchisor store that is proposed to be opened and will involve a 
payment by you to us of the then current initial franchise fee and other fees 
that are then customarily and ordinarily payable to us or our associates for 
the grant of a Franchisor franchise.  
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- the rights under your franchise cannot be used by you or your 
associates at another site or in another area except under another 
franchise agreement or other agreement with us; and we, our associates 
or anyone else may in Australia and elsewhere in the world develop, 
open or run other Franchisor stores and/or allow others to develop, open 
or run other Franchisor stores except as stated in clauses 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
During your franchise, we will give you a right (sublicence) to use the 
Franchisor trade name or mark in connection with the store and your 
business. 
 
F18 
 
The Franchise shall be subject to the following qualifications and 
restrictions 
… 
Franchisor reserves the right to appoint new Franchise Owners, agents or 
representatives without restriction 
F19 In consideration of the performance by the Member of its obligations under 
this agreement, the Company grants to the Member a non-exclusive right to 
use the Intellectual Property in the course of carrying on the Business at the 
Location during the Term on the terms and conditions of this agreement.… 
During the Term, the Company agrees not to grant any other person the 
right to use the Retail Brand as the brand of a pharmacy in the Territory, 
without prior written approval of the Member. 
Note: * F10 appears twice, first as the existing contract and second as a revised 
contract of the same system with significant proposed revisions. 
 
Discussion of results  
Over half of the contracts in the sample explicitly state that the grant to a franchisee is 
non-exclusive.  Franchisors may refuse to make grants to franchisees of exclusive 
territory, citing the need for flexibility in responding to market conditions.  Where 
franchisors do grant exclusive territories to franchisees, the contract provision often 
covers only the unit premises.  The franchise contracts in the sample indicate that the 
prevailing practice is to limit the licence to a franchisee’s premises, but even this right 
may be subject to franchisor oversight; one contract provides that the franchisee has 
no property rights over premises; the franchisor keeps keys, and has unlimited access 
to the premises.481  Several contracts in the sample (Systems F1, F2, F4, and F5) 
granted an exclusive licence to the use the intellectual property, limited to the defined 
territory or the shop premises.  
                                                 
481 System F14. 
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Most of the contracts sampled provide very limited, if any, restraints on a franchisor’s 
use or further grant of the intellectual property beyond a franchisee’s premises. Some 
expressly ensure a franchisor’s discretion.  Franchise contracts that contain language 
reserving a franchisor’s rights provide a substantial legal basis to uphold a 
franchisor’s right to encroach (Systems F1, F2, F4, F7, and F8).  One contract 
sampled specifically protects a franchisor’s right to do business on the Internet.482     
The grant of an ‘exclusive’ right at the premises or similar language may give the 
illusion of greater protection of its rights than a franchisee actually enjoys.  A 
franchisee with an ‘exclusive’ licence may not in reality gain real assurance against 
franchisor encroachment. Some contracts, however, do include limits on a 
franchisor’s licensing of the intellectual property in the franchisee’s territory,483  and 
one of the contracts in the sample imposes a duty on a franchisor to protect a 
franchisee’s territory.484  
Three of the contracts contained a franchisee right of first refusal, so that if a 
franchisor wishes to open a new unit near a franchisee, the franchisee has the first 
option to take that unit.485  In some cases a right of first refusal is a benefit to 
franchisee but it can be double-edged sword; it can create added risk for the 
franchisee, while giving the appearance of offering franchisee protection.   
Keeping a franchisor’s options open is a justifiable discretion to the extent that it 
benefits the system and all franchisees; it may be less justifiable where it adversely 
affects the rights of an individual franchisee to conduct its business.   To the extent 
that a franchisor retains the right to use and sell the intellectual property, 
notwithstanding any rights sold to a particular franchisee, then that franchisee is 
receiving correspondingly less value for its investment in the right.   
If, as in the sample, the guarantee of exclusivity is absent, or is limited to a 
franchisee’s premises, a franchisor is free to open a new unit a block or two away and 
a franchisee has no right to stop it.  This creates uncertainty for a franchisee. Without 
contractual protection, a franchisee that is faced with franchisor encroachment is 
                                                 
482 System F7. 
483 System F16. 
484 System F2. 
485 Systems F6, F15, F17. 
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forced to rely on a vague standard such as the principle of unconscionable conduct, 
though its application in franchising cases generally has been unhelpful to 
franchisees.486  A franchisee might have some faint hope of prevailing on a claim of 
lack of good faith by a franchisor in the exercise of its discretion.   
The sample indicates that this contract term reinforces a franchisor’s interest in 
maximum discretion and flexibility to exploit the intellectual property freely outside a 
franchisee’s premises and so it reflects an imbalance of power between the parties and 
uncertainty for a franchisee. 
Case law relating to scope of grant and encroachment  
In Neilson Investments (Qld) P/L and Ors v Spud Mulligan's P/L and Ors,487  a 
franchisee, the plaintiff, purchased a franchise that failed.  Meanwhile, the defendant, 
the franchisor, had built a competing store within three kilometres of the franchisee’s 
store.  The franchisee claimed to have relied on representations by franchisor that had 
induced him into entering franchise agreement. The court held for the franchisee; the 
franchisor was found to have breached the Trade Practices Act (the TPA) sections 52 
and 82. 
In Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd,488 a franchisor set up its own outlet 200 
meters from the boundary of a franchisee’s exclusive territory and directed Telstra to 
divert calls to the franchisee’s business to the franchisor. This damaged the 
franchisee’s business and it was forced to sell the premises.  The sale constituted 
grounds for termination, and the franchisor terminated the franchise agreement. The 
franchisee alleged breach of an implied term of good faith; breach of an express term 
‘to use best endeavours to promote the mutual business interests of the parties’; and  
unconscionable conduct under section 51AC of the TPA.  The court held that the 
franchisee’s breach ‘was not a breach which the franchisor, acting in good faith and 
reasonably, ought to have relied upon as a ground for exercising the power to 
terminate the franchise agreement.’   The franchisor was in breach of the express 
term, and its conduct was held to be unconscionable in breach of section 51AC of the 
                                                 
486 Jenny Buchan, ‘Who is the franchisee contracting with and does it matter anyway?’ (Paper 
presented at the 51st ICSB World Conference, 2006, Melbourne, Australia). There are few cases in 
franchising where a court has held in favour of a franchisee on a claim of unconscionable conduct. 
487 Neilson Investments (Qld) P/L and Ors v Spud Mulligan's P/L and Ors [2002] QSC 258.  
488  Bamco Villa Pty Ltd v Montedeen Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 192. 
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TPA.  No contract in the sample contains a term similar to the express term that was 
found to have been breached by the franchisor in the case. 
In Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd,489 McDonald’s decided to open 
a new restaurant near an existing franchisee, but did not offer the franchise to this 
franchisee. The franchisee had no territorial rights nor any express contractual right to 
be offered this franchise, but it alleged that McDonald’s forced it out of the system 
and breached the implied duty of good faith.  Though on the facts there was 
insufficient evidence to prove McDonald’s lack of good faith, the case is significant 
because the court held that there was an implied duty of good faith,  
‘there is to be implied into a franchise agreement a term of good faith and fair 
dealing which obliges each party to exercise the  powers conferred upon it by 
the agreement in good faith and reasonably, and not capriciously or for some 
extraneous purpose’.490   
With respect to virtual encroachment, in Dymock’s Holdings Pty Ltd v Top Ryde 
Booksellers Pty Ltd the court held that the franchisor’s website was in direct 
competition to the franchisees.491   
While these cases show that a franchisee can prevail in some cases of franchisor 
encroachment, there is no contractual term that a franchisee can rely upon.  Instead, a 
franchisee must hope that a court will sympathize with one of its claims that might 
include, variously, breach of section 52, or section 51 AC of the TPA or a duty of 
good faith. 
Direct intervention in scope of grant 
In the US franchisee interests continue to lobby for increased regulation to protect 
franchisees against franchisor encroachment.492   In Australia the scope of grant 
provision is regulated only through disclosure requirements.493  The Franchising Code 
                                                 
489  Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd  [2000] VSC 310. 
490 Extraneous purpose includes trying to force a franchisee out. 
491 Dymocks Holdings Pty Ltd v Top Ryde Booksellers Pty Ltd & Ors [2000] NSWSC 795.  Franchisors 
note that the case illustrated the challenge for franchisors in integrating an e-business strategy within 
their franchise systems.  For related articles see  <http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2001-7/July01-
feature2.htm at 22 July 2005. 
492 Chris van Assche, Deacons Consulting, Lessons From Uncle Sam: US Trends in Franchising (2002) 
<http://www.deaconsconsulting.com/mediacentre/articles/shouldifran.pdf> at 30 December 2005. 
493 A grant of exclusivity may cause anti-trust law problems in some jurisdictions. In the European 
Community, for example, it is possible to grant exclusivity only with an individual exemption under 
article 81(3) of the Treaty of Rome or within the de minimis exemption. Even then it must comply with 
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of Conduct Disclosure Item 8 requires disclosure of five items of information, 
whether or not the information is in the contract:   
 
Disclosure under the Code provides no more information to a franchisee than the 
contract itself as to the nature of the conditions that will be required. 
Measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in scope of grant 
Because the greater power resides with a franchisor and because there is a high level 
of uncertainty for franchisee with respect to risk of franchisor encroachment, which 
can occur in a variety of ways, disclosure cannot be relied upon to avoid the problems 
encroachment can cause.494    
One possible method to enhance certainty is clearer specification of location 
specifications, criteria, and conditions connected to the grant and franchisee's rights. 
Another measure is to ensure greater reciprocal commitment; this could help with 
balance of power.  For example, the restraint of trade limitations imposed upon a 
franchisee are not balanced by protection of a franchisee against franchisor 
encroachment on a franchisee’s operation.  Greater sharing of benefits could also 
increase the alignment of franchisor and franchisee interests.  There could be, for 
example, compensation for franchisees affected by encroachment.495  A franchisor 
who benefits from additional locations might consider sharing in the existing 
                                                                                                                                            
the laws of the member state.  Competition law implications in Australia are covered under the 
restrictive trade practices provisions of the TPA. 
494 In the US horizontal allocations of territory are per se illegal, but vertical allocations are analysed 
according to the rule of reason. Most franchisors justify territorial allocations for purposes of interbrand 
competition. See M. J. Morris, and D. D. Smith, Government Regulation of Franchises (1991) 
Franchise Smith <http://franchisesmith.com/chap67.htm> at 30 December 2005.  
495 Chris van Assche, Deacons Consulting, Lessons From Uncle Sam: US Trends in Franchising (2002) 
<http://www.deaconsconsulting.com/mediacentre/articles/shouldifran.pdf> at 30 December 2005.  
Disclosure Item 8 
   
 whether the franchise is for an exclusive or non-exclusive territory or 
limited to a particular site; 
 whether the franchisor or its associates may operate a business that is 
substantially the same as the franchise in the franchised territory; 
 whether the franchisor or its associates may establish other franchises that 
are substantially the same as the franchise in the franchised territory; 
 whether you may operate a business that is substantially the same as your 
franchise outside the franchised territory; and 
 whether the franchisor may change the territory. 
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franchisee’s decrease of profits by making a financial contribution, reducing the 
royalty rates or requiring the new franchisee to pay a portion of its royalties to the 
affected franchisee.496  In some cases there might be a formula to compensate 
franchisees negatively affected by encroachment.497  Finally, a franchisee nearest the 
new unit should consider negotiating the terms of a right of first refusal to a new 
unit.498  
Other methods are procedural.  Both certainty and balance of power can be addressed 
by proper procedures for matching franchisees with appropriate franchise units and 
territories.  For example, a franchisor should ensure that a franchisee is properly 
selected, that the size of the territory is carefully determined.  A franchisee's skills 
and resources can inform a determination of the geographical scope of the territory. 
Franchisee cooperation can also help to formulate appropriate terms to allow 
franchisor return and franchisee return on investment.  These procedures should 
include provisions for franchisee involvement and input.  There should also be a 
process through which a franchisor can make changes to territory allocations. 
Another procedural measure could be the use of business and development plans. 
These can help consensus-building and create certainty so cooperative involvement in 
business and development plans is recommended.  Incorporation of any business plan 
into the development schedule will help to encourage a realistic approach by a 
franchisee and enable a franchisor to allocate its resources more effectively.  The 
business plan should reflect any anticipated weaknesses as well as strengths to 
increase certainty for the parties.  Such plans can also include specification of what 
franchisee rights are protected, along with a description of the process by which a 
franchisor can establish new franchised or company-owned units, make changes to 
territory allocations, and/or undertake its own marketing efforts on the Internet.  Only 
one contract in the sample required a business plan, not for the system, but for the 
franchised unit.  None of the contracts in the sample included a development plan 
                                                 
496 Robert Zarco on behalf of franchisees, in Michael H. Seid, David Kaufman, and Robert Zarco, 
Franchise Encroachment, Part 1: Most Significant Encroachment Issues (2000) Entrepreneur.com 
<http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,283208-2,00.html> at 4 January 2006. 
497 Chris van Assche, Deacons Consulting, Lessons From Uncle Sam: US Trends in Franchising (2002) 
<http://www.deaconsconsulting.com/mediacentre/articles/shouldifran.pdf> at 30 December 2005. 
498 David Kaufman, and Robert Zarco, Franchise Encroachment, Part 1: Most Significant 
Encroachment Issues (2000) Entrepreneur.com <http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,283208-
2,00.html> at 4 January 2006. 
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(franchisors may want to consider also section 51AC which requires parties to 
disclose future plans).499 
Some of the foregoing procedural measures are best handled cooperatively.  
Cooperative and collective action can help franchisees to gain a level of 
understanding and certainty, rather than be subject to interpretations of franchisor 
good faith.  Cooperative involvement in business and development plans, proper 
procedures for matching franchisees with appropriate franchise units and territories, 
and cooperation in formulating appropriate terms to allow franchisor return and 
franchisee return on investment all can help redress imbalance of power and 
uncertainty. The alternative is that these conditions will be reinforced when 
franchisees are excluded from important business functions and processes. 
                                                 
499 The contracts in the sample were predominantly established franchise systems.  Development plans 
might be more common in new, developing systems and/or with in systems entering new markets. It is 
also probable that such plans do not appear in the contract boilerplate. While this study can determine 
what provisions appear in contracts, this is not to say that because a practice is not provided for in the 
contract, it therefore is not part of a given system. Including it in the contract, however, is a step toward 
ensuring that the practice will be followed. 
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5.4 CONTRACT TERM:  DURATION AND RIGHT OF RENEWAL  
The duration of the contract and right of renewal, if one is provided for, are 
commonly included together in the early sections of the franchise contract.  The 
length of the contract, any ensuing renewal period, and the conditions placed upon it, 
are important considerations for both franchisor and franchisee, but once again their 
interests conflict.  A franchisee prefers an initial contract duration long enough to 
allow it to recoup its investment and to achieve a reasonable return on its original 
capital investment.500  Franchisee fees allow a franchisor to recover the costs of its 
investment in the development of the unit.501  A franchisor typically prefers relatively 
short contract duration with a conditional option to renew.502  Shorter contract 
duration gives a franchisor the opportunity to collect further fees at transfer or renewal 
or upon sale of the franchise to a new franchisee.  The conditions of renewal give 
franchisors the opportunity to impose additional operating requirements, to require 
franchisees to upgrade premises and/or to undertake additional obligations.503    
Established systems, larger territories, and master franchise arrangements often 
involve longer contract durations, probably because of larger investments by 
franchisees and longer time frames required for franchisees to achieve reasonable 
returns.  Another reason for longer terms is that more experienced franchisor systems 
and franchisee operators are involved.  It is common that McDonald’s contracts run 
for twenty years and typically do not offer a right of renewal.  Longer duration 
contracts are less likely to carry with them automatic rights of renewal due to higher 
risk exposure if franchisees do not perform, or relations break down.  Because the 
initial contract duration for a McDonald’s franchise is around twenty years, there is 
ample opportunity for a franchisee to recoup his considerable initial investment.  It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that a franchisor will be unwilling to commit to right of 
renewal at the end of the twenty year contract duration.  This is a good example of the 
                                                 
500 Jeff Elgin, Ready to Commit? About to buy a franchise but intimidated by the licence agreement? 
We explain what to look for before you sign on the dotted line (2005) Entrepreur.com 
<http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,321573,00.html> at 10 August 2005. 
501 The share parameter or royalty, on the other hand, is set so as to compensate the franchisee and the 
franchisor for the costs of their ongoing efforts. 
502 Jeff Elgin, Ready to Commit? About to buy a franchise but intimidated by the licence agreement? 
We explain what to look for before you sign on the dotted line (2005) Entrepreur.com 
<http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,321573,00.html> at 10 August 2005. 
503 Ibid. 
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need for different approaches depending upon the stage of maturity and development 
of the franchise system.     
Franchisors are perennially concerned with the pool of qualified potential franchisees. 
Currently much of what a franchisor does is geared to make a franchisee as 
‘substitutable’ as possible.504  Franchisees are often surprised to find that their share at 
transfer or termination does not meet expectations.505   A franchisee wants a term long 
enough to recoup its investment, to have something to sell upon exiting the 
arrangement, and not to be subject to franchisor hold-up.  The term ‘right of renewal’ 
is a misnomer to the extent that the term does not spell out a right of a franchisee as 
much as it outlines conditions and ensures franchisor discretion not to grant renewal.    
 
Table 5.4: Summary of Contract Duration and Right of Renewal Terms in 
Contracts under Review 
 
Franchise 
System 
Contract duration, right of renewal  
F1 5/5 year term and right of renewal. 
  Right to renew subject to conditions 
F2 10/10 year term and right of renewal. 
Right to renew subject to conditions. 
(a)(ii) franchisee not pay new Franchise Fee (but $5k renewal fee per schedule) 
F3 Term not specified in the contract. 
First Renewal 
At the end of the Initial Term, the Franchisee may renew the Franchise for the 
Renewal Term if: 
the Franchisee notifies the Franchisor of the election to renew (the Renewal 
Notice) at least six months before the end of the Initial Term; 
the Franchisee is not in breach of any provision of this agreement when the 
Renewal Notice is given or at the end of the Initial Term; 
the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor on demand the Franchisor's reasonable 
costs (including legal costs on a solicitor and own client basis) of and incidental 
to the renewal of the Franchise; 
the Franchisee and each Principal executes and delivers to the Franchisor a then 
current Franchisor Business franchise agreement (which may differ from this 
agreement as to material and non-material terms and conditions); 
the Franchisee remodels, repairs and redecorates the Location to ensure that 
they conform to the Image; and 
the Franchisee and each Principal comply with such other conditions as the 
Franchisor may reasonably impose. 
                                                 
504 The author is not aware of any economic analysis that has been conducted on the economic benefit 
to franchisor of franchisee longevity compared to high franchisee turnover.   
505 Telephone interview with Richard Evans, Franchising Council of Australia, late 2004. 
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Second Renewal 
At the end of the first Renewal Term, the Franchisee may renew the Franchise 
for a second Renewal Term if: 
the Franchisee notifies the Franchisor of the election to renew (the Renewal 
Notice) at least six months before the end of the first Renewal Term; 
the Franchisee is not in breach of any provision of this agreement when the 
Renewal Notice is given or at the end of the first Renewal Term; 
the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor on demand the Franchisor's reasonable 
costs (including legal costs on a solicitor and own client basis) of and incidental 
to the renewal of the Franchise; 
the Franchisee and each Principal executes and delivers to the Franchisor a then 
current Franchisor Business franchise agreement (which may differ from this 
agreement as to material and non-material terms and conditions); 
the Franchisee remodels, repairs and redecorates the Location to ensure that 
they conform to the Image; and  the Franchisee and each Principal comply with 
such other conditions as the Franchisor, acting reasonably, may impose. 
F4 5/5 year term and right of renewal; Franchisee must pay renewal fee… will not 
be required to pay any further Initial Franchise Fee 
F5 Term not specified in the contract  
s20 You must pay to us the territory renewal fee in item 10 in accordance with 
the terms in item 10 or such other terms as we may separately agree with you. 
F6 Term not specified in the contract  
Subject to the provisions of this clause 20, the Franchisee will have an option 
(exercisable only by written notice delivered to Franchisor not more than nine 
(9) months, but not less than six (6) months, prior to the end of the Term) to 
renew the Franchise for one further term only (the “Renewal Term”), if and 
only if: 
(a) the Franchisee is at the date of exercise of the option to renew in full 
compliance with this Deed and has not during the Term materially 
breached this Deed, the lease or licence of the Premises, any other 
agreement between Franchisor and the Franchisee or any other 
agreement with other parties which relates to or is incidental to the 
Franchise; 
(b) the Franchisee has paid to Franchisor all outstanding amounts due to it; 
(c) the Franchisee has secured possession of the Premises by lease or 
licence for the entire Renewal Term; 
(d) the Franchisee, if required by Franchisor or by the lessor, refurbishes the 
Premises at its cost to meet the then current design and image, standards 
and fit-out specifications for new Franchisor Stores, or to the design and 
image  required by the lessor of the Premises and agreed to by 
Franchisor; 
(e) the Franchisee must have paid to Franchisor its reasonable cost of 
renewing the Franchise and if applicable the lease, including reasonable 
legal fees and expenses incurred in the preparation of all necessary 
documents, as well as stamp duty on such documents; and 
(f) the Franchisee enters into the Standard Franchisor Franchise Deed 
(identified by Franchisor) then being used by Franchisor at the time of 
the exercise of the option, save that such Franchise Deed shall not 
contain any further renewal options.  The Franchisee must agree to pay 
the levels of Franchise Service Fees and Advertising Contributions 
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applicable at the time to new franchisees (provided that there shall be no 
further Initial Franchise Fee payable in terms of clause 6.1 and no 
further contribution to the Advertising Contributions Account in terms 
of Item 9(a) of the Schedule) 
 
20.2 Loss of right to renew 
The Franchisee will be deemed to have irrevocably lost its right to renew the 
Franchise (and its or his option shall thereupon terminate) if having given a 
notice pursuant to clause 20.1 it or he fails to execute and return to Franchisor, 
the Franchise Deed (referred to in clause 20.1(f)) and other such documents 
required by Franchisor for a renewal, within twenty (20) Business Days after 
Franchisor has delivered the Franchise Deed and other documents to the 
Franchisee for execution. 
F7 Term not specified in the contract  
Conditions of Renewal similar to F6 above: 
The Franchisee’s right to renew the Franchise is subject to and conditional upon 
satisfaction of each of the following conditions: 
- at the date of giving the notice of renewal and at the end of the current term of 
the Agreement, there is no outstanding breach of this Agreement or any Related 
Agreement which has not been remedied; 
- the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor all amounts owed to the Franchisor by 
the Franchisee; 
- the Franchisee pays its suppliers all amounts owed to them by the Franchisee; 
- the Franchisee pays the Renewal Fee to the Franchisor; 
- the Franchisee establishes that it has obtained an Occupancy Right to the 
Premises for the duration of the renewal period; 
- the Franchisee executes and returns to the Franchisor its then standard 
franchise agreement (which may contain different terms and conditions to those 
set out in this Agreement and excluding - in the case of a renewal for the First 
Further Term, the right to renew for the First Further Term and in the case of a 
renewal for the Second Further Term, excluding any provision for the right to 
renew for a further term) and all other documents required by the Franchisor for 
a renewal within 1 month after the Franchisor has delivered those documents to 
the Franchisee; 
the Franchisee, Manager and the key employees of the Franchisee nominated 
by the Franchisor, at the cost of the Franchisee, complete the then current initial 
training program to the satisfaction of the Franchisor; and 
- the Franchisee renovates and refurbishes the Premises and replaces or 
upgrades any plant, equipment, fixtures, fittings and signs as the Franchisor 
may reasonably require in order to bring the Premises and other assets used in 
the Business up to the then current standards and specifications of the 
Franchisor for all new Businesses and to comply with any Laws and the 
requirements of any authority. 
(…) 
RENEWAL FEE 
The costs and expenses of the Franchisor of and incidental to the grant of the 
Franchise for the further term, including (without limitation) 
- the costs and expenses of the Franchisor investigating and reviewing the status 
of the Franchisee and the proposed guarantors; 
- the legal costs and expenses of the Franchisor on a full indemnity basis of and 
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incidental to the preparation and execution of the new franchise agreement and 
other incidental documents; 
- all filing/registration fees; and 
- all other reasonable costs and expenses. 
F8 10/10 year term and right of renewal. 
F9 5/5 year term and right of renewal; Renewal fee $5000, Right to renew subject 
to conditions 
F10 10/10 year term and right of renewal (few conditions) 
F10 
 
Term of Agreement - This Agreement will start on the date of execution and 
continue for ten years, unless terminated under Clause qq.  
 
Option to renew - After ten years the Franchisee may sign, without charge, the 
then current Franchise agreement for a further ten years, provided that they are 
not in breach of the Agreement and have no overdue business accounts with 
anybody. The new Agreement will contain a clause similar to this one, allowing 
a further ten years. 
F11 5/5 year term and right of renewal. Option to renew subject to various 
conditions 
F12 5/5 year term and right of renewal. 
F13 Term not specified in the contract /Right of renewal NA 
F14 5 year term; renewal term not stated 
Possible Renewal: 
At least 3 months prior to the expiry date, we may give a written notice to you 
stating if we will renew the franchise, and if so, on what terms. 
If we do give such a notice, you must: 
(a) within 1 month of receiving the notice advise us in writing whether you will 
accept the terms contained in the notice; and 
(b) within 14 days of receiving a new Franchise Agreement, sign such 
Franchise Agreement and return it to us along with any payment that you may 
be required to make.  
If we do not give such written notice, either of the following may occur:  
(a)   your franchise will not be renewed and you will be required on the expiry 
date to cease operating the Business and vacate the Business Premises and 
otherwise comply with the termination provisions of this Agreement; or 
(b)   we may nevertheless enter into discussions and/or negotiations with you 
concerning the granting of another franchise - this will be entirely at our 
discretion. 
F15 
 
Term not specified in the contract /Right of renewal NA  (Annexure A not 
included in Franchise Agreement) 
 
Renewal Fee: $1 (Schedule Item 15) 
3.2  Option for Renewal. The Franchisor grants to the Franchisee an option 
to renew this Agreement and conduct the Franchised Operation for the Renewal 
Term. 
3.3  Exercise of Option. The Franchisee shall only be entitled to exercise the 
option (if any) contained in Clause 3.2 in the event that: 
(a)  the Franchisee has at all times during the Term duly observed 
and performed his obligations under this Agreement and all 
agreements with the Franchisor and the Leasing Company; 
(b)  the Franchisee upgrades the Premises to meet the then current 
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Franchisor Image; 
(c)  the Leasing Company has been granted a renewed term under 
the Head Lease pursuant to an exercise of option or otherwise; 
(d)  the Franchisee has sought a renewal of the Licence; 
(e)  the Franchisee has given written notice to the Franchisor 
exercising the option not more than nine (9) months and not less 
than three (3) months before the expiration of the Term; 
(f)  the Franchisee pays the Renewal Fee; 
(g)  the Franchisee is prepared to execute the then current franchise 
agreement; 
(h)  the Franchisee pays the Franchisors reasonable costs of and 
incidental to (including legal fees) the preparation of the then 
current franchise agreement, renewal of the Head Lease and the 
Licence of the Premises (if allowable at law); 
(i)  the Franchisee undertakes and satisfactorily completes, at its 
cost, four (4) weeks re-training if requested to do so by the 
Franchisor at a location nominated by the Franchisor in the 
reasonable exercise of its discretion;  
(j)  the Franchisee complies with a direction from the Franchisor to 
permanently remove from the Premises any Asset item or items 
that no longer form part of the Image and/or System.  
 
F16 10/10 year term and right of renewal. (4.1; Schedule item 3) 
F17 
 
 
Term not specified in the contract  
 
Option to renew your franchise  
You have one option to renew your franchise for the renewal term if you 
and your associates comply with clause 5.2 and you give us a renewal 
notice at least 3 months, but no longer than 9 months before this franchise is 
due to expire.  
 
Renewal conditions  
Before we will grant you a new franchise for the renewal term and after you 
have exercised the option to renew your franchise in clause 5.1, you and your 
associates must comply with the following pre-conditions:  
you and your associates must:  
- not be in default under this agreement at the date you exercise your option and 
on the expiry date of your franchise;  
- pay all money due by you and your associates to us and our associates on the 
date you exercise your option and on the expiry date of your franchise;  
- sign and return to us all the renewal documents; and  
- you must pay:  
- the renewal fee to us when you give us the renewal notice;  
- the reasonable costs (but not more than $500 plus GST) incurred by us or our 
associates in reviewing the suitability and financial position of you and your 
associates;  
- the reasonable legal costs incurred by us and our associates in negotiation, 
preparation, signing, delivery, stamping, completing and registration of the 
renewal documents;  
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- you must:  
- reasonably demonstrate to us that you are able to maintain a right to 
possession, use or occupation of the store for the renewal term or to secure and 
develop a new store within the protected franchised area at a suitable location 
reasonably approved by us:  
- if we reasonably require have your associates or managers undertake any re-
training course at your cost; you must at your cost:  
- before this franchise expires or if we allow, within the first 6 months of the 
renewal term, do all redevelopment works to the store we reasonably require so 
long as before the redevelopment works are done we consult with you about the 
nature of the redevelopment works needed to be done to the store;  
 
if we consider reasonably necessary, having regard to the performance of your 
business at its current location or other relevant facts, you must relocate the 
store to more suitable premises within the protected franchised area or to a new 
location within 2km from the centre of the store, so long as before you have to 
move your business, we have consulted with you about the proposed new 
location for the store.  
 
5.3 Loss of renewal term - If you fail to comply with the preconditions for 
renewal of your franchise in clause 5.2 after 30 days written notice to do so, we 
may refuse to renew your franchise and end all agreements with you in 
connection with the renewal of your franchise. If for any reason your franchise 
has already been renewed, the failure to comply with any of the preconditions 
in clause 5.2 will be taken to be a default entitling us to end the renewed 
franchise agreement.  
 
5.4 Renewal documents - The renewal documents may be different to the 
existing franchise agreement and transaction documents. …A new franchise 
agreement will not require the payment of an initial franchise fee but will 
require you to pay the renewal fee.  
 
5.6 No renewal - Despite anything to the contrary in this agreement, we do 
not have to renew your franchise if: for any reason beyond our control before 
the start of the renewal term, the store cannot be leased or otherwise made 
available for use or occupation by you for your business; and you do not, within 
6 months of the store becoming unavailable for use or occupation by you, find 
and secure a right to use or occupy a new store within the protected franchised 
area suitable for your business and to which your business may be relocated to 
for the balance of the proposed renewal term.  
F18 5/5 
Renewal 
Within six (6) months but not less than two (2) months before the expiration of 
the Term, the Franchise Owner shall notify Franchisor in writing if it desires to 
extend the Franchise for the Further Term. Where Franchisor has not received a 
notice from the Franchise Owner within the required time period, Franchisor 
shall not be entitled to advise the Franchise Owner that the Franchise has 
expired unless and until Franchisor sends to the Franchise Owner a written 
notice advising the Franchise Owner that the Franchise has not been renewed, 
and allowing the Franchise Owner a further twenty-eight (28) days to exercise 
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the Franchise Owner's option to renew. Franchisor will not unreasonably 
withhold its consent to a request for renewal for the Further Term where the 
requirements of clause 4.2 have been satisfied. 
F19 
 
 
 
 (a)  Subject to the earlier termination of this agreement in accordance with 
its terms, the Term is a period of three years from the Commencement Date.  
(b)  This agreement will be renewed automatically for successive periods of 
three years (each a "Renewal Term") unless either party gives to the other not 
less than three months notice prior to the end of the Term or the Renewal Term 
(as the case may be), that it will not be renewing the agreement after the Term 
or the then current Renewal Term.  
 
Discussion of results  
The initial contract duration in the sample varied from five to ten years; no contract in 
this sample was of duration longer than ten years.   Most contracts sampled did 
contain a right of renewal.   The most commonly-used formula in the contracts 
sampled is the five-year initial contract duration with an option to renew for a further 
five years.506  All contracts sampled offered an option to renew for one term of the 
same length as the initial term; none offered a further option to renew.  Some 
provisions were made for month-to-month operation after the expiration of the initial 
term.  Variations among these terms related principally to the notice period for 
renewal, renewal fees and other conditions for renewal.   
To address franchisor concern that the ‘right of renewal’ might create a property right 
in a franchisee, most of the terms in this sample include extensive conditions that can 
be imposed by a franchisor to prevent a franchisee from acquiring a property right or 
other right that is onerous to a franchisor.507  These conditions allow a franchisor to 
refuse to grant renewal where a franchisor may have an interest in limiting the power 
and influence of existing franchisees, for example, in major or geographically 
extensive markets, or where, for these and other reasons, there is a potentially strong 
                                                 
506  In Europe most franchisee agreements run for a period of between five and ten years but ‘Pan EU 
agreements are usually longer between 10 and 25 years’, in order for the franchisee to obtain a decent 
return on its investment.  
507 Because a contractual relationship of limited duration becomes property right – ‘statutes that limit 
the franchisor’s right not to renew…impinge upon the substantive economic rights of the parties’.  See 
Rupert M. Barkoff, Government Regulation of the Franchise Relationship in the United States (2003) 
Kilpatrick Stockton LLP <http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/pubs.aspx> at 15 August 
2003.  
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franchisee that may no longer comply sufficiently or may threaten a franchisor’s 
control.508    
Only one contract in the sample, F19, provides for an automatic renewal that can be 
declined by either party with three months’ notice.  If the contract were to reflect a 
balance of power between the parties, contract duration terms could be expected to be 
calibrated to protect and allow recovery of a franchisee’s specific investment while 
safeguarding a franchisor from franchisee free-riding.509   It is not clear whether the 
five-year initial term with five-year right of renewal does create such a balance but 
shorter contract terms do tend to favour a franchisor, and most of the contracts in the 
sample provide for short contract terms.  The sample therefore indicates that the 
contract reflects an imbalance of power between the parties.   
The scope for franchisor discretion in determining conditions for renewal is difficult 
for a prospective franchisee to assess but can have a significant impact on a 
franchisee’s return on its investment.  Long-term contracts are in theory associated 
with uncertainty, but shorter contract duration in the long-term contract also creates 
uncertainty for a franchisee.  Not only is a franchisee in this situation giving 
discretion to a franchisor over the period of the initial term, but also a franchisee is 
subject to franchisor’s conditions, often exercised with a franchisor’s discretion, at 
the expiration of the initial term.  For example, a common renewal condition is to 
require a franchisee to sign the "then current" form of the franchise contract, which is 
likely to include higher fees as well as new restrictions on the operation of the 
business. A franchisee may be required to update the physical plant of the business to 
the current basis for new units opening in the system, a potentially major 
investment.510  As franchisees approach the expiration of their term they may be 
                                                 
508  The Franchise Agreement (2005) European Franchising Network 
<http://www.europeanfranchising.com/introtofranchising/14franchiseagreement.aspx> at 30 December 
2005.     
509 Janet Bercovitz, ‘An Analysis of the Contract Provisions in Business Format Franchise Agreements’ 
(1999) International Society for New Institutional Economics 
<http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE00/Papers/Bercovitz.pdf>  at 8 December 2004. 
510 Jeff Elgin, ‘Ready to Commit? About to buy a franchise but intimidated by the licence agreement? 
We explain what to look for before you sign on the dotted line’ (2005) Entrepreur.com 
<http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/0,4621,321573,00.html> at August 2005. See also; ‘The 
Problems Franchisees Face’ (2003) American Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchisee.org/problem> at 30 December 2005.  
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subject to franchisor pressure to conform in a variety of ways as a condition of 
renewal.511   
Case law 
Most case law that is available regarding right of renewal in franchising involves 
petrol stations.512  Several of these cases suggest that the terms of contracts are often 
constructed so that a franchisor does not have to renew, as the court found that there 
was not a right of renewal enjoyed by the franchisee.  Because these are governed by 
a separate code,513 they are not discussed further here. 
Direct intervention in contract duration and right of renewal   
Some jurisdictions impose substantive requirements with respect to this term.  In 
some provinces in Canada the right of a franchisee to renew is protected by 
legislation.514  Several countries now have legislated mandatory minimum contract 
duration.515  With respect to the initial term of franchise agreements Indonesia and 
Malaysia require a minimum five-year term.  The minimum term in Italy is three 
years.516   
In Australia there is no substantive statutory requirement with respect to term and 
franchisee right of renewal.  There is no regulatory requirement that protects a 
franchisee’s right to renew, and there are no substantive requirements with respect to 
a franchisor’s imposition of conditions on right of renewal.  Common law rules apply; 
the courts are left to assess what is reasonable in the franchise relationship, informed 
                                                 
511 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 116. 
512 These cases include Ampol Ltd v Calaby Pty Ltd (1991) 110 ALR 343,  Sagittarian Enterprises Pty 
ltd and Others v Ampol  (1986) 69 ALR 551, Anjac Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 69 
ALR 733, Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Brian Brindle (1983) 62 ALR 89, Dinyarrak Investments Pty Ltd v 
Amoco Australia Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 214.   
513 See the Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act 1980 (Cth). 
514 See, e.g. Valas and Associates, A F5D Standards Regulating Term and Renewal (2005) Valas and 
Associates <http://www.franchiseelaw.com/term.html> which outlines right of renewal “ROR”;  Cyber 
Frontier eBusiness, Franchise Agreement (2003) <http://www.cyberfrontier.biz/en/cfc-cb-franchise-
sept03.pdf>  which provides a sample contract with ROR; <http://www.nig.co.uk/fabout.html>.  See 
also the 2000 amendment to the The Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/documents/Bills/37_Parliament/Session2/b138_e.htm> which protects 
franchisees against franchisor non-renewal in Canada. 
515 Interview with Lorelle Frazer, Associate Dean, Postgraduate Studies, Griffith University at the FCA 
Conference, 2003. 
516 In Europe some legislation reportedly provides for a maximum term. See 
<http://www.europeanfranchising.com/>. 
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in the process by criteria contained in TPA section 51AC and the developing doctrin 
of good faith in contract performance.  Statutory regulation of this contract term, 
Disclosure Item 17, requires only a summary of the relevant conditions of the 
franchise agreement.  
 
Disclosure under the Code provides no more information to a franchisee than the 
contract itself as to the nature of the conditions that will be required by a franchisor 
for renewal.  A franchisor enjoys flexibility to make changes to the system and to 
require compliance by a franchisee with the new terms, though a franchisee cannot 
predict and has no say in what those terms might involve. 
FCC Disclosure 17, Summary of other conditions of agreement, provides as 
follows: 
17.1 Summary of the conditions of the franchise agreement (or references to 
the relevant conditions of the franchise agreement, if attached) that deal with 
the following matters: 
(a) term of the franchise agreement;  (…) 
(c) renewal or extension; 
    (d) conditions the franchisee must meet to renew or extend the franchise 
agreement;… 
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Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
term/franchisee right of renewal 
There should be clearer understanding on both sides of how long the individual 
franchisee needs to be in business to recoup its investment.517  To enhance certainty 
for a franchisee the initial duration of the contract should be sufficient to provide a 
franchisee return on investment.  This contract term may be one instance where 
individual franchisee circumstances should play a greater role in negotiations.  
Customising these provisions could accommodate the investment and demographic 
profiles of individual franchisees and the likelihood of meeting their overall business 
objectives.   
Certainty could also be improved through clearer understanding on both sides of what 
needs to happen for a franchisee to exercise a right of renewal.  Currently, a 
franchisor can set conditions at the time of renewal and a franchisee has no advance 
knowledge of what a franchisor’s conditions for renewal are likely to be.  A 
franchisee needs greater certainty in the form of specification of what a franchisor can 
require and/or some input in the process. 
To improve balance of power collective action could be beneficial in instituting 
consultation processes that include franchisees; thus better ensuring franchisees’ 
interests are served.  Not only could this help insure against franchisor abuse, but 
could protect a franchisor from exposure to liability under the TPA section 51AC.  
This could be a benefit to franchisors of consultative processes generally, not only in 
the negotiation of term and right of renewal. 
 
                                                 
517 Similarly, the costs and the requirements of the franchisor must be based on the contract duration and 
franchisee’s expected return. These figures would vary widely depending upon the type of industry, the size of 
the unit, etc.   
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5.5 CONTRACT TERM:  FRANCHISOR OBLIGATION TO ADVERTISE  
Maintenance of brand and trademark is a critical aspect of the success of any 
franchise system.  Franchisor promotional obligations build and reinforce brand and 
trademark.  They also can help to curb franchisee free-riding by centralising brand 
maintenance for the system, while a franchisee may undertake local promotions on 
behalf of the unit.  Franchisee participation in promotional funding is mandatory.  
Promotions are paid for with funds a franchisor collects from franchisees.  A 
franchisor may allocate funds at its discretion for advertising and promotions.518  
Advertising is one of the few explicit contractual obligations of a franchisor, but it is 
an obligation undertaken at a franchisor’s discretion; a franchisor  
‘shall oversee all System and Product advertising, with sole discretion 
to approve or disapprove the creative concepts, materials and media 
used in such advertising, and the placement and allocation thereof.’519   
This situation where one party that provides an asset that is vulnerable to the actions 
of the other party exercising control over the asset presents a classic case of 
opportunistic risk.  A franchisee is vulnerable to several forms of franchisor 
opportunism in promotional activities. There is, for example, no contractual provision 
to restrict spending on promotions that increases the revenues of franchisors, but not 
those of franchisees.  Contracts are often drafted so that a franchisor is not required to 
spend advertising dollars in the market where franchisees have contributed to the 
funds. A franchisor can use the funds to advertise heavily in areas served by company 
stores or those served by favoured franchisees.  Franchisees therefore need assurance 
that franchisors will fulfil this crucial obligation to its franchisees.   
The following hypothetical illustrates a problem that arises with respect to franchisor 
control over promotions: 
Suppose a franchisor in the exercise of this discretion offers thirty-five percent 
off all products in a state-wide promotion.  Volume will increase but profit 
                                                 
518  Rupert M. Barkoff and Andrew C. Selden (eds), Fundamentals of Franchising (1997) 60; note that 
franchisees must beware to avoid price-fixing and related anti-competition regulations, but see Leegin 
Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc. (2007), The Oyez Project, Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. ___ (2007),  available at: <http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2006/2006_06_480/> Tuesday, September 4, 2007.   Note also that in addition to funding 
franchisor’s promotions for the brand, a franchisee has an obligation to promote locally. 
519 System F1. 
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margins may be reduced or wiped out altogether.   A franchisor gains because 
its royalties are based on volume.  Franchisees, whose remuneration is based 
on profits (which can be calibrated by a franchisor to run at the narrowest of 
margins) may lose money.  A franchisor in such a situation may assure 
concerned franchisees that the decline in profit margins will be made up in 
volume, but franchisees report that in reality this is often not the case, and that 
those paying high royalties are particularly burdened.520   There is nothing 
franchisees can do, however, because marketing expenditures are expressly 
left to a franchisor’s discretion. 
 
Table 5.5: Summary of Franchisor Obligation to Promote in Contracts under Review 
Franchise  
system 
Franchisor obligations with respect to advertising 
F1 
 
Recognising the value of advertising and promotion, and the importance of the 
standardisation of advertising and promotion programs to the furtherance of 
goodwill and public image of the System and Products in Australia, the parties 
agree as follows: 
… Franchisee shall contribute monthly 
… (franchisor) shall oversee all System and Product advertising, with sole 
discretion to approve or disapprove 
… Franchisee agrees to expend each year, for local advertising and for 
promotion, and in addition to the Advertising Amount, an amount equal to one-
half of one percent (0.5%) of its annual gross sales. 
… Franchisee shall participate in all sales promotion programs as required from 
time to time by (franchisor) 
F2 
 
Franchisor will undertake, subject to the limitations of the amounts of the 
Marketing Contributions available in the Marketing Fund, all other marketing 
as it decides is reasonably necessary… 
The Franchisor: 
(a) may in its sole discretion from time to time advance moneys to the 
Marketing Fund; 
(b) will before making any advance to the Marketing Fund seek the 
approval of the franchisees; 
(c) will be entitled to interest payable on moneys advanced at the rate of 
interest payable and terms of repayment agreed to by the franchisees; 
(d) is entitled to a refund of all moneys advanced by the Franchisor from 
the Marketing Fund and repayment of these moneys will be a proper payment 
of advertising expenses under this Agreement; 
(e) and the Franchisee acknowledges and agrees that the total contributions 
to the Marketing Fund need not be spent in the year in which they are 
                                                 
520 This scenario was reported to have occurred in a major US eyewear franchise system.  See Laura M. 
Holson, Have We Got a Deal For You: The Hidden Truth About Franchising (1996) Zarco Einhorn 
Salkowski & Brito P. A. <http://www.zarcolaw.com/CM/News/news46.asp> at 30 December 2005.  
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received and that a reserve in the Marketing Fund may be accumulated 
by the Franchisor for future promotions; 
f) will be entitled to administer the Marketing Fund as it deems 
appropriate and will not be obliged to expend a proportionate part of the 
Marketing Contributions received from any other franchisee on any 
particular franchisee or territory but the Franchisor must act fairly in the 
interests of all franchisees and the Franchisor to ensure REASONABLE 
and consistent coverage in all territories operated by franchisees and the 
Franchisor; 
(g) is entitled to delegate its responsibilities relating to marketing and 
advertising, contained in this clause, to one or more parties of its choosing; 
(h) must keep a proper set of books of account relating to moneys paid to it 
for Marketing Contributions and will accurately maintain them;  
(i) may establish a marketing consultancy or contract with a marketing 
consultancy to co-ordinate and assist in the marketing, promotional and 
advertising initiatives and requirements of the Franchisee (provided the 
Franchisor will not appoint a marketing consultant without the prior 
consent of the Franchisee); 
(j) may require the Franchisee to pay all costs associated with the products 
and promotional materials provided by that consultancy at the request of 
the Franchisee, in addition to the contributions to the Marketing Fund 
made by the Franchisee; and 
(k) will prepare the annual financial statement required to be prepared under 
the Code and will have that statement audited in accordance with the Code 
unless 75% or more of the franchisees contributing to the Marketing Fund give 
Notice to the Franchisor that they do not want it audited. 
F3 
 
Franchisor may provide merchandising, marketing and advertising research 
data and advice developed by the Franchisor from time to time;  
The Franchisor may: 
refuse to approve proposed advertisements and promotional material; and 
revoke previous approvals of advertisements and promotional material. 
The Franchisee must: 
  (a) use its best endeavours to promote the Franchise Business in accordance 
with the System; 
  (b) use only advertising materials prepared by or on behalf of the Franchisor 
or prepared by the Franchisee and approved by the Franchisor before use; and 
   (c) spend not less than 2% of its Gross Receipts on promoting the Franchise 
Business. 
S.9.2 Refusal/revocation of approval 
The Franchisor may: 
  (a) refuse to approve proposed advertisements and promotional material; and 
  (b) revoke previous approvals of advertisements and promotional material. 
S.9.3. Franchisee's obligations 
The Franchisee must: 
  (a) take part in any special promotional programs sponsored, adopted or 
arranged by the Franchisor or, if required by the terms of the Franchisee's lease, 
licence or other tenancy agreement, the landlord of the Location; 
  (b) comply with advertising laws and with advertising standards established or 
endorsed by the Franchisor from time to time; 
  (c) immediately remove or stop using any material for which the Franchisor 
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has revoked approval; and 
  (d) advertise at its cost (with other franchisees if requested) in such business 
directories as the Franchisor may prescribe. 
F4 
 
Franchisor on behalf of its franchisees will establish an advertising fund to 
cover the costs of carrying out such advertising, promotion and/or marketing as 
the Franchisor decided, in its sole discretion, to be appropriate or desirable to 
promote the System. 
F5 
 
You agree to participate in any national advertising campaign or national 
promotion that we undertake….Whilst we will consult you regarding major 
elements of our advertising and promotion, all decisions relating to this 
advertising and promotion will be made by us and you will be bound by these 
decisions…You will pay us the marketing levy… we are not responsible for the 
effectiveness or success of such advertising, promotion or marketing 
expenditure… you will take part in special advertising and promotional 
activities reasonably required by us… 
F6 
 
 Franchisor will provide product and promotional advice from time to time. 
The Franchisee will actively and diligently promote the Franchised Operation. 
F7 
 
The Franchisor must use its reasonable endeavours to promote the Network. 
F8 
 
The Licencee shall be solely responsible for the cost of advertising or 
marketing initiated by the Licencee but such advertising and marketing must be 
approved in writing by the Licensor prior to its initiation and all advertising and 
marketing conducted by the Licensor shall be paid for by the Licensor. 
 
The Licensor may formulate and implement advertising and promotional 
programs from time to time as determined by it in respect to Services and 
Products to the Licenced Operation. The Licensor shall conduct those 
advertising campaigns and other promotional activities for the Services and 
Products offered to the public through both licensor and the Licencee. 
F9 
 
The Franchisor hereby covenants and agrees to 
(…) 
assist the Franchisee with advertising and promotions from time to time when 
requested, and to supply the Franchisee with advertising or promotional 
material if and when available; 
 
The Franchisee hereby covenants and agrees at its own expense, to do and/or 
perform each of the following: 
(…)  
the Franchisee shall expend annually on local advertising and promotion of the 
Business, a minimum amount equal to such amount as may be required to be 
expended under the Lease. Subject to the right of the Franchisor at any time to 
require the Franchisee to submit all advertising and promotions to be used by 
the Franchisee to it for prior approval, the Franchisee shall have the right to 
conduct such advertising and promotions in connection with the Business, as 
the Franchisee in its reasonable discretion so desires, provided that any 
advertising and promotions,  
(i) shall be conducted only in a manner reflecting favourably upon the Business, 
and the Franchisor,  
(ii) shall not be deceptive, untrue or otherwise misleading in any way,  
(iii) shall use the Trademark only in its proper form and  
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(iv) shall not be inconsistent with the quality and general over-all advertising 
and promotional campaigns being used in connection with the Franchisor 
System.  
If the Franchisor in its sole discretion determines that the advertising and/or 
promotions being employed by the Franchisee do not comply with any of the 
foregoing provisos, the Franchisee shall cease forthwith all use of such 
advertising and/or promotions. Further, notwithstanding the foregoing,  
(i) if the aforesaid provisos are not being complied with, or  
(ii) if such advertising and/or promotions are in the opinion of the Franchisor, 
detrimentally affecting the business in any manner of another franchisee' of the 
Franchisor, or of the Franchisor itself, or  
(iii) if for any reason the Franchisor desires to conduct the local advertising 
and/or promotions of the Franchisee, the Franchisor shall have the right at any 
time in consultation with the Franchisee to conduct all advertising and/or 
promotions being conducted or to be conducted by the Franchisee, on behalf of 
and at the expense of the Franchisee; in conducting any such advertising and/or 
promotions on behalf of the Franchisee, the Franchisor may carry out same 
solely for the benefit of the Business and/or in co-operation with advertising 
and/or promotions being conducted by the Franchisor for its own retail sales 
outlets and/or advertising and/or promotions being conducted by others who 
operate retail sales outlets using the Franchisor System and the Trademark, 
provided in the latter 2 instances such advertising and/or promotions shall be 
conducted in either the Franchisee's direct market area and/or the Franchisee's 
appropriate regional market area as determined by the Franchisor in 
consultation with the Franchisee;  
with respect to payment for such advertising and/or promotions, if the 
Franchisor so exercises this right, the Franchisee shall pay to the Franchisor 
monthly, in advance, together with the royalty fee payable pursuant to clause 
3.1 (2) hereof, an amount equal to such amount as the Franchisor in 
consultation with the Franchisee determines is, to be spent to conduct such 
advertising and/or promotions for the subsequent month;  
the manner, media and cost of such advertising and/or promotions shall be 
solely within the discretion of the Franchisor;  
for providing the foregoing services, the Franchisor shall be entitled to receive 
an administration fee equal to 150/0 (sic) of the amount in fact expended in 
connection with such advertising and/or promotions, as well as to be 
reimbursed for all disbursements incurred by it;  
all amounts so collected as provided above (less amounts payable for the 
administration fee and disbursements) shall be used in connection with 
advertising and/or promotions;  
no later than 21 days after each calendar quarter in which the Franchisor has so 
conducted such advertising and/or promotions, the Franchisor shall give to the 
Franchisee a statement setting out particulars as to the expenditures of the 
amounts so paid by the Franchisee pursuant hereto. 
 
(15)  in addition to the advertising and promotions to be conducted as set 
forth in subclause (14) above, the Franchisor shall have the right at any time as 
it shall determine, to levy upon the Franchisee a national advertising and/or 
promotional appropriation equal in amount to 1% per annum of the Franchisee's 
Gross Revenue. In the event the Franchisor so exercises this right, the 
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Franchisee shall pay to the Franchisor monthly, in advance, together with the 
royalty fee payable pursuant to clause 3.1 (2) hereof, an amount equal to 1%, of 
the Franchisee's Gross Revenue for the immediately preceding month. The 
manner, media and cost of such advertising and/or promotions shall be solely 
within the discretion of the Franchisor. For the services provided by the 
Franchisor herein, the Franchisor shall be entitled to receive an administration 
fee equal to 15% of the amount in fact expended in connection with such 
advertising and/or promotions, as well as to be reimbursed for all disbursements 
incurred by it. All amounts so collected (less amounts payable for the 
administration fee and disbursements) shall be used in connection with such 
national advertising and/or promotions. No later than 3 months after the end of 
each calendar year in which the Franchisor has so conducted such advertising 
and/or promotions, the Franchisor shall give to the Franchisee a statement 
setting out particulars as to the expenditures of the amounts so paid by the 
Franchisee pursuant hereto; … 
 
F10 
 
The Regional Franchisor must apply the monthly Advertising Fee for the 
purpose of advertising and promoting the Franchise Businesses and for 
the mutual benefit of that Franchise Business and such other Franchise 
Businesses associated with the National Franchisor within the Region 
(including purchasing goodwill) as the Regional Franchisor may in its 
absolute discretion decide. 
 
The Regional Franchisor agrees to prepare and provide financial statements 
relating to the Advertising Fee for the preceding Financial Year and to provide 
same to the Franchisee upon request.  
F10 
 
The Franchisor must apply the monthly Advertising Fee to finding work for 
Franchisees in the Region. Each Franchisee should receive an account of 
advertising income and spending within sixty days of the end of the financial 
year.  
 
The Franchisor will make reasonable efforts to find the Franchisee client leads, 
and to spend the Advertising Contribution in an effective manner. 
Franchisees should be regularly consulted on the spending of the 
Advertising Fee, though the Franchisor has the final say. 
F11 
 
Franchisor will conduct any advertising it considers appropriate from time to 
time at its expense.  
The franchisee will not be required to contribute to a central advertising fund. 
Franchisor may elect to conduct advertising to which the franchisee may be 
requested to contribute to the cost of conducting. The parties must agree on the 
franchisee’s share of the costs before the promotional activities are conducted. 
The franchisee must actively promote its Business as required by the Tool Kit. 
Restriction on Advertising –  
Without limiting clause 9.3, for each advertisement or promotional activity, the 
franchisee must: 
(a) first obtain Franchisor’ written approval; 
(b) not use any Mark without the prior approval of Franchisor; 
(c) not engage in any activity or commit any act which is likely to jeopardize 
the reputation of Franchisor’ Business in any way; 
(d) indemnify Franchisor against any loss or damage to any Mark by reason of 
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its use other than as set out in this Agreement and the directions or consents of 
Franchisor; and 
(e) not advertise or promote its Business outside Australia without the consent 
of Franchisor. 
 
Marketing Plan –  
Each year, within one (1) month of the anniversary of the Commencement 
Date, the franchisee must prepare and give to Franchisor its Marketing Plan for 
approval by Franchisor. If Franchisor does not approve the plan, it will meet 
with the franchisee as soon as it can after receipt of a Marketing Plan to discuss 
and finalise variations to the Marketing Plan so that it can be implemented by 
the franchisee as soon as possible.   
F12 
 
7 Advertising 
7.1.1.2 The Franchisee may conduct such marketing, advertising or promotion 
as it considers reasonably necessary in the conduct of the Business provided 
that such marketing or promotion complies with all relevant laws and has first 
been approved by the Franchisor. 
7.1.1.3 The Franchisor may from time to time conduct marketing or advertising 
campaigns, but is under no obligation to do so. The Franchisor may require the 
Franchisee to contribute to the cost of such campaign, provided that: 
7.1.1.3.1 The Franchisee may reasonably be expected to receive some direct or 
indirect benefit from the campaign; and 
7.1.1.3.2 if more than one Franchisee is asked to contribute, the contribution is 
equal as between the Franchisees. The Franchisee must: 
7.1.1.3.3 Participate in all promotions the Franchisor reasonably requires; 
7.1.1.3.4 Comply with all reasonable directions of the Franchisor about 
advertising, marketing and promotions; 
7.1.1.3.6 Not provide any Products or Services being advertised by the 
Franchisor at prices higher than the prices advertised. 
F13 
 
 
 
 
Franchisor must provide franchisee with advice and information to promote and 
market the products. 
… 
Franchisor must arrange advertising campaigns and other promotional activities 
for the products and services offered to the public and use advertising 
contributions made by you and other franchisees in the campaign. 
F14 
 
We will market the Business and products sold by our franchisees in such 
manner as we see fit. This may include: 
     (1) a national or local advertising campaign; 
     (2) promotions and displays at locations we choose; 
     (3) sponsorship of events or persons with high profile; 
All expenses incurred by us in connection with marketing and promotion will 
be funded by advertising contributions paid by you and other franchisees 
F15 
 
4.1  Franchisor Covenants. The Franchisor covenants and agrees with the 
Franchisee, as follows:    … 
(d)  Marketing. To apply all Marketing Contributions received from 
Franchisees to the National Marketing Fund which will be applied towards 
Marketing; 
 … 
The Franchisor has established a separate bank account known as the National 
Marketing Fund and shall operate this account to pay the costs of Marketing in 
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such manner as the Franchisor, in its sole discretion, deems appropriate … 
 
Marketing Contribution. The Franchisee shall pay the Marketing Contribution 
to the Franchisor for deposit into the nominated National Marketing Fund bank 
account. The Marketing Contribution shall be paid by the Franchisee by the 
first Friday following the end of each Accounting Week.  
 
All Marketing Contributions shall be exclusively used for Marketing including 
such agency fees and reasonable overhead and administrative costs as the 
Franchisor may incur in connection with the administration of the National 
Marketing Fund. 
 
The Franchisee acknowledges and agrees that the total of all marketing 
contributions from all Franchisees to the National Marketing Fund need not be 
spent in the year in which the contributions are received, and that a reasonable 
reserve may be accumulated in the National Marketing Fund, and further 
acknowledges that upon the termination of this Agreement it shall not be 
entitled to claim any part of the monies standing in the National Marketing 
Fund. 
 
The Franchisee acknowledges that the Franchisor is entitled to administer the 
National Marketing Fund as it deems appropriate and is not obliged to expend a 
proportionate part of the Marketing Contributions in any area or on behalf of 
any particular Franchisee or territory provided that the Franchisor will use its 
best endeavours to ensure that all franchised territories are given good 
marketing coverage. The Franchisor will not invest any Marketing 
Contributions in any prescribed interest or invest or lend these contributions to 
the Franchisor or any company related to it. 
F16 
 
Advertising seems to be the obligation of the Franchisee rather than the 
Franchisor, i.e. - 
The Master Franchisee must at all times actively and diligently develop and 
promote the Franchisor’   Franchise in the Master Franchise Area specified in 
Schedule 5. 
F17 
 
We will set up and keep a marketing fund by opening a separate, general 
business account called "Franchisor Marketing Fund" or another name 
chosen by us. This account will not be a trust account. You have no 
control over the way we use the marketing fund.  
 
We will deposit the marketing levies into the marketing fund and keep records 
about the marketing fund.  
 
During the franchise term, we may control, manage, spend, use or apply the 
marketing fund for any purpose we see fit… 
  
   You and your associates agree that:  
• the marketing fund can be used to improve and promote public 
recognition and acceptance of the trade marks;  
• money in the marketing fund need not be spent nor committed in the 
year in which it is received;  
• we may if we consider it appropriate accumulate a reasonable 
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reserve of money in the marketing fund. methods of allocating the 
use of marketing levies between Franchisor stores may vary and 
may not be the best nor fairest use of the marketing fund;  
• we will solely decide as to creative form, content, endorsement and 
media use, type and nature of all advertising, marketing and 
promotions to be undertaken and relevant budgets with respect to 
them.  
 
During the franchise term, we do not have to:  
• consult with you about the advertising or marketing plan to be 
adopted by us;  
• give you a refund from the marketing fund even if we do not spend 
all of the money in the marketing fund;  
• invest the money in the marketing fund;  
• make the benefits you or anyone else get from the marketing fund 
equal or proportionate to the marketing levies you or anyone else 
have paid into the marketing fund;  
• make sure that you or your business benefits directly from use of the 
marketing fund,  
 
During the franchise term, we may:  
• control how the trade names and trade marks are used by you in 
connection with any marketing, advertising or promotions;  
• decide when and how to use the marketing fund between Franchisor 
stores;  
• choose the areas that are to be covered by any marketing, 
advertising or promotions: and  
• delay or waive the collection of marketing levies from anyone or 
more of our franchisees or anyone else.  
 
We will keep separate accounts with respect to the marketing fund and at your 
request, within 6 months after the end of each tax year during the 
franchise term, provide you with reasonable accounting details about the 
money received and spent in connection with the marketing fund.  
… 
You and your associates agree that we will own, maintain and control a 
database of the Franchisor VIP customers and members. We may use that 
database in any way we see fit. 
F18 
 
Franchisor will not engage in any direct marketing specifically targeted at the 
Franchise Owner's Clients.  
 
Franchisor will not use for direct marketing any database of the Franchise 
Owner's.  
 
The Franchise Owner acknowledges and accepts that Franchisor has, and will 
continue to develop, many databases. Where any direct marketing by 
Franchisor is proposed using any database which it is foreseeable may contain 
Clients of the Franchise Owner, Franchisor will consult with the elected 
representatives of the Franchise Owner, currently the Franchisor Franchise 
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Trust, and will develop procedures to ensure the interests of the Franchise 
Owners are considered in all marketing initiatives.  
 
For the purposes of clauses 3.6 to 3.9, "direct marketing" means marketing to 
an individual or group and does not include media advertising or promotions or 
any marketing to the public.  
 
Responsibilities of Franchisor 
Franchisor will during the Term, build a strong Franchisor brand awareness 
relevant to the Approved Products and the Approved Services.  
 
Marketing, Advertising and Promotions 
The Franchise Owner shall be responsible for the advertising, marketing and 
promotion of the Franchised Business. 
 
Marketing and Business Plan –  
The Franchise Owner shall be responsible to achieve the advertising, marketing 
and promotional objectives and carry out the strategies and activities described 
in the Marketing and Business Plan in a manner consistent with the overall 
strategies set by Franchisor. 
… 
Franchisor Marketing of Brand - Franchisor shall market the Approved 
Products, the Approved Services and the Franchisor brand so as to build strong 
brand awareness. 
F19 
 
During the Term the Company will: 
(1)  use all reasonable efforts to protect the Retail Brand, its image and 
reputation and promote public awareness of the Retail Brand; 
(2)  undertake retail promotions as gazetted in the promotional calendar 
communicated to the Member at the commencement of the promotional year 
and as amended by the Company from time to time; 
(3)  undertake to advise the Member of participation or involvement in any 
public relations activity and media programs which may from time to time 
include, without limitation, television, radio, or print media; 
(4)  prepare and distribute from time to time a newsletter containing 
information about the Retail Brand marketing systems, programs, pharmacies, 
activities, products and services; 
(5)  at least once each year, provide an opportunity for the Member to meet 
other licenced users of the Retail Brand and discuss as a group the activities and 
programs associated with the Retail Brand; 
(6)  develop and offer to the Member programs to encourage consumer 
loyalty as detailed in the Program Guidelines; 
(7)  from time to time, provide promotional merchandising materials for use 
by the Member at the Location, as detailed in the Program Guidelines. 
 
Discussion of results  
Most contracts state here or elsewhere a franchisee’s obligation to pay into a 
marketing fund to be administered by a franchisor. The schedules for these amounts 
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are often contained in other documents, but the F9 contract states that in addition to 
the amounts a franchisee must pay for local advertising, it must pay a percentage into 
the national fund along with a 15% administration fee to the franchisor. 
Eight of the contracts sampled, F2,F4, F7, F11, F15, F17, F18, and F19, list 
franchisor obligations regarding promotion by stating that the franchisor ‘shall’, ‘will’ 
or ‘must’ engage in some promotions or brand maintenance but every one of these 
contracts qualifies this obligation, according discretion to a franchisor with 
permissive language to the effect that a franchisor may engage in advertising and 
promotion as it determines to be ‘reasonably necessary’ (F2), ‘as it deems 
appropriate’ (F11), or it will apply reasonable endeavours or efforts (F7, F19).    F8, 
and F12 state that the franchisor may advertise, as it considers reasonably necessary 
(F12). 
F4, F15 and F17 state that the franchisor will set up or administer a marketing fund. 
F10 states that the franchisor will apply the franchisees’ advertising fees to 
promotions.  F2, F9 and F13 state that the franchisor will advise or assist franchisees 
with promotions, but qualified with language such as ‘if and when available’ (F9).  F2 
states that it will be entitled to reimbursement and may delegate this function and 
require a franchisee to pay all costs.   
Franchisor obligation in this contract term is stated in vague terms and/or is subject to 
a franchisor’s discretion, ‘…the manner and style of advertising and promotion 
together with their frequency will be determined in the absolute discretion of the 
Franchisor.’521 A franchisor’s discretion may include the ability to delegate the 
function; a franchisor may administer the program directly or set up trust or 
corporation to administer.522    
Also, this clause does not ensure adequate investment by a franchisor in brand 
maintenance, as the following two excerpts illustrate:  ‘… the Franchisor may 
determine in its discretion how the Marketing Fund is spent’523 and ‘…the Franchisor 
operates that account for the purposes of and to pay for the costs of developing, 
publishing, operating and administering, advertising, public relations and promotional 
                                                 
521 System F2. 
522 System F2’s contract expressly allows a franchisor to delegate advertising responsibilities.    
523 System F7. 
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material and programmes in such manner as the Franchisor in its sole discretion 
deems appropriate for the benefit of the Franchise System, the Franchisee and all 
other franchisees.’524 
If a franchisor’s circumstances are such that promoting the brand becomes a lower 
priority, either for a franchisee’s territory or for the entire franchise system, a 
franchisee has little recourse. If a franchisor is rapidly expanding, for example, or if a 
franchisor is in a cost-cutting phase, a franchisee may lose franchisor brand 
support.525   
This clause could be presented to a prospective franchisee as offering protection 
against franchisor opportunism, such as inadequate investment by a franchisor in 
promotion, but given the level of discretion with which such clauses are qualified, the 
practical effect is that they offer maximum latitude to franchisors with little protection 
or assurance to franchisees.  In fact, several contracts (See F15 and F17) expressly 
provide that a franchisor has no obligation to spend the funds, and the franchisee 
nevertheless has no claim to these funds. 
On balance these clauses delegate to a franchisor maximum latitude with minimum 
obligation (see Table 5.9)   Some discretion is necessary because at the time the 
contract is signed, no one knows what sorts of promotions will be required.  Because a 
franchisor’s interests are not coterminous with those of its franchisees, however, 
franchisees’ total lack of control in this function can reinforce franchisee uncertainty 
and compound franchisee vulnerability to franchisor opportunism.   
                                                 
524 System F2. 
525 Telephone interview with Nick Heys, National Manager, Franchising and Small Business, 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2004). 
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Case law 
In Mark Clifford and Ors v Eagle Boys Dial-A-Pizza Australia Pty Ltd,526 the 
franchisee owned two pizza operations, and decided to join Eagle Boys. The 
franchisee also took over some franchise operations from other Eagle Boys 
franchisees.  Tension developed between the franchisor and the franchisee in a 
number of areas including advertising and marketing activities.  The franchisee 
claimed that the amounts expended by the franchisor and the nature of the 
expenditures were inadequate, rendering the agreement unfair.527  The court held that 
the applicants did establish unfairness. 
In Sunice v Wendy's Supa Sundaes and Anor,528 the plaintiff, a franchisee, sought 
summons for all advertising money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, as the 
plaintiff was dissatisfied with promotional proposals and a change in direction of 
franchised shops proposed by the master franchisor. The court ordered mediation, as 
the most recent franchise agreement provided for dispute resolution.  Because the 
results of mediation are confidential, the disposition of this case is not known. 
                                                 
526 Mark Clifford and Ors v Eagle Boys Dial-A-Pizza Australia Pty Ltd [2000] NSWIRComm 30.  
527 Other issues included Section 106 Industrial Relations Act, unfairness brought by applicants with 
respect to franchise agreements, the pricing scheme. 
528 Sunice v Wendy's Supa Sundaes and Anor [1998] QSC 223. 
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Direct intervention in franchisor advertising 
A franchisor’s obligations with respect to brand maintenance are regulated 
exclusively through disclosure and reporting requirements.  These are contained in 
Disclosure Item 12 and Sub-Clause 17, which are reproduced here: 
 
FCC Disclosure Item 12: Marketing or other cooperative funds 
12.1 For each marketing or other cooperative fund, controlled or administered 
by or for the franchisor, to which the franchisee may be required to contribute, 
the following details: 
(a) the kinds of persons who contribute to the fund (for example, franchisee, 
franchisor, outside supplier); 
(b) whether the franchisor must contribute to the fund in relation to businesses 
owned or operated by the franchisor that are substantially the same as the 
franchised business and, if so, whether the contribution is worked out in the 
same way as for a franchisee; 
(c) how much the franchisee must contribute to the fund and whether other 
franchisees must contribute at a different rate; 
(d) who controls or administers the fund; 
(e) whether the fund is audited and, if so, by whom and when; 
(f) whether the fund’s financial statements can be inspected by, or will be 
given to, franchisees; 
(g) the kinds of expense for which the fund may be used; 
(h) the fund’s expenses for the last financial year, including the percentage 
spent on production, advertising, administration and other stated expenses; 
(i) whether the franchisor or its associates supply goods or services for which 
the fund pays and, if so, details of the goods or services; 
(j) whether the franchisor must spend part of the fund on marketing, 
advertising or promoting the franchisee’s business. 
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This financial disclosure does nothing to prevent the franchisor from exercising to its 
fullest extent the discretion accorded to it in the contract term.  There is no franchisor 
obligation to balance the interests of franchisees against its own in making advertising 
decisions and expenditures, even though these expenditures are funded by franchisees.  
Disclosure required under Clause 17 allows franchisees to inform themselves about a 
franchisor’s activities in this area, but the burden is still on franchisees to do this, and, 
if necessary, to prove that a franchisor’s expenditures are not being made reasonably.  
This will be made more difficult by the fact that a franchisor has discretion or absolute 
discretion and often no obligation to spend the funds. 
FCC Sub-clause 17  
17 Marketing and other cooperative funds 
(1) If a franchise agreement provides that a franchisee must pay money to a 
marketing or other cooperative fund, the franchisor must: 
(a) within 3 months after the end of the last financial year, prepare an annual 
financial statement of the fund’s receipts and expenses for the last financial 
year, including the amount spent on production, advertising, administration, 
goods or services supplied by the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor 
and other stated expenses; and 
(b) have the statement audited by a registered company auditor within 3 
months after the end of the financial year to which it relates; and 
(c) if the franchisee asks, in writing, for a copy of the statement — give a copy 
of the statement to the franchisee within 30 days after the request. 
(2) However, a franchisor does not have to comply with paragraph (1) (b) for 
the financial year if 75% of the franchisor’s franchisees in Australia, who 
contribute to the fund, agree. 
(3) A franchisor is taken to have complied with paragraph 12.1 (h) of 
Annexure 1 if, to the extent to which the franchisor is aware of the details, the 
franchisor supplies the following information for the period before 1 July 1998 
to the franchisee: 
(a) the amounts of expenditure on production, advertising, administration and 
any other category of expenditure stated in the disclosure document for each 
marketing or other cooperative fund controlled or administered by or for the 
franchisor to which the franchisee may be required to contribute;  
(b) the percentage that each amount disclosed in accordance with paragraph 
(a) constitutes of the total expenditure disclosed in accordance with that 
paragraph. 
(4) If a franchise agreement provides that a franchisee must pay money to a 
marketing or other cooperative fund, the reasonable costs of administering and 
auditing the fund must be paid from the fund. 
 218
The 2006 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct 
made the following recommendation:  
The annual financial statement of marketing or other co-operative funds, 
receipts and expenses prepared pursuant to clause 17 of the Code be subject to 
compulsory annual audit by a registered company auditor.529  
 
The Government in response stated that it would require that the Code be amended to 
provide that franchisees are provided with a full account of these funds and with the 
auditor's reports.530  This measure fails to address the franchisor/franchisee conflicts 
of interest in the way the funds are spent in promotion, which is still left entirely to 
franchisor discretion.  
Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
franchisor promotions 
A franchisor has discretion, often absolute discretion to spend or not to spend 
franchisee funds for promotions. Since their interests are not the same as a 
franchisor’s, franchisees need some protections.  Substantive requirements would be 
useful but, due to the relational nature of the contract and the need for discretion, 
these may not be possible. If a franchisor cannot be held to specific obligations over 
the long term, to ensure its legitimate interest in discretion in promotional decision-
making, then procedures may help to ensure proper consideration of the interests of a 
franchisee.   
Given the importance of a franchisor’s obligation to maintain the brand, franchisees 
might want to negotiate performance or procedural standards to ensure that they can  
monitor and enforce the term.  To enhance certainty a franchisee might want to ensure 
prudent administration of the fund that serves the interests of both franchisors and 
franchisees; potential measures could include a substantive provision outlining 
specific franchisor obligations or warranties regarding advertising.  The question here 
                                                 
529 The Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-
F60A-CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007 Recommendation 6:  Auditing of marketing and other 
co-operative funds.  
530 See the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007 and the Australian Government Response to the Review of the 
Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
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is whether a franchisor will in fact offer any such assurances, or whether it will only 
be possible to secure from it some caveats, such as a detailed explanation of the scope 
of a franchisor’s discretion in undertaking its own marketing efforts and how these 
may be in conflict with the interests of the individual franchisee or franchisees 
collectively. 
The advertising and promotions function presents another instance where consultative 
processes could enhance certainty.  Franchisee participation in promotions can help 
ensure that a franchisor is performing. The contract might include assurances of 
franchisee inclusion in decision-making processes and/or required involvement of the 
Franchisee Advisory Council (FAC).  Such measures could ensure quality of 
franchisors efforts, and could also help limit a franchisor’s liability in case of 
problems with promotions.  Legal counsel for franchisors themselves suggest some 
franchisee participation (though never a veto power).531 
                                                 
531 E-Mail to listserv Sept 2005 from David E. Holmes, Holmes and Lofstrom, LLP,  
D.Holmes@HolmesLofstrom.com 
<http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0509&L=franchising&P=R21578&I=-3> at 30 
December 2005. 
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5.6 CONTRACT TERM:  SUPPLY  
Supply requirements allow a franchisor to control franchisees’ use of sub-standard 
products and free-riding on the quality of product in other units, as well as to provide 
for approved suppliers, and to maintain levels of stock.  In the name of uniformity and 
brand maintenance, a franchisor exercises control over supply and can impose 
changes unilaterally.  A franchisee must follow a franchisor’s requirements. 
Supply requirements vary with the type of franchise business.  Franchises that involve 
sales of products often involve supply and product-tying requirements where any 
variation by a franchisee is subject to franchisor approval.532  A franchisor may be a 
supplier or one of several approved suppliers, and will negotiate supply and 
distribution contracts to which it may require franchisees to commit to certain levels 
of purchases, regardless of whether local conditions warrant such levels.533   
Here again a franchisor’s legitimate need to preserve uniformity creates risks to a 
franchisee.  A franchisor can require a franchisee to supply from a franchisor, which 
sets prices and controls quality so that a franchisor’s product purchase requirements 
can erode franchisee profit margins.  Tying franchisees to vendors reduces franchisee 
flexibility in supply, threatens competition and can cause franchisees to have to pay 
higher prices, thus reducing franchisee profit margins.  Thus, if franchisees must 
purchase products solely from a franchisor, or from suppliers designated by a 
franchisor, the determination of a franchisee’s gross margin lies in the hands of a 
franchisor.534    
Supply requirements also pose a risk where there may be secret rebates to franchisors.  
Kickbacks, promotional fees and commissions paid to franchisor reduce franchisee 
profit margins.535  A franchisor has discretion to require a franchisee to purchase from 
a supplier whose products are more expensive, but who pays a franchisor a 
                                                 
532 Antony W. Dnes, ‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 Journal of Legal 
Studies 367, 393. 
533  <http://www.tfsa.info/consider.htm at 15 February 2005. 
534 E-mail from David Newton, 10 Feb 2003.  The particular concerns here involve quality, price or 
delivery time of goods. 
535 The Problems Franchisees Face (2003) American Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchisee.org/Buying%20a%20Franchise.htm#problem> at 9 December 2006. 
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commission.   Some franchise contracts expressly protect a franchisor’s right to make 
deals with franchisee suppliers.  
 
Table 5.6: Summary of Supply Terms in Contracts under Review 
Franchise 
system 
Supply 
F1 Franchisee shall maintain in sufficient supply, and use and/or sell at all times, 
only such Products and Supplies as meet (franchisor) standards and 
specifications (Franchisee shall not deviate without franchisor’s prior written 
consent) and as are expressly approved for use and/or sale in writing by 
franchisor. The Franchisee shall sell or offer for sale all types of Products and 
services specified by Franchisor 
F2  franchisee only sells approved products, other suppliers as approved by 
franchisor 
F3 According to franchisee’s terms and conditions 
 
The Franchisee acknowledges that any goods supplied by the Franchisor to the 
Franchisee are supplied in accordance with the Franchisor's terms and 
conditions for supply of goods current at the time of supply 
F4 Franchisee must only prepare, supply, deliver and sell only the full range of 
products.  Franchisee must take all measures necessary to obtain appropriate 
authorization. 
F5 Merchandise 
S. 65: You are liable for the cost of purchasing your merchandise. 
S. 66: You agree to: 
  (a) remove at our request any merchandise which does not, in our opinion, 
meet our standards. 
  (b) make available for sale from the premises at least the minimum product 
range that we determine should be stocked by our franchisees generally. 
  (c) Have on hand at least the minimum stock levels deemed appropriate by us 
for a store of your size and turnover from time to time. 
  (d) display and sell only authorised products. 
S.67: You must: 
display the merchandise for sale in accordance with our specifications from 
time to time. 
remove from display any damaged or soiled merchandise. 
F6 Purchase only from Franchisor or approved suppliers. 
Franchisee must: 
purchase all quantities of the Approved Ingredients used for the preparation of 
Authorised Products  sold or offered or advertised for sale in or from the 
Premises from Franchisor or its approved suppliers provided that  in the 
event that at any time or from time to time  franchisor or its approved 
suppliers are unable to supply the Franchisee (except where the 
Franchisee is in breach of this Deed or any of the payment and delivery 
terms and conditions) with such quantity or quantities or such flavour or 
flavours of the Approved Ingredients as the Franchisee may reasonably 
require,  Franchisor may (in its absolute discretion but entirely without 
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being obliged to) substitute other Approved Ingredients for the period of 
the shortage or permit the Franchisee to acquire such quantity or 
quantities of the Approved Ingredients from any alternative supplier 
approved by Franchisor, but only to the extent to which and for the 
period during which  Franchisor or its approved supplier, is unable to 
supply the Franchisee (and the Franchisee acknowledges that  
Franchisor has the right at anytime to discontinue, substitute, alter, 
change packaging, or add to the range of Approved Ingredients). 
•  
(b)maintain in the Premises such minimum quantity or level of the Approved 
Ingredients as  Franchisor may from time to time specify; 
purchase sufficient quantities of the Approved Ingredients to enable the 
Authorised Products to be prepared and sold or offered or advertised for sale in 
or from the  Premises or stocked or stored in the  Premises, to meet the demand 
for the Authorised Products; and purchase all quantities of the Approved 
Ingredients required for use in the  Premises, from  Franchisor or its approved 
suppliers 
F7 The Franchisee must purchase all of the Special Products and Approved 
Products …only from Approved Suppliers on the written terms and conditions 
specified by those suppliers. 
If the Franchisee wishes to use a supplier of Special Products or Approved 
Products who is not an Approved Supplier, the Franchisee must obtain the 
Franchisor’s written consent.  This consent must not be unreasonably withheld 
if the Franchisee: 
- gives the Franchisor written notice of the nature and quantity of the products 
or services that the Franchisee is seeking to purchase; the name and address of 
the proposed supplier; and the price per unit that will be charged by the 
proposed supplier for the product or service; delivers to the Franchisor a sample 
of the product or service that the proposed supplier will provide; provides a 
written statement from the proposed supplier of the period that those prices will 
be fixed; and the terms and conditions of supply; satisfies the Franchisor that 
the proposed supplier is able to maintain a continuity of supply of the product 
or service; and satisfies the Franchisor that the product or service meets the 
criteria set out in clause  Franchisor’s Response 
If the Franchisor’s approval is sought… the Franchisor must advise the 
Franchisee of its decision within a reasonable time. 
Franchisee must not offer, sell or supply any food or beverages that are not 
specified on the Menu, unless the Franchisee first obtains the Franchisor’s 
written consent. 
F8 
 
Maintain Stock – The Licencee shall ensure that the Licenced Operation has 
sufficient Products and so arrange the Licencee’s affairs to meet the 
specifications of the Licensor and market demand. 
 
3.46 Use Approved Products – The Licencee shall only stock Products and 
brands of Products approved and promoted by the Licensor and such 
Products purchased from the Licensor (but only to the extent that it is 
lawful to oblige the Licencee to do so without breaching the provisions 
and trade practices legislation relevant to the Territory of the Licenced 
Operation) if available from the Licensor. If such Products are not 
available, the Licencee shall purchase those Products from suppliers 
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approved of by the Licensor (“Approved Suppliers”). 
F9 
 
(16)  the Franchisee acknowledges that it is in the interests of the Franchisee, 
the Franchisor and all other franchisees of the Franchisor that the uniform 
standards of the Franchisor System be adhered to. Accordingly, the Franchisee 
agrees to sell, handle, dispense or otherwise deal in only those Products and 
perform only such services as may be associated with the Franchisor System 
and specified by the Franchisor from time to time. The Franchisee further 
agrees to purchase all Products to be sold, handled, dispensed or otherwise dealt 
in with respect to the operation of the Business only 
(a) from the Franchisor, or 
(b) from suppliers (who may include affiliates of the Franchisor) which the 
Franchisor has advised the Franchisee have been approved by; or 
(c)from suppliers nominated by the Franchisee that the Franchisor has advised 
the Franchisee satisfy the quality standards set by Franchisor. 
 
(17) whenever reasonably possible, to offer the Products for sale to the 
public at such prices as the Franchisor may reasonably suggest from time to 
time; provided it is agreed, the Franchisee is under no obligation to accept such 
suggested prices and the Franchisee will not suffer in its business relations with 
the Franchisor if it does not offer the Products at the suggested prices; however, 
prior to varying the suggested prices, the Franchisee agrees to consider the 
effect of such variance on its sales and its profits, and generally the detrimental 
effect, if any, to the sales and profits of other franchisees of the Franchisor, and 
to the Franchisor System; 
F10 No supply requirements – mobile service. 
F10 Not stated. 
F11 
 
The franchisee must comply with the service standards set out in the Tool Kit. 
The franchisee must only provide Services approved by franchisor 
F12 
 
The Franchisee must participate in any business systems, techniques, initiatives, 
programmes, computer facilities and other facilities (“the facilities”) the 
Franchisor thinks necessary. 
F13 
 
you must purchase all the products from  Franchisor  or through  Franchisor ; 
and if  Franchisor  or its suppliers are unable to supply all or part of an order for 
product within 14 days of the receipt by  Franchisor  of an order, you may 
acquire through  Franchisor  any outstanding items from on alternative supplier 
approved in writing by  Franchisor  (which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld); and to ensure those items are at least equal to the level of quality 
prescribed by  Franchisor , suitable for the purpose for which they were 
intended, and also for any bar-coding purpose, you must supply and deliver to  
Franchisor  a sample of each product purchased from the alternative supplier in 
(b) above. If  Franchisor  disapproves of the sample, you must not sell products 
represented by the sample 
F14 
 
25. You must not:  
(a) sell any goods from the Business Premises other than those goods falling 
within the National Menu, without our prior written consent;  
(b) sell any goods from the Business Premises other than as a retailer - this 
means that you must not sell goods as a wholesaler or to any person which 
intends on selling the goods to consumers. 
F15 Supplies of Product. The Franchisee agrees that: 
(a) the Franchisee shall stock use and sell only the Products in the 
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Franchised Operation which have been specified by the Franchisor and are 
permitted by the Head-Lease. Under no circumstances shall the Franchisee 
stock, use or sell products other than the Products or those specified by the 
Franchisor and permitted by the Head-Lease. The Franchisee shall sell all 
Products specified from time to time by the Franchisor and that are permitted 
by the Head-Lease;  
(b)  the Franchisor shall source approved recommended suppliers in respect 
of all Products and supplies used in connection with the Franchise from such 
appropriate suppliers that meet the standards for quality, reliability and product 
control as specified by the Franchisor from time to time and as shall be 
approved by the Franchisor. The Franchisee shall acquire all Products and 
supplies only from suppliers who have been approved by the Franchisor, as 
meeting its standards for quality, reliability and product control. Should a 
Franchisee wish to acquire products or supplies from a non-approved supplier it 
must submit all necessary details and samples to the Franchisor or the 
Franchisor for approval; 
(c)  the Franchisor shall be entitled to negotiate and receive a fee from 
suppliers used by Franchisees; 
(d)  it shall use only Franchisor bags, paper goods and packaging of the type 
approved by the Franchisor and bearing the Names and Marks or insignia or 
labels approved by the Franchisor. The Franchisor shall authorise and permit 
manufacturers of bags paper goods and packaging of the type approved by the 
Franchisor to imprint the approved labels, Names and Marks or insignia on 
them and provided further that the imprinted bags, paper goods and packaging 
shall be used exclusively by the Franchisee in connection with the operation 
and conduct of the Franchised Operation and for no other purpose; 
(e)  Products will be supplied by companies associated with the Franchisor 
at prices that reflect the cost of manufacture plus a reasonable mark up but 
otherwise at wholesale cost plus a maximum gross profit margin of 50%; 
(f)  The Franchisor, in its absolute discretion, will determine by notice in 
writing to the Franchisee on a bi-annual basis, the type, quality, range and value 
of Products to be maintained by way of stock levels by the Franchisee in its 
operation of the Business during the Term. 
F16 No specific supply requirements – as this is a mobile service. However some 
standards apply – 
8.6 Approved products and services 
The Master Franchisee must use its best endeavours to ensure that Sub-
Franchisees only use equipment, supplies, products and services which conform 
to the Franchisor’ standards and specifications and as set out in the Franchise 
Agreement and Operations/Marketing Manual. Any list of approved suppliers 
provided to the Master Franchisee will refer to suppliers whose supplies, 
products and services conform to the Franchisor’s quality standards and whose 
prices are competitive. 
F17 
 
During the franchise term, you must make sure that your business:  
offers for sale and sells all approved foods and beverages as stated on the 
Franchisor foods and beverage menus applicable to your business or that are 
otherwise authorised by us; and provides dine-in, takeaway and customer 
services in line with the system standards or as reasonably required by us.  
During the franchise term. you must not offer for sale or sell from the store, 
foods, beverages, goods or services that have not been approved by us for sale 
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from your business.  
 
During the franchise term, you must make sure that in connection with your 
business you use:  
all ingredients, flavourings, garnishments. doughs, spices, foods or beverages, 
cooking materials, containers, packaging materials, paper and plastic goods, 
equipment, menus, forms, cleaning and sanitation materials and other supplies 
that are reasonably approved by us or that comply with the system standards; 
boxes, containers, plastic and paper goods printed with the trade names, trade 
marks or copyright works that form part of the system standards or that we 
reasonably require.  
 
You and your associates agree that:  
it is integral to the system that only approved foods and beverages from 
approved Franchisor food and beverage menus applicable to your business be 
sold or supplied from your business; and some foods, beverages and/or services 
supplied from your business have become linked to or indistinguishable from 
the system, the image, the trade names or trade marks.  
F18 No specific supply requirements. 
F19 
 
Products 
During the Term the Member must:  
(1)  offer for sale at a price not exceeding the price specified by the 
Company in any promotion to customers or the public, any products which are 
the subject of such promotions undertaken by or on behalf of the Company for 
the duration of the promotional period, provided that stocks of such products 
are readily available for purchase from the Company by the member prior to the 
commencement of, and for the duration of, any such promotion… 
 
Discussion of results 
Most contracts in the sample restrict a franchisee’s liberty to supply through the 
conditions, specifications and/or standards of supply set by a franchisor.  Systems F1 
through and including F9 as well as F13, F15 and F17 all require a franchisee to 
supply only what meets franchisor’s standards and specifications, terms and 
conditions, or similar language.  
Some supply clauses refer to franchisor’s specifications with respect to quantity (F5 
and F6).   F2, F6, F7, F9 and F13 also requires that franchisees can only supply from 
the franchisor or approved suppliers.   Some systems (F2, F5, and F17) stipulate that a 
franchisee can only source approved products rather then from approved suppliers. F8 
stipulates both approved products and approved suppliers.   
F6 allows a franchisor to set quantities as well as to require its franchisees to purchase 
from the franchisor or approved suppliers. Thus, the franchisor can say that its 
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franchisee can only buy from the franchisor, in the quantities the franchisor dictates, 
regardless of the franchisee’s requirements.536  
F15 specifically authorizes payments to a franchisor by suppliers of a franchisee, ‘the 
Franchisor shall be entitled to negotiate and receive a fee from suppliers used by 
Franchisees’. 
There appears to be a difference in the importance placed upon supply across 
different types of franchise systems.  In the case of restaurants there was greater 
attention in the contract to the issue of supply (F1, F4, F6, and F7).  In the case of 
retail a franchisor may be less concerned about its role as supplier.  In 
coaching/training, manuals are a revenue source for a franchisor, but not a principal 
source.  In services supply appears less important, but there will still be standards and 
requirements (F10, F11, F16 and F18). 
 
                                                 
536 This is what happened in the Simply No-Knead case. See ACCC v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) 
Pty Ltd [2000]) Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) 
Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1365. 
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Direct intervention in supply 
Supply is regulated by the Code Disclosure Items 9 and 10.  Currently, supply 
requirements as a relationship issue between franchisor and franchisee are regulated 
only through disclosure.537 
  
 
 
                                                 
537 This may be in part due to the role of competition law with respect to this aspect of the contract.  
Supply is dealt with under the competition law provisions of the TPA to regulate the impact of 
franchise systems’ activities on the market.  The drafters of regulation may have felt that supply was 
not a relationship issue, but rather an issue that should be dealt with, if necessary, through competition 
law. 
 
Disclosure Item 9 Supply of goods or services to a franchisee 
9.1 For the franchisor’s requirements for supply of goods or services to a 
franchisee — details of: 
(a) any requirement for the franchisee to maintain a level of inventory or 
acquire an amount of goods or services; and 
(b) restrictions on acquisition of goods or services by the franchisee from other 
sources; and 
(c) ownership by the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor of an interest 
in any supplier from which the franchisee may be required to acquire goods or 
services; and 
(d) the obligation of the franchisee to accept goods or services from the 
franchisor, or from an associate of the franchisor; and 
(e) the franchisor’s obligation to supply goods or services to the franchisee; 
and 
(f) whether the franchisee will be offered the right to be supplied with the 
whole range of the goods or services of the franchise; and 
(g) conditions under which the franchisee can return goods, and to whom; and 
(h) conditions under which the franchisee can obtain a refund for services 
provided by the franchisor, and from whom; and 
(i) whether the franchisor may change the range of goods or services, and if 
so, to what extent; and 
(j) whether the franchisor, or an associate of the franchisor, will receive a 
rebate or other financial benefit from the supply of goods or services to 
franchisees, and whether any rebate or financial benefit is shared, directly or 
indirectly, with franchisees. 
Note Before a requirement is made under paragraph (b) or (c), the franchisor 
may notify, or seek authorisation from, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (see Act, Part VII). 
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The 2006 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct 
recommended, 
‘Item 9.1(j) of Annexure 1 to the Code be extended to include disclosure of the 
amounts or method of calculation of rebates or other financial benefits to the 
franchisor or an associate of the franchisor from the supply of goods or services to 
franchisees.’538 
The government agreed to this extension of disclosure to provide ‘greater 
transparency in the relationships between the participants in franchising.’539  This 
change is good news for franchisees.  Supply is one of many instances where control 
in the hands of a quality franchisor benefits both the system and its franchisees, while 
control by an opportunistic franchisor can create serious problems for franchisees.   
 
Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
supply  
An imbalance of power manifests itself again in this term in the form of control by a 
franchisor over franchisee’s supply.  Power, control and whatever certainty can be had 
reside with the franchisor.  This imbalance is ensured by the contract that allows little 
or no latitude for a franchisee to deviate from franchisor requirements.    
                                                 
538  Item 5 of the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 
2006,  <http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-
F60A-CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
539  Australian Government Response to the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
Disclosure Item 10:  Supply of Goods or Services by a Franchisee 
Details of:  
(a) restrictions on the goods or services that a franchisee may supply; and  
(b) restrictions on the persons to whom a franchisee may supply goods or 
services; and 
(c) whether a franchisee must supply the whole range of the goods or services 
of the franchise. 
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The proposed change to the Code may help to curb franchisor abuse with respect to 
rebates and approved suppliers, but it does not cure these problems entirely, nor does 
it address others, such as a franchisor’s ability to dictate franchisee levels of stock. 
Other measures to enhance certainty and improve balance of power include processes 
for collective participation, in particular measures that allow franchisees to play a role 
in negotiating supply such as procedures for approval of new brands or suppliers to 
ensure franchisor’s reasonable control over price and quality.540  Collective 
participation could also involve franchisee-operated buying cooperative for larger 
systems, along with a franchise contract that authorizes franchisee to shop from 
among several franchisor approved suppliers. Here, too, protection of franchisees 
against uncertainty means that procedures for franchisor approval should be clearly 
specified.541  A franchisor does have a legitimate interest in uniformity, but a 
franchisor’s power must be balanced against the interests of its franchisees, for 
example in their ability to make a reasonable profit. 
 
                                                 
540 American Bar Association Forum on Franchising, Rupert M. Barkoff (Ed), Andrew C. Selden (Ed), 
The Fundamentals of Franchising (1997)  58. 
541 Dairy Queen franchisees in the US formed a purchasing cooperative and recruited new suppliers, 
but the suppliers still needed approval from the franchisor that franchisees say was difficult to obtain. 
See Alexandra Friedman, ‘Ten things your franchiser won’t tell you’, partial reprint from Smart Money 
Magazine.<http://www.zarcolaw.com/CM/News/news46.asp> at 30 December 2005.  
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5.7 CONTRACT TERM:  MINIMUM PERFORMANCE AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
Minimum performance clauses and reporting requirements are used by a franchisor to 
address franchisee free-riding on the performance of others, inaccurate reporting by 
franchisees, and the lack of available high-quality franchisees.  Minimum 
performance clauses help curb franchisee free-riding by ensuring the performance 
levels of each individual franchisee.  A franchisor takes measures to ensure franchisee 
performance through accounting procedures; minimum performance clauses; specific 
benchmarks; reservation of right of inspection,542 and restrictive covenants that may 
require a franchisee to devote its effort exclusively to the operation of the franchise or 
set minimum hours or impose restrictions on passive ownership.  The costs of these 
measures are generally passed on to a franchisee 
A franchisor is vulnerable to a franchisee’s information advantage about the operation 
of the local franchise unit.  A franchisee may be tempted not to provide a franchisor 
with accurate accounts, as this information affects the amount of royalty a franchisee 
must pay, and the attainment of performance targets. Here again, a franchisor and a 
franchisee’s interests diverge.  A franchisor will focus on volume as the most 
important indicator of the franchise unit performance, while a franchisee may be 
more concerned with profit and may be tempted to inflate costs (or a franchisee may 
for some reason lack incentive to control costs).543  To counter its risk due to 
asymmetric knowledge, a franchisor includes contract provisions to help ensure its 
right to information through reporting requirements, periodic reporting/reviews, 
verification methods, and verification procedures.  Franchisor access to a franchisee’s 
business premises and computer systems may also be expressly guaranteed in the 
contract.  Some contracts may allow a franchisor access to all franchisee computers 
and business records, with no qualification that they be related to the franchise 
operation.   Such terms raise concerns over invasion of privacy because they provide 
an unnecessarily broad licence for a franchisor to intrude on a franchisee’s operation. 
                                                 
542 American Bar Association Forum on Franchising, Rupert M. Barkoff and Andrew C. Selden (eds), 
Fundamentals of Franchising (1997) 61-62. 
543  Antony W. Dnes, ‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 Journal of Legal 
Studies 367.  
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Franchisors also rely on these clauses to mitigate problems stemming from poor 
quality of franchisees where there is an inadequate supply of qualified franchisees.  A 
franchisor shifts the risk that a franchisee will fail to each franchisee through its 
ability to terminate if a franchisee does not meet the performance standards. For 
example, if there is an exclusive grant (the territory is usually limited to the 
premises), minimum performance requirements facilitate franchisor’s taking back the 
franchise due to under-performance and so help ensure that a franchisor can 
maximize revenues from the territory.  Such provisions should be considered 
carefully by the prospective franchisee, as they may permit a franchisor to terminate 
the franchise on the basis of unilaterally imposed performance requirements that are 
vague or unfair.   
 
Table 5.7: Summary of Minimum Performance and Reporting Requirements in 
Contracts under Review 
 
Franchise 
system 
FRANCHISEE MINIMUM PERFORMANCE and REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
F1 The Franchisee covenants that, during the term of this Agreement, the 
Franchisee or its designated manager, shall devote full time, energy, and best 
efforts to the management and operation of the Store. 
F2 Franchisee must during the Term conduct the Business in a proper and 
efficient manner…The Franchisee must devote all of its reasonable efforts 
towards the operation and growth of the Business and must not engage in any 
other business without the Franchisor's prior written consent.  The 
Franchisor’s consent will not be unreasonably withheld 
F3 Franchisee must operate according to OM and other directives of franchisee  
Report weekly, quarterly and annually, Submit tax returns, Franchisee pays 
all franchisee costs in connection with agreement except 27.6 costs of dispute. 
The Franchisee must prepare and implement one year firm and three year 
indicative business plan for the conduct of the business including financial 
and non-financial key performance indicators, in a format approved by the 
Franchisor. 
F4 Franchisee must at all times, faithfully, honestly and diligently perform its 
obligations, and must continuously devote its full time, attention and best 
efforts to the operation of the Franchise.  
Franchisee must nominate a senior officer as the nominated manager who is 
responsible for compliance with agreement and supervision. 
Franchisee and manager must exercise best efforts and devote at min. 20 
hours per week to: 
(A) Supervising operation  
(B) promoting and maximising the sales  
(C) Obtaining and maintaining goodwill  
(D) Safeguarding the interests of the Franchisee. 
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Franchisee must at all times ensure that the premises and all equipment meet 
the both the operation manual’s standard as well as appropriate 
standards of design, function, performance and serviceability. 
Franchisee must properly and accurately record its gross sales and report to 
Franchisee. 
F5 You must exercise your best efforts at all times to achieve the highest 
possible level of sales of the authorised products from the premises. We may 
meet with you from time to time to discuss your sales performance. However, 
you shall be responsible for achieving the sales performance at all times and 
we have no responsibility in this regard. 
You must ensure that your gross sales in any 12 month period do not fall 
below the minimum sales level set out in item 18 of the Schedule. 
If your annual gross sales fall below the minimum sales level in any 12 month 
period, the we may notify you of the fact in writing and may in our absolute 
discretion require you to undertake any or all of the following steps at your 
cost: 
  (a) meet with our representative to review your sales performance, 
  (b) attend such meetings or complete such further training sessions as 
required by us,  
  (c) make such changes to the franchise business as we may reasonably 
require 
If, despite attending to the requirements of clause  0, your annual gross sales 
do not increase to a level above the minimum sales level then we may notify 
you of the fact in writing and in our absolute discretion either require that 
further training and changes are required as per clause  0 above, or if there is 
no valid external commercial reason for the failure to achieve the minimum 
sales level, may elect to terminate the Agreement by written notice. 
 
You must give the following information to us in the form required by us: 
   (a) within two days of the end of each trading period, a statement of your 
daily gross sales for the previous trading period, less any merchant fees paid 
in respect of those sales. 
  (b) within seven days of the end of each trading period, a list detailing the 
daily quantity, sales value and gross profit of each model sold. 
  (c) by the end of each trading period a statement of your cost of sales for the 
previous trading period and stock on hand at the end of the previous trading 
period. 
  (d) by 30 November of each year detailed statements of financial 
performance and financial position prepared by your accountant and verified 
by you for the previous financial year. 
  (e) by 30 September of each year the information required by us to complete 
our annual benchmark study including preliminary statements of financial 
performance and financial position. 
(f) by the 7th day after request, any other financial or non-financial 
information required by us concerning the franchise business including copies 
of returns made to government bodies 
F6 The Franchisee will deliver or transmit (by electronic means) to  
FRANCHISOR on the due date all reports as set out in the Confidential 
Operations Manual or as stipulated from time to time in writing by Franchisor. 
F7 Achieve Minimum Performance Criteria (F7) 
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The Franchisee must achieve the Minimum Performance Criteria during each 
Assessment Period. 
 
Failure to achieve Minimum Performance Criteria 
If the Franchisee fails to achieve the Minimum Performance Criteria in any 
Assessment Period the Franchisee and Manager must attend a meeting held 
by the Franchisor, at the Franchisee’s Cost, to discuss the performance of the 
Business. 
 
Training Attendance 
If the Franchisor considers that the Franchisee has failed to achieve the 
Minimum Performance Criteria for reasons within the control of the 
Franchisee, the Franchisor may require the Franchisee and/or the Manager 
and/or the Franchisee’s employees, provided that, in the case of the 
Franchisee’s employees, the training is to be held in the State in which the 
Premises is located, to undertake the Franchisor’s initial training program, at 
the Franchisee’s cost. 
 
Further Failure by Franchisee  
If the Franchisee fails to: 
- attend a meeting with the Franchisor in accordance with clause  0; or 
- attend and complete or procure that its Manager and/or employees attend 
and complete to the satisfaction of the Franchisor an initial training program 
required by the Franchisor under clause  0; or 
- meet the Minimum Performance Criteria for an Assessment Period within 6 
months of: 
- attending a meeting with the Franchisor in accordance with clause  0; or 
- the Franchisee, the Manager and/or the Franchisee’s employees completing 
the Franchisor’s initial training program, as required under clause  0, 
- the Franchisee must, within 6 months of the date upon which the Franchisor 
notifies the Franchisee that it has failed to meet one or more of its  obligations 
under this clause  0, sell the Business in accordance with the procedure set out 
in clause 
F8 3 Licencee’s duties 
3.3 Promotion the Operation – The Licencee will actively and diligently 
promote the Licenced Operation and exercise the Licencee’s best endeavours 
in the conduct of the Licenced Operation to promote the mutual business 
interests of the Licensor and the Licencee and cause to be provided at the 
Location all such facilities and Services and Products as the Licensor shall 
require and shall employ sufficient, qualified and trained staff to effectively 
conduct the Licenced Operation. 
3.54 Observe and Maintain Standards – The Licencee shall observe and 
maintain standards in the conduct of the Licenced Operation at least equal to 
those prescribed from time to time by the Licensor and comply with the 
regulations, procedures and standards set down by the Licensor in any 
Manuals issued by the Licensor to the Licencee during the Term. 
3.34 Keep Accurate Records – The Licencee shall keep true and correct 
records, accounts, books and data (the “Records”) on the premises of the 
Licenced Operation which shall accurately reflect all particulars relating to 
the Licenced Operation and conform to the requirements prescribed by the 
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Licensor the Licencee shall submit to the Licensor upon request from the 
Licensor the Records together with such other information and reports 
concerning the Licensor Operation in such form as the Licensor shall from 
time to time prescribed or otherwise require and Licencee warrants the truth 
accuracy and completeness of any such Record information or reports 
provided to the Licensor. The Licencee shall preserve and keep available all 
Records for a period of not less than seven (7) years. 
F9 7.  DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRANCHISEE 
7.1  Business Obligations 
The Franchisee hereby covenants and agrees at its sole expense, to do and/or 
perform each of the following: 
(1)  to operate the Business at the Premises using the Franchisor System 
and not to engage in any other type of business at the Premises; to carry on 
the Business at all times in an up-to-date and reputable manner and to devote 
its full time attention and effort in order to diligently and efficiently establish, 
develop and promote the Business; and to operate the Business in strict 
compliance with the standards, policies and rules of the Franchisor including 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing… 
 
5 ACCOUNTING RECORDS. REPORTS AUDITS 
5.1 Covenant to Keep Records and Reports  
The Franchisee covenants and agrees to maintain such books and records and 
to submit such statements and reports to the Franchisor as are specified in this 
agreement or as otherwise may be required by the Franchisor from time to 
time. Such statements and reports shall be in such form and style and shall 
contain such details and breakdown as the Franchisor may in its discretion 
determine. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, if at any time 
during the currency of this agreement the Franchisor institutes any 
computerised accounting, reporting, inventory control, book keeping or other 
similar type program or system, the Franchisee at its expense, agrees to utilise 
such program or system, and to maintain such of its books and records and 
prepare such of its statements and reports in accordance with such program or 
system. 
 
5.2 Reports to be Submitted 
The Franchisee agrees to submit to the Franchisor:  
(1)  by the 10th day of each month of the Term, a monthly report of Gross 
Revenue for the preceding month, and such report shall specifically include if 
required by the Franchisor, the amount of the daily Gross Revenue; 
(2)  within 60 days of the end of each fiscal year of the Franchisee, a copy 
of the Franchisee's financial statements (certified by the Franchisee as being 
true and correct and including without limitation a balance sheet and a 
statement of profit and loss) in respect of the Business as at the end of each 
year; 
(3)  a copy of all financial and other reports and statements submitted by 
the Franchisee under the provisions of the Lease and/or the Sublease; and 
(4)  upon the written request of the Franchisor, copies of all income, and 
sales tax returns submitted by the Franchisee to the appropriate authorities. 
 
5.3  Records to be Kept for 3 Years 
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F10 Obligations of Franchisee To Operate 
The Franchisee agrees to devote their sole attention and endeavours to this 
Franchise Business. 
Customer complaint handling 
7.39 The Franchisee must immediately inform the Regional Franchisor of 
any complaint made by a customer with respect to the behaviour of 
the Franchisee, it’s employees and agents, and allow the Regional 
Franchisor or its representative to investigate the complaint and take 
such remedial action as is deemed necessary by the Regional 
Franchisor. The Franchisee shall be responsible for and pay the 
Regional Franchisor all costs incurred by the Regional Franchisor in 
remedying the complaint. 
 
Obligation to keep records and provide reports 
7.40 The Franchisee must keep and maintain records, accounts, books and 
data which accurately reflect all particulars relating the Franchise 
Business ("records"). Such records must be prepared in accordance 
with a recognised accounting standard and must be preserved for a 
minimum period of seven (7) years.  
Obligation to provide reports 
7.41 The Franchisee must submit to the Regional Franchisor such 
information and reports concerning the Franchised Business as the 
Regional Franchisor reasonably requires including but not limited to 
the Franchisee’s work diary and invoice and receipt books. 
 
Inspection of reports 
7.42 The records and reports referred to in Clause 7.41 must be available 
for the Regional Franchisor and its representatives to examine, copy 
and audit ("an inspection"). Any examination, copying or audit of 
such records may be carried out at all reasonable times without notice 
to the Franchisee.  
 
7.43 If an inspection pursuant to Clause 7.42 above reveals a deficiency in 
payment of Monthly Franchisee Fees to the Regional Franchisor, the 
Franchisee must immediately pay to the Regional Franchisor the 
amount of the deficiency in addition to interest calculated in 
accordance with Clause 14.9.  
 
7.44 If the inspection is necessitated by the Franchisee's failure to comply 
with this Agreement the cost of the inspection (including travel, 
accommodation, food, wages and professional costs incurred by the 
Regional Franchisor) must be paid by the Franchisee. 
 
7.45 The Regional Franchisor's rights pursuant to this clause are in addition 
to its other rights and remedies available to it in the event of a default by the 
Franchisee. 
F10 
 
Devote sole attention 
The Franchisee agrees to devote their sole attention and endeavors to this 
Franchise Business, except with written permission from the Franchisor. 
Inspections 
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The Franchisee must, upon receipt of reasonable notice, permit the Franchisor 
to inspect the equipment and materials used in the Business, including diary 
and workbooks. 
F11 Minimum performance standards are stipulated via the Schedule, in addition 
to various other minimum requirements noted throughout the Franchise 
Agreement. 
 
Schedule Item 7 Minimum Performance Standard: The franchisee 
must use its best endeavors to enter into consultancy agreements to provide 
Support to at least 2 clients per month. 
 
15.1 Participation – In consideration of payment of the Training Fee, 
Franchisor will provide the franchisee with initial training. Before 
beginning to operate the Business, the franchisee must participate in a 
four (4) day initial training program on conducting the Business. The 
franchisee must also participate in any other training Franchisor 
reasonably requires during the Term to ensure the efficient conduct of 
the Business. The initial training will be at the cost of Franchisor. The 
franchisee must complete all training programs to the reasonable 
satisfaction of Franchisor. 
 
15.2 Attain skills – The franchisee must at all times during the Term attain 
and display the skills which in Franchisor’ reasonable opinion are necessary 
to conduct the Business successfully. 
 
23.1 General obligations of franchisee – The franchisee must at its own 
expense: 
 ... 
 (b) Standard – Meet the Minimum Performance Standard Throughout 
the Term; 
 (c) Promote Business – Promote and make every effort to increase the 
Business in the Territory; 
  
32 Secret Commissions 
The franchisee acknowledges that it is imperative to the goodwill of 
Franchisor’ Business and the Business that the franchisee does not 
accept any unusual or additional payment or gift from a Customer. 
The franchisee also must not accept a secret commission or payment 
in connection with the Business. 
 
Reporting requirements as follows. 
18 Franchisee’s records and Audit 
18.1 Keep Records – the franchisee must keep full and accurate books of 
account and records relating to the Business. All books and account 
records must be kept for at least seven (7) years after the end of the 
relevant financial year. 
18.2  Reports – The franchisee must provide Franchisor with reports at the 
times and in the manner as set out in the Tool Kit. 
18.3 Profit and Loss Statement – The franchisee must provide Franchisor 
with a copy of its Profit and Loss Statement and Balance Sheet for the 
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Business for each financial year ended 30 June in each year by 30 
September in each year during the Term. 
18.4 Franchisee’s records and audit – Franchisor has the right at any time, 
without notice to the franchisee, during the Term and for twelve (12) 
months after the Term by itself or through its authorised 
representatives to inspect and audit the books or account and 
documents of the franchisee relating to the Business. The inspection 
may be done at the location where the books and documents are 
usually kept. Franchisor may nominate an auditor to carry out the 
examination. 
18.6 Payment of understatement – If the audit, or the inspection as the case 
may be, discloses an understatement of any amount due to be paid by 
the franchisee to Franchisor, then the franchisee must pay the amount 
within two (2) weeks of receipt of the report. 
18.7 Report is binding – The auditor’s report will be final and binding on 
all parties. 
18.8 Inspection – The franchisee will permit Franchisor, its agents or 
representatives to inspect its books and records at any time in relation to 
Services provided to any specific Customer. 
F12 Complete Attention 
8.2.1 The Franchisee or the Nominated Operator must directly supervise the 
Business on a daily basis, other than for absences in the normal course or 
such other absences approved in writing y the Franchisor. 
8.2.2 The Franchisee must make reasonable provision to maintain the 
Business during the Franchisee’s and Nominated Operator’s absences and 
vacations as described above in consultation with the Franchisor. 
8.4 Meetings 
8.4.1 The Franchisee or the Nominated Operator must use their best 
endeavours to attend all meetings called by the Franchisor. 
8.10 Operating Standards 
8.10.1 The Franchisee acknowledges and agrees that in order to achieve the 
highest level of service to customers of the Business, the Franchisee must 
conform to the standard of operation required by the Franchisor. 
8.21 Reports  
8.21.1  The Franchisee must provide to the Franchisor a monthly report for 
the business activities of the Business in the previous month, in such form and 
containing such information as the Franchisor requires.   
8.21.2  The Franchisee must provide the monthly report within seven (7) 
Business Days after the end of each month.  
8.21.3  Upon giving 30 days notice to the Franchisee, the Franchisor may 
alter the frequency, timing and method of reports under this clause. If an 
adequate computing system is in place, the Franchisor may require any report 
under this clause within 24 hours after the end of the relevant period.   
8.21.4  Within 150 days after each 30 June of the Term, if required by the 
Franchisor, the Franchisee must provide to the Franchisor financial statements 
for the Business for the financial year ending on that 30 June (including a 
profit and loss statement and balance sheet), prepared by a certified practising 
accountant in a form approved by the Franchisor.  
8.21.5  The Franchisor may use any information obtained from the Franchisee 
as it sees fit, but subject to any legislative obligations upon the Franchisor. 
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8.21.6  The Franchisee will comply with any requirements of the Franchisor 
in relation to the provision of client information from the Franchisee to the 
Franchisor.  
8.22 Co-operation  
8.22.1  The Franchisee must provide whatever co-operation and assistance the 
Franchisor requires to enable the Franchisor to determine that the Franchisee 
is discharging its obligations under the Law.  
F13 Franchisee must provide Financial Information incl. an audited sales 
certificate, P and L and Balance Sheet to Franchisee. 
Franchisee must keep and accurately maintain books of Account and 
Financial Records. 
…Promote Business by—-Franchisee must employ sufficient competent 
staff.- working the required rate of business hours  
Standard of Conduct--Franchisee must observe standard of conduct as 
imposed by Franchisor from time to time. 
Franchisee must  
Repaint or Redecorate which Franchisor requires. 
Clean and Repair Premises to standard required by Franchisor. 
Keep Books of Account and Financial Records. 
Keep Sales Records 
Achieve Gross Sales Volume as specified by Franchisor. 
F14 Subject to the requirements of the Lease or any relevant statue by-law or 
regulation, you must keep the Business Premises open for business at such 
hours as are necessary to successively conduct the Franchisor Business and 
not less than the minimum hours directed by us.  
 
Reporting obligations 
Each Friday you must forward to us weekly takings analysis in the form 
required by us. This should be forwarded with your royalty and 
advertising contribution payment.  
By the 10th day of each month, you must forward to us a monthly profit 
and loss statement for the previous month in the form required by us. 
 
By 31 December each year, you must, if requested by us, forward to us your 
annual financial statements (profit and loss statement and balance sheet for 
the year ending the preceding 30 June) prepared by your accountant. It is your 
responsibility to ensure that your accountant is able to complete these 
financial statements prior to 31 December each year.  
 
The financial information provided to us by you under this Agreement will 
become part of our business records and we shall be entitled to pass on this 
information to other interested parties such as lending institutions and other 
prospective franchisees at our discretion.  
F15 6.8  Standard of conduct for Franchised Operation. The Franchisee shall 
comply with such standards in the conduct of the Franchised 
Operation (including with respect to the Premises) as may be 
prescribed from time to time in the Franchisee's Confidential 
Operation Manual or otherwise specified by the Franchisor in writing 
and in particular the Franchisee will comply with any instruction 
issued by the Franchisor and any amendments from time to time by 
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the Franchisor. 
12.11  Complete Attention. The Franchised Operation shall at all times be 
under the direct supervision of the Franchisee, and, where the 
Franchisee is a company or partnership, the Nominated Operator. 
Except for short temporary absences and reasonable vacations from 
time to time, in which case the Business shall always be under the 
direct supervision of a fully trained employee-manager approved by 
the Franchisor, the Nominated Operator will devote his/her full-time 
attention to the Business. 
6.21  Books of Account. The Franchisee shall: 
(a)  at all times keep and maintain a proper set of books of account 
together with all supporting documentation specified in the Manual including 
computer, cash register and support information in respect of the Franchised 
Operation and shall comply with such regulations and requirements in 
relation to such accounts as are by legislation or regulation required; 
(e)  without limiting the generality of the foregoing the Franchisee shall 
during the continuance of this Agreement submit to the Franchisor a trading, 
profit and loss statement and balance sheet for the Franchised Operation in 
such form and content as determined by the Franchisor in writing from time 
to time for each half year terminating on the 30th June and 31st December 
during the Term. Such accounts are to be prepared and submitted to the 
Franchisor no later than ninety (90) days after the completion of each such 
half year; 
(f) supply to the Franchisor within three (3) days after each Accounting 
Week the Gross Sales figures for the Franchised Operation for that 
Accounting Week in writing together with the Additional Reports; 
(g)  supply to the Franchisor the trading data described in Section 4 of the 
Franchisee's Confidential Operations Manual seven (7) days after the end of 
each calendar month for the purpose of receiving from the Franchisor 
monthly trading accounts and essential key profit performance indicators for 
the Business. 
F16 No specific minimum performance standards stipulated. However, some 
involvement is required on the part of the Franchisee – 
8.7 Active promotion of business 
The Master Franchisee must at all times actively and diligently develop and 
promote the Franchisor’   Franchise in the Master Franchise Area specified in 
Schedule 5. 
8.9 Performance review 
The Master Franchisee must conduct an on-site performance review of 
each Sub-Franchisee and Franchise area not less than once every six 
months of operation. The review must be conducted according to the 
Franchisor's appraisal format and shall be undertaken by the Master 
Franchisee with diligence. 
Reporting requirements 
11.7 Financial Statements 
 Within three (3) months after the end of each financial year the 
Franchisor must: 
 (a) prepare a financial statement of the Joint Advertising Funds' 
receipts and expenses; and 
 (b) have the statement audited by a registered Company auditor; and 
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 (c) upon request, give a copy of the statement to the Master 
Franchisee within thirty (3) days after the request. 
 Provided however that if 75% of the Master Franchisees who 
contribute to the Joint Advertising Fund agree, the Franchisor does not have 
to comply with 11.7(b) 
 
12.1 Maintenance of records 
The Master Franchisee must keep accurate and separate records, 
accounts, books and data in accordance with good accountancy 
practice in the Master Franchise Area and which accurately reflect all 
particulars relating to the Business. They must be preserved for at 
least seven years or in accordance with the statutory requirements 
relevant to the Master Franchise Area. 
 
12.2 Reports to be given to the Franchisor 
The Master Franchisee must, within ten (10) days after the end of each 
calendar month, submit to the Franchisor such information and reports 
concerning the Sub-Franchisees, the business or the operation of an 
Franchise area as the Franchisor reasonably requires, in the form the 
Franchisor specifies, including but not limited to: 
(i) the name, address and contact telephone number of each Sub-
Franchisee; 
(ii) a monthly report from each Sub-Franchisee in the format set 
out in the Master Franchise manual; 
(iii) a Franchise report (to be provided by the Franchisor for the 
Master Franchisee to complete) for the preceding month 
signed by the specified person; 
(iv) a monthly unaudited profit and loss statement for the Master 
Franchisee for the preceding calendar month; 
(v) within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the accounting 
reference date of the Master Franchisee, a balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement of the Master Franchise for the 
preceding financial year. If the Franchisor has reasonable 
grounds for believing such financial statements may reveal a 
discrepancy, the Franchisor can request the Balance Sheet and 
Profit and Loss Statement be in an audited form in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles in the Master 
Franchise Area; 
(vi) within one hundred and twenty days (120) days of the 
accounting reference date of each Sub-Franchisee if so request 
and received by the Master Franchisee, a balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement of each Sub-Franchisee for the Sub-
Franchisee’s preceding financial year, certified correct by a 
Certified Practising Accountant and the Sub-Franchisee; 
(vii) such other reports as the Franchisor designates from time to 
time. 
 
F17 ART 10 YOUR OBLIGATIONS  
10.2 Pre-conditions to start of business  
You must not start your business without our consent until:  
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• you and your associates have signed all the transaction 
documents that we require; the development works are 
finished to the system standards we require;  
• you have enough stock to start your business;  
• you have enough qualified staff to start your business;  
• you have all the consents, permits and licences required by law 
to start your business; you have installed and displayed all 
Franchisor signage we require.  
 
10.3 Your obligations  
During the franchise term, you must in connection with your business:  
• act in good faith and honestly with us;  
• honestly and in good faith properly account for your turnover;  
• keep your business open for trading during the core trading hours of 
the building or centre in which the store is located or as we or the 
lessors of the store reasonably state;  
• have at least one qualified manager working in the store during all 
core trading hours;  
• have one of your directors at the store during core trading hours for 
direct in store supervision of your business for at least 20 hours a 
week unless we have waived in writing this requirement in the case of 
a Franchisor store managed by us or an approved manager;  
• supply all foods and beverages required by us from the then current 
Franchisor food and beverage menu approved for your business;  
• adopt, introduce and serve any new foods or beverages we may 
require as soon as possible after we introduce any new food or 
beverage item to be served as part of the Franchisor menu;  
• sell only foods and beverages we have approved but ensure that you 
do not breach the permitted use clause under your store premises 
agreement;  
• make sure that all chef choices of food or beverages are appropriate 
and meet with our approval;  
• except for pre-prepared or pre-cooked foods or beverages, make and 
prepare fresh in the Franchisor kitchens any foods or beverages that 
form part of the Franchisor approved food and beverage menus that 
we require to be prepared in the store for sale from your business and 
make sure that food and beverages are generally as fresh as possible;  
• follow the food and beverage recipes and menus that we reasonably 
state;  
• observe all reasonable recommendations we make as to the way food 
and beverages are to be made, prepared, packed, presented and served; 
• promote and maintain safety and hygiene in connection with the 
handling, preparation, storage, cooking, serving, supply, transport and 
delivery of all foods and beverages;  
• if we ask, date code food and beverage ingredients in line with the 
food and beverage manuals or as we may reasonably state;  
• safely and properly prepare, handle, store, serve, supply, deliver or use 
food and beverage ingredients and take all reasonable steps to make 
sure that the food and beverages you supply from your business are 
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safe to eat or drink;  
• conduct any training programs as required by the manuals or that are 
reasonably needed to keep your business running reasonably 
efficiently;  
• install and use the electronic equipment we reasonably require;  
• make sure that electronic equipment is played at the volumes and 
times we reasonably require; pay any fees payable for the public 
performance or broadcast of copyrighted works; and  
• record details of accidents, injuries or illnesses to anyone, property or 
vehicles;  
• conduct your business so that it does not cause risks to the health and 
safety of employees, non-employees or members of the public;  
• permit inspections of your business upon reasonable notice to your 
manager or directors except that mystery shopping programs can be 
done without notice and we or our employees may undertake up to 5 
unannounced surprise visits during each year of the franchise term;  
• permit, allow and take part in any mystery shopper program and pay 
for the reasonable costs of that program including the reasonable costs 
of any foods or beverages bought as part of the mystery shopper 
program so long as the cost of the mystery shopper program is not to 
exceed $500.00 per year;  
• comply with reasonable requisitions and recommendations issued by 
us after any inspection of your business or arising out of the mystery 
shopper programs;  
• give us reasonable help with test marketing, consumer research and 
mystery shopper programs;  
• do regular stock takes of your stock;  
• pay your creditors within their usual trading terms unless there is a 
bona fide dispute with the creditor and use your best efforts to try to 
resolve disputes between you and your creditors as soon as reasonably 
possible;  
• pay the relevant taxing authority all relevant federal, state and local 
taxes imposed upon you or your business unless there is a genuine 
dispute the subject of an appropriate appeal;  
• use your best efforts to try to resolve complaints about you, your 
business or your employees in a reasonable, fair and lawful manner 
and give us details of any food poisoning complaints made to you or 
your employees in connection with food or beverages supplied by 
your business; and  
• refund in 14 days, any money paid by us or our associates to your 
creditors (even if you have not asked us to pay your creditors).  
 
10.4 During the franchise term, you must:  
• keep the store (including any toilets and restrooms in the store) clean, 
tidy and in good repair and in a safe condition;  
• keep clean and sanitised food and beverage preparation equipment, 
benches, cooking utensils, tableware and other equipment coming into 
contact with food and beverages;  
• not allow your employees to smoke in food preparation areas in the 
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store.  
 
10.5 During the franchise term, you must in connection with the store and 
your business, comply with:  
• the system standards set by us for the preparation, packing, handling, 
storage, cooking, presentation, supply, transportation and delivery of 
foods and beverages;  
• the system standards set by us or that are stated in the manuals;  
• set up and maintain a reasonable food and beverage hygiene program 
suitable for your business and make sure that your food hygiene 
program covers food handling techniques, personal hygiene, 
prevention of cross-contamination, cleaning, sanitation, pest control, 
waste management and storage temperatures;  
• any zoning or signage requirements relevant to the store or your 
business; and  
• laws including safety, health, sanitation, workplace, child labour laws, 
immigration laws, environmental, employment and tax laws applying 
to or affecting you, your business, the store,  your employees and/or 
the activities of your employees and other workers.  
 
10.6 During the franchise term, you must keep:  
• your business name registered with any register or person we require;  
• enough stock of fresh food and beverage ingredients as we require or 
that are needed to make and supply the Franchisor menu foods and 
beverages to meet market demand.  
 
10.7 During the franchise term. you must in connection with your business 
make sure that: your directors and employees act professionally;  
• your business is run reasonably efficiently:  
• the salary of your associates does not reduce your working capital to 
affect the ordinary running of your business or your ability to pay your 
debts when due:  
• all your employees and workers wear the uniforms or clothing we 
approve;  
• all merchandise, paper goods, packaging, point of sale material, 
marketing materials have been approved by us; and  
• your manager or your directors go to conferences, meetings and 
seminars as we reasonably require that are relevant to your business: 
and  
 
10.8 During the franchise term. you must, if we ask:  
• sign and return to us or our lawyers, forms for registration, surrender, 
cessation and/or transfer by you of your business name;  
• give us a list of all names, address, phone numbers of your creditors;  
• suspend or stop the supply from your business of food, beverages, 
goods or serving if any of them: do not comply with the system 
standards; or  
• are likely to be a serious health risk or danger to members of the 
public; or are prohibited or restricted by law.  
 244
 
PART 16 RECORDS, REPORTS, ACCOUNTING  
16.1  Reports  
During the franchise term, you must give us by phone, fax or mail signed by 
one of your directors or by your manager:  
• by close of trading on or before the 1st day of each week (usually 
Monday), a weekly report about your turnover for the previous week, 
plus all daily reports and summary print outs from all cash registers or 
point of sale systems;  
• by the 7th day of each month, the monthly report about your turnover 
and costs for the previous month; and within 3 months of your tax 
year ending, unaudited financial accounts in connection with you and 
your business for the previous tax year prepared in line with generally 
accepted accounting practices in Australia applicable to companies 
and certified as true and correct by your accountant.  
16.2  During the franchise term, you must allow us to access electronically 
any financial or other information (such as details of your takings) 
from your cash registers or point of sale systems, computers or other 
electronic equipment used in connection with your business.  
16.3  Reports  
During the franchise term, you must, if we ask you in writing, give us within 
30 days:  
• a copy of your financial accounts in connection with you and your 
business prepared in line with generally accepted accounting practices 
in Australia applicable to companies for the previous tax year or for 
the first or last 6 months of the then current tax year and certified as 
true and correct by your accountant;  
• a copy of your latest federal and state income tax, sales tax, liquor 
returns and all applicable assessments for you or your business and 
evidence that shows that any taxes or other fees that are due have been 
paid in full; and  
the originals or copies of any of your records for us to inspect and/or copy.  
F18 Minimum standard requirements. 
2.4  (c) the Franchise Owner, the Principals and the Nominated 
Representative shall satisfactorily complete any initial training program, or 
accreditation requirements, and obtain all necessary qualifications, 
accreditations, permits, authorities, licences or memberships required by 
Franchisor or any law, regulation or code of conduct; 
 
8 Compliance with the Standards, Image and System - The Franchise 
Owner and the Nominated Representative commit to "best practice" standards 
of professionalism, conduct, service and performance which will not be 
compromised. Accordingly the Franchise Owner and the Nominated 
Representative agree during the Term of the Franchise: 
 
8.1  to strictly comply with the Franchisor Standards at all times during the 
conduct of the Franchised Business. In addition the Franchise Owner and the 
Nominated Representative shall not in the conduct of any activities outside 
the Franchised Business act in a manner materially inconsistent with the 
Standards;  
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8.2  to strictly comply with the Franchisor Image and the Franchisor 
System in the operation of the Franchised Business. In addition the Franchise 
Owner and the Nominated Representative will not in the conduct of any 
business or activities outside the Franchised Business act in a manner which 
prejudices the goodwill or reputation of Franchisor, any company within the 
Franchisor Group, the Franchisor Standards, the Franchisor Image or the 
Franchisor System;  
 
8.3  to meet or exceed the Minimum Performance Criteria relevant to 
maintaining the Franchise, or maintaining it at the relevant Status Level of the 
Franchise Owner; 
 
8.4  to attend all initial and ongoing training relating to the Franchisor 
System, the Franchisor Image and the Franchisor Standards; 
 
15.1 Franchisor may terminate the Franchise by written notice effective 
immediately if either the Franchise Owner or any of the Principals: 
 
(j) fails to achieve the Minimum Performance Criteria for any six month 
period, and fails to rectify the failure during the subsequent period of six 
months. 
 
Reporting Requirements. 
 
5.5  Franchisor will maintain a record of all earnings of the Franchise 
Owner for each quarter and year and will credit all earnings and debit all 
adjustments. The records of Franchisor shall be conclusive evidence of the 
earnings of the Franchise Owner, the date of such earnings and all other 
relevant facts except where the Franchise Owner can demonstrate a clear and 
manifest error. 
 
9 General Responsibilities of the Franchise Owner 
 
The Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative shall at all times 
during the currency of this Agreement: 
 
9.3  maintain complete, true and accurate accounting records in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles to enable verification of any 
detail or transaction relating to the Franchised Business; 
 
9.4  provide written reports to Franchisor containing all information 
relevant to the purposes of this Agreement and reasonably requested by 
Franchisor in the format required by Franchisor; 
 
11 Inspection and Audit 
 
11.1  Franchisor shall be entitled at any time to inspect and audit the 
Franchised Business to ensure compliance with this Agreement and in 
particular the Franchisor System, the Franchisor Image and the Franchisor 
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Standards.  
 
11.2  The Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative shall answer 
all questions, complete any questionnaires and examinations and provide any 
information reasonably requested by Franchisor to verify compliance with the 
provisions of this Agreement or any of the Collateral Agreements. 
F19 13. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS AND STAFF  
(a)  The Member must: … 
(2)  conduct the Business at all times in accordance with generally 
accepted professional, ethical, business and financial principles and standards; 
 
 
Discussion of results 
Franchisors impose various types and levels of reporting requirements.  Some 
contracts have ‘best efforts’ or ‘all reasonable efforts’ (F1, F2) while others refer to 
minimum performance criteria or sales targets (F7, F13).  These criteria or target 
figures are usually unilaterally determined by a franchisor; a franchisor may impose 
performance requirements with little or no consultation with a franchisee.   
A recent situation involved a system that required master franchisees to open a certain 
number of new stores.  None of the master franchisees was able to meet the target 
number, leading to complaints of franchisor lack of due care in analysis.   
The F3 contract requires a franchisee to produce two business plans, a one-year and a 
three-year.  No such requirements are imposed on a franchisor.  Other requirements in 
these terms may include a full-time manager, minimum hours, and specified reporting 
periods.   
Contracts also provide for franchisor access to a franchisee’s computer systems and 
premises.  The F14 contract provides that the franchisor can enter a franchisee’s 
premises at any time, ‘We may retain keys to the Business Premises and have 
unlimited access to the premises for the purposes of this Agreement or the Manual.’ 
Case law 
In Auto Masters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd,544 the franchisor alleged 
franchisee breach in failing to comply with invoicing and reporting requirements 
using computer software and hardware supplied by franchisor. The franchisee was 
experiencing difficulties in accurately processing invoices using the software.  The 
                                                 
544 Auto Masters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 286.  
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franchisor served breach notices over a four month period and commenced legal 
proceedings to terminate the agreement on same day that the franchisee served a 
notice of dispute.  The contract contained an express term to act in good faith. The 
court held that the franchisor had breached its obligation to act in good faith and that 
the franchisor had acted unconscionably in contravention of section 51AC of the 
Trade Practices Act.545 
Direct intervention in performance and reporting 
This aspect of the relationship is another that is regulated exclusively through 
disclosure requirements of the contract term: 
 
There is no substantive regulation with respect to a franchisor’s power to impose 
requirements, to change criteria or to monitor the activities of a franchisee.   (For 
franchisee obligation to comply with pricing and or set prices see also TPA regulation 
                                                 
545 The court adopted the passage from Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald’s Australia Ltd  [2000] VSC 
310 that, ‘there is to be implied into a franchise agreement a term of good faith and fair dealing which 
obliges each party to exercise the powers conferred upon it by the agreement in good faith and 
reasonably, and not capriciously or for some extraneous purpose.’  
Disclosure Item 16 Franchisee’s obligations: 
16.1 Summary of the conditions of the franchise agreement that deal with 
obligations for a franchisee (or references to the relevant conditions of the 
franchise agreement, if attached) for the following matters: 
(a) site selection and acquisition; 
(b) requirements for starting the franchised business; 
(c) development of the site, premises, vehicles and equipment; 
(d) training: 
 (i) before the franchised business starts; and 
(ii) during operation of the franchised business; 
(e) opening the franchised business; 
(f) complying with standards or operating manuals; 
(h) warranties and customer service; 
(i) territorial development and minimum performance criteria; 
(j) maintenance and appearance of premises, vehicles and equipment; 
(k) insurance; 
(l) marketing; 
(m) indemnities and guarantees; 
(n) participation requirements for the franchisee or its directors, management 
or employees; 
(o) records and reports; 
(p) inspections and audit. 
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45 and TPA regulation 48.  With respect to these issues viewed in terms of an 
employment relationship, see Restrictive Covenants.) 
Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
performance standards  
To enhance certainty for a franchisee, performance standards should be more about 
process that includes franchisees than about a franchisor unilaterally setting arbitrary 
standards which, if a franchisee fails to meet, constitute grounds for termination. 
Minimum performance requirements provide another reason for a franchisor to 
participate in the consultative process. The contract should ensure a franchisee’s 
involvement in the process of determining what minimum performance assurances 
will be required. Otherwise, such requirements imposed by a franchisor may be 
determined to be unreasonable, or to constitute a lack of due care on the part of a 
franchisor.546   
This is an area particularly suited to an expanded role for trust in the regulation of the 
relationship.  A variety of non-legal methods can be used to ensure performance on 
both sides of the contract, such as signalling, assurances, and bonds all of which help 
assure franchisee performance.  For example, a franchisee’s act of granting discretion 
to franchisor in termination is a form of signalling.547  By accepting a franchisor’s 
broad power to terminate, a franchisee offers a sort of assurance that he expects to be 
compliant and profitable.  A franchisee demonstrates trust by allowing this exposure 
to possible franchisor opportunism in the exercise of rights to terminate.  Flowing in 
the opposite direction, however, there are fewer contractual commitments made by 
franchisors to franchisees.  Reciprocity of obligation could be increased, for example 
where a franchisor has some duties, for example to properly develop the system, 
including formulating reasonable expectations for franchisee performance, 
expectations which should be explained to franchisee and to which franchisee should 
specifically agree.  Other express duties required of a franchisor might include the 
duty to maintain brand (stated in less discretionary language), the duty to train 
franchisees, and to exercise discretion in imposing requirements on a franchisee and 
                                                 
546 Duty of care is not an established principle but one relatively new franchise system’s contract 
provides that a franchisee cannot sue a franchisor for failure to develop the franchise concept. 
547 David Goddard, ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ (1997) New Zealand 
Law Review 423, 442. 
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in accessing franchisee premise, computer systems and records. There should also be 
consultative processes for amendments to performance and reporting requirements.  
The contract should ensure a franchisee’s involvement in the process of determining 
what minimum performance assurances will be required.  Such measures would help 
to balance the power relationship and to improve certainty for a franchisee. 
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 5.8 CONTRACT TERM:  TRANSFER BY FRANCHISEE 
The Chairman of the FCA, Stephen Giles, advised a meeting of the Franchise 
Consultative Panel that a franchise is ‘like a marriage, when it’s over it’s over – you 
do not bring in a substitute’.548   Transfer describes the arrangement in which the 
franchise is transferred or sold by a franchisee.  A franchisor usually has unlimited 
capacity to sell the system or any part of its interest in it at any time without 
consulting its franchisees.  After several years of operation a franchisee may wish to 
transfer its operation, but a franchisee has less latitude than a franchisor to sell its 
interests relating to the franchise system.  Franchisors derive little benefit from 
franchisee transfer of the franchise, and so, there is, perhaps not surprisingly, no 
‘right’ of a franchisee to transfer the franchise.    
Selected results of the sample 
Due to the lengthy conditions for franchisor consent to franchisee transfer, only one 
sample of such a clause is provided with this text.  For the full text of all transfer 
clauses sampled please refer to Appendix B.   
 
The following is a sample transfer clause:549 
‘The rights and obligations of the Franchisee under this Agreement are personal 
to the Franchisee.  Neither the Franchisee nor the Shareholders are entitled to: 
(a) sell, assign, transfer or encumber in whole or in part its legal or beneficial 
entitlement or interest:  
(i) in this Agreement; or 
(ii) in the Franchisee; 
(b) sub contract or delegate the performance of any of its rights, duties or 
obligations under this Agreement except as provided for in this Agreement, 
to any person without the prior written consent of the Franchisor.   
20.4 Conditions of consent.   
The Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold its consent to an assignment 
under clause 20.3.  The Franchisor's consent to a sale, assignment or transfer to 
a proposed transferee may be withheld absolutely or granted upon such 
conditions as the Franchisor in its discretion considers reasonably appropriate.  
The Franchisor will provide its consent if: 
(a) the Franchisee is not in default or arrears in respect of any payments owing 
to the Franchisor; 
(b) the proposed transferee is in the opinion of the Franchisor a respectable, 
                                                 
548 2004 ACCC Franchise Consultative Committee meeting. Stephen Giles provides information about 
the meeting, though not of this particular statement, at Franchising Focus (2005) Deacons 
<http://www.deacons.com.au/franchisingfocus/ff_12_04.htm> at 3 October 2005 
549 System F2. 
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responsible, solvent and financially sound person with sufficient business 
experience to carry on the Business and to fully and expeditiously carry out the 
Franchisee's obligations under this Agreement; 
(c) the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor its full costs of the investigation of the 
proposed transferee its directors, officers, employees and shareholders and any 
person who proposes to give any guarantee, indemnity or other security in 
respect of the proposed transferee, together with the Assignment Fee (if any); 
(d) the proposed transferee signs: 
(i) an acknowledgement of receipt of the Franchisee's Disclosure Document; 
(ii) a new franchise agreement in the form of the Franchisor's then current 
franchise agreement; 
(iii) such agreement or agreements as are reasonably required by the Franchisor 
(to be prepared by the Franchisor's solicitors at the Franchisee's expense) under 
which the proposed transferee agrees to be bound and perform the Franchisee's 
obligations under this Agreement as if it were originally named in this 
Agreement; and  
(iv) each other document as may customarily be required by the Franchisor of 
other franchisees; 
(e) the proposed transferee obtains all guarantees, indemnities, covenants of 
restraint and/or other documents or securities as the Franchisor may reasonably 
require for the fulfilment of the proposed transferee's obligations under this 
Agreement; 
(f) the proposed transferee agrees at its cost to undergo or causes its Nominated 
Operator or employees to undergo any training programme prescribed from 
time to time by the Franchisor and pays to the Franchisor the full cost of doing 
so which cost is included in the Assignment Fee; 
(g) the Franchisee agrees to execute a general release of the Franchisor’s 
Authorised Representatives from all Claims that it may have against the 
Franchisor’s Authorised Representatives in respect of this Agreement, or the 
Business and agrees to remain liable for its pre-existing obligations under this 
Agreement; 
(h) the proposed transferee acquires all of the Franchisee's essential assets used 
in the Business and assumes all of the Franchisee's obligations in relation to it; 
(i) the Franchisee has given the Franchisor reasonable Notice of the proposed 
transfer to enable it to comply with its obligations under the Code;  
(j) the Franchisee has given to: 
(i) the prospective transferee; and 
(ii) the Franchisor, a copy of the Franchisee's Disclosure Document and the 
proposed transferee acknowledges receipt of it before the proposed transferee 
agrees to purchase the Business or the Franchise or any interest in the 
Franchisee; and 
(k) the proposed transferee agrees to take over occupation of the Premises in 
accordance with the Term of the Premises Agreement either by assignment of 
the lease, sublease or licence or the grant of a new lease, sublease or licence to 
meet the then current requirements of the Franchisor and the Franchisee.’ 
 
Many contracts include a franchisor right of first refusal.  When a franchisee 
applies to a franchisor for approval of a transfer, a franchisor may choose to 
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exercise this right and buy the unit.  A sample of a right of first refusal clause is 
reproduced here:550 
 
‘24. Right of first refusal (Franchise) 
24.1 Franchisor to have right of first refusal 
If at any time: 
(a) the Franchisee wishes to assign the Licence to a third party; or 
(b) a Principal wishes to transfer to a third party any shares in the Franchisee 
('Shares') then, before entering into any agreement with the third party, the 
assignor must: 
(c) notify the Franchisor of the terms, including the price, of the proposed 
transaction (a 'Sale Proposal'); 
(d) provide the Franchisor with all other information reasonably requested by 
the Franchisor to evaluate the Sale Proposal; and 
(e) provide the Franchisor with the Franchisor's then current Franchise 
application completed by the proposed assignee. 
24.2 Franchisor to give notice 
If within 30 days after receipt of the Sale Proposal and other information 
referred to in clause x: 
(a) the Franchisor gives notice to the assignor that it wishes: 
    (i) to operate the Franchise Business at the Location under the Approved 
Name, the parties will terminate this agreement and the Franchisor must pay the 
Franchisee in accordance with the Sale Proposal; or 
    (ii) to acquire the Shares, the assignor must transfer the Shares to the 
Franchisor on the terms set out in the Sale Proposal; or 
(b) the Franchisor gives notice to the assignor that it does not wish to operate 
the Franchise Business or acquire the Shares or does not give any notice to the 
assignor, the assignor may assign the Franchise or the Shares to the person 
named in the Sale Proposal on terms no more favourable than those contained in 
the Sale Proposal and subject to satisfaction of the provisions of clause. 
24.3 Franchisor to purchase 
If the Sale Proposal includes: 
(a) in the price payable by the purchaser consideration other than money, the 
price payable by the Franchisor for the Franchise or the Shares will be the 
monetary consideration specified in the Sale Proposal increased by the market 
value of the non-monetary consideration; 
(b) an offer to acquire from the assignor assets used in the Franchise Business, 
and the Franchisor gives notice under clause  0, the Franchisor must buy those 
assets; and 
(c) an offer to acquire from the assignor other assets, the Franchisor may elect to 
buy some or all of those assets.  The price payable by the Franchisor for those 
assets will be their market value. 
24.4 Submission of future Sale Proposals 
The Franchisor's election not to operate the Franchise or acquire the Shares in 
accordance with this clause does not affect the obligation to submit future Sale 
Proposals to the Franchisor.’ 
 
                                                 
550 System F2. 
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Discussion of results 
As the sample indicates, this contract term consists primarily of franchisor constraints 
on franchisee transfer.  Franchisors use constraints on a franchisee’s right to transfer 
to protect a franchisor’s interest in brand maintenance and to ensure the level of 
quality in system franchisees.551  They also draft the term with an eye to deterring 
franchisee hold-up, such as post-contractual revision of fee schedule.   
A franchisee cannot transfer his franchise unit without the prior written consent of a 
franchisor. A franchisee can only transfer if it complies with a franchisor’s 
conditions,  
‘In addition to meeting the then-current (franchisor) franchisee qualification 
requirements of Sub-Franchisor, approval of a transfer to an heir, legatee or 
other proposed transferee may also be subject to one or more of the following 
conditions in the sole discretion of (franchisor)or Sub-Franchisor.’552 
 
While this term is similar across systems, there is some variation in conditions for 
franchisor approval of transfer.  Most systems demand a payment of a transfer fee.  
For example, F1 sets the fee at $5000, F3 at 10 percent of purchase price, while F6 
sets the fee at the greater of 10 percent or $10,000. In addition to payment of the 
transfer fee there is usually a lengthy list of conditions that can provide a franchisor 
with justification to refuse transfer.553  Franchisor approval of franchisee transfer 
cannot be unreasonably withheld, however, 
‘The Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold its consent to an 
assignment…The Franchisor's consent to a sale, assignment or transfer to a 
proposed transferee may be withheld absolutely or granted upon such conditions 
as the Franchisor in its discretion considers reasonably appropriate.’554 
Finally, there is the related issue of ownership of goodwill.  In contrast to the 
convention in the US where local goodwill belongs to a franchisee, in Australia, 
contracts typically provide that goodwill belongs to a franchisor. No exception is 
                                                 
551 Note also that a franchisor is concerned with the nature of franchisee organization (individual, 
partnership, corporation, trust), in order to ensure that all individuals signing the agreement will be 
personally liable.  
552 System F1. 
553 See typical transfer clause in this section.  For more information, see Rupert M. Barkoff and 
Andrew C.  Selden (eds), Fundamentals of Franchising (1997) 65. 
554 System F2. 
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made for local goodwill.555   Franchisors argue that this is necessary to ensure that it 
retains control over the use of the elements that make up the goodwill, so that these 
elements retain their distinctiveness to preserve the goodwill of the business for both 
the franchisor and the franchisees.  The following is an example of a clause which 
appears in a similar form in most contracts sampled: 
 Goodwill and Intellectual Property Rights to vest in Franchisor: The Franchisee 
assigns to the Franchisor all existing and future goodwill arising out of the use 
of the System by the Franchisee; Intellectual Property Rights in improvements 
to the System developed by the Franchisee; and Intellectual Property Rights in 
any plans, specifications or advertising materials prepared by or for the 
Franchisee in relation to the Franchise Business… all existing goodwill and 
existing Intellectual Property Rights …vest in the Franchisor and all future 
goodwill and future Intellectual Property Rights, on their creation, will vest in 
the Franchisor; and [franchisee] must do, at its own cost, all things reasonably 
requested by the Franchisor to enable the Franchisor to assure further its title to 
the goodwill and the Intellectual Property Rights…556 
This limitation on a franchisee’s rights regarding the goodwill of the business is often 
not understood by franchisees.  It is also not clear, given the many other ways in 
which a franchisor exercises control over a franchisee’s activities, why control over 
goodwill to protect the brand must necessarily require that a franchisee has no 
property interest in the goodwill.  
A franchise is a wasting asset.557  As Blair and Lafontaine point out, a franchisee who 
contracts for a licence to use a franchisor’s intellectual property needs to understand 
that it is purchasing something that it can never sell.  There may be a significant 
difference in net sales proceeds from a franchise as opposed to an independent 
operation.   
The Code was put in place in 1998; in 2008 the first franchisees will near the end of 
their renewal periods.  Some will find that after ten years of nurturing a business, they 
have less to sell than they expected.  In addition, a franchisee may not have control 
over the property or lease, the conditions of which may make the franchise more 
                                                 
555 Though some assert that it is understood in the sector that a franchisor may at its discretion allow a 
franchisee to sell part of the goodwill, there is no such contractual provision.  Even if there were such a 
provision, the discretion of a franchisor remains.  While a franchisor may permit a franchisee to sell 
goodwill, such a decision is made at the discretion of the franchisor; for any individual franchisee, the 
situation is far from certain. 
556 System F3. 
557 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise 
Relationship’ (2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 116. 
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difficult to sell.558  For these reasons accountants advise franchisees that the best time 
to sell is in about year seven of a ten-year term, when a franchisee will have had a 
return on its investment, but still an interest to sell in the remaining duration of the 
licence.   
Seven of the nineteen contracts contained a franchisor right of first refusal.  A 
franchisor right of first refusal is sometimes described to a franchisee as insurance that 
a franchisor will buy the unit if a franchisee needs to sell. This is generally not the 
case. A franchisor right of first refusal is a right and not an obligation of a franchisor. 
It does not create any rights in a franchisee.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
franchisors may buy back units from distressed franchisees, but often at distress-sale 
prices.  Some contracts include asset valuation clauses with a pre-set formula for 
franchisor purchase of the franchise.  Dnes speculates that these clauses may provide 
some certainty to a franchisee.559   However, since a franchisor has the discretion to 
exercise its right of refusal, the set formula is more likely to benefit a franchisor. None 
of the contracts in the sample contained or referred to an asset valuation with respect 
to a franchisor right of first refusal. 
A franchisor may require as a condition of completing the sale that the selling 
franchisee sign a termination and release form which says the outgoing franchisee 
gives a franchisor a general release of claims. 560  Two contracts in the sample 
contained this condition.561    
 
Transfer:  Direct intervention in transfer 
Transfer is subject to substantive regulation as well as disclosure.  The Code prohibits 
franchisors from unreasonably withholding consent to transfer.  
 
 
                                                 
558 Significant problems for franchise systems stem from the high rents and onerous requirements of 
shopping centre leases. 
559 See Antony W. Dnes, ‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 Journal of Legal 
Studies 367, 392.  Article has a significant section on termination and valuation of assets to protect 
franchisees.  
560 The Problems Franchisees Face (2003) American Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchisee.org/Buying%20a%20Franchise.htm#problem> at 9 December 2006. 
561 Systems F2 and F17. 
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The Code addresses a franchisor’s right of first refusal in Disclosure Item 17. 
 
 
All the terms in the contracts sampled appear to comply with the Code as baseline 
standard; most contracts provide that the franchisor must not unreasonably withhold 
its consent to an assignment.   The regulation offers protection to a franchisee, but 
ultimately it is still up to the courts to determine what is ‘unreasonable’ in 
withholding consent.   
Disclosure Item 17 Summary of other conditions of agreement 
17.1 Summary of the conditions of the franchise agreement (or references to 
the relevant conditions of the franchise agreement, if attached) that deal with 
the following matters: 
(…) 
(j) Transfer of a franchise 
(…) 
(l) option or right of first refusal, if any, for a franchisor to buy the franchised 
business; 
Clause 20  
Transfer of the franchise 
(1) A request for a franchisor’s consent to transfer of a franchise must be made 
in writing. 
(2) A franchisor must not unreasonably withhold consent to the transfer.  
(3) For subclause (2), circumstances in which it is reasonable for a franchisor 
to withhold consent include: 
(a) the proposed transferee is unlikely to be able to meet the financial 
obligations that the proposed transferee would have under the franchise 
agreement; or 
(b) the proposed transferee does not meet a reasonable requirement of the 
franchise agreement for the transfer of a franchise; or 
(c) the proposed transferee has not met the selection criteria of the franchisor; 
or 
(d) agreement to the transfer will have a significantly adverse effect on the 
franchise system; or 
(f) the proposed transferee does not agree in writing to comply with the 
obligations of the franchisee under the franchise agreement; or 
(g) the franchisee has not paid or made reasonable provision to pay an amount 
owing to the franchisor; or 
(h) the franchisee has breached the franchise agreement and has not remedied 
the breach. 
(4) The franchisor is taken to have given consent to the transfer if the 
franchisor does not, within 42 days after the request was made, give to the 
franchisee written notice: 
(a) that consent is withheld; and 
(b) setting out why consent is withheld. 
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Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
transfer 
Overall, the balance of power favors a franchisor; franchisor approval of franchisee 
transfer can include a variety of criteria, not all of which may be anticipated by the 
prospective franchisee.562  In addition, a franchisor owns the goodwill, usually 
controls the lease,563 and has an option of first refusal to buy the unit, often at 
according to a pre-determined formula.   
Franchisees are as dependent on the good faith of a franchisor in exiting the system as 
they are during the course of their affiliation with a franchisor.564   A franchisee is 
subject to a franchisor’s good faith and approval of the incoming franchisee and of the 
transfer itself, but a franchisor is also very much in the business of selling franchises.  
A franchisee can transfer his interest in the franchise, but must get consent from a 
franchisor with whom a franchisee is also competing to sell franchise units.565  Here 
again, the greater power lies with a franchisor, the greater uncertainty with a 
franchisee. A franchisee needs substantive protection against a franchisor 
opportunistically taking advantage of its position to make transfer difficult, expensive 
and even impossible.  
                                                 
562 See typical transfer clause in this section.  For more information, see Rupert M. Barkoff, and 
Andrew C.  Selden, (eds), Fundamentals of Franchising (1997) 65. 
563 Unless there is a demolition clause, in which case a franchisor may require a franchisee to hold the 
lease. 
564 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise 
Relationship’ (2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 116. 
565 The transfer fee paid to the franchisor offsets the franchisor’s conflict of interest with respect to the 
franchisee’s transfer of the unit.  Of course, the fee also decreases the net proceeds available to the 
franchisee upon sale.   
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Franchisee vulnerability with respect to his right to transfer is addressed by the 
substantive prescriptive regulatory requirements that a franchisor cannot unreasonably 
withhold consent, and some parameters for the reasons a franchisor may withhold 
consent.  Nevertheless, a franchisee remains at a disadvantage in its ability to transfer 
compared to that of a franchisor. More reciprocal obligations of franchisor and 
franchisee in transferring their interests could improve the balance of power.   A 
franchisee also may need further substantive protection against a franchisor’s 
opportunistically taking advantage of its position.  Measures to improve a franchisee’s 
position in transfer include collective negotiation, and further specification of 
procedures to protect franchisee’s assets.  The courts have a role to play in ensuring 
that franchisees are compensated for losses, but an enhanced role for the courts still 
would not help the many franchisees who do not litigate.   
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5.9 CONTRACT TERM:  TERMINATION BY FRANCHISOR 
Termination rights enable a franchisor to deal with under-performing franchisees, 
franchisee free-riding and franchisee hold-up.  While a franchisor’s right to terminate 
is important to a franchisor in maintaining uniformity and the quality of the brand, 
inefficient termination in which a franchisee loses more than a franchisor gains, 
should be discouraged. Efficiency in the termination of a franchise agreement is 
difficult to measure, however, especially when trying to take into account impact on a 
franchisor’s brand.  Perhaps this is why, ‘Courts have traditionally applied the rule of 
termination at will to exclusive agency and distributorship agreements.’566  This 
tradition has carried over into the franchise relationship, franchisors defend the right 
to terminate if a franchisee performs poorly or breaches contract as a crucial aspect of 
maintaining brand.  A franchisee, however, has a considerable investment in the 
relationship and deserves some protection, more than an agent or distributor that has a 
less significant investment in the relationship. 
Franchisors argue that courts should demand only good faith and reasonable notice 
for termination.567  They support this argument not only with their need to protect the 
brand, but also with the claim that they are unlikely to terminate profitable 
franchisees.  There are reasons, however, that a franchisor might wish to terminate, 
even when a franchisee is profitable.  For example, a franchisor may feel that the 
power of a franchisee is too great, or a franchisee is too independent, or there might 
be conflicts over leases or financing.    
From a franchisee’s point of view this right of a franchisor to terminate without 
regard to a franchisee’s investment in specialized assets leaves a franchisee 
vulnerable to ‘hold-up’ by a franchisor.  A franchisee’s other related contracts and 
rights with respect to dispute resolution may also be compromised.568    
 
                                                 
566 George Dent, ‘Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances’ (2002) 58 The Business Lawyer 45, n247. 
567 Id., 252. 
568 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 124-125:   ‘As added risk to the franchisees, default of one 
franchise agreement may result not only in termination of the franchise at issue, but - due to cross-
default clauses - result in declaration that the franchisee is in default of all the franchisee's agreements.’ 
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Termination clauses in most contracts are lengthy, selected results of the sample are 
not reproduced in a table in the text, but are included in Appendix C. 
 
A Sample Termination Clause569 
Termination for default 
If an Event of Default occurs and: 
the Event of Default is not a breach of this agreement, the Franchisor may, by 
giving a reasonable period of notice, setting out the reasons for termination of 
this agreement, terminate this agreement upon expiry of the notice; and 
the Event of Default is a breach of this agreement: 
the Franchisor may give the Franchisee a notice: 
- specifying the Event of Default and that the Franchisor proposes to terminate 
the agreement because of the breach; 
- identifying what the Franchisor requires the Franchisee to do to remedy the 
Event of Default; and 
- nominating a reasonable period which need not exceed 30 days (Cure Period) 
to remedy the Event of Default, and 
- if the Event of Default is not remedied, in accordance with paragraph (B) 
within the Cure Period, the Franchisor may, by a further notice, terminate this 
agreement. 
 
The following are Events of Default:  
if the Franchisee: 
- submits to the Franchisor a licence application or supporting information 
containing false or misleading statements or omissions of fact; 
- does not open the Location for business within three months after the date of 
this agreement; 
- does not rectify any failure to operate and maintain the   Business strictly in 
accordance with this agreement as required by a notice from the Franchisor 
requiring rectification; 
- sells or provides from the Business any products or services not approved by 
the Franchisor and continues to do so for five days after receiving notice from 
the Franchisor requiring the Franchisee to stop selling those products and to 
stop providing those services; 
- does not provide items required by the Franchisor and continues to fail to do 
so for five days after receiving notice from the Franchisor requiring those 
products to be provided; 
- does not pay any sum due under this agreement within seven days after 
receiving notice from the Franchisor requiring payment; 
- assigns or purports to assign the Licence without complying with clauses 
- becomes bankrupt, unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or enters into any 
form of insolvency administration; 
- encumbers or purports to encumber the Licence without the Franchisor's 
approval; 
- does not maintain the licences (including any liquor licences) necessary to 
                                                 
569 System F3. 
 261
operate the Business; 
- abandons the Business or ceases or threatens to cease to operate the   Business 
or to occupy the Location, without the Franchisor's approval; 
- breaches any other provision of this agreement and fails to remedy the breach 
within seven days after receiving notice requiring it to do so; 
- engages in any conduct, that in the Franchisor's opinion may adversely affect 
the System or the Business; 
by the Franchisee's inaction adversely affects, in the Franchisor's opinion, the 
System or the Business; 
- fails to maintain a good credit rating by failing to pay promptly undisputed 
invoices from suppliers of goods and services to the Business;  
- fails to make any payments due to the Franchisor in excess of $24,000 whether 
under this agreement or otherwise within 14 days of becoming due; or 
- fails to comply with one or more requirement of this agreement or the 
Operations Manual whether or not that non-compliance is corrected after notice 
on two or more occasions within any three month period. 
if in the Franchisor's reasonable opinion the transfer of any interest in any share 
of the Franchisee or the variation of the rights attaching to the shares of the 
Franchisee results in the effective control of the Franchisee being transferred to 
a competitor of any Business. 
 
Discussion of results  
In Australia most termination clauses in contracts mirror the Code provisions.570  
Under Clause 21, termination in case of franchisee breach, the Code requires the 
franchisor to give to a franchisee reasonable notice that the franchisor proposes to 
terminate the franchise agreement because of the breach; to tell a franchisee what the 
franchisor requires to be done to remedy the breach; and to allow a franchisee a 
reasonable time to remedy the breach (but a franchisor does not have to allow more 
than 30 days). Clause 22 addresses termination where there is no breach by 
franchisee; this clause also requires reasonable notice to a franchisee and ensures 
applicability of Part 4.  Clause 23 provides the circumstances where a franchisor is 
not required to comply with Clauses 21 or 22.   
If you or the specified person fails to attend or successfully complete the initial 
training sessions to our reasonable satisfaction then we may, at our discretion 
either:  by notice to you terminate this agreement; or insist on additional training 
at your cost.571 
                                                 
570 There is a similar pattern in the US where termination clauses in contracts mirror FCC termination 
regulations.  See Rupert M. Barkoff, and Andrew C.  Selden, (eds), Fundamentals of Franchising (1997).  
571 System F5. 
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There is little reciprocity with respect to termination in franchise contracts.   
Termination by a franchisee is not addressed at all in most contracts, but some 
franchise contracts give a franchisor 30, 60, or 90 days to cure any alleged defaults.   
Case law 
Several cases have been decided in favour of franchisees who object to a franchisor’s 
exercise of its rights to terminate.  In Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd,572 
Burger King sought to terminate the Hungry Jack’s franchise for failure to develop 
four restaurants per year. The court held that Burger King had breached an implied 
duty of good faith through its conduct in preventing Hungry Jack’s from meeting the 
four restaurants per annum quota in order to develop its Australian market through a 
co-branding arrangement with Shell, unhindered by its contractual arrangements with 
Hungry Jack’s after terminating Hungry Jack’s’ franchise agreement. The notice of 
termination was therefore invalid. 
In Aura Enterprises Pty Ltd v Frontline Retail Pty Ltd,573 the defendant franchisor 
notified the plaintiff franchisee of its intention to terminate.  The court held for the 
franchisee because the notice of termination did not identify the obligation breached.  
In Dymock’s (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd,574 the judge held that, under the law of New 
South Wales, a power to terminate had to be exercised reasonably. 
Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd,575 sheds some 
light on the reasonableness question.  Six franchisees alleged that the franchisor had 
threatened the removal of certain products in order to compel them to surrender their 
franchises under value, enabling the franchisor to provide these products at its wholly-
owned outlets instead.  The court held for the franchisor, which it found to have acted 
with the legitimate purpose of promoting its commercial interests.  The court did not 
determine if there was an obligation of good faith, as the franchisee had failed to 
establish breach of any applicable obligation of good faith. The court also held that 
                                                 
572 Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 (see also Hungry Jack’s v. Burger 
King [1999] NSWSC 112). 
573 Aura Enterprises Pty Ltd v Frontline Retail Pty Ltd  [2006] NSWSC 902. 
574 Dymock’s (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2002] UKPC 50, [2004] 1 NZLR 289. 
575 Meridian Retail Pty Ltd v Australian Unity Retail Network Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 223 (21 June 2006) 
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the franchisees failed to establish their claims of misleading and deceptive conduct 
and unconscionable conduct. 
Direct intervention in termination 
Of the countries that have enacted franchise-specific legislation, only Australia and the 
US have substantive provisions with respect to termination.  The FCC Clauses 21-23 
are reproduced below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clause 22:  Termination — no breach by franchisee 
(1) This clause applies if: 
(a) a franchisor terminates a franchise agreement: 
(i) in accordance with the agreement; and 
(ii) before it expires; and 
(iii) without the consent of the franchisee; and 
(b) the franchisee has not breached the agreement; and 
(c) clause 23 does not apply. 
(2) For subparagraph (1) (a) (iii), a condition of a franchise agreement that a 
franchisor can terminate the franchise agreement without the consent of the 
franchisee is not taken to be consent. 
(3) Before terminating the franchise agreement, the franchisor must give reasonable
written notice of the proposed termination, and reasons for it, to the franchisee. 
(4) Part 4 (resolving disputes) applies in relation to a dispute arising from 
termination under this clause. 
 
Clause 21:   Termination — breach by franchisee 
(1) This clause applies if: 
(a) a franchisee breaches a franchise agreement; and 
(b) the franchisor proposes to terminate the franchise agreement; and 
(c) clause 23 does not apply. 
(2) The franchisor must: 
(a) give to the franchisee reasonable notice that the franchisor proposes to 
terminate the franchise agreement because of the breach; and 
(b) tell the franchisee what the franchisor requires to be done to remedy the 
breach; and 
(c) allow the franchisee a reasonable time to remedy the breach. 
(3) For paragraph (2) (c), the franchisor does not have to allow more than 30 
days. 
(4) If the breach is remedied in accordance with paragraphs (2) (b) and (c), the 
franchisor cannot terminate the franchise agreement because of that breach. 
(5) Part 4 (resolving disputes) applies in relation to a dispute arising from 
termination under this clause. 
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Regulation of termination has been said to reduce the value and frequency of 
franchising in California.576   Franchisors lobby for flexibility, so that states have been 
circumspect in legislating, thus allowing greater discretion to franchisors.577   
The 2006 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct 
noted that, ‘A number of submissions expressed concern about the unequal nature of 
a business relationship that allows a franchisor to unilaterally terminate a franchise 
agreement without any breach by a franchisee.’578  The government response stated 
that the problem would be addressed through reform to section 51AC of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 in relation to unconscionable conduct.  The response also stated 
that, ‘the Government will ask the ACCC to consider including this issue in their 
educational material.’579 
 
                                                 
576 James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark and  Michael S. Weisbach,  ‘The Economic Effects of 
Franchise Termination Laws’ (1991) 34 (1) The Journal of Law and Economics 101.  See also 
Jonathan Klick, Bruce Koyabashi and Larry Ribstein, ‘The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of 
Franchising’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951464> at 18 August 2007.  
577 Silvana Sciarra, ‘Franchising and Contract of Employment: Notes on a Still Impossible 
Assimilation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 263.  
578 See the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
579 Australian Government Response to the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
Clause 23:  Termination — special circumstances 
A franchisor does not have to comply with clause 21 or 22 if the franchisee: 
 (a) no longer holds a licence that the franchisee must hold to carry on the 
franchised business; or 
(b) becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or an externally-
administered body corporate; or 
(c) voluntarily abandons the franchised business or the franchise relationship; or 
(d) is convicted of a serious offence; or 
(e) operates the franchised business in a way that endangers public health or 
safety; or 
(f) is fraudulent in connection with operation of the franchised business; or 
     (g) agrees to termination of the franchise agreement. 
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Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
termination 
Termination is a critical issue in the franchise relation, but it is neglected at the 
negotiation and start-up stages.  Franchisors do need to be able to terminate, ‘The 
franchisor owes it to the shareholders and the franchised system to act 
promptly to preserve the brand reputation in the marketplace.’580  Research into long-
term contracts suggests that such contracts should contain specific termination 
provisions to mitigate uncertainty and improve conditions for ongoing performance 
obligations through the course of the franchise unit operation.581   
The termination provisions should be fair for both parties.  A franchisor could 
compensate a franchisee for losses that are not the fault of a franchisee.  This should 
not create an undue burden for a franchisor that only terminates with good cause.  
Indemnification for franchisee losses can be incorporated into a franchisor's cost of 
doing business to be spread among all franchisees. Such provisions would increase 
trust between the parties, by reducing concerns of anticipated franchisor opportunism. 
Because of their specific investment, franchisees are more vulnerable than employees, 
not less so, and they are as vulnerable to franchisors’ control as employees are to 
employers’ control.  A franchisee, therefore, needs at least as much protection as that 
afforded to employees.  At a minimum they should have the assurance of fair, 
efficient procedures and terms for ending the business relationship. 
 
                                                 
580 Email from John B. Sivertsen to ABA forum on Franchising listserv 9 June 2006. 
581 David Goddard ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New Zealand 
Law Review 423. 
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5.10 CONTRACT TERM:  RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
Restrictive covenants protect franchisor’s intellectual property, information and brand 
identity against franchisee free-riding.  Restrictive covenants are used to address 
information asymmetry where control over a resource (including a system or process) 
is separate from control over information relevant to efficient use of the resource;582 
such problems are addressed through signalling regarding commitment to perform.583  
This signalling function, along with its poor bargaining position generally, helps 
explain franchisee willingness to accept restraint of trade clauses.  It also explains 
why there is no reciprocity of franchisor obligation here, for example, in the form of 
limitations on a franchisor’s right to encroach. 
In the US and other jurisdictions where a franchisee owns the goodwill of the 
franchise unit, restrictive covenants maintain the value of the penalty for franchisee 
failure over life of the contract.  This is due to the fact that the value of local goodwill 
increases over time, while physical asset value may decline.584   In Australia, this is 
perhaps not necessary because a franchisee is not technically the owner of the 
goodwill (though a franchisor may permit a franchisee to include the value of 
goodwill in the value of the franchise at transfer).   
Some franchisees argue that they should be allowed to engage in a similar business 
provided that they discontinue the use of a franchisor’s trademarks and trade secrets 
and return all confidential operating materials to a franchisor.585  It is not often likely 
that there will be an issue about brand awareness at the location because in many 
cases a franchisor exercises some form of control over the premises so that a 
franchisee exiting the system cannot remain in the same location.586   
                                                 
582 David Goddard, ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New Zealand 
Law Review 423, 438. 
583 Other forms of signalling include bearing greater risk, accepting a smaller sum, and making greater 
up-front commitments. 
584 Antony W. Dnes, ‘A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts’ (1993) 22 Journal of Legal 
Studies 367, 388. 
585 See for example, The Problems Franchisees Face (2003) American Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchisee.org/Buying%20a%20Franchise.htm#problem> at 30 December 2005. 
586 Jenny Buchan, ‘Who is the franchisee contracting with and does it matter anyway?’ (Paper 
presented at the 51st ICSB World Conference, 2006, Melbourne, Australia). 
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Franchisees argue that their position is more analogous to that of employees than 
business owners in the interpretation of such restraints.  Once a franchisee learns to 
run a computer repair business or a cake shop, effectively these clauses prohibit a 
franchisee from continuing to ply its trade after the expiration of the franchise licence.  
The only way a franchisee can continue in its occupation is to participate in the 
franchise system. 
 
A sample restraint of trade clause:587 
 
S.28 Restrictions on competition 
 
S. 28.1 Restraint of trade 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, 
Managing Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any 
Principal will directly or indirectly (within the Restraint Area, during the Term 
and for the Restraint Period without the prior written consent of the Franchisor 
be concerned or interested in:  
  (a) any (similar) themed restaurant or café; 
  (b) any business that involves the supply or provision of any of the products 
or services authorised for sale in the course of the Franchisor Business; or 
  (c) any form of business similar to that of the Franchisee's business or the 
Franchisor's business, 
or damage the goodwill of the Franchisor or the Franchisor Business. 
 
S.28.2 Conditions of restraint of trade 
The Franchisee and its directors, shareholders, Managing Director and any 
other key employee of the Franchisee and any Principal shall be deemed to 
have breached clause x if any of those persons has an interest in a business 
described in clause x on its own account, or jointly or with or on behalf of any 
other person, firm or corporation, or is an employee, independent contractor, 
partner, joint venturer or agent of such a business, or has an interest in such a 
business through any firm, trust or corporation in which the Franchisee, its 
directors, officers or shareholders or any Principal may be interested as 
director, officer, shareholder, beneficial owner of shares, lender, advisor or 
otherwise. 
 
S.28.3 Concurrent conditions of restraint of trade 
Clause x shall be construed and take effect as if it were a number of concurrent 
separate clauses.  Each such clause shall be produced by construing one of the 
limbs of the definition of 'Restraint Period' and one of the limbs of definition 
of 'Restraint Area' until all possible combinations are exhausted.  Each such 
clause shall be severable from the other clause. 
 
                                                 
587 System F3. 
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S.28.4 Definitions 
In clause x: 
  (a) Restraint Period means: 
    (i) the period of two years; and 
    (ii) the period of one year, 
    (iii) after the termination of this agreement; and 
  (b) Restraint Area means: 
    (i) the area of 15 kilometres surrounding the Location; 
    (ii) the area of 10 kilometres surrounding the Location; and 
    (iii) the area of five kilometres surround the Location. 
 
S.28.5 Clauses enforceable 
If any of the separate clauses resulting from the construction of clause x in the 
manner referred to in clause x is void or unenforceable for any reason, that 
voidness or unenforceability shall not prejudice or in any other way affect the 
validity or enforceability of any other such clause. 
 
S.28.6 Franchisee's warranty for System 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, 
Managing Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any 
Principal will at any time, either in Australia or overseas, appropriate, use or 
duplicate the System. 
 
S.28.7 Warranty for non-solicitation of customers or employees 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, 
Managing Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any 
Principal will at any time within 2 years after the termination of this 
Agreement: 
  (a) solicit customers or former customers of the franchisor with the intent of 
taking their custom for  a similar business; 
  (b) employ or offer to employ any person who: 
    (i) immediately before such employment or offer of employment was 
employed by the Franchisor; 
    (ii) immediately before such employment or offer of employment was 
employed by any person who was at that time operating a business according 
to the System; 
    (iii) employs or offers to employ any person who was so employed at any 
time during the 2 years preceding such employment; or 
    (iv)directly or indirectly induce any such person to leave his or her 
employment. 
 
S.28.8 Directors, shareholders and Principals covenant 
The Franchisee must ensure that all directors and shareholders of the 
Franchisee (in the case of a company being the Franchisee) and the Principal 
enter into direct covenants of similar content to those contained in clauses x - 
x and x - x above with the Franchisor. 
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Discussion of results  
It has been pointed out that due to a franchisor’s retention of ownership of goodwill, 
there may be less need for restrictive covenants in Australia.  Nevertheless, every 
contract sampled contained restrictive covenants.  This could be explained by the fact 
that Australian franchisors, in practice, do typically allow a franchisee to include local 
goodwill in the transfer of a franchise unit. 
Some clauses are quite abbreviated while others (in the sample, restaurants in 
particular) contained lengthy restraint of trade clauses. Very often these clauses are 
stepped to ensure a franchisor the maximum protection that the common law as 
applied in that jurisdiction will allow.   
Case law 
The restraint of trade doctrine is primarily concerned with protecting personal liberty, 
rather than competition generally in the market.   Franchisors argue that restraints of 
trade contained in franchising agreements, such as the grant of an exclusive territory 
to a franchisee, are actually pro-competitive, and accordingly fall outside the doctrine. 
At common law, any restraint of trade is prima facie contrary to public policy and 
void unless the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests.  
Whether a restraint of trade is reasonable depends on a number of factors.  Courts 
consider geographical area, the scope of the activities restrained and the period of the 
restraint, the degree to which the restraint is necessary to protect goodwill and 
confidential information, customs and practices within the particular industry; and 
whether the restraint applies only during the term of the contract or covers a post-
termination period. A different test for reasonableness of restraint applies depending 
upon jurisdiction.588 
                                                 
588 In KA and C Smith Pty Ltd (trading as Uticolor Australia) v Ward and Ors [1999] NSWSC 138 
there was a conflict between jurisdiction where CL applies and jurisdiction where legislation addresses 
defects in CL. 
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In both Stained Glass Overlay Australasia Pty Ltd and Ors v Kevind James Rea and 
Anor  and Sureslim Australia v Mansell courts upheld restraint of trade clauses in the 
franchise agreements.589 
In KA and C Smith Pty Ltd (trading as Uticolor Australia) v Ward and Ors the court 
considered whether the restraint of trade clause was too broad given the need to 
balance the interests of the parties.  It considered the interests of the franchisor, 
‘the franchisor has an interest at stake which is analogous to the purchaser’s 
goodwill. It has an interest in protecting the patronage built up through the 
operation of the franchise, which may be lost if the franchisee is permitted to 
compete without restriction. The franchisor also has an interest in preserving the 
confidentiality of confidential information provided to the franchisee, which 
could be used by the franchisee to compete with the franchisor if there were no 
restraint.’ 590   
On the other hand, the interests of the franchisee must also be considered, 
‘the franchisee has an interest in protecting the goodwill of its business. The 
customers are customers of the franchisee’s business, though the franchisor also 
has an ‘interest’ in the customers since they are attracted to the business as a 
franchise business.’ 591 
The holding pursuant to NSW Statute was that there was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade which was void at common law. However, because the Restraints of Trade Act 
1976 (NSW) applied, the restraint was held to be valid.592 
 
                                                 
589 Stained Glass Overlay Australasia Pty Ltd (ACN 006 311 762) and Ors v Kevind James Rea and 
Anor [1998] WASC 325,and Sureslim Australia v Mansell [2002] NSWSC 945. 
590 KA and C Smith Pty Ltd (trading as Uticolor Australia) v Ward and Ors [1999] NSWSC 138., 25 
591 Ibid. 
592 Section 4(1) of the Act. 
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Direct intervention in restraint of trade:   
Disclosure Item 18 requires a disclosure of the nature of any restraint of trade 
agreement: 
 
 
 
Summary and measures to address imbalance of power and lack of certainty in 
restraint of trade 
With respect to restraint of trade clauses on a franchisee compared with restraints on 
franchisor encroachment, in the interests of trust and reciprocity of the relational 
contract, entitlement of a franchisee to similar protection of his business for the 
duration of the franchise contract would improve the balance of power.593  
 
                                                 
593 American Franchise Association, The Problems Franchisees Face (2003) 
<http://www.franchisee.org/Buying%20a%20Franchise.htm#problem> at 30 December 2005.  
Disclosure Item 18: Obligation to sign related agreements 
18.1 Summary of any requirements under the franchise agreement for the franchisee 
or directors, shareholders, beneficiaries, owners or partners of the franchisee to enter 
into any of the following agreements: 
(…) 
(e) an agreement not to carry on business within an area or for a time after the 
franchise agreement is terminated. 
 
With respect to both to restraint of trade and non-competition clauses, apart from 
this disclosure, common law rules apply. 
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5.11 CONTRACT TERM:  COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
To provide further assurance of franchisor discretion, some franchise contracts 
include a collective agreement clause (also known as an ‘agree to agree’ or ‘come 
along’ clause) that binds a franchisee to cooperate with any decisions of the majority, 
whether or not it agrees. Contracts may also include terms that suggest a franchisor 
can unilaterally change certain aspects of the agreement, for example, ‘standard 
franchise agreement means the standard terms and conditions pertaining to the grant 
of a franchise by us as amended by us from time to time in our absolute discretion.’594   
Table 5.8 provides a sample of the exact language used in collective agreement 
clauses in Australian franchise contracts.   
    
Table 5.8: Examples of Collective Agreement or ‘Agree to Agree’ Clauses 
F7 
 
Variation:  An amendment or variation to this Agreement is not effective 
unless it is in writing and signed by the parties. 
F3 
 
IMPROVEMENT TO THE SYSTEM: You must incorporate into the 
franchise business all changes to the system stipulated by us from time to time. 
Any development or improvement to the system created by you or on your 
behalf must be specified and notified to us. You agree that we own the rights to 
any improvement or development to the system made by us or by you (or on 
your behalf) from time to time. 
F3 Come along:  You will abide by any decision of the majority even if you are 
not one of the majority. 
 
The Franchising Code of Conduct Disclosure Item 17.1 requires a summary of the 
conditions that deal with the following matters variation.595  There is no other sector-
specific regulation with respect to amendments to the agreement, but the TPA section 
51AC (3) may apply (see below). 
Item 17 of the Review considered the right of unilateral change to a franchise 
agreement. The Review noted that, ‘Franchisors are currently able to include in the 
franchise agreement the right to unilaterally amend arrangements between themselves 
and franchisees.’  The Review also noted that, ‘The original Franchise Bills proposed 
that such clauses in a franchise agreement should be null and void.’  A franchisor does 
                                                 
594 See System B (AF). There was some discussion of regulating against the unilateral revision of 
contracts at a 2004 ACCC Franchise Consultative Committee meeting. Stephen Giles, who attended the 
ACCC Consultative Committee meeting, provides information at: Franchising Focus (2005) Deacons 
<http://www.deacons.com.au/franchisingfocus/ff_12_04.htm> at 3 October 2005. 
595 Item 17.1(b). 
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need the latitude to exercise control in the best interests of the system, but because of 
the potential to adversely impact a franchisee, the review advised measures to alert 
franchisees to the risks of such clauses, and stated that, ‘it is important that the ACCC 
ensure that such risks are clearly spelt out in the educational material they provide to 
prospective franchisees.’ 596   
The Review’s recommendation that a Risk Statement and ACCC educational material 
refer to the risks associated with unilateral franchisor changes to franchise 
arrangements was not agreed to by the government, which in its response stated that 
the problem would be addressed through reform to section 51AC of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 in relation to unconscionable conduct ‘where unilateral variation 
clauses will be a factor that may indicate a corporation has engaged in unconscionable 
conduct.’597  
 
                                                 
596 See the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007, 41. 
597 Australian Government Response to the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
 274
5.12 CONTRACT TERMS ANALYSIS RESULTS SUMMARY 
Franchisee Independence (See Table 3.1)  
Summary: In clauses that describe the franchise relationship, such as the 
‘Independence of Franchisee’ clause, a franchisor disclaims relationship of partner, 
agent, employee, but retains control over the activities of franchisees. Relationship 
attributes of agency, partnership, and employment do exist in franchising, but a 
franchisor uses this clause to disclaim these qualities of the relationship and avoid the 
various forms of liability that they may engender.   
Regulation: There is no regulation with respect to this contract term.   
Recommendations: These roles should be more clearly and definitively understood by 
the parties as well as mediators, courts and legislators. As long as the relationship 
remains poorly defined, a franchisor has greater freedom to impose its own 
interpretations and requirements and it is more difficult for franchisees to protect 
themselves or to benefit from court interpretation and regulation that protects them in 
the various roles of vulnerability in which they find themselves in the franchise 
relationship. 
Scope of Grant  
Summary: The Scope of Grant clause delineates and effectively limits the rights of a 
franchisee, while specifically reserving rights, such as use of the intellectual property, 
and discretion to a franchisor.  Most grants are not exclusive, so that in most cases a 
franchisor retains the right to encroach.  There is often little or no protection for a 
franchisee against a franchisor right to encroach, and many contracts often 
specifically reserve rights and discretion to a franchisor in order to avoid court 
intervention, for example, implying a duty of good faith.   
Regulation: This term is subject only to Franchising Code of Conduct (FCC) 
Disclosure Item 8 that requires disclosure.    
Recommendations: Balance of power could be improved through cooperative and 
collective action, reciprocal commitment, and sharing of benefits of expansion by a 
franchisor.  Uncertainty would be helped through clear specification of details, proper 
selection of franchisees, and carefully delineated territories, and business and 
development plans. 
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Right of Renewal  
Summary: The ‘right, the ‘right of renewal’ is not actually a right but rather a set of 
conditions restricting a franchisee’s ability to renew.  If a franchisee is permitted to 
renew, renewal must be exercised within specific parameters of a franchisor’s 
conditions, set largely at a franchisor’s discretion.    
Regulation: This term is subject only to FCC Disclosure 17 Summary of the 
conditions of the agreement.  
Recommendations: Balance of power might be helped by collective action, while 
greater certainty could be achieved if the initial contract duration of the contract were 
sufficient to provide a franchisee return on investment.  Both sides need clearer 
understanding of how long the individual franchisee needs to be in business to recoup 
his investment, as well as of what needs to happen for franchisee to exercise a right of 
renewal.   
Franchisor Advertising  
Summary: Advertising is a franchisor obligation. While each franchisee pays into the 
marketing fund, generally franchisees have no say individually or collectively in 
franchisor promotional activities.  A franchisor has discretion that contributes to the 
risk of franchisor opportunism and to uncertain conditions for its franchisees; 
franchisees pay but have no say in franchisor promotional activities.   
Regulation: This term is subject to FCC Disclosure Item 12 re Marketing or other 
cooperative funds and FCC Sub-clause 17: Financial report by franchisor re marketing 
and other cooperative funds.  
Recommendations: Consultative processes again could help the balance of power 
while certainty could be enhanced through substantive provision outlining specific 
franchisor obligations or warranties regarding advertising.   If a franchisor cannot be 
held to specific obligations over the long term, then procedures may help to ensure 
proper consideration of the interests of a franchisee.   Franchisee participation, for 
example, can help ensure that a franchisor is performing, assurances of franchisee 
inclusion in decision-making processes and/or required involvement of the Franchisee 
Advisory Council (FAC). 
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Franchisee Supply  
Summary: A franchisor controls, while a franchisee agrees to comply.   
Regulation: This term is subject to regulation in the form of FCC Disclosure Item 
9.1 for a franchisor’s requirements for supply of goods or services to a franchisee 
and FCC Disclosure Item 10.   
Recommendations: With respect to supply a franchisor controls, while a franchisee 
agrees to comply; this too illustrates an imbalance of power over future conditions 
that contributes to uncertain conditions for franchisees.  To improve certainty the 
procedures for franchisor approval should be specified as clearly as possible.  
Collective participation, in particular measures that allow franchisees to play a role 
in negotiating supply can address balance of power, also franchisee buying 
cooperatives for larger systems, and authorization for franchisee to shop from 
among several franchisor approved suppliers.    
Franchisee Minimum Performance and Reporting  
Summary: Franchisee may be required to work full time or certain minimum 
number of hours on franchise business also must meet performance targets that are 
set and can be changed by franchisor at its discretion.  All franchisee books, 
records, computer systems are available to franchisor, but the reverse is not true. 
Again, these terms of the contract indicate uncertain conditions for a franchisee, 
while a franchisor enjoys power and discretion.   
Regulation: Applicable regulation consists of FCC Disclosure Item 16.1 Summary 
of the conditions of the franchise agreement that deal with obligations for a 
franchisee.  
Recommendations: Measures to address imbalance of power include non-legal 
methods to ensure performance on both sides of the contract, for example, 
signalling, assurances, bonds, and reporting requirements.  Also greater reciprocity 
of obligation is needed; a franchisor should have some duty to properly develop the 
system and should establish consultative processes for amendments to the system.  
To address uncertainty performance standards should be more about process than 
setting an arbitrary standard. In this context, collective action and participatory 
processes can be helpful.    
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Transfer  
Summary: Contract terms relating to franchisee transfer put control over a 
franchisee’s ability to transfer in the hands of a franchisor.  All rights and obligations 
of franchisee are personal to a franchisee, and a franchisee can only transfer if it meets 
the conditions of a franchisor, while a franchisor is unfettered in its ability to transfer 
its rights and obligations under the contract.   Again, there is imbalance of power in 
favour of a franchisor and uncertainty for a franchisee.   
Regulation: There is substantive regulation that affects this term.  FCC Clause 20 
Procedural Requirements for Transfer of the franchise with respect to franchisor’s 
consent to transfer of a franchise and FCC Disclosure Item 17.1(j) Summary of the 
conditions of the franchise agreement (or references to the relevant conditions of the 
franchise agreement, if attached) that deal with transfer of a franchise.   
Recommendations: Measures to improve a franchisee position include collective 
negotiation, and further specification of procedures to protect franchisee’s assets can 
address uncertainty.  Power imbalance can be helped by substantive protection for 
franchisees against a franchisor opportunistically taking advantage of position to 
make transfer difficult and expensive.  
Termination  
Summary: Franchisee has specific obligations; if breached franchisor may terminate. 
Franchisor has vague obligations; there is little recourse for franchisee if franchisor 
does not perform.   
Regulation: There is substantive regulation that affects this term in the form of FCC 
Clause 21 Termination - breach by franchisee (reasonable notice, reasonable time to 
remedy the breach598, and dispute resolution as per Part 4);  FCC Clause 22 
Procedures for Termination - no breach by franchisee (notice of breach and dispute 
resolution as per Part 4); and  FCC Clause 23 Procedures for Termination - special 
circumstances (circumstances where franchisor does not have to comply with clause 
21 or 22).   
                                                 
598 According to Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (No 162) (Cth), 
Clause 21, the maximum notice required is 30 days.   
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Recommendations: Measures to address imbalance of power and uncertainty include 
specific termination provisions to mitigate uncertainty and improve conditions for 
performance obligations.  Inefficient termination should be discouraged.  Protections 
afforded to employees should be considered as should compensation to franchisees 
for losses that are not the fault of a franchisee.   
Restraint of Trade  
Summary: With respect to restraint of trade a franchisee is subject to detailed 
restraints to the maximum extent the law will allow, while a franchisor is generally 
subject to minimal restraints, if any, on its business (compare Scope of Grant).   
Regulation: This clause may be subject to FCC Disclosure Item 18 that addresses 
restraint of trade if a franchisee is required to sign an agreement in connection with 
restraint of trade.   
Recommendations: To address imbalance of power and uncertainty, in the interests of 
trust and reciprocity of the relational contract, a franchisee should be entitled to 
similar protection that a franchisor has to encroach.  
Collective Agreement  
Summary:  Franchisor in most cases can make unilaterally. Franchisees must comply 
even if they do not agree.  Franchisor can also change operations manual, computer 
systems, and sometimes control over franchisee premises.   
Regulation: The Code of Conduct does not address such provisions, regulating only 
through FCC Disclosure 17.1 Summary of the conditions that deal with variation.   
Recommendations: The collective agreement clauses reinforces imbalance of power 
and uncertainty.  Analogies may be drawn with other organisational paradigms such 
as rules regarding minority shareholders,599 but there is always the option of banning 
the use of such language altogether in franchise contracts as the original Franchise 
Bills proposed. 
Conclusions based on contract terms analysis results summary  
                                                 
599 Watson and Gunasekara, ‘Regulating Business Format Franchising: Familiar Solutions for Novel 
Problems’ (2006) 12 NZBLQ 174.Whitford, William C., ‘Symposium: Relational Contracts and the 
New Formalism’ [2004] Wisconsin Law Review 631 
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While it is difficult to make generalizations about diverse contract terms, some 
patterns have emerged.  First, imbalance of power is evident. Second, uncertainty for 
a franchisee is strongly evident and reinforced by the contract.  High levels of 
discretion to one contracting party indicate an imbalance of power in the contracting 
relationship.  The contract terms analysis shows that the contract terms consist largely 
of lengthy and detailed obligations on a franchisee, and high levels of discretion to a 
franchisor in the performance of the contract as well as transfer and termination, even 
though these aspects are subject to some substantive regulation.  As the standard form 
and relational nature of the contract would suggest, throughout the terms analysis, a 
franchisor has control.  Franchisor interests are protected and franchisor risks are 
minimized. This is accomplished largely by shifting risk to franchisees that enter the 
relationship with less power and so are persuaded to grant high levels of discretion to 
franchisors.   
With respect to certainty, where contractual obligations are vague, flexibility and 
discretion accrues to franchisor.  In both the case of a franchisee and a franchisor 
obligation, then, uncertainty is subject to a franchisor’s judgment or discretion, never 
that of a franchisee.  Discretion to accommodate the long-term nature of the contract 
thus accrues to a franchisor.  High levels of discretion accorded to a franchisor not 
only indicate an imbalance of power, but also high levels of uncertainty for and risk to 
a franchisee. 
The statutory regulation applicable to these contract terms is summarized here as 
follows:  Of the ten clauses seven were regulated using the tool of disclosure 
exclusively; one was regulated using disclosure and substantive regulation (transfer 
procedures); one was regulated using only substantive regulation (termination 
procedures); and one (Franchisee Independence) was not subject to any Code of 
Conduct regulation.  There is a heavy reliance on disclosure, but imbalance of power 
and uncertainty for a franchisee persist.  The next chapter will explore the reasons 
why disclosure is ineffective.   
The findings of this chapter are that contract terms reflect an imbalance of power in 
favour of a franchisor and uncertainty for a franchisee, providing evidence that the 
stated goals of regulation are not met.  Alternative measures have been considered 
that might ameliorate the imbalance of power and uncertainty manifest in the various 
contract terms. One important step is to better define the relationship and educate 
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participants, third parties, courts and regulators about the implications of the 
relationship (for example, the franchisee independence clause). 
Procedural safeguards can help ensure fairness and efficiency, provide more 
information and enhance certainty, and contribute to a balancing of power in the 
relationship. These might include:   
• procedures outlining how franchisees are selected, how franchisees are 
matched to units and territories, and how franchisors can make changes to 
territory allocations  
• procedures for approval of new brands or suppliers to ensure franchisor’s 
reasonable control over price and quality; as well as  
• procedures for ending the business relationship, transfer and termination, 
franchisor insolvency, etc.; and, most importantly, 
• Procedures for cooperation and consultation that encompass collective input 
from franchisees.  It is important that franchisees not only not be prohibited 
from acting collectively, but that they be encouraged to do so.   
Prescriptive measures can also help to redress imbalance of power and uncertainty for 
a franchisee.  These might include: 
• further specification of procedures to protect franchisee’s assets;  
• reciprocal commitments (for example, with respect to the scope of grant as 
opposed to restraint of trade and performance standards that are in place for 
franchisees but not for a franchisor,); and  
• specificity where possible.  
Performance standards for both parties can help to enhance reciprocity such as 
business plans required of both parties, not just of franchisees; collective franchisee 
participation in review of promotional activities for the brand 
These are just a few measures that could be implemented to address the imbalance of 
power and lack of certainty in the relationship.  There is ample scope in these 
measures for participation of franchisees, especially collectively and in collaboration 
with franchisors and the regulator.  The most obvious are in the areas of information 
and education of existing and prospective franchisees, conflict management, as well 
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as collective buying, and collective input in marketing and promotions.  Some of these 
may be appropriate for some systems, some may not. 
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5.13 SYMMETRY IN DISCRETION 
Imbalance of power and uncertainty lead to high levels of discretion for a franchisor.  
Franchisor discretion in turn leads to greater imbalance of power and uncertainty for a 
franchisee. This manifests itself in relatively low levels of contractual obligation for a 
franchisor with high levels of discretion to a franchisor.  A franchisee on the other 
hand, takes on high levels of contractual obligation and must perform these 
obligations under conditions of relative uncertainty.  The contracts could not be said 
to contain reciprocal commitments.600  These conditions add to the asymmetry that 
characterizes the relationship.  
The connection between discretion and the concepts of balance of power and 
uncertainty introduced in Chapter One has run as a subtext throughout this 
dissertation.  Chapter Three discusses the asymmetry of information and the need to 
preserve uniformity which leads to franchisor power and discretion. Chapter Four 
analyses the standard form and relational qualities of the contract that together lead to 
high levels of power and discretion in a franchisor. 
This chapter gives examples of asymmetry of discretion and of asymmetry of 
obligation in franchise contracts.  The following two excerpts from contracts in the 
sample provide for franchisor discretion with respect to general conditions and terms 
and changes thereto (italics added): 
• ‘Franchisee further acknowledges and agrees that (franchisor)shall have 
sole control and discretion over the development of the System and the 
designation of the Products and services to be offered in the Store, and 
that Franchisee will comply with franchisor’s requirements in that 
regard.’601 
 
• ‘Standard franchise agreement means the standard terms and conditions 
pertaining to the grant of a franchise by us as amended by us from time 
to time in our absolute discretion.’602 
 
Another contract in the sample contains several provisions that ensure franchisor 
discretion to exercise control in various aspects of performance (italics added): 
                                                 
600 Recommended by Goddard as a desirable feature of the longer duration contract. See David 
Goddard ‘Long-Term Contracts: A Law and Economics Perspective’ [1997] New Zealand Law Review 
423.  
601 System F1. 
602 System F5. 
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• ‘The Franchisee must not sell the Products from a removable site or 
vehicle, whether within or outside the Territory, without the express 
prior written consent of the Franchisor.  The consent of the Franchisor 
may be granted or withheld at the Franchisor’s absolute discretion and 
on such conditions as the Franchisor shall determine.’ 
 
• ‘The Franchisee may not establish or operate another business similar to 
the Business, whether inside or outside the Territory, without the prior 
written consent of the Franchisor.  The consent of the Franchisor may be 
granted or withheld at the Franchisor’s absolute discretion and on such 
conditions as the Franchisor shall determine.’  
 
• ‘…the Franchisor has reserved its rights to decide in its absolute 
discretion how Commercial Customers will be serviced;’ 
 
• ‘…the Franchisor has reserved its rights to decide in its absolute 
discretion how special events will be serviced.’603 
 
Most franchise contracts contain fewer obligations for a franchisor than for a 
franchisee.  A franchisor’s contractual obligation usually involves some commitment 
to maintain and promote the brand and to provide training, but these obligations are 
almost always to be carried out at a franchisor’s discretion.  One of the contracts in 
the sample is arranged with an ‘Our Obligations’ section for a franchisor and a ‘Your 
Obligations’ section for a franchisee, and so provides a neatly pre-packaged example 
of the ratios of franchisor to franchisee obligations.  The franchisor’s ‘Our 
Obligations’ section is two pages in length and consists of fourteen items, many of 
which can be performed according to franchisor discretion, while the franchisee’s 
‘Your Obligations’ section covers four pages and consists of 58 items, many of which 
are highly specific and/or are also subject to franchisor discretion.  See Table 5.9 
below. 
 
Table 5.9:  Comparison of Franchisor and Franchisee Obligations604  
 
FRANCHISOR OBLIGATIONS 
1. manage and operate our business in a professional and competent way. 
2. share with you our knowledge and experience in the formation and 
operation of the franchise business. 
3. make our manuals available to you and grant you a licence to use those 
manuals for the term of this agreement. 
                                                 
603 All four provisions taken from System F2. 
604 System F5. 
 284
4. provide advice and assistance with: 
a. the products to be offered for sale; 
b. the display of these products; 
c. customer service; 
d. marketing and selling; 
e. training; 
f. operation of the franchise business; 
g. site location and lease negotiation; 
h. initial hiring of staff; 
i. store design and fitout; and 
j. placing your initial product orders 
5. provide training sessions at times and places reasonably selected by us. 
You and the specified person in item 13 and where necessary, your 
employees, must attend these training sessions at your cost. 
6. we will help you in selecting suppliers of the products you will sell 
and the other items necessary for you to run the franchise business. 
7. If you request, we will provide you with a list of suppliers from 
whom you may obtain authorised products that you can sell in the franchise 
business. 
8. negotiate with suppliers for discounts and allowances for the benefit of 
us and all our franchisees including you. 
9. give you various marketing material for use by you. The nature and 
extent of this material will be at our discretion. 
10. We will supply personnel at our cost to assist you in the opening of the 
franchise business for such time as we reasonably determine. 
11. supply you with the recommended retail prices for the products to be 
sold by you.   
12. subject to the terms of any individual franchise agreement, endeavour 
to treat all our franchisees equally. 
13. If we need to give our consent or approval we must consider it 
promptly and must be fair and reasonable in giving or withholding it. We 
may also require you to obey any reasonable terms before we give our 
consent or approval. 
14. We and you agree to comply with the terms of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct. The Franchising Code of Conduct is deemed to form part of this 
Agreement and will prevail where there is a conflict between this agreement 
and the Franchising Code of Conduct. 
  
 
 
YOUR OBLIGATIONS   
1. You must keep the premises clean and tidy and decorated and equipped in 
accordance with our general plans and requirements for a store fitout. 
2. If we change these plans and requirements we must notify you and you will 
at your expense comply with these changes within 30 days of this notice. 
Otherwise, you agree not to make any alterations of any nature to the 
premises without our written consent. 
3. You will use the premises only for the operation of the franchise business. 
4. You will commence trading on the date in item 5. 
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5. You must hire at your cost an experienced staff member of ours for a 
minimum of 4 weeks from the date in item 5 to assist you in the 
introduction of our standards and requirements. You must pay the rate 
specified by us for this staff member and any of their reasonable travelling 
and accommodation costs. 
6. You must keep the premises open for business during the reasonable hours 
set by us and during the hours, if any, set down in the lease of the premises. 
7. You will ensure that the person in item 13 will supervise and operate the 
franchise business diligently, in accordance with our standards and 
requirements, so as to maximise the revenue and profit of the franchise 
business and to reflect favourably on you and us and our other franchisees. 
You and the person in item 13 will devote full time and attention to the 
operation of the franchise business and to any other of our franchised 
businesses owned by you. 
8. You will comply at your cost with any changed marketing or operational 
practices that we wish our franchisees to implement. 
9. You are not allowed without our consent to make any representation or 
warranty about the franchise business or the products offered for sale other 
than those that are permitted by this agreement and the manuals. 
10. You must exercise your best efforts at all times to achieve the highest 
possible level of sales of the authorised products from the premises. We 
may meet with you from time to time to discuss your sales performance. 
However, you shall be responsible for achieving the sales performance at all 
times and we have no responsibility in this regard. 
11. You must ensure that your gross sales in any 12 month period do not fall 
below the minimum sales level set out in item 18 of the Schedule. 
12. If your annual gross sales fall below the minimum sales level in any 12 
month period, the we may notify you of the fact in writing and may in our 
absolute discretion require you to undertake any or all of the following steps 
at your cost: 
 meet with our representative to review your sales performance, 
 attend such meetings or complete such further training sessions as required 
by us, 
 make such changes to the franchise business as we may reasonably require 
13. If, despite attending to the requirements of  [ITEM 12], your annual gross 
sales do not increase to a level above the minimum sales level then we may 
notify you of the fact in writing and in our absolute discretion either require 
that further training and changes are required as per [ITEM 12], or if there 
is no valid external commercial reason for the failure to achieve the 
minimum sales level, may elect to terminate the Agreement by written 
notice. 
14. You are liable for the cost of purchasing your merchandise. 
15. You agree to 
a. remove at our request any merchandise which does not, in our 
opinion, meet our standards. 
b. make available for sale from the premises at least the minimum 
product range that we determine should be stocked by our 
franchisees generally. 
c. Have on hand at least the minimum stock levels deemed appropriate 
by us for a store of your size and turnover from time to time. 
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d. display and sell only authorised products. 
16. You must: 
a. display the merchandise for sale in accordance with our 
specifications from time to time. 
b. remove from display any damaged or soiled merchandise. 
17. You must give at all times efficient and courteous service to all your 
customers. You must act with honesty and integrity in all your dealings with 
your customers, suppliers and employees. You agree to follow the standards 
set by us for the operation of  [franchise system] stores including the: 
a. methods of buying, displaying, storing and selling products. 
b. safety, maintenance, cleanliness, operation and appearance of the 
premises. 
c. appearance of you and your employees and uniforms or clothes to be 
worn in conducting the franchise business. 
d. use of credit card services which we arrange. 
e. use of advertising and marketing materials. 
18. We have various authorised gift certificate systems in use in our stores. 
Details of these systems can be obtained on request. You will honour gift 
certificates issued under any of these systems irrespective of the source of 
issue.   
19. You will accept by way of return or exchange any merchandise purchased 
from any The [franchise system] store within Australia or New Zealand, 
provided that such return or exchange complies with the returns and 
exchanges policy issued by us from time to time. 
20. You will implement the procedures outlined in our returns and exchanges 
policy in relation to inter-store transactions.  
21. You will comply with any variations to the above procedures implemented 
by us from time to time. 
22. You agree that any transfer of merchandise between you and any other The 
[franchise system] store will comply with the inter-store stock transfer 
policy that we issue from time to time. 
23. You acknowledge that adherence to our policies, manuals and standards is 
essential for the creation and maintenance of the uniformity upon which the 
goodwill of the system depends. You agree to abide by the policies, 
manuals and standards issued or set by us from time to time. 
24. You and the covenantor jointly and severally agree that during the term of 
this agreement, and for a period of 12 months after its termination you and 
the covenantor will not, in any capacity whatsoever, carry on any business 
substantially the same as the franchise business or involving the sale of any 
goods similar to or competitive with any of the authorised products within 
the territory or within the territory of any other franchise granted by us in 
Australia or New Zealand. 
25. We are the owners of the know-how and we will disclose such know-how to 
you. We grant you a non-exclusive licence to use the know-how throughout 
the term of this agreement. 
26. You will not acquire any interest in the know-how, other than the right to 
use it in the development and operation of the franchise business during the 
term of this agreement. 
27. You agree that this know-how is our property, and is disclosed to you on the 
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condition that you: 
28. will not use or duplicate the know-how in any other business or capacity. 
29. will maintain the confidentiality of the know-how during and after the term 
of this agreement. 
30. will not make unauthorised use or disclosure to your employees. 
31. You must obey any law or contract that requires you to do anything 
concerning the premises, the franchise business or this agreement. 
32. You operate the franchise business and occupy the premises at your own 
risk. You also carry out any building work in the premises at your own risk. 
33. You will use your best endeavours to assist us in any action or demand due 
to any damage, loss, injury or death occurring in or about the premises and 
the franchise business, except to the extent that we cause this by any act of 
negligence. 
34. You indemnify us against action or demand due to any damage, loss, injury 
or death caused by: 
35. an act of negligence by you, your employees or your agents, or 
36. the use or occupation of the premises by you, your employees or your 
agents, or 
37. the conduct of the franchise business by you, your employees or your 
agents, 
38. except to the extent that we caused this by an act or negligence. 
39. This indemnity will continue after the termination of this agreement. 
40. You must have current insurance for all the following during the term of 
this agreement, at your cost: 
41. public liability insurance for the amount in item 14. 
42. industrial special risks policy for the usual risk and covering all your 
property in the franchise business for its full value. 
43. workers’ compensation.  
44. loss of income for the amount stated in item 15. 
45. such other insurance as we require from time to time. 
46. If you do not, we have the right but not the obligation to take out insurance 
on your behalf. If we do take out insurance on your behalf, we must give 
you notice and you must reimburse us immediately. 
47. You must provide evidence of the insurance to us upon our request. 
48. The relationship between you and us is strictly that of franchisee and 
franchisor.  You are not and must not represent yourself as the agent, 
representative or employee of us for any purpose.  You have no authority to 
create any obligation of any kind, express or implied, in the name of or on 
behalf of us. 
49. At our request, you will show on the premises and in all records and 
business forms and stationery in a manner satisfactory to us that you are the 
owner of the franchise business under franchise from us. 
50. You will maintain the contents of the franchise business in excellent 
working condition. If any part needs replacing you will replace it with a part 
that fits our specifications. 
51. You are responsible for the hire and fitting out of your employees and for 
the terms of their employment. 
52. You must not approach or attempt to hire any person working in any other 
The [franchise system] store or location without the written consent of the 
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owner of that store or location. 
53. You must maintain sufficient trained staff to operate the franchise business 
properly. 
54. You must ensure that your staff are trained in accordance with our training 
policies, procedures and standards issued by us from time to time. 
55. You will comply with any other agreement to which you are a party and 
which relates in any way to the operation of the franchise business. 
56. We and you agree to comply with the terms of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct. The Franchising Code of Conduct is deemed to form part of this 
Agreement and will prevail where there is a conflict between this agreement 
and the Franchising Code of Conduct. 
57. You must pay all creditors and comply with their trading terms. If you do 
not, we have the right but not the obligation to pay your creditors. If we do 
pay your creditors we must give you notice and you must reimburse us 
immediately. 
58. You will abide by any decision of the majority even if you are not one of 
the majority. 
 
In the contracts sampled there are no procedural standards connected with the terms 
granting discretion to a franchisor, for example in franchisor training, support or 
promotional activities.  Franchisee obligations, on the other hand, are typically subject 
to strict standards, schedules, and targets, often to be set and/or changed at the sole 
discretion of a franchisor.  Not all franchisee obligations, however, are strictly 
specified at the outset.  It is not uncommon that franchise contracts impose 
requirements on a franchisee that fail to clearly specify the nature of the contractual 
obligation.  Minimum performance is one example where the contractual term allows 
a franchisor to unilaterally impose and vary exact requirements through other 
schedules and documents such as the operations manual.   With respect to certainty of 
contractual obligations, those assumed by a franchisee are often unclear, subject to 
change by a franchisor through the operations manual, technical and training manuals 
and other documents, as well as by relying on the collective agreement clause, or on 
provisions in the contract that accord to a franchisor broad discretion.  Even the 
flexible, open-ended requirements of franchisee are to be performed at a franchisor’s 
discretion.   
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The lack of reciprocity is clear.  Contracts in the sample contain few performance 
standards for a franchisor.  Franchisor obligations are open-ended, to be performed at 
a franchisor’s discretion.  Because of the uncertainty in the relationship over time, 
where they do occur, performance standards are generally not specific, but rather rely 
on reasonableness or procedural standards. A reasonableness requirement with respect 
to franchisor contractual obligation is common in franchise contracts.605 
Franchisor legal advisers find any such requirement unacceptable.  They argue that 
discretion offers insufficient protection for a franchisor, ‘there is general agreement 
among the courts about one thing—the (implied covenant of good faith) requires that 
parties to an agreement exercise discretion “reasonably.”’  In order to avoid even the 
requirement to act reasonably a franchisor is counselled to,  
‘go hunting for the “D” word’ replacing it with ‘the (franchisor’s)"right"… 
Better yet, make clear somewhere in the agreement that whenever the franchisor 
is reserving a right, it has the uncontrolled or unfettered right…Almost all 
courts agree that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not trump an 
express right.’606 
The franchise contract binds a franchisee over a period of years.  A franchisee’s 
extensive obligations are specified in detail and can be strictly enforced.  If a 
franchisee fails to meet any of them, a franchisor can terminate for breach of contract.  
A franchisor, on the other hand, is subject to a minimum number of requirements, as a 
franchisor requires flexibility and discretion in operating the system. Because neither 
a franchisee nor a franchisor can predict future circumstances, a franchisee has to 
trust its franchisor, and hope that a franchisor will act in a franchisee’s best interests. 
Unfortunately, given the many conflicts of interest in the relationship, this is not 
always the case.   
5.14 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapters Three and Four outlined the market interaction in franchising and the nature 
of the franchise contract, both of which contribute to the conditions of imbalance of 
power and uncertainty.  The market interaction is weighted in favour of a franchisor 
and is fraught with uncertainty for a franchisee.  The standard form and relational 
                                                 
605 The content analysis of the contracts sampled showed a high frequency of a ‘reasonable’ standard. 
606 William L. Killion, ‘Putting Critical Decision-Making Where It Belongs: Scouring the Franchise 
Agreement for the “D” Word’ (2005) 24 Franchise Law Journal 228, 229-230. 
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contract allows a franchisor to take advantage of the imbalance and uncertainty of the 
market and the contract form exacerbates these conditions.   
Chapter Five demonstrates that, in practice, contract terms are drafted to reflect and 
reinforce imbalance of power and franchisee uncertainty.  It provides evidence from 
real franchise contracts that contract terms do not reflect the attainment of the two 
goals of regulatory intervention.  Instead they reflect the imbalance of power as they 
protect the interests of a franchisor over those of a franchisee.  The analysis in 
Chapter Five shows high levels of discretion to a franchisor across many of the 
contract terms sampled.  As one franchise lawyer observed, ‘the “name of the game” 
here…is the inclusion of appropriate clauses in the Franchise Agreement limiting the 
potential liability of the Franchisor.’607  This contractual assurance of franchisor 
discretion increases uncertainty for a franchisee and enhances the power of a 
franchisor at the expense of that of a franchisee.   
This chapter also demonstrates that the parties’ self-regulation does not achieve the 
goals of regulation.  Because private regulation through market and contract creates 
and reinforces imbalance of power and uncertainty, there is a need for direct 
intervention.  This chapter identifies the applicable Code regulation for each contract 
term, which in most cases involves disclosure.  It is despite these statutory measures 
that the contract terms are characterized by imbalance of power and uncertainty; it is 
clear that imbalance of power and uncertainty persist in franchising even though 
direct intervention provides for disclosure to address these conditions.   
5.15 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Chapter Five provides a comparative analysis of eight contract terms from nineteen 
Australian franchise contracts.  The results are consistent with the theoretical analysis 
of contract in Chapter Four; they indicate that the contract terms reflect an imbalance 
of power and high levels of uncertainty for a franchisee. The main points and 
recommendations of this chapter are as follows: 
• There is an asymmetry in discretion in franchise contracts.  A franchisor 
enjoys high levels of discretion and power and the greater certainty that come 
with the exercise of discretion. 
                                                 
607 Email from David E. Holmes to ABA Forum on Franchising Listserv, 26 September 2005.  
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• A franchisor in most cases can make changes unilaterally. Franchisees must 
comply even if they do not agree.  A franchisor can also change operations 
manual, computer systems, and sometimes control over franchisee premises. 
• Case law provides little guidance on the interpretation of these clauses in 
franchise contracts; this is because Code-mandated mediation means relatively 
few cases are litigated and because of the complex and idiosyncratic nature of 
the issues in the cases that are litigated.   
•  Direct intervention is designed to address private law failure in franchising.  
Most contract terms are subject to regulatory requirements, predominantly 
disclosure, that are outlined in each section. Disclosure appears to accomplish 
little toward improving certainty and balance of power among the parties; even 
with disclosure, there is a lack of certainty and an imbalance of power in the 
franchise relationship.    
Chapter Six will examine why the current statutory regulation fails to meet its goals, 
and why, in its current form, it cannot be expected to achieve these goals.  It explains 
why, fundamentally, the Code in its current form cannot be expected to make a 
difference in redressing balance of power and improving certainty for franchisees.   
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Chapter Six 
Regulation by Direct Intervention:  
Why Disclosure Does Not Achieve the Goals of Regulation  
 
 ‘A curious feature of the growing demand for more information is the paucity 
of concrete evidence that past disclosures have made a significant difference in 
consumer or market behaviour.’608   
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five’s results indicated that the terms of the contract continue to reflect the 
imbalance of power and uncertainty engendered by the market interaction and 
strengthened by the structure of the contract as standard form and relational.  It also 
indicated that disclosure is the chief method of regulating with respect to these 
contract terms. Because the problems persist, then, disclosure is not effective in 
changing the balance of power or uncertainty as reflected in the parties’ contractual 
commitments.   
Here, Chapter Six explains the reasons why, even if it is complied with, the statutory 
regulation of franchising can fail to achieve its objectives.  Because disclosure has a 
strong self-regulatory element, disclosure does offer cost advantages. In order to 
ensure efficiency, however, there are conditions that must be met.  This chapter 
evaluates current disclosure in Australia for its consistency with the conditions 
necessary for effective disclosure.  It identifies three persistent problems; first, that 
there is insufficient information needed both to gauge the risks that regulation should 
address and to design a regulatory program; second, the disclosure process does not 
ensure reliability, accessibility and useability of the information; and third, the nature 
of the relationship and the contracting process impair the capability of prospective 
franchisees to act on the information.  
After identifying problems, this chapter considers some ways to improve the function 
of disclosure. The lack of information can be addressed by initiatives to develop 
independent and objective sources of information about the sector and about the risks 
                                                 
608 George S. Day, ‘Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements’,  Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 1976) 42-52. 
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to participants in the sector.   The second problem, that the process does not ensure 
reliability, accessibility and useability of the information, can be addressed through a 
variety of measures identified in the analysis.  The third problem, the fact that 
franchisees cannot act on the information, is the most difficult to address.  It may not 
be possible for disclosure to improve a prospective franchisee’s negotiating position; 
to render the contract terms more negotiable; to expand the alternatives for contract 
terms; to make franchises more ‘substitutable’ for prospective franchisees; or to 
change the levels of discretion enjoyed by franchisors in managing franchise systems.  
It may be necessary therefore to consider other regulatory tools to supplement 
disclosure. 
6.1 DISCLOSURE AS A PRINCIPAL REGULATORY TOOL 
As has been outlined above in Chapter Two, the Regulatory Impact Statement for the 
Franchising Code of Conduct lists several ‘objectives of government action’ including 
redressing the imbalance of power and increasing certainty for participants.609   To 
achieve these objectives, the Code relies primarily on regulatory tools that include a 
handful of substantive provisions, prescribed dispute resolution procedures, and 
information disclosure.610  Mediation and the few substantive provisions of the Code 
can help to ameliorate some of the problems that regulation of franchising is meant to 
address, including the imbalance of power and uncertainty in the relationship.  But 
these measures have limits.   
Mediation is a self-regulatory option primarily intended to address problems with 
dispute resolution. A well-designed dispute resolution process that includes mediation 
can have benefits.  Because the parties are in a continuing relationship, mediation may 
do less damage to the relationship and improve the parties’ capacity to resolve future 
disputes.  Mediation can accommodate parties’ needs for privacy and confidentiality.  
It is often the process of choice in the case of complex, protracted subject matter, or if 
the subject matter is related to large numbers of other disputes that can benefit from 
integrative solutions.  When issues other than legal issues need to be resolved, 
mediation can address them. Finally, because of the nature of the process, including 
                                                 
609 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) 
No. 162 at 
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawithLegislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/framelodgmentattach
ments/77630AD9222B25BCCA256F73000E7654> at 10 April 2005. 
610 Franchising Code of Conduct 1998 (Cth). 
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the involvement of the parties themselves throughout mediation, there is greater 
flexibility in crafting solutions.611   Despite these advantages, however, mediation can 
also reinforce existing imbalances in the franchise relationship.  Where there is a 
significant power imbalance between the parties, there is a risk that the stronger 
participant will dominate the process.612   Also, there is insufficient emphasis on 
preparation for mediation, which disadvantages the less well-informed and less 
experienced party, usually a franchisee.613  Mediation can occur too late in the 
relationship; mediation as it is prescribed by the Code primarily deals with conflicts 
that have risen to the point where parties are seeking outside advice.  Mediation does 
not change the parties’ reference to rights and obligations under the contract, which 
reinforces imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee.  Finally, Code-
mandated mediation lacks procedures for collective action by franchisees.  A 
franchisor knows the disposition of each prior or related dispute, but each individual 
franchisee is disadvantaged by lack of knowledge of how similar disputes may have 
been handled.  All these factors mean that mediation can embody and reinforce the 
imbalance of power and uncertainty that regulation is intended to remedy.  
The substantive provisions of the Code also do little to address imbalance of power 
and uncertainty, with the exception of some aspects of the transfer and termination 
provisions, most of which involve procedural requirements with respect to notice 
periods.  The prohibition against general indemnity of a franchisor by a franchisee can 
                                                 
611 Boulle and Nesic, Mediation:  Principles Process Practice (2001) at 92-97. 
612 A 1992 study that examined franchisors’ choice of dispute resolution strategies showed that when 
the stakes, franchisee dependence, and complexity of disputes are high, or where there is a high 
precedent-setting aspect to the dispute, dominant parties choose what they perceive to be low-risk (not 
necessarily lower cost) strategies such as politics or bargaining.  These choices are motivated by 
perceived immediate gain as well as greater latitude for tactical manoeuvres and exercise of influence.  
Conversely, when the stakes, franchisee dependence, and complexity of the disputes are perceived to 
be  low, and when the precedent-setting value is low, dominant parties are more likely to choose 
“higher-risk” processes such as problem-solving and integrative procedures.  These results are 
consistent with two commonly held views about choice of procedure, one, that integrative problem-
solving is appropriate when the relative power of the parties is balanced and, two, that rights-based 
processes are used when there is a need to set precedent.  On the other hand, the results of the study 
challenge the view that integrative problem-solving is more appropriate when levels of complexity are 
high.  They found that the dominant party opted for lower-risk strategies such as politics and 
bargaining in complex situations.  Further research into the organisational culture of franchising may 
indicate ways to address this aspect of the relational imbalance.  See Dant and Schul, ‘Conflict 
Resolution Processes in Contractual Channels of Distribution’, (1992) 56 Journal of Marketing 1 at 40.   
613 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) Review of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, 9 October 2002.  The NADRAC Report suggests that more help should be provided 
to the parties at this stage.  The Report is available at 
http://www.nadrac.gov.au/wwwithdisputeresolutionHome.nsf/Web+Pages/4C00DE78CBE68246CA25
6B4C0006506D?OpenDocument at 2 October 2004. 
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be avoided by careful drafting; rather than a general indemnity the contract simply 
contains a long list of specific indemnifications of a franchisor by a franchisee.  
Because mediation and the few substantive provisions make only minimal 
contributions toward addressing these two fundamental goals of regulation, and 
because disclosure is used to regulate eight out of ten of the contract terms sampled, 
and is the only regulation for six of those terms, disclosure will be considered here in 
some detail. 
Disclosure is a form of informational regulation; it influences the flow of information 
in a market.614 Disclosure is often favoured as a cost-efficient alternative to 
conventional regulatory approaches, and has been a popular regulatory strategy in the 
US since its introduction in securities regulation in the 1930s.615   The purpose of 
informational regulation underlying the securities rules has been to reveal risks to 
investors so that they can decide whether to invest.  Informational regulation is now 
not only used to protect investors, but also consumers; notable examples are for 
insurance and home mortgage products.  It has also been used in environmental 
regulation to equip the public with information about the activities of companies and 
their potential risks to local communities.616   
Today, disclosure is the principal tool in the regulation of the franchise sector in 
Australia through the Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code).  Disclosure is also the 
principal regulatory tool in many other jurisdictions that have instituted sector-
specific regulation of franchising.  Of the approximately 25 countries with sector-
specific regulation of franchising twelve countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Romania, Spain, and the US) rely on 
disclosure as the principal means of regulation, as do seventeen US states and a 
handful of Canadian provinces.617  Though they have not enacted sector-specific 
                                                 
614 Anthony I. Ogus,  Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 121. 
615 Case, David W., The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation,  31 ELR 
10773, (2001) Environmental Law Institute,  Washington, DC,  
<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/vcems/papers/ELRVersion2.pdf> at 9 May 2006. 
616 See Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139. 
617 In the US the UFOC applies in all fifty states and is intended to provide a minimum protection. In 
addition fourteen states have adopted further legislation requiring disclosure. 
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legislation, New Zealand and Sweden have voluntary codes that require disclosure.618   
Disclosure is also the central regulatory tool of the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Model Franchise Disclosure Law. 619   
The emphasis on disclosure in franchise regulation seems logical when one considers 
that misinformation is a major source of conflict in the sector.  As Chapter Three 
described, franchisees often entertain fundamental misperceptions about franchising; 
they need information and education in order to properly understand the nature of the 
business structure and the franchise relationship.  Accurate, reliable information is not 
easy to obtain, however, and so regulation aims to make it available through 
disclosure requirements.   
Generally, disclosure works by allowing the recipients of the disclosed information to 
make use of that information in two ways, to negotiate and/or to find alternatives.  
First, informational regulation facilitates private bargaining.620 By reducing 
information asymmetries, and with them the transaction costs which impede effective 
bargaining, disclosure is thought to improve the transparency and efficiency of 
markets, and to reduce market volatility.621   Second, disclosed information helps 
recipients to make better-informed choices among the alternatives in the market.  By 
providing market participants equal access to information, disclosure can ‘level the 
playing field’ and so promote trust and boost confidence in the market.   
Levels of regulatory intervention range from low-intervention to high-intervention.622  
As a low-intervention tool, where recipients of disclosed information remain 
responsible for their decisions, disclosure reduces costs to the regulator, ‘in both 
monitoring and enforcement, in contrast to the “more bureaucratic procedures” 
                                                 
618 See <http://www.unidroit.org> at 3 March 2006. 
619 Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002) UNIDROIT 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2002franchise/2002modellaw-e.pdf> at 5 December 
2006. 
620 David W. Case, ‘The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation’ (2001) 31 
Environmental Law Reporter 10773,  <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/vcems/papers/ELRVersion2.pdf> at 
28 December 2006. 
621 See Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 151-157. 
622 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 5. 
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associated with traditional regulatory models.’623  Another benefit of the self-
regulatory qualities of disclosure is the reduction of guesswork and mistakes by the 
regulator. Disclosure may also help to avoid the appearance of paternalistic 
approaches to regulating, a criticism commonly levelled at substantive regulation.  
The attractiveness of disclosure, then, is due largely to its self-enforcing qualities 
which are seen to offer an effective, low-intervention and cost-efficient alternative to 
conventional regulatory approaches in facilitating the efficient operation of 
markets.624   
6.2 CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE  
Despite its advantages, however, informational regulation is not always the ideal 
regulatory strategy, 
‘Uniformity in modes of regulation and governance is now widely debated. The 
predominant thesis is that there should be a superior model promoting 
optimality by disclosure of information and transparency. But today, this thesis 
is greatly contested…evidence shows that this unique model of regulation and 
governance tends to generate major failures and turbulences.’625 
 
Disclosure is no longer seen as a panacea. In his analysis of environmental 
informational regulation David Case has observed that it has been, ‘at best, a blunt 
and unfocused instrument.’626  Perhaps the problems with disclosure in franchising 
arise not because it is the wrong tool, but because it needs refinement in application.   
It is becoming recognized that disclosure has the capacity to generate problems, for 
example, if it provides inaccurate or incomplete information; fails to identify actual, 
existing concerns;  promotes unjustified fears; produces a false sense of security; 
perpetuates misinformation; and/or promotes under or over-reaction.627  It has even 
                                                 
623 David W. Case, ‘The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation’ (2001) 31 
Environmental Law Reporter 10773,  <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/vcems/papers/ELRVersion2.pdf> at 
28 December 2006. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Third Meeting of the European Network on Economics and the Firm (2006) European Network on 
Economics and the Firm <www.enef.group.shef.ac.uk/ENEF%202006%20call.doc> at 8 August 2006. 
626 David W. Case, ‘The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation’ (2001) 31 
Environmental Law Reporter 10773  <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/vcems/papers/ELRVersion2.pdf> at 
28 December 2006. 
627 Cass Sunstein, ‘Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond’ (1999) 
147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 613.  Failures of disclosure may also occur where the 
object of regulation is technically complex, rendering concise and accurate disclosure difficult or 
impossible. 
 299
been suggested that disclosure has been counter-productive in the regulation of 
franchising, ‘The regulatory bodies in their haste to enforce disclosure laws have hurt 
the very consumer they purport to be protecting.’628 
Not only are its disadvantages often underestimated, but also disclosure’s advantages 
may not be as great as they seem.  Though it is relatively low-cost from the point of 
view of the regulator, there can be significant costs to participants.  The preparation of 
the disclosure document is a major undertaking for franchisors that incurs significant 
costs.  The Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct found that the range of 
estimated costs per year was $2,000-$65,000.  The FCA submission to the Review 
reported an average annual cost per system of $52,000.629   Franchisors are able to 
pass these costs on to franchisees, but what is not known is whether the benefits are 
worth the costs.    
While a cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is possible to 
consider the appropriateness of this regulatory tool for franchising based on certain 
conditions that correlate with the optimal effectiveness of disclosure. Sunstein notes 
that because informational regulation relies on, ‘market pressures…and public 
pressure to enforce…standards’, it depends on the availability of reliable and 
‘useable’ information.   Informational regulation can only be effective if recipients 
have the ability to understand and use the information; also there must be alternatives 
in the market. 630   
In his research in the area of environmental regulation, Tietenberg identified four 
separate ‘functions’ as necessary for the establishment of an effective information 
disclosure strategy. According to his research, for informational regulation to be 
effective it is necessary to: 
1) Gauge the extent and magnitude of the particular risks; 
2) Obtain reliable information; 
                                                 
628 Email from Lance Winslow,’Lance@carwashguys.com’, Date: 19 Jun 2005, posted on  
<http://www.franchising.org/_bbs/000000bf.htm at 28 July 2006. 
629 Office of Small Business, Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct: Report of the Franchising 
Policy Council (May, 2000) at 47, 
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/ReviewofFCoC.pdf> at 1 April 2007. 
630 Cass Sunstein, ‘Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond’ (1999) 
147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 613, 618. 
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3) Disseminate information in a form that is both useable by and accessible to the 
community; and  
4) Ensure options for the target audience to act upon the information.  Disclosed 
information might work effectively through pre-existing channels, including 
market interactions, and/or new mechanisms might be employed, including 
enforcement.631   
These ‘functions’ of an effective disclosure strategy suggest a framework for 
evaluating the effectiveness of disclosure in regulating the franchise sector.  For the 
purposes of this analysis the second and third of these four functions are discussed 
together, so that they are collapsed into a framework of three conditions for effective 
disclosure.  First, if informational regulation does not gauge the extent and magnitude 
of the risks, it cannot be designed to address these risks.  Second, if it fails to ensure 
that reliable information is obtained and disseminated an accessible and useable form, 
then franchisees as recipients of the information cannot rely upon or access or use the 
information.  Third, if does not ensure that recipients can act upon the information, 
then no matter how reliable, accessible and useable the information may be, it is 
ineffective.  Because there is a transaction cost for the recipient to assimilate and use 
the information, if it does not meet these conditions, disclosure can even be counter-
productive.632     
This dissertation evaluates the current disclosure requirements of the Code against the 
conditions for effective informational regulation.  The results indicate that there is 
insufficient information to properly gauge the risks; that disclosure does not provide 
all the needed information in a way in which reliability, accessibility and useability 
are assured, and that franchisees are not fully capable of acting on the disclosed 
information.   
6.3 GAUGING THE RISKS 
The first function of effective informational regulation is to ensure that the necessary 
information is available in order to gauge the risks that regulation should address.  As 
Chapter Three explained, there are several fundamental reasons for the lack of reliable 
                                                 
631 Tom Tietenberg, ‘Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control’ (1998) 11 Environmental and 
Resource Economics 587. 
632 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 284-5.  See also Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal 
Form and Economic Theory (1994) 121-149. 
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and accurate information about franchising.   First, the sources of information about 
problems in the sector are limited and are dominated by franchisors. Second, 
franchisors have a strong interest in projecting a positive image of the sector.  Third, 
conflicts of interest between franchisors and franchisees mean less information 
sharing.  Fourth, franchisees who may consider speaking out about their negative 
experiences in franchising have legitimate concerns about the threat of defamation 
actions.  Fifth, it is difficult to garner evidence from dispute resolution processes.   
The lack of reliable information about the sector generally means that the first 
function of effective informational regulation cannot be adequately carried out, and 
that all further efforts to tailor a regulatory program to the needs of the sector are 
compromised.  Reliable information informs deliberations and decisions about the 
design and structure of regulatory process as a whole. It also informs decisions about 
the use of tools and strategies in regulating.  The Preamble to the UNIDROIT Model 
Franchise Disclosure Law offers a long list of factors that legislators need to consider 
before instituting informational regulation, 
‘whether it is clear that there is a problem,  what its nature is, and what action, if 
any, is necessary; whether prospective investors are more likely to protect 
themselves against fraud if they have access to truthful, important information 
in advance of their assent to any franchise agreement; whether the nation’s 
economic and social interests are best served by legally requiring a balance of 
information between the parties to a franchise agreement; whether there is a 
pattern of abusive conduct, or whether this conduct is isolated or limited to 
particular industries; the nature of the evidence of abuse; whether existing laws 
address the concerns and whether they are adequately applied; whether an 
effective system of self-regulation exists; the financial burden the new 
legislation will place upon franchisors and investors as compared to the benefits 
of legally required disclosure; whether the proposed legislation inhibits or 
facilitates entry to franchisors, and its effect on job-creation and investment; and 
the views of interested organisations, including national franchise 
associations’.633 
 
All these considerations inform the determination that disclosure is the right tool for 
the intended purpose.  Information is needed to determine the risks and the purpose of 
regulatory intervention.  Current formulations of disclosure are intended not just to 
protect franchisees, but also to limit franchisor liability.  The Explanatory Note to the 
UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law states that helping franchisees make 
                                                 
633 Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002) UNIDROIT 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2002franchise/2002modellaw-e.pdf> at 5 December 
2006. 
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informed investment decisions and providing certainty for franchisors are both 
contributing factors in the choice of disclosure as the principal tool of the UNIDROIT 
Model Law: 
 
‘The Model Law is a disclosure law. A disclosure law may be considered to be 
a means to create a secure legal environment between all the parties in a 
franchise arrangement. To that end, the Model Law ensures that the prospective 
franchisees who intend to invest in franchising receive material information 
about franchise offerings, thus permitting them to make an informed investment 
decision. In addition, the Model Law brings security to franchisors in their 
relationships with franchisees, administrative authorities and courts.’ 634  
 
The chairman of the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD) has 
claimed that mandated disclosure was negotiated by franchisors to avoid accusations 
of fraud, and that the Federal Trade Commission agreed to allow franchisors to 
provide a disclosure statement to distance themselves from oral representations.  It 
may be, then, that disclosure was originally intended as protection for the industry 
rather than the consumer.635   Both for the US disclosure law and for UNIDROIT, it 
seems that at least part of the motivation for the choice of disclosure has been to 
protect franchisors’ interests.  The Australian goals seem to state purposes to protect 
franchisee interests, but the regulation was originally modelled on US legislation. 
Motivation informs the shape of the regulation.  Once the purpose of regulation is 
determined and regulatory tools are chosen, it is then necessary to determine how they 
should be designed for their express purpose.  In the case of disclosure regulatory 
process involves gauging the risks in order to determine what information should be 
provided to prospective franchisees and when and how this information should be 
provided in order to best address these risks.  The difficulty is the lack of reliable and 
objective information about the sector generally.  Though franchising is a significant 
part of the Australian economy, the dearth of reliable information about the sector has 
been a perennial problem that impedes useful discussion and analysis of the operation 
of the sector, as well as attempts to regulate it.  
                                                 
634 Ibid. 
635 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 266 
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6.4 RELIABLE, ACCESSIBLE AND USEABLE INFORMATION 
The second function of effective informational regulation is to ensure the availability 
of information to prospective franchisees to better inform their investment decisions.  
Disclosure is a self-regulatory tool that puts the onus on the parties themselves, in 
particular on a franchisee.  If disclosure is to work effectively, a franchisee must have 
access to reliable, accessible and useable information.     
6.4.1 Information about franchising generally 
The previous section on ‘gauging the risks’ reiterated the discussion in Chapter Three 
about the obstacles encountered in Australia in obtaining reliable information about 
the Australian franchise sector generally.  Franchising is the subject of ongoing study 
in the fields of management, marketing, economics and the law, but there is still much 
about this business structure that is poorly understood.  This is evidenced by the 
varied conceptions of the nature of the franchise form reflected in academic research, 
court decisions, and regulatory approaches.  If marketing experts, economists, courts, 
regulators, and lawyers have difficulty in defining franchising, it is understandable 
that prospective franchisees should entertain misperceptions about the nature of this 
complex and multi-faceted relationship.    
As Chapter Three also explained, misguided franchisee motivations can lead to 
conflict. The irony is that, even with disclosure, the myths persist; misleading or 
deceptive conduct is still the most commonly litigated complaint in franchising.  Even 
with disclosure the need for accurate and reliable information persists.    
A franchisee needs balanced and objective information about the franchise 
relationship generally, the business structure, the nature of the franchising contract, 
the role of other documents and related agreements.  One aspect of the relationship 
that is not explained to a franchisee is the nature of the franchise contract as a contract 
that is both standard form and relational.  For a franchisee to understand franchising, 
it would do well to recognize the synergistic effects of the contract characteristics, 
because the combined effect of these qualities has some potentially important and 
fundamental disadvantages to a franchisee.  
Many other aspects of the franchising relationship generally are insufficiently 
understood.  More research is needed about the reasons for franchisees to participate 
in this business form and the risks involved. Blair and Lafontaine observe that, ‘In an 
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economic sense, we know that franchising must be efficient as an organizational form 
since it continues to thrive in competition with other organizational structures.’ But 
they also point out that ‘there are many ways in which franchisor and franchisee needs 
diverge’, creating ‘conflict that undermines the value that cooperation creates.’  
Independently of each other, the standard form and relational qualities of the contract 
contribute to imbalance of power and uncertainty in the relationship.  As Chapter Four 
explained, the power imbalance of the standard form combined with the reliance on 
trust and reciprocity of relational contracting lead to increased inequality of 
bargaining power.  The standard form contract assumes aspects of a ‘commodity’, 
part of the product a franchisor is selling.  This conflicts with the ‘contract as 
relationship’ of the relational quality of the franchise. To accommodate the relational 
nature of the contract, all flexibility and discretion is accorded to a franchisor.  A 
franchisee takes on qualities of consumer of product, rather than an equal party to the 
negotiation of terms.  A franchisor has power, while a franchisee must rely on trust, 
reputation and other factors outside the contract.  Further, the lack of negotiation of 
the contract of the standard form combined with the flexibility, discretion, and 
vaguely defined obligation required by the relational quality of the franchise contract 
mean that a franchisor can manage risk through contract, but a franchisee cannot. A 
franchisor accords flexibility to itself, with specified obligations imposed upon 
franchisee.  Thus, uncertainty for a franchisee is increased.  A franchisee should 
understand how the contract sets up the conditions of imbalance of power and 
uncertainty in the relationship, conditions that regulatory intervention sets as stated 
goals to redress.  This is information that is not disclosed in any way to a prospective 
franchisee.  
6.4.2 Information about a particular franchise system 
In addition to an understanding of franchising generally, a prospective franchisee 
needs information about a particular franchise system in which it may choose to 
participate and invest.  Disclosure is intended to help franchisees make informed 
decisions about whether to buy the rights to participate in a particular franchise 
system.  While disclosure purports to provide a franchisee with the necessary 
information about the nature of the investment and business commitment, however, 
all the information that is most needed is not always provided.  Table 6.1 summarizes 
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the disclosure requirements of the Code with comments on the relationship of the 
disclosure requirements to the contract and the utility of these provisions.   
 
Table 6.1:  Detail of Disclosure Requirements under the Code  
 
Item 
# 
Information Required to be 
Disclosed 
Information contained in 
contract term or new 
information required? 
Related Contract Term, if 
any. 
Comments 
1 If this is a new franchise agreement (not a 
renewal, 
extension or transfer) of an agreement, you 
will be entitled to a 7 day ‘cooling off’ 
period after signing the agreement, during 
which you may terminate the agreement 
without cost. 
No related 
contract term 
There may be non-
refundable investment, 
for example, 
establishment costs, 
leasing, fit-out made 
before the signing of 
the contract (see Item 
13).  Cooling off will 
not provide any 
recourse to the 
franchisee with respect 
to these expenditures. 
2   
 
Details of a franchisor  
Name, ABN, ACN or ARBN, address of 
registered office and principal place of 
business,  
description of the kind of business operated 
under the franchise, name, ABN, ACN or 
ARBN, address of registered office and 
principal place of business of each associate 
of a franchisor;  name, position held and 
qualifications of each director, secretary, 
executive officer, or partner of a franchisor 
likely to have management responsibilities 
Mostly 
information not 
contained in 
the contract.   
 
No related 
contract term 
This information 
should include all 
related businesses.   
3  
 
Business experience  
Relevant business experience in the last 10 
years of each person, other than an 
executive officer, mentioned in item 2.6. 
and of a franchisor  
(a) length of experience in: 
 (i) operating a business substantially the 
same as that of the franchise; and 
(ii) offering other franchises that are 
substantially the same as the franchise; and 
(b) whether a franchisor has offered 
franchises for other businesses and, if so: 
(i) a description of each such business; and 
(ii) for how long a franchisor offered 
franchises for each such business 
New 
information 
 
No related 
contract term 
 
4   
 
Litigation  
Details of: 
(a) current proceedings by a public agency, 
New 
information 
 
Information on current 
proceedings and past 
convictions omits 
 306
criminal or civil proceedings or arbitration, 
relevant to the franchise, against a 
franchisor in Australia alleging: 
(i) breach of a franchise agreement; or (ii) 
contravention of trade practices law; or (iii) 
contravention of the Corporations Law; or 
(iv) unconscionable conduct; or (v) 
misconduct; or 
(vi) an offence of dishonesty; and 
(b) proceedings against a franchisor under: 
(i) section 127A or 127B of the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996; or (ii) section 106 of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1996 of New 
South Wales; or (iii) section 276 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1999 of 
Queensland. 
4.2 Whether a franchisor or a director of a 
franchisor has been: (a) in the last 10 years 
— convicted of a serious offence, or an 
equivalent offence outside Australia; or (b) 
in the last 5 years — subject to final 
judgment in civil proceedings for a matter 
mentioned in paragraph 4.1 (a); or  (c) in the 
last 10 years — bankrupt, insolvent under 
administration or an externally-administered 
body corporate in Australia or elsewhere. 
Include the following details (where 
relevant): 
(a) the names of the parties to the 
proceedings;  (b) the name of the court, 
tribunal or arbitrator; (c) the case number; 
(d) the general nature of the proceedings; 
(e) the current status of the proceedings; (f) 
the date of order or undertaking under 
section 87B of the Act; (g) the penalty or 
damages assessed or imposed; (h) the names 
of the persons who are bankrupt, insolvent 
under administration or externally 
administered; 
(i) the period of the bankruptcy, insolvency 
under administration or external 
administration. 
No related 
contract term 
actions that did not 
result in conviction in 
last 10 years or 
judgments in last 5 
years. Also does not 
include information on 
mediation, though this 
is the Code-mandated 
dispute resolution 
procedure 
5    
 
Payments made to recruiting agents 
For any agreement under which a franchisor 
must pay an amount, or give other valuable 
consideration, to a person who is not an 
officer, director or employee of a franchisor 
in connection with the introduction or 
recruitment of a franchisee — the name of 
the person. 
New 
information 
 
No related 
contract term 
No information given 
on the scope of the 
relationship 
6   
 
Existing franchises and those terminated 
by a franchisor in the last three years 
Number, sorted by State, Territory or 
region, of: 
(a) existing franchised businesses; and (b) 
New 
information 
 
No related 
contract term 
Only the number of 
former franchisees is 
provided - no names, 
addresses or contact 
information or any 
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existing franchisees; and (c) businesses 
owned or operated by a franchisor in 
Australia that are substantially the same as 
the franchise. 
6.2 For each existing franchisee: 
(a) business address, if this is not a 
franchisee’s residential address; and (b) 
business phone number; and (c) year when a 
franchisee started operating the franchised 
business. 
6.3 However, if there are more than 50 
franchises, a franchisor may instead give 
details for all franchisees in the State, region 
or metropolitan area in which the franchise 
is to be operated. 
6.4 For each of the last 3 financial years and 
for each of the following events — the 
number of franchised businesses for which 
the event happened: 
(a) the franchise was transferred;  (b) the 
franchised business ceased to operate; (c) 
the franchise agreement was terminated by a 
franchisor; (d) the franchise agreement was 
terminated by a franchisee; (e) the franchise 
agreement was not renewed when it 
expired; (f) the franchised business was 
bought back by a franchisor; (g) the 
franchise agreement was terminated and the 
franchised business was acquired by a 
franchisor. 
basis upon which to 
obtain further 
information 
7   
  
Details of  trademark, patent, design or 
copyright  
For any trade mark used to identify, and for 
any patent, design or copyright that is 
material to, the franchise system 
(intellectual property): 
(a) description of the intellectual property; 
and (b) details of a franchisee’s rights and 
obligations in connection with the use of the 
intellectual property; and  (c) whether the 
intellectual property is registered in 
Australia, and if so, the registration date, 
registration number and place of 
registration; and  (d) any judgment or 
pending proceedings that could significantly 
affect ownership or use of the intellectual 
property, including:  (i) name of court or 
tribunal; and 
(ii) matter number; and (iii) summary of the 
claim or judgment; and (e) if the intellectual 
property is not owned by a franchisor — 
who owns it; and (f) details of any 
agreement that significantly affects a 
franchisor’s rights to use, or to give others 
the right to use, the intellectual property, 
Most not 
contained in 
contract. 
 
Intellectual 
Property 
Goodwill 
Note that 7.2 provides 
that a franchisor is 
taken to comply with 
item 7.1 for any 
information that is 
confidential if a 
franchisor gives: 
(a) a general 
description of the 
subject matter; and 
(b) a summary of 
conditions for use by a 
franchisee. 
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including: 
(i) parties to the agreement; and (ii) nature 
and extent of any limitation; and (iii) 
duration of the agreement; and 
(iv) conditions under which the agreement 
may be terminated. 
8    
 
Site or Territory  
Details of the franchise territory including: 
  
 whether the franchise is for an exclusive or 
non-exclusive territory or limited to a 
particular site; 
May be in 
contract term 
Scope of Grant 
 
 whether a franchisor or its associates may 
operate a business that is substantially the 
same as the franchise in the franchised 
territory; 
May be in 
contract term 
Scope of Grant 
 
 whether a franchisor or its associates may 
establish other franchises that are 
substantially the same as the franchise in the 
franchised territory; 
May be in 
contract term 
Scope of Grant 
 
 whether you may operate a business that is 
substantially the same as your franchise 
outside the franchised territory; and 
May be in 
contract term 
Scope of Grant 
 
 whether a franchisor may change the 
territory. 
May be in 
contract term 
Scope of Grant 
 
9    
 
Supply of Goods or Services to 
Franchisee  
Details of: 
(a) any requirement for a franchisee to 
maintain a level of inventory or acquire an 
amount of goods or services; and 
(b) restrictions on acquisition of goods or 
services by a franchisee from other sources; 
and 
(c) ownership by a franchisor or an 
associate of a franchisor of an interest in 
any supplier from which a franchisee may 
be required to acquire goods or services; 
and 
(d) the obligation of a franchisee to accept 
goods or services from a franchisor, or from 
an associate of a franchisor; and 
(e) a franchisor’s obligation to supply goods 
or services to a franchisee; and 
(f) whether a franchisee will be offered the 
right to be supplied with the whole range of 
the goods or services of the franchise; and 
(g) conditions under which a franchisee can 
return goods, and to whom; and 
(h) conditions under which a franchisee can 
obtain a refund for services provided by a 
franchisor, and from whom; and 
(i) whether a franchisor may change the 
range of goods or services, and if so, to 
May be in 
contract. 
 
Operations 
Manual 
 
Products and 
Supplies 
Note that restrictions on 
the supply of goods 
may be authorized by 
the ACCC or permitted 
on the basis of a 
notification process. 
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what extent; and 
(j) whether a franchisor, or an associate of a 
franchisor, will receive a rebate or other 
financial benefit from the supply of goods 
or services to franchisees, and whether any 
rebate or financial benefit is shared, directly 
or indirectly, with franchisees. 
 
10   
 
Supply of Goods or Services by 
Franchisee  
Details of: 
(a) restrictions on the goods or services that 
a franchisee may supply; and (b) restrictions 
on the persons to whom a franchisee may 
supply goods or services; and (c) whether a 
franchisee must supply the whole range of 
the goods or services of the franchise.  
 Note that restrictions on 
the supply of goods 
may be authorized by 
the ACCC or permitted 
on the basis of a 
notification process. 
11   
 
Sites or Territories  
The policy of a franchisor, or an associate 
of a franchisor, for selection of as many of 
the following as are relevant: 
(a) the site to be occupied by the franchised 
business; 
(b) the territory in which the franchised 
business is to operate. 
 
11.2 Details of whether the territory or site 
to be franchised has been subject to a 
franchised business operated by a previous 
franchise granted by a franchisor and, if so, 
details of the franchised business, including 
the circumstances in which the 
previous franchisee ceased to operate. 
New 
information 
 
No related 
contract term 
11.3 provides that the 
details mentioned in 
item 11.2 may be in a 
separate document and 
may be made available 
for inspection at a time 
and place mentioned in 
the disclosure 
document.  Effectively, 
this means that a 
franchisee must make a 
special appointment to 
see such information at 
franchisor’s place of 
business or other 
location as designated 
by a franchisor. 
This information about 
the history of the 
performance of the 
franchise location or 
territory is of utmost 
importance and should 
not be made more 
difficult to access by 
requiring the 
prospective franchisee 
to take these extra 
steps, steps which a 
franchisor may in a 
variety of ways 
discourage a franchisee 
from taking. 
12    
 
Marketing & other  
co-operative funds 
For each marketing or other cooperative 
fund, controlled or administered by or for a 
May be in 
contract. 
 
 
See also Reg 17 
 
In addition to (b) 
franchisee needs to be 
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franchisor, to which a franchisee may be 
required to contribute, the following details: 
(a) the kinds of persons who contribute to 
the fund (for  example, franchisee, 
franchisor, outside supplier); 
(b) whether a franchisor must contribute to 
the fund in relation to businesses owned or 
operated by a franchisor that are 
substantially the same as the franchised 
business 
and, if so, whether the contribution is 
worked out in the same way as for a 
franchisee; 
(c) how much a franchisee must contribute 
to the fund and whether other franchisees 
must contribute at a different rate; 
(d) who controls or administers the fund; 
(e) whether the fund is audited and, if so, by 
whom and when; 
(f) whether the fund’s financial statements 
can be inspected by, or will be given to, 
franchisees; 
(g) the kinds of expense for which the fund 
may be used; 
(h) the fund’s expenses for the last financial 
year, including the percentage spent on 
production, advertising, administration and 
other stated expenses; 
(i) whether a franchisor or its associates 
supply goods or services for which the fund 
pays and, if so, details of the goods or 
services; 
(j) whether a franchisor must spend part of 
the fund on marketing, advertising or 
promoting a franchisee’s business. 
 
Payments aware that franchisor 
marketing for this 
franchise system may 
be affected by 
franchisor’s interest in 
other brand(s) 
 
Also note that there is 
no general requirement 
that a franchisor 
promotion must benefit 
the franchisee 
13   
 
Payments  
Prepayments 
13.1 If a franchisor requires a payment 
before the franchise agreement is entered 
into — why the money is required, how the 
money is to be applied and who will hold 
the money. 
13.2 The conditions under which a payment 
will be refunded. 
Establishment costs 
13.3 Details of the range of costs to start 
operating the franchised business, based on 
current practice, for the following matters: 
(a) real property, including property type, 
location and building size; (b) equipment, 
fixtures, other fixed assets, construction, 
remodelling, leasehold improvements and 
decorating costs; (c) inventory required to 
begin operation; 
Not usually in 
contract unless 
in separate 
schedule. 
 
 
 
Payments 
For items 13.4 and 
13.6, if the amount of 
the payment cannot 
easily be worked out — 
the upper and lower 
limits of the amount. 
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(d) security deposits, utility deposits, 
business licences,  insurance and other 
prepaid expenses; (e) additional funds, 
including working capital, required by a 
franchisee before operations begin; (f) other 
payments by a franchisee to begin 
operations. 
13.4 For item 13.3, the details for each 
payment must include: 
(a) description of the payment; and (b) 
amount of the payment or the formula used 
to work out the payment; and (c) to whom 
the payment is made; and(d) when the 
payment is due; and 
(e) whether the payment is refundable and, 
if so, under what conditions. 
Other payments 
13.6 For each recurring or isolated payment 
payable by a franchisee to a franchisor or an 
associate of a franchisor or to be collected 
by a franchisor or an associate of a 
franchisor for another person: (a) 
description of the payment; and (b) amount 
of the payment or formula used to work out 
the payment; and (c) to whom the payment 
is made; and (d) when the payment is due; 
and (e) whether the payment is refundable 
and, if so, under what conditions. 
13.8 If 2 or more of items 13.1, 13.3 and 
13.6 apply to a payment, the information 
required by those items in relation to that 
payment need be set out only once. 
 
14   
 
Financing arrangements 14.1 The material 
conditions of each financing arrangement 
that a franchisor, its agent or an associate of 
a franchisor offers to a franchisee for 
establishment or operation of the franchised 
business. 
14.2 For item 14.1, the material conditions 
of a financing arrangement include the 
following: 
(a) any requirement that a franchisee must 
provide a minimum amount of unborrowed 
working capital for the franchised business; 
(b) any requirement that a franchisee must 
meet a stated debt to equity ratio in relation 
to the franchised business. 
 
Not usually in 
contract unless 
in separate 
schedule. 
 
No related 
contract term 
 
15    
 
Franchisor obligations Summary of the 
conditions of the franchise agreement that 
deal with obligations of a franchisor (or 
references to the relevant conditions of the 
franchise agreement, if attached), including: 
(a) an obligation to provide training: 
In contract.   
Item 23 permits 
franchisor to 
refer to 
agreement in 
lieu of 
This is a summary of 
franchisor obligations 
in the contract. Terms 
and disclosure often 
contain vague language 
with respect to 
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  (i) before the franchised business starts; 
and 
  (ii) during operation of the franchised 
business; and 
(b) any obligation that continues after the 
franchised business ceases to operate 
providing this 
information in 
disclosure. 
 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Training 
franchisor obligations 
to the effect that it will 
be carried out ‘as a 
franchisor deems 
necessary’.  (Also 
reasonableness 
standards frequently 
used) 
16   
 
Franchisee obligations Summary of the 
conditions of the franchise agreement that 
deal with obligations for a franchisee (or 
references to the relevant conditions of the 
franchise agreement, if attached) for the 
following matters: 
(a) site selection and acquisition; (b) 
requirements for starting the franchised 
business; (c) development of the site, 
premises, vehicles and equipment; (d) 
training:    (i) before the franchised business 
starts; and  (ii) during operation of the 
franchised business; (e) opening the 
franchised business; 
(f) complying with standards or operating 
manuals (h) warranties and customer 
service; (i) territorial development and 
minimum performance criteria; (j) 
maintenance and appearance of premises, 
vehicles and equipment; (k) insurance; (l) 
marketing; (m) indemnities and guarantees; 
(n) participation requirements for a 
franchisee or its directors, management or 
employees; (o) records and reports; 
(p) inspections and audit. 
 
In contract.   
Item 23 permits 
franchisor to 
refer to 
agreement in 
lieu of 
providing this 
information in 
disclosure. 
 
 
Minimum 
performance 
criteria 
 
Various other 
contractual 
provisions (see 
column to left) 
(Note: There is no 
Disclosure Item 16(g) 
in the Code) 
17  
 
Summary of other conditions of the 
franchise agreement  
Summary of the conditions of the franchise 
agreement that deal with the following 
matters: 
(a) term of the franchise agreement; 
(b) variation; 
(c) renewal or extension; 
(d) conditions a franchisee must meet to 
renew or extend the franchise agreement; 
(e) termination by a franchisor; 
(f) termination by a franchisee; 
(g) a franchisee’s goodwill, if any, on 
termination or expiry; 
(h) a franchisee’s obligations when a 
franchise agreement is terminated, expires 
or is not renewed; 
(i) a franchisor’s rights to sell its business; 
(j) transfer of a franchise; 
(k) mediation; 
(l) option or right of first refusal, if any, for 
In contract. 
Item 23 permits 
franchisor to 
refer to 
agreement in 
lieu of 
providing this 
information in 
disclosure. 
 
 
Length of term 
and renewal 
period 
 
Advertising 
and  
Marketing 
 
Obligations on 
Expiration or 
This is a summary of 
franchisee obligations 
in the contract.  Very 
lengthy, so that impact 
of any information 
disclosed may be lost. 
For example, one 
firm’s disclosure 
template lists items (a) 
through (s) with item 
(g) regarding franchisee 
goodwill if any upon 
expiry.  This is an item 
of importance that 
should be clearly 
explained, not buried in 
the middle of 19 other 
terms.  Significant 
items grouped together 
in this list include a 
franchisor’s right to sell 
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a franchisor to buy the franchised business; 
(m) a franchisor’s rights, if any, to inspect 
financial and other records of the franchised 
business; 
(n) confidentiality of a franchisee’s records; 
(o) death or disability of a franchisee or a 
director or shareholder of a franchisee; 
(p) details of the operation or establishment 
of any franchisee representative body, eg 
Franchise Advisory Council; 
(q) restrictions on a franchisee’s operation 
of other businesses during or after the term 
of the franchise agreement; 
(r) operations manual; 
(s) choice of governing law. 
Termination 
 
Transfer 
 
Adjustments 
 
its business, conditions 
of renewal, variation, 
restraint of trade and 
others. 
18   
 
Obligation  
to sign related agreements Summary of 
any requirements under the franchise 
agreement for a franchisee or directors, 
shareholders, beneficiaries, owners or 
partners of a franchisee to enter into any of 
the following agreements: 
(a) a lease, sublease, licence or other 
agreement under which a franchisee can 
occupy the premises of the franchised 
business; 
(b) a chattel lease or hire purchase 
agreement; 
(ba) an agreement under which a franchisee 
gains ownership of, or is authorised to use, 
any intellectual property; 
(c) a security agreement, including a 
guarantee, mortgage,security deposit, 
indemnity, loan agreement or obligation to 
provide a bank guarantee to a third party; 
(d) a confidentiality agreement; 
(e) an agreement not to carry on business 
within an area or for 
a time after the franchise agreement is 
terminated. 
 
In contract. 
 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
Goodwill 
 
Restraint of 
Trade 
 
19   
 
Earnings information  
19.1 Earnings information for the franchise, 
if it is given, must be based on reasonable 
grounds. 
19.2 Earnings information may be given in 
a separate document attached to the 
disclosure document. 
19.3 Earnings information includes 
information from which historical or future 
financial details of a franchise can be 
assessed. 
19.4 If earnings information is not given — 
the following statement: 
A franchisor does not give earnings 
No related 
contract term 
Franchisor can opt out 
by statement that it 
does not provide 
earnings information.  
Yet this information is 
obviously central to the 
sale and the decision of 
the prospective 
franchisee to purchase.  
In practice a franchisor 
can circumvent 
regulatory requirements 
and avoid liability for 
Misleading or 
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information about a [insert type of 
franchise] franchise. Earnings may vary 
between franchises. A franchisor cannot 
estimate earnings for a particular franchise. 
19.5 Earnings information that is a 
projection or forecast must include the 
following details: 
(a) the facts and assumptions on which the 
projection or forecast is based; 
(b) the extent of enquiries and research 
undertaken by a franchisor and any other 
compiler of the projection or forecast; 
(c) the period to which the projection or 
forecast relates; 
(d) an explanation of the choice of the 
period covered by the projection or forecast; 
(e) whether the projection or forecast 
includes depreciation, salary for a 
franchisee and the cost of servicing loans; 
(f) assumptions about interest and tax. 
 
deceptive conduct 
through the use of third 
parties that provide 
such information to a 
franchisee, but are 
stated not to be acting 
as agents of a 
franchisor. 
 
If a franchisor does 
provide earnings 
information, it will 
include language to the 
effect that a franchisor 
makes no 
representation or 
warranty as to its 
accuracy or 
completeness. 
20   
 
Financial details  
A statement as at the end of the last 
financial year, signed by at least 1 director 
of a franchisor, whether in its directors’ 
opinion there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a franchisor will be able to pay 
its debts as and when they fall due.   
20.2 Financial reports for each of the last 2 
completed financial years that have been 
prepared by a franchisor in accordance with 
sections 295 to 297 of the Corporations 
Law. 
20.3 Item 20.2 does not apply if: 
(a) the statement under item 20.1 is 
supported by an independent audit provided 
by a registered company auditor within 12 
months after the end of the financial year to 
which the statement relates; and 
(b) a copy of the independent audit is 
provided with the statement under item 
20.1.  
New 
information. 
 
No related 
contract term 
 
21   
 
Updates  
21.1 Any information given under clause 18 
of the code that has changed between the 
date of the disclosure document and the date 
the disclosure document is given under the 
code. 
 
No related 
contract term 
 
22   
 
Other relevant  
disclosure information 
22.1 Copy of proposed franchise agreement 
may be attached. 
22.2 Copy of the code may be attached. 
No related 
contract term 
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22.3 Any other information that: 
(a) a franchisor wants to give; and 
(b) does not contradict information required 
to be given. 
 
23 Provision for acknowledging your receipt of 
the disclosure document. 
NA 
 
No related 
contract term 
 
 A franchisor may attach a copy of the 
franchise agreement to the disclosure 
document. If the agreement itself discloses 
matters listed in Items 15, 16 and 17 above, 
then the disclosure document need only 
refer to their inclusion in the agreement. 
In contract.  
 
6.4.2.1 Disclosure summary 
As Table 6.1 indicates, there are 23 items in Annexure One disclosure, requiring 21 
substantive sets of information from a franchisor.  The table notes where the 
information is provided in the contract as opposed to additional information not in the 
contract.  The disclosure document may be provided at a different date from the 
contract, so it is important that the two documents are consistent.  The following 
contract terms with respect to payments and earnings, site information, supply, and 
advertising illustrate how disclosure requirements may fail to adequately inform a 
franchisee: 
• Payments and earnings information:  Payments and earnings information are 
critical to a franchisee. With respect to earnings information, Disclosure Item 
13 provides that a franchisor can simply state that it does not furnish such 
information.  Not only does this leave an observer to wonder on what basis the 
sale of the business is to be made, but also it raises issues of inconsistency 
with TPA misleading or deceptive conduct provisions (discussed in more 
detail at 6.4.3 below).  For payments required by a franchisee disclosure can 
also be inadequate.  A franchisor is not required to specify all payment 
amounts, but is allowed to provide a range, with upper and lower limits.  
Anecdotal information suggests that franchisors often provide more detailed 
information about payments in final documents that are presented to a 
franchisee to sign on the day at closing than was provided as part of the 
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disclosure process.  If disclosed information changes, the original disclosure is 
not effective in informing a franchisee of the nature of the arrangement.636 
• Site information:  Franchising is a flexible model and there are many ways in 
which a franchisor can structure the legal aspects of a franchisee’s premises 
occupancy.  For example, a franchisor may own the real estate, or it may hold 
the lease and lease or sub-lease to a franchisee, or a franchisee may lease the 
property directly from the owner.  A franchisee should be aware of how the 
nature of the tenancy of the franchised premises may affect his or her 
operation on an ongoing basis and at the end of the franchise relationship.637 
• Intellectual property:  Disclosure requires a franchisor to provide only 
minimal information about its intellectual property.  For any information that 
is confidential a franchisor is permitted by the legislation to provide (a) a 
general description of the subject matter; and (b) a summary of conditions for 
use by a franchisee.  Details about the ownership of and control over the 
intellectual property are significant to a franchisee, but are not required to be 
disclosed.638 
• Franchisee obligations:  Disclosure is not required to offer information about 
franchisee obligations other than what is contained in the contract.  In fact 
Item 23 permits a franchisor to refer to the contract in lieu of providing this 
information in Disclosure Item 17 (Item 23 makes the same provision for 
franchisor obligations required under Disclosure Item 15).   Where it is 
provided as a separate document, Disclosure Item 17 is simply a summary of 
franchisee obligations in the contract.  As franchisee obligations are usually 
extensive, it is lengthy so that the impact of any information disclosed may be 
lost. For example, one solicitor’s disclosure boilerplate lists items (a) through 
                                                 
636 Also, where prepayments are made, it is not always clear whether these are refundable if a 
franchisee decides not to go forward within the seven-day cooling off period.  But a recent case 
interprets the Code to offer significant protections; see Ketchell v Master of Education Services Pty Ltd 
[2007] NSWCA 161 in which the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a franchising agreement 
was illegal because it contravened clause 11 (1) of the Franchising Code of Conduct. 
637 For more information on the structure of retail tenancies in franchising see Jenny Buchan, ‘Who is 
the franchisee contracting with and does it matter anyway?’  51st ICSB World Conference, 2006, 
Melbourne, Australia. 
638 For more information on the importance of disclosure of information with respect to intellectual 
property rights, see Jenny Buchan, Submission to the Minister for Small Business on disclosure in the 
regulation of the franchise sector in Australia (2006). 
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(s) with item (g) regarding franchisee goodwill, if any, upon expiry.  This is 
just one item of importance that should be clearly explained, rather than lost in 
the middle of nineteen other terms.  Other significant items grouped together 
in this list include a franchisor’s right to sell its business, conditions of 
renewal, variation, and restraint of trade.  
• Franchisor reputation:  Because of the high levels of control and discretion 
enjoyed by a franchisor, information about the reputation of a franchisor is 
important information that a franchisee ought to have in making its decision 
about buying a franchise.  This includes information about past business 
endeavours, business associates, and financial track record, some of which is 
provided.   Also of critical importance is the nature of a franchisor’s 
management of the system and the relationships within it.  Franchisees are 
likely to be frustrated in learning about this aspect of a franchisor’s operation.  
One reason is that there is no contact information for franchisees who have 
exited the system.  Disclosure Item 6 requires only that a prospective 
franchisee be informed of the number of franchisees who have exited the 
system in the past three years.  No names, addresses or further information is 
given.  Second, though mediation is the Code-mandated dispute resolution 
procedure, according to the current disclosure requirements, there is no 
information about franchisees in mediation.  The interests of confidentiality in 
mediation compromise prospective franchisees’ ability to obtain information 
and to understand the nature of problems in the sector and in that franchise 
system.  While some commercial franchise consultants do collect comparative 
information about franchise systems to share with their clients, this 
information is patchy, and may be prohibitively expensive for many 
franchisees.  There has been no successful, centralized effort at gathering data 
about the reputations of franchisor systems that could be made publicly 
available. As Gillian Hadfield testified as expert witness to expert witness at 
the Ontario [Canada] public hearings in 2000, 
‘They [government] can support the reputation mechanisms and can do 
that by supporting the flows of information, by allowing information to 
flow. It's important for the stories about what franchisors have done and 
what franchisees have experienced to be out there and available at low 
cost to potential franchisees, so that they can make judgments about what 
to do, because that's what provides the check on franchisor behaviour that 
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will in the end probably be most effective. That's really what makes the 
reputation mechanism that says, "Look, a franchisor's not going to cheat 
their franchisees because they won't be able to sell franchises." For that to 
work, that information has to be flowing. That's what you want 
franchisors to be doing, is paying attention to that...’ 639 
 
The 2006 Review of Disclosure Item 8 recommended that the Code ‘be amended to 
require not just the numbers but also names, location and contact details…’  The 
government's response was that the Code should be amended ‘to allow franchisors to 
provide details of names, location and contact details where consent has been 
obtained and where that information is available to the franchisor.’640   Italics has 
been added to highlight that this will be a permissive provision and not a requirement 
of franchisors, and will only operate where a franchisor has made an effort to keep 
such information and has sought and obtained consent.  All this seems highly 
unlikely, when providing the information is not in a franchisor’s interest in the first 
place. 
6.4.2.2 Providing the needed information where contracts are relational  
Relational contracts are not amenable to regulation by disclosure because, as Chapter 
Four outlined, they reflect the uncertainty of the long term largely through the use of 
open-ended terms, flexibility and discretion.641  The relational qualities of flexibility 
and discretion mean that there are significant aspects of the contractual relationship 
that are left to be arranged by the parties over time.  Because these aspects are not 
specified, much of the ‘deal’ remains to be determined and therefore cannot be 
disclosed.  The fact that the terms cannot be disclosed, however, does not mean that  a 
franchisee cannot be apprised of the significance of the discretion left to a franchisor 
in these unspecified aspects of the contractual arrangement. 
                                                 
639 Gillian K. Hadfield, Expert Testimony , Legislative Assembly of Ontario, March 8, 2000 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/gillian_hadfield_value_reputation_systems> at 9 September 2007. 
640 See the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007 and the Australian Government Response to the Review of the 
Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
641 I. Ayres and R. Gertnert, ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’ 
(1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 729. 
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6.4.3 Monitoring to ensure reliability 
Though informational regulation is largely self-regulatory, the regulator has a 
continuing role in monitoring the ability of participants in the sector to adequately 
perform their self-regulatory functions.  Just as franchisors collectively have an 
interest in marketing franchising as a business opportunity, each individual franchisor 
is in the business of selling franchises and so has an interest in projecting a positive 
image.  The lack of registration or monitoring of disclosure documents increases any 
franchisor temptation to provide more favourable information than it warranted, or to 
leave out select details. A franchisor may also minimise the importance of the 
disclosed information in discussions with a franchisee.   
Misleading or deceptive conduct under section 52 of the Trade Practices Act (the 
TPA) is the most commonly-litigated complaint in franchising,642 even though 
disclosure is the primary regulatory tool of the Code.  The Code and TPA section 52 
actually conflict with rather than complement each other because the Code allows a 
franchisor to decline to provide earnings information, while failure to disclose 
material information can constitute a breach of TPA section 52.643  A franchisor 
typically protects against the risk of a TPA section 52 breach by requiring a franchisee 
to sign a deed of representation,644 as well as through contractual provisions that may 
include a merger clause,645  and/or a clause that states that the ‘sales representative is 
not our agent’.646   Together these measures form multiple barriers to successful 
claims by franchisees of misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of a franchisor in 
                                                 
642 Some cases litigated on claims of breach of section 52 of the TPA since the adoption of the Code 
include  Australian Billboard Connections Pty. Ltd v Jansen  [2000] VSC 471,  ACCC v Billbusters 
[2003] FCA 423, ACCC v Will Writers Guild Pty Ltd (2003) FCA 1231 and ACCC v Ewing [2004] 
2204 FCA 5.  Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 LAR 553, Fed Ct of Aust (Barbara’s House & Garden), 
Borderland Investments Pty Ltd v Theiss Toyota Pty Ltd (now known as Toyota Motor Sales Australia 
Ltd) (1987) VG 385, Crawford & Ors v Parish (1992) ATPR (Digest) 46-087, Novamaze v Cut Price 
Deli (1995) 128 ALR 540, and  Haynes & Anor v Top Slice Deli Pty Limited & Ors (1995) ATPR 
(Digest) 46-147. 
643 Earnings information is material information; not even a naïve and inexperienced franchisee would 
purchase a franchise without formulating some idea of expected earnings.   
644 The Deed of Representation that many franchisees are now required to sign states in essence that in 
making the decision to enter the agreement, a franchisee has not relied on any information provided by 
a franchisor  
645 Also known as a ‘whole agreement’ or ‘integration clause’, the ‘merger clause’ is a clause that is 
included in most franchise contracts.  The clause states that the writing constitutes the sole and final 
agreement between the parties.   
646 See Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 131, aka the Lenard’s 
case. 
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recruitment and negotiation.647   The result is that franchisees are recipients of 
information upon which they cannot rely, as ‘…a franchisor may provide a disclosure 
document in accordance with the Code but be found by a court to have represented or 
warranted little at all.’648  The Code disclosure requirements, when taken together 
with the risk of misleading or deceptive conduct under TPA section 52, create an 
incentive for franchisors to disclose required information but to do so in such a way 
that a franchisee cannot later claim to have relied upon the information.  Rather than 
reinforcing the Code, TPA section 52 may actually diminish the utility of disclosure. 
There are also procedural inconsistencies in enforcement of the Code of Conduct and 
TPA misleading and deceptive conduct provisions.  In principle both are enforceable 
by the parties themselves or by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (the ACCC).  In practice, as the regulatory agency charged with 
administering the Trade Practices Act the ACCC administers and enforces mandatory 
industry codes established pursuant to TPA section 51AD, unless the enabling 
legislation provides otherwise.649   Subject to external review by Courts, Tribunals, 
Parliament, independent reviews and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the ACCC 
handles inquiries on all aspects of the Code; it is responsible for education about and 
enforcement of the Code, as well as many other federal regulations that affect 
franchising, such as consumer protection and competition law.  The enabling 
legislation does provide that private parties may also bring an action for breaches of 
the Code.  Other sections dealing with misleading conduct, such as TPA section 59, 
provide for criminal penalties in case of breach; these would be enforced by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).    
It should be noted that there are ways in which the Code and the TPA do support each 
other.  For example, where the Code requires a franchisor to give reasons for 
termination, if these reasons demonstrate unconscionability, an action will lie under 
TPA section 51AC.  To summarize, however, reliable information that is needed by a 
franchisee to make disclosure function as it is intended is not always assured or made 
                                                 
647 Most recently, the Lenard’s case involved misleading or deceptive conduct under TPA section 52 of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and the extent to which the operation of  TPA section 52 can 
be circumvented by disclaimers and “entire agreement” clauses.  
648 Des Giugni, ‘Standards of Franchising Disclosure: The Disclosure Document’ (1998-99) 
Franchising Law and Policy Review 84. 
649 Original proposals envisioned a new, separate administrative body to oversee the Code.  Such a 
body was not set up.  
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available to a franchisee.  There is no monitoring, no registration and the Code is not 
designed so that it is reinforced substantively and procedurally by TPA section 52 
6.4.4 Accessibility and useability 
Continuing with the requirement that reliable information should be obtained and 
disseminated in a form that is accessible and useable by a franchisee,650 the next 
section evaluates the regulation of franchising in Australia for the qualities of 
accessibility and ‘useability’.  Accessibility may be compromised by the use of 
obscure language or ‘legalese’ and discrepancies in legal advice. For several reasons, 
as discussed in Chapter Four, franchisees often fail to secure adequate legal 
representation and advice and so they operate at a disadvantage, not only with respect 
to their understanding of the contract but also disclosure and other documents such as 
hire-purchase agreements, leases and security agreements. Disclosure documents 
written by franchisors’ lawyers often employ formalized language that a franchisee is 
not likely to be able to use if it does not understand.  Such language may not be 
intended to confuse a franchisee,  
‘One of the limitations of disclosure is the difficulty of drafting simplistic, 
understandable descriptions of the structure and operations of business 
organizations that are today more complex than at any other time in history.’651   
The primary purpose of a solicitor’s drafting of disclosure documents, however, is not 
to inform a franchisee as a consumer in making a decision, but rather to protect the 
drafting party, its franchisor client, from liability.652    
Other factors that have the potential to detract from franchisees’ ability to access and 
use information are physical accessibility, presentation and inappropriate timing.  In 
some cases a franchisee must make an appointment to view certain information at a 
franchisor’s place of business.   This is expressly permitted by the Code with respect 
to critical information about past performance of the particular unit or territory.653     
                                                 
650  For the purposes of this paper, liberty has been taken with Tietenberg’s functions two and three, 
which are here collapsed into one function; a requirement of reliable information disseminated an 
accessible and useable form.   
651 Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 148. 
652 Id., 186. 
653 Franchising Code of Conduct, Disclosure Item 11. 
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Timing in the provision of information is another difficult issue; information may be 
provided too early to engage a franchisee or it may come too late, when a franchisee 
feels committed and has made specific investments and when confirmation bias 
prevents a franchisee from making use of the information.  Most jurisdictions that 
require disclosure specify a time period to allow a franchisee reasonable time to 
review the information, typically from seven to twenty days.654  The recruitment 
process, however, can take months.  There can be a considerable amount of time and 
psychological investment in the deal by the time disclosure is introduced.655    
Franchisee inexperience and state of mind can further impair the ‘useability’ of the 
disclosed information.  Prospective franchisees often lack the sophistication and 
awareness necessary to properly assimilate and benefit from the information 
disclosed, particularly as many are inexperienced in business.656  Most franchisees 
have never signed or even seen a franchise contract before.   Their lack of skills to 
decipher what the information means or how to use it effectively can have debilitating 
consequences when franchisees are faced with large amounts of information.  Lengthy 
and complex disclosure may impede rather than facilitate decision-making.   
Further limits to franchisees’ ability to use information include psychological factors 
such as optimism and overconfidence.   Studies show that people often have higher 
expectations of their own abilities than are justified by objective tests.657  A 
prospective franchisee may look at an underperforming location and be overconfident 
in his or her ability to overcome obstacles.  Studies also show that overconfidence can 
lead people to believe they have better-than-average abilities to judge character so that 
they substantially overrate their own capacity to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
others.658  These factors can prevent a franchisee from realistic assessment of its 
                                                 
654 The longest, 20 days, is required in France.  Brazil requires 10 days, Italy 15 days.  US states’ 
requirements vary.  In Australia, the franchise disclosure must be provided 14 days before the contract 
is signed. 
655 Accenture presentation conducted at Franchise Council of Australia Conference, Melbourne 2004.  
Of about 10-11 steps in the recruitment/sales process, contract is introduced in around the third quarter. 
656  The Deloitte Franchisee Satisfaction Survey (2004) Deloitte 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D5527%2526cid%253D83960,00.html> at 
15 August 2005.   
657 Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 163-176. 
658 Ibid. 
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future business partner.659  Finally, confirmation bias, the tendency to give greater 
weight to information that confirms existing opinions, creates a tendency to discount 
new information, and so prevents a franchisee from effectively using disclosure.660 
6.4.5 Summary of problems with respect to reliability, accessibility and useability  
To summarize, there is a variety of limitations of disclosure with respect to the 
reliability, accessibility and useability of the disclosed information.  First, the 
information a franchisee needs is not always provided. This includes information 
about franchising generally as a business form and about the particular franchise 
system.  General information should include information about the nature of the 
market interaction and the ramifications of the standard form and relational 
characteristics of contract. Specific information should include information a 
franchisee needs about payments and earnings, site information, intellectual property, 
franchisee obligations and franchisor reputation. Other problems with reliability are 
the lack of monitoring to ensure compliance, and difficulties in enforcement, for 
example because Code disclosure is inconsistent with misleading or deceptive 
conduct provisions of the TPA.  Accessibility can be compromised by the language of 
disclosure as well as presentation and timing.  ‘Useability’ is impaired because 
franchisees are often inexperienced and naïve about business practices and are not 
‘rational actors’ in their use of the information.  For all these reasons the disclosed 
information is not as reliable, accessible or as useable as possible for optimum 
effectiveness of disclosure. 
6.5 OPTIONS TO ACT 
The final function of effective informational regulation is to ensure that the recipient 
has options to act on the information. This is a major obstacle to the effective 
operation of informational regulation of franchising.  Fundamentally, disclosure 
works by helping a recipient of information 1) to negotiate and/or 2) to find 
alternatives in the market.  For disclosure in the regulation of franchising to function 
effectively, then, a franchisee must be able to negotiate and/or to find alternatives.  
                                                 
659 This may not be the way that a franchisee should see the role of a franchisor, as the contract states 
that they are not partners.  Many do see it that way, however, in part because that is how the 
relationship is often marketed by franchisors. 
660 Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 163-176. 
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The standard form and relational characteristics of a franchise contract detract from 
the efficacy of disclosure by impairing the ability of a franchisee to act on the 
disclosed information both to negotiate and to find alternatives.   
First, standard form contracting implies an imbalance of negotiating power.  In a 
situation where a franchisor writes the contract and does not allow negotiation of 
contract terms, a franchisee is unable to act in the negotiation process even if it has the 
necessary information.   Disclosure may have the potential to ‘level the playing field’, 
but it is less effective if a franchisee cannot use the information to bargain.   
Since the standard form forecloses the possibility of negotiation, the main function of 
disclosure in the franchising context is to enable a franchisee to make alternative 
selections in the market.  Disclosure, however, can be effective in this way only if a 
franchisee has options.  Investors and consumers, for example, can compare what is 
on offer in the market, and can easily find alternatives.  The problem is that there may 
not be many viable alternatives.   First, it may be that a franchisee may not be able to 
find a substitutable product.  As the court found in a US case,   
 ‘[the] unique nature of [the subject of the contract] meant that plaintiffs were 
not able to go elsewhere and seek different terms…. Where goods and services 
can only be obtained from one source (or general sources on non-competitive 
terms) the choices of one who desires to purchase are limited to acceptance of 
the terms offered or doing without.’ 661 
A franchisee is likely to find itself in a similar position in buying a franchise.  
Branding is critical in franchising; because the essence of business format franchising 
lies in the qualities of that particular brand, the choice of a particular franchise may 
not be substitutable for a franchisee.  Even if it is, standard terms are widely used 
across the franchise sector, and so there are limited alternatives in the market for 
contract terms.   
It may be also that a franchisee is not able to use disclosure to find alternatives in the 
market because of the timing of disclosure.  Daniel Barnhizer discusses this problem 
and the court interpretation of the bargaining positions of the parties to a contract, 
‘Given the dynamic, changing nature of parties' developing preferences and 
subjective desires between the initial moment of desire and the execution of a 
contract, the key to assessing bargaining power on the basis of meaningfulness 
of alternatives often depends upon the time frame in which the court assesses 
those desires.  …some courts assess the alternatives available before that party 
actually decided to enter a contract with the allegedly stronger party. This 
                                                 
661 123 California Reporter 2d 288, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 293. 
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approach maximizes the possible alternatives that the allegedly weaker party 
could have explored rather than accept the proffered terms and generally 
justifies a conclusion that the apparently weaker party did not lack meaningful 
alternatives.’662 
Late disclosure can impair a franchisee’s ability to act on the information because it 
reduces the latitude for substitution of alternatives in the market. Not only is there a 
considerable amount of time and psychological investment in the deal by the time the 
contract is introduced, but also there is less latitude for substitution of other products 
in the market.  If disclosure fails to coincide with the time that a franchisee may be 
comparing alternatives, it cannot help a franchisee with this function.  If, in the 
process of entering franchising, a franchisee does make comparisons, by the time a 
franchisee receives the disclosure document, it is likely to have passed the stage of 
comparing franchise systems.  At the stage where a franchisee may be comparing 
different franchise systems, because there is no registration of disclosure documents, a 
franchisor’s disclosure information is not available to help a franchisee to make 
comparisons.  
In addition to the problems raised by the standard form, the relational quality of the 
contract impairs the ability of a franchisee to use the information.  There are two 
fundamental reasons why a relational contract is not conducive to regulation by 
disclosure.  First, a relational contract emphasizes the ‘trust us’ aspect of the 
relationship, and so detracts from the psychological importance of franchisee due 
diligence.   Second, the relational qualities of flexibility and discretion leave 
significant aspects of the contractual relationship to be arranged by the parties over 
time.  Obviously, since these aspects are not specified they cannot be disclosed at the 
time of contract formation.   
The character of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee varies with the 
stage of operation of both the individual franchise unit and the system, in addition to 
external influences.  While contract formation, the target of disclosure, is a critical 
stage, performance of the contract extends over a period of many years.  A relational 
contract is not conducive to regulation by disclosure because the relational quality of 
the franchise contract is inconsistent with the regulatory focus on formation.  As 
Gillian Hadfield noted, the focus on the unequal bargaining power between franchisor 
                                                 
662 Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 University of Colorado Law 
Review 139, 204. 
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and franchisee at the time the contract is "negotiated" fails to address the fact that ‘the 
difficulties in franchising arise in the ongoing exercise of power in the gaps of the 
incomplete contract.’663 
To summarize, the third set of limitations of disclosure as a tool to regulate the 
franchise sector involves the ability of franchisees to act on the disclosed information.  
The contract is standard form, and so impairs the use of information to negotiate and 
to find alternatives.  The contract is relational; it emphasizes trust over due diligence; 
also, it leaves contract terms unspecified, and therefore impossible to disclose. 
6.6 ENHANCING DISCLOSURE 
6.6.1 Measures to better gauge the risks 
There are potential solutions to problems with the insufficiency of information needed 
to gauge the risks that regulation should address.  Several avenues are available to 
obtaining more meaningful measurements to inform regulatory process generally. 
These include cooperation with legitimate, independent research initiatives; better 
information from franchisees and franchisors, through, for example, the use of an 
intranet; better studies and surveys that accurately reflect all stakeholders’ interests;  ;  
fuller representation of stakeholders on consultative panels; and more complete 
information from dispute processes, especially the Code-mandated process of 
mediation. 
Industry leaders and regulators should encourage more independent research about the 
sector. In this respect there are some franchising organizations that can serve as 
models.  The European Franchise Federation (the EFF) lists as its objects the 
coordination of the national organizations, unbiased and scientific study and the 
dissemination of that information; it outlines in some detail how it approaches its 
‘scientific, pedagogic, informational and ethical objectives’.664  The French Franchise 
Federation (the FFF) actively supports academic research,665 and the FFF and the 
                                                 
663 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts’ (1990) 
42 Stanford Law Review 927, n 262. 
664 Article 3.3 of the Statutes of the Federation (2001)   <http://www.eff-
franchise.com/EFF%20statutes%20of%20the%20federation_ENG%20version.pdf> at 26 December 
2006. 
665 ‘Fédération Française de la Franchise (the FFF), <http://www.franchise-fff.com> at 10 March 2007. 
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American ‘International Franchise Association’ (the IFA)666 also actively support the 
unification of franchisor and franchisee interests, perhaps most importantly by 
unifying them as members in one association.     
One place to look for information about problems in the sector in some countries is on 
the Internet in the form of chat groups and blogs.  There is no resource of this kind for 
Australian franchisees perhaps due to the risk of defamation.  In Canada Gillian 
Hadfield testified that,  
‘...by mandating participation in an Internet Web site that publicizes information 
about the experience of franchisees with particular franchisors, that prospective 
franchisees could then access in order to assess, just as they're assessing 
investment levels and how you've been in this, so that the information is there. 
At the end of the day, I think that's one of the most effective things we can 
do.’667 
 
6.6.2 Measures to enhance the reliability, accessibility and ‘useability’ of 
disclosure 
Giving a franchisee the right information involves better informing prospective 
franchisees about the nature of the sector and the nature of the franchising relationship 
generally, as well as the inherent risks for participants in the sector, particularly for 
franchisees.  A franchisee needs a better understanding of the nature of this business 
form as it is exemplified in the characteristics of the contractual relationship that is 
standard form and relational, and the general qualities and characteristics of the 
contract terms.  Such information would help a franchisee in making a decision about 
whether to purchase a franchise or to operate an independent small business.  Further, 
it could have some influence on which franchise to purchase.  If this information is to 
be provided, it could be through educational initiatives that involve franchisors, 
                                                 
666 The International Franchising Association (the IFA) is the primary industry group in the US  The 
IFA’s new self-regulation program offers an ‘effective alternative to litigation and legislation, both of 
which are costly, time-consuming and potentially destructive to franchising’.  An important aspect is 
that it integrates franchisors and franchisees within the organization, enabling cooperation among 
interested parties to find effect solutions apart from litigation and government regulation.  Other related 
initiatives include streamlined enforcement; an ombudsman who, in the case of a dispute serves as the 
first point of contact; a reward/recognition program; and new educational programs (especially on-line 
education) to serve the needs of both franchisors and prospect franchisees.  See the International 
Franchise Association, IFA Self Regulation Program (2005) International Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchise.org/content.asp?contentid=770> at 31 December 2005. 
667 Gillian K. Hadfield, Expert Testimony , Legislative Assembly of Ontario, March 8, 2000 
<http://www.bluemaumau.org/gillian_hadfield_value_reputation_systems> at 9 September 2007. 
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franchisees and the regulator on an ongoing basis, rather than being limited to the 
franchisor/franchisee interaction at the time of entering the contract.   
Giving a franchisee the right information also raises the issue of the need for the right 
information to be provided about the particular franchise system. The risks must be 
identified in order to determine what information a franchisee needs to make its 
decision.  What is needed is a participative process to better determine the nature and 
extent of the risks to both parties in the relationship and the best ways to address 
them.   
Earnings information should be provided to a franchisee in a way that is consistent 
with both the Code and TPA section 52.  Under TPA section 52, failure to provide 
material information can constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.  If a franchisor 
still does not disclose earnings information, a franchisee should not simply be 
required to sign a document to this effect and a Deed of Representation to the effect 
that a franchisee has not relied.  This provides a franchisee with little recourse when 
earnings do not meet those it has been led to expect through oral representations, 
inferences and agents’ representations. Instead, a franchisee should include a 
statement of what information it does rely upon in making the decision to purchase 
the licence.   
With respect to payments or any other information that is supposed to be disclosed, if 
this information is contained in the final contract but not in disclosure documents, this 
omission amounts to non-compliance with disclosure requirements, and there should 
be procedures for monitoring and enforcement of the regulation to deter non-
compliance.668  Site information should include disclosure to a franchisee about the 
nature of the legal entities involved and what rights these entities hold in a variety of 
circumstances, including transfer, termination, and franchisor insolvency.669    
Particular information a franchisee needs about the franchise system also includes 
information about the reputation of a franchisor.  Some of this information can be 
provided by a franchisor in disclosure, such as the number and nature of mediations in 
which they have been involved (in addition to the information that already must be 
                                                 
668 Personal interview with former Tweed Heads Lenard’s franchisee, Samantha Gow, Gold Coast, 
January 2006. 
669 For more detailed research on these issues see Jenny Buchan, Submission to the Minister for Small 
Business on disclosure in the regulation of the franchise sector in Australia (2006). 
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provided about ongoing litigation) and contact information for franchisees who are, 
for one reason or another, no longer with the system.  Another aspect of this 
information, however, can only be provided by participants in the market, in particular 
by franchisees, but also by suppliers, other stakeholders and third parties, for example 
on the Internet through consumer organizations.  Provision of information through the 
market may require regulator intervention; to the extent it happens commercially, the 
information will probably not be widely available and will be less available to the 
prospective franchisees that most need it.  As Hadfield testified, it is important that 
the information be available at low cost to prospective franchisees.670 
In franchising, because negotiation is not generally available, the principal reason for 
disclosure of information is to enable a franchisee to find alternatives in the market.  
Here reputation offers several advantages; it is available early; it can be made widely 
available; and it can be used for comparison, whereas disclosure is only available 
relatively late in the decision process and for the one system, so it has less value as a 
comparative tool.  
Reputation including business history, dispute resolution trends, and so on constitutes 
critical information needed by any prospective franchisee about the franchise. Such 
information reveals how franchisees see a franchisor and how a franchisor handles 
relationships and the management of the system. Reputation as a market regulatory 
instrument to supplement disclosure thus benefits quality franchise systems and the 
sector.  Currently, providing disclosure to individual, prospective franchisees reduces 
franchisor risk of liability, but is not a source of marketing benefits to a franchisor.  
This is an important function that can benefit the brand.  Market power of 
corporations rests on established reputation of the brand.  Goodwill provides 
insurance against risks of innovation.671   By enhancing the importance of reputation 
in the sales process, a high-quality franchisor stands to gain and where better quality 
franchisors gain, the image of the sector should improve as well.  Thus, improved 
regulation has the potential to enhance the quality of franchising overall to enhance 
franchisors’ marketing efforts for the sector.    
                                                 
670 Gillian K. Hadfield, Expert Testimony , Legislative Assembly of Ontario, March 8, 2000 
http://www.bluemaumau.org/gillian_hadfield_value_reputation_systems at9 September 2007. 
671 William van Caenegem, ‘Striking a Balance between Protecting Commercial Reputation and 
Promoting Competition’ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 598.  
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Monitoring and enforcement of the Code has been a subject of complaint by 
franchisees.672  The 2006 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct found that, ‘The administration of the Code by the ACCC is a key 
element in ensuring that franchisors are complying with the disclosure provisions of 
the Code.’ The Review noted, however, that, ‘A number of submissions from 
franchisees expressed concern about the level and extent of action by the ACCC to 
deal with claims of breaches of the Code by franchisors.’673  If the Code is to be 
effective, there must be adequate capacity by the regulator to enforce the Code where 
necessary.    
In France and in the US there are penalties for non-compliance with disclosure.  In 
Australia there are penalties for providing false or misleading information under TPA 
misleading or deceptive conduct provisions, but, though TPA section 51AD states that 
a breach of the Code amounts to a breach of the TPA itself, there are no fines 
prescribed for failure to comply with the Code.674  In sum the regulation of 
franchising in Australia needs more effective and comprehensive enforcement, 
monitoring and review procedures.   
Standardization of procedures regarding measurement and collection methods for 
disclosed information could help assure disclosure of reliable information.  In order to 
ensure consistency with misleading or deceptive conduct provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act, some measures to improve operation of regulation in this area would be 
to harmonize enforcement and interpretation of misleading or deceptive conduct and 
the Code disclosure; if necessary, revise regulation to extend the coverage of principal 
legislation; and increase enforcement and monitoring.   
Because the language of disclosure in some cases may be confusing, further measures 
can help to ensure franchisee access to legal advice.  If franchisees are to understand 
                                                 
672 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
673 See Recommendation 24 of the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
674 The penalties for breaching this section include:  Injunction under s80 of TPA; and Damages under 
s82 of TPA (an applicant can claim damages if they can show that they have suffered loss or damage as 
a result of the respondent breaching s51AD). 
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the terms of a franchise contract without having to consult with a lawyer, a ‘plain 
language’ requirement could be included in the legislation.675 Franchisors could be 
required to construct the documents so that they are intelligible to prospective 
franchisees that may be inexperienced in business and/or lack a legal background.   
Educational programs are needed to help franchisees use disclosed information.  
Education is a critical component of the success of participative processes, and 
complements disclosure as a regulatory tool.676  The focus of regulatory intervention 
is on the supply side, but the fact that recipients are often inexperienced and naïve 
about business practices indicates a need for regulation to better address the demand 
side, that of a franchisee.  Another option, then, is a collective effort within a 
franchisee community to provide education to prospective franchisees.  This, 
however, assumes the existence of a franchisee community, a ‘contracting 
community’ that currently does not exist.  
Further assurances of physical accessibility and proper timing of disclosure can be 
instituted.  The extra step of requiring a franchisee to make an appointment to visit a 
franchisor’s office or other locations to view disclosed information should be 
eliminated if it is not justified by a legitimate need to protect confidentiality of 
information that cannot be ensured through other means such as a franchisee signing a 
confidentiality agreement upon receipt of disclosure.  As previously discussed, it may 
be beneficial to many franchisees to provide disclosure earlier, possibly through 
staged disclosure.677 
Because disclosure does little to enhance a franchisee’s ability to negotiate, there is 
greater emphasis on disclosure’s other key role, that of increasing a franchisee’s 
ability to make alternative selections in the market.  When it does choose to enter a 
contract, a franchisee needs education and guidance about the arrangement. Education 
complements disclosure, so that franchisees are better equipped to understand and to 
                                                 
675 Please refer to Chapter Seven’s overview of tools used to regulate the franchise sector in other 
jurisdictions, but the author is not aware of a plain language requirement in any other jurisdiction at the 
time of this writing. 
676 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (1998). 
677 Also, disclosure can be organized to better address specific needs for information.  There might be a 
Part A, General System disclosure; Part B, General disclosure for all operators at each level of the 
system; Part C, State disclosure with organizational chart; and Part D, Specific Unit disclosure.  See 
Jenny Buchan, Submission to the Minister for Small Business (2006). 
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act on the information.  Currently, disclosure may not protect a franchisee, partly 
because there is no explanation of the risks involved with particular contract terms.  
The Franchise Council of Australia (the FCA) website offers some information for 
prospective franchisees, the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) sells 
books on franchising,678  and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(the ACCC) offers A Franchisee's Guide which explains the application of the Code 
of Conduct.679   It is probably ill-advised to rely on franchisors for this function at this 
time, but disclosure might safely serve both functions if it were monitored and there 
was in place a procedure for registration.  Much of the information that is needed 
could be provided through a process of collaboration in educational initiatives that 
involve franchisors, franchisees and the regulator, and not by the particular 
prospective franchisor as part of the contracting process.  There is a role for the 
regulator to coordinate collaborative initiatives to improve educational programs by 
the regulator or associations.680   
6.6.2.1 Registration of disclosure 
Registration of disclosure documents is required in about fourteen US states.681  
Malaysia also requires filing of disclosure documents.  Registration of disclosure 
documents increases transparency in regulatory process, allows the possibility of 
comparison, and supports a market for terms and other collaborative processes of 
regulation.   It also provides important baseline data about the sector as a whole.  In 
the US, ‘Using these documents has generated a volume of highly reliable data 
unmatched in any prior survey-based studies.’682  In Australia such information could 
prove invaluable in identifying the problems in the sector, formulating regulatory 
goals, and in selecting the appropriate tools to achieve them.   
                                                 
678 See Small Business Development Corporation Online Bookshop 
<http://www.sbdc.com.au/bookshop/bookshop.asp> at 5 December 2006. 
679 Available on the ACCC website - Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, A 
franchisee's guide: a guide to the Franchising Code of Conduct (2001) Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/304784> at 31 December 
2005.  
680 For more on the synergistic effects of education coupled with disclosure see Neil Gunningham, 
Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998). 
681 The Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
682Deacons on Franchise Legislation (2006) Franchisebusiness.com.au 
<http://www.franchisebusiness.com.au/articles/FC/0C0402FC.aspx> at 10 July 2006. 
 333
Registration was recommended by the 2006 the Review of the Disclosure Provisions 
of the Franchising Code of Conduct.  The Review found that,  
‘A number of franchisees advised the Committee that they had not been given 
disclosure documents at all whilst some others advised that the disclosure 
document they had received was not in accordance with the Code. Additionally 
many of the concerns raised in the submissions may have been overcome if the 
degree of compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Code was improved. 
The Committee formed the view that to address this issue, the registration of 
franchisors and review of a sample of disclosure documents should be 
introduced.’683 
The government did not agree to carry out this recommendation, stating that,   
‘Decisions relating to the viability and associated risks of any business venture are 
ultimately the decision of the businesses themselves.’  The government also expressed 
concerns about the burden that registration would place on the regulator, 
‘Registration of the franchisors and their disclosure documents could be seen as 
providing credibility to their claims and ACCC endorsement. The ACCC would 
not be in a position to ensure the quality nor the substance of the documents. 
The cumulative paperwork and compliance burden upon franchisors is likely to 
be significant and would be at odds with the Government's policy of reducing 
the regulatory burden on business, where possible.’ 684 
The Government noted, apparently by way of vitiating the need for registration of 
disclosure, that the Franchise Council of Australia had announced a national 
franchise-accreditation scheme. As of this writing there is no information publicly 
available to non-members of the FCA regarding the scheme, and no indication of 
when and how it might be implemented.685   Registration would probably not be more 
burdensome on franchisors, as they already prepare the disclosure documents; it 
would mean an increased responsibility for the regulator, but the benefits are 
significant.    
                                                 
683 See Recommendation 23, the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
684 Australian Government Response to the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, February 2007,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Response_to_Recommendations_(Final)06F
eb0720070206091019.pdf> at14 May 2007. 
685 The only information available from a general search of the Internet was a  US Commercial Service 
first issue of the bi-annual Franchising Update, inaugural issue, January 2006. 
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6.6.3 Measures to ensure participants’ ability to act on the information 
The third issue, the fact that franchisees cannot act on the information, is perhaps the 
most difficult to address, but there are ways to improve a franchisee’s ability to act on 
the disclosed information and so to help achieve the purpose of disclosure generally, 
which is to allow the recipient to act on the information through negotiation and/or 
choice of alternatives in the market.   
The concept of a ‘market for terms’ has been posited as a means to balance bargaining 
positions where standard form contracts are used. If a franchisee does not agree to the 
terms, it can in theory ‘enter the market through alternative means.’686    According to 
this theory the contract is part of the package a franchisor is selling; and in a 
competitive market, consumers can shop around for the supplier that offers the most 
favourable terms.   A franchisor might, for example, market the franchise system by 
ensuring prospective franchisees that, unlike our competitors, ‘our contract gives you 
peace of mind with respect to termination, encroachment, etc. …’ and/or ‘our contract 
ensures fair, efficient conflict management and dispute resolution processes’.   The 
market for terms/contract-as-sales tool offers a variety of potential benefits, such as 
engendering contracting parties’ awareness of their rights and obligations under the 
contract, and reducing the incidence of unfair surprise.   It can supplement consumer 
education about the nature of the contract, as it would increase both franchisors’ and 
franchisees’ attentiveness to contract terms from the outset. Further, by bringing 
business people back into their own contracts, the roles of both solicitors and 
regulators may be trimmed, thus making the contract more relevant to the parties 
themselves.687  
In practice, though there are alternatives in the market for franchises generally, it may 
be that the alternatives are limited for a franchisee to find favourable contractual 
terms.  The results of this research suggest that the terms in franchise contracts tend 
                                                 
686 James V. Jordan and Judith B. Gitterman, ‘Franchise Agreements: Contract of Adhesion?’ (1996) 16 
Franchise Law Journal 1, 15.   See also: Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz 471 US 462 (1985) and  David 
Hess, ‘The Iowa Franchise Act: Towards Protecting Reasonable Expectations of Franchisees and 
Franchisors’ (1995) 80 Iowa Law Review 333, 340-41. 
687 “Llewellyn… missed the significance …that it is very often the lawyers expertise, not the 
businessman’s that is revealed”: Todd D. Rakoff, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’ 
in John J. A. Burke (ed), ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law [180] <http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 
2003.  
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toward uniformity not only within each franchise system, but even across different 
franchise systems and different industries.  With respect to contract terms there may 
be no discernable difference to a franchisee which franchise it chooses.  If competitors 
do use similar terms, effectively there are fewer alternatives in the market.  As 
franchise lawyer and commentator Rupert Barkoff notes, ‘…While prospective 
franchisees always can decide not to buy franchises, many of the provisions that 
franchise advocates find objectionable have become ‘industry standard.’688    
This uniformity in contracts reinforces itself.  If the terms are uniform, franchisees 
may not bother to read them.  And if franchisees do not read or understand the terms, 
there is little incentive for franchisors to improve them.  This situation is even more 
pronounced if the contractual term is not of high priority or is poorly understood by a 
franchisee.  Even where there are differences, the prospective franchisee cannot shop 
for terms because the contract is not provided to a franchisee until very late in the 
bargaining process.  Prospective franchisees are not in a position to compare 
contracts.  The market for terms may not be effective without other complementary 
measures, for example a contracting community, wide use and understanding of 
terms, all of which mean education and public relations efforts and also may be best 
achieved collaboratively. 
Perhaps one contribution of research such as this is to highlight the differences in 
contract terms where there are differences,  to help parties make more informed use of 
the contract and to raise awareness of the alternatives. 
With respect to the problems engendered by the relational aspects of the contract, 
because a relational contract emphasizes the ‘trust us’ aspect of the relationship, and 
so detracts from the psychological importance of franchisee due diligence, it may be 
necessary to counter-balance this with educational programs that emphasize the 
importance of franchisee due diligence.  Several franchisees interviewed in the course 
of this research indicated that they simply had failed to ask the questions that should 
have been asked.  Though disclosure cannot be used to illuminate such details of the 
relationship that are left to a franchisor’s discretion, it is perhaps worthwhile to 
explain generally the nature of this dynamic to a franchisee and/or to bring to a 
franchisee’s attention to which aspects of the contract are left to franchisor discretion. 
                                                 
688 Rupert M. Barkoff, ‘Drafting Tips: Pitfalls of Preparing a Franchise Agreement’ (2002) 8 
Franchising Business and Law Alert 5. 
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Finally, it may be necessary to balance disclosure that addresses contract formation 
with other regulation that addresses performance of the contract over the period of 
years.  The philosophy behind a regulatory focus on contract formation is that the 
state can protect parties in entering contracts, to ensure the agreement they reach is 
fair, but that the courts should not re-write agreements once they are made.  This 
philosophy, however, has been eroded in other areas of contract law, such as 
employment law and consumer protection.  A similar shift away from this philosophy 
in the franchise context may be appropriate because the employment and consumer-
like attributes of the relationship mitigate in favor of regulation that reflects these 
conditions, and not just protection of a franchisee in an investor role.  Also, the terms 
of the contract deal primarily with performance obligations, not formation and 
termination of the contract,   
‘The most chilling fact to come out in the hearing was that while the FTC 
[Federal Trade Commission] continues to concentrate its enforcement efforts on 
pre-sale franchise issues most of the problems faced by franchisees are post-
sale, after the contract is signed, i.e., encroachment, sourcing of supplies, etc.’689  
Australia’s current regulatory program provides little protection for a franchisee to 
ensure the performance of a franchisor.   
6.7 CONCLUSION 
Using disclosure to alleviate franchisee misperceptions that might otherwise lead to 
conflict seems a perfect solution to franchise relationship imbalance and uncertainty. 
The reality, however, is that even with disclosure problems persist.  This is because 
information provided may be inadequate, and also because, even where the 
information may be adequate, a franchisee may not be able to use it. 
This chapter outlines the conditions that are considered essential for effective 
regulation by disclosure, to gauge the risks; to ensure that reliable information is 
obtained and disseminated an accessible and useable form; and to ensure that 
recipients can act upon the information. This chapter then explains why disclosure 
does not meet these conditions.   
                                                 
689 Hearing held June 25, 2002 before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade and Consumer Protection,  
http://www.franchisee.org/Blast%20Fax/0207%20Blast%20Fax%20Special%20Edition.pdf at 10 
September 2007. 
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With respect to the first condition, there is a lack of reliable information needed to 
gauge the risks in informing the design of regulatory process and the selection of 
regulatory tools.  This information is needed also to determine how regulatory tools 
are applied.  In the application of disclosure, for example, the risks have not been 
gauged by participants in a participative regulatory process to determine what 
information must be provided, either about the nature of the enterprise generally or 
about a specific franchise system.    
With respect to the second condition there are difficulties with ensuring that the 
information a franchisee receives in the disclosure document is reliable, accessible 
and useable.  The accessibility and useability of the information that is disclosed is 
compromised in a variety of ways.  The right information is not always provided; both 
about the general nature of the franchise relationship and about the particular 
franchise system.  There is no registration of disclosure, no monitoring to ensure 
compliance, and there are inconsistencies with other regulation.  The language of 
disclosure can be unclear, and the presentation and timing of the information is not 
always consistent with the need for the information.  Finally, franchisees are not 
‘rational actors’ in their use of the information.  
Finally, the third condition is to ensure that a franchisee is capable of acting upon the 
disclosed information.  Effective disclosure works by improving flows of information 
in order to improve the ability of a franchisee to negotiate and to improve the ability 
of a franchisee to select alternatives in a market.  A franchisee’s ability to act on the 
information is impaired by the nature of the contracting relationship.   
Because it is a standard form contract and because many terms are common across the 
sector, the two fundamental purposes of disclosure are impaired.  First, in theory, 
disclosure helps to improve market function by redressing information asymmetry and 
so improving the ability of parties to negotiate the contract.  In the case of franchising, 
however, disclosure is ineffective because, where there is no negotiation of the 
contract, disclosure cannot improve a recipient’s negotiating position.  Secondly, 
disclosure helps to improve market function by providing information about 
alternatives in the market.  In this function as well disclosure cannot be optimally 
effective in the case of franchising.  It fails to help a franchisee with its choice of 
alternatives in the market because there are limited alternatives for contract terms and 
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because the timing of disclosure is usually later in the process than would be 
necessary to facilitate comparison shopping by franchisees.   
Not only does the standard form quality of the franchise contract impede effective 
disclosure; the relational nature of the contract is also inconsistent with disclosure as a 
regulatory tool.  In relational contracting significant parts of the contract are left 
unspecified, and therefore cannot be disclosed.   
Disclosure can be enhanced by encouraging more independent research, improving 
the quality, the timing and presentation of information made available to franchisees 
as well as education about and monitoring and enforcement of disclosure provisions.  
There is a need for better information about the nature of franchising generally.  There 
is also a need for more specific information about the particular franchise system.  To 
ensure greater clarity in disclosure with respect to terms of the agreement, more 
detailed information should be provided about, for example, payments, earnings, 
intellectual property, and tenancy.  The Code also needs to be consistent with other 
regulation, such as TPA section 52.  Finally, disclosure should be provided in a 
manner that is timely and accessible.  Some of these measures to improve the function 
of disclosure can be conducted through collaborative initiatives that include better 
franchisee education programs and wide use and understanding of contract terms, as 
well as information about the general nature of the franchise relationship and the 
franchise agreement. Collective initiatives could also provide a source of information 
to prospective franchisees about franchisor reputations.  
There is no one means by which to refine and improve the operation of disclosure, 
just as disclosure is not the only method by which the sector is or might be regulated. 
Currently, disclosure is widely used in the regulation of franchising, not only in 
Australia, but in many jurisdictions that regulate franchising.  Its appeal as an 
appropriate regulatory tool for the sector is in part attributable to its self-regulatory 
qualities.  It is efficient and low-intervention, as it allows the people who are in many 
ways best suited to the task, the parties themselves, to be participants in their own 
regulation.   
Because disclosure does not meet the conditions for effective informational 
regulation, however, it cannot be relied upon as the principal tool for regulating the 
franchise relationship.  There is no evidence that disclosure makes a significant 
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difference in consumer or market behaviour.  A franchisor can be in compliance with 
the Code of Conduct and have provided little information that makes any guarantee or 
is useful to franchisees.  Disclosure puts the burden and much of the cost of regulation 
on the parties themselves; it does not protect franchisees substantively.  
Regulators have viewed franchising as a business-to-business transaction, not in need 
of higher levels of regulatory protection afforded to consumers when they transact 
with business. This evaluation of the power in the relationship is inaccurate; and it is 
one reason why disclosure as it is currently designed is ineffective as the principal 
tool used to regulate franchising.  Disclosure can be effective only if a franchisee is 
properly positioned to fulfill its role. The current status of a prospective franchisee in 
Australia is that it is not a full participant in the process and it is not adequately 
equipped to play the important role it has been assigned in the regulatory process.   
There is an imbalance of power in every aspect of the franchising relationship, 
including the regulatory process itself. 
Franchising presents a situation where, ‘Private law failure feeds the need for 
regulation.’690  There is a need for a comprehensive regulatory scheme that does not 
rely upon, but supports and enhances the self-regulatory sphere through effective 
direct intervention.   If the regulation of franchising is to continue to emphasise 
disclosure, any future program should include careful consideration of how a 
franchisee can play its role in the disclosure process.  A franchisee needs the right 
information, information that is reliable, accessible and useable. Most importantly, a 
franchisee must be able to act upon the information.    
Enhanced substantive protections for a franchisee should also be considered.  
Regulatory intervention and reform should not single out particular tools; it should 
instead start with process, with selection of tools as one step in that process.  This 
chapter has focussed on disclosure specifically.  The next chapter considers ways to 
reform a comprehensive regulatory process in order to improve regulatory results. 
6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter has explained why disclosure fails to address the imbalance of power and 
the uncertainty for a franchisee in the franchise relationship.   The main points and 
recommendations are as follows: 
                                                 
690 Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (1997) 54. 
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• The Code relies on disclosure as a regulatory tool.  
• The conditions that are considered essential for effective regulation by 
disclosure,  gauging the extent and magnitude of the particular risks; obtaining 
reliable information; disseminating information in a form that is both useable 
by and accessible to the community; and ensuring options for the target 
audience to act upon the information, are not met. 
•  The reasons why disclosure does not meet these conditions are as follows: 
o  there is not enough reliable information to gauge the risks in 
informing the design of regulatory process and the use of regulatory 
tools; 
o the information a franchisee receives in the disclosure document is not 
reliable, accessible and useable because the right information is not 
always provided; there is no registration and no monitoring to ensure 
compliance; the language of disclosure can be unclear; the presentation 
and timing of the information is not always consistent with the need for 
the information; and franchisees are often inexperienced and ill-
equipped to use the information; 
o the standard form and relational qualities of the contract impair a 
franchisee’s ability to act on the information:          
 because the contract is not subject to negotiation; and  
 because there are limited alternatives for contract terms and 
because of the late timing of disclosure.  
o  the relational nature of the contract is also inconsistent with disclosure 
as a regulatory tool.  In relational contracting significant parts of the 
contract are left unspecified, and therefore cannot be disclosed.  
• The Franchising Code of Conduct is a low-intervention form of regulation as it 
relies principally on less interventionist methods such as disclosure.691   
• Disclosure does not meet the conditions necessary for it to function 
effectively. 
                                                 
691 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 5. 
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• Disclosure puts a heavy burden on a prospective franchisee to be equipped to 
receive, understand and act upon the disclosed information.  This form of 
regulation can be effective only if a franchisee is properly positioned to fulfil 
this role.   
• Current participation by franchisees in regulatory processes is very limited and 
based upon arbitrary processes of selection.  A prospective franchisee must be 
a full participant, equipped to play the important role it has been assigned in 
the regulatory process.   
• Disclosure is ineffective in addressing the imbalance of power and the 
uncertainty for a franchisee in the franchise relationship.  The process of 
regulation needs revision to improve the use of tools and incorporate the full 
and effective participation of franchisees. 
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Chapter Seven 
  Conclusion and Recommendations:  
Reframing Regulation to Improve its Effectiveness692 
 
‘Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s inclination to 
injustice makes democracy necessary.’693 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the main points of the dissertation.  The market interaction 
and the franchise contract establish and reinforce the imbalance of power and 
uncertainty in the relationship.  Contract terms indicate the ineffectiveness of 
regulation in addressing imbalance of power and uncertainty because they continue to 
manifest, and indeed reinforce these conditions.  Direct intervention is not effective in 
redressing the imbalance of power in the relationship or in alleviating the uncertainty 
of franchisees. The second part of Chapter Seven offers some recommendations.  In 
order to improve the performance of both private and public levels of regulatory 
governance, Chapter Seven proposes reframing regulation, first by instituting 
collaboration that includes franchisees in all stages of regulation.  Secondly, it 
recommends a process-oriented approach in order to ensure better measurements and 
better information about the sector.  Finally, this chapter offers some ideas as to how 
this information can in turn be used by stakeholders and the regulator to identify 
problems and to select the appropriate regulatory tools to address them. 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH  
After thirty years of regulation of the franchise sector in Australia, there is still no 
consensus about the effectiveness of the regulatory program for franchising.  Silvana 
                                                 
692 The technique of reframing in neuro-linguistic programming (NLP)  involves confirming positive 
intentions behind the behaviors that one seeks to change. Alternatives to satisfy the positive intent are 
found, followed by negotiations with self to resolve conflict, check for ecology and to implement the 
new behaviours. Reframing is also used in NLP to describe changing the context or representation of a 
problem. More precisely, one of the most effective techniques for achieving almost any desired change 
in NLP is the "six step re-frame".  See  <http://www.semanticrestructuring.com/anthro_ideo.php at 23 
July 2007. 
693 Reinhold Niebuhr, Remembering Reinhold Niebuhr: Letters of Reinhold and Ursula M. Niebuhr 
(1991). 
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Sciarra wrote in 1991 that, ‘[T]he degree to which franchisees are under-protected 
remains just as highly debatable as their state of subordination.’694  The degree to 
which franchisees are protected remains just as debatable today.   
In order to answer that question, this dissertation proceeded from the premise that, in 
order to be considered to be effective, regulation must achieve its goals.  The 
objectives of government action in implementing the regulation of the franchise sector 
included raising standards of conduct in the franchising sector without endangering 
the vitality and growth of franchising; reducing the cost of resolving disputes in the 
sector; reducing risk and generating growth in the sector by increasing the level of 
certainty for all participants; and addressing the imbalance of power between 
franchisors and franchisees.   The dissertation did not address the objective of 
reducing costs of dispute resolution or the overarching objective of raising standards 
of conduct while protecting the vitality and growth of the sector, but it did assess how 
well regulation has met the latter two stated objectives of regulation, redressing the 
imbalance of power between franchisors and franchisees and increasing the level of 
certainty for all participants. 
The framework for this analysis of whether the regulation of franchising is effective is 
based upon current theories of regulatory activity frame, theories that frame regulation 
as a broader function than the traditional view of regulation as a set of rules imposed 
by government.  Regulation encompasses many different tools, many potential 
participants, and many strategies in a multi-layered system of governance.  This 
multi-layered system of governance provides the framework for the analysis of the 
regulation of the franchise relationship; it encompasses self-regulation through private 
interaction between the parties in market and contract as well as public intervention 
through legislation.  
Chapters Three through Six together demonstrated that regulation does not adequately 
achieve the two goals of redressing imbalance of power and uncertainty for all 
participants.  Chapter Three provided an introduction to the nature of the franchise 
sector, explaining that the parties’ self-regulation of the relationship through the 
market interaction establishes conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty for a 
                                                 
694 Sciarra Silvana, ‘Franchising and Contract of Employment: Notes on a Still Impossible 
Assimilation’ in Christian Joerges (ed), Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative 
Approaches in Europe and the United States (1991) 254. 
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franchisee.  A franchisee is not well-equipped to understand the nature of the 
franchise relationship.   The lack of reliable information about the sector generally 
and about individual franchisors means that a franchisee may not understand the 
product, and may enter into a franchise business with significant misconceptions. A 
franchisor is typically more experienced in franchising, and generally has a better 
understanding of the nature of franchising and its own motivations for participating in 
this business form.   In the market interaction a franchisor is selling a product about 
which a franchisee has, in form and substance, only the information a franchisor 
makes available to it.  A franchisee functions less as an active participant in a business 
relationship, and takes on qualities of investor, consumer, and employee, among 
others.   
The market interaction between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by 
asymmetry of information, imbalance of power, and concomitantly high uncertainty 
for a franchisee.  In another layer of governance, the self-regulation of the franchise 
relationship by means of the contract, a franchisee is also less than an equal and active 
participant.  Chapter Four explained how the standard form and relational qualities of 
the contract increase uncertainty and imbalance of power.  The standard form 
contract, drafted by a franchisor without consultation or negotiation with a franchisee, 
by definition involves imbalance of power in the contracting relationship.  It also 
means higher levels of uncertainty and risk for a franchisee.  The relational quality of 
the contract contributes to the imbalance of power and to uncertainty for a franchisee 
because conditions of the agreement cannot be specified and because a franchisor is 
accorded virtually all contractual discretion to accommodate future uncertainty. 
Together, the standard form and relational qualities of the franchise contract add to 
the imbalance of power and to uncertainty for a franchisee because a franchisor has 
power, while a franchisee must rely on trust and reputation; because a franchisor can 
manage risk through contract, while a franchisee cannot, and because the relationship 
can only take shape over time according to the will of the drafting party that has 
accorded all discretion in the contract to itself.   In the contracting process as in the 
market interaction a franchisee takes on qualities of consumer of product, its role is 
not that of an equal party to the negotiation of terms.  Self-regulation through the 
contract thus reinforces the imbalance of power and uncertainty of the arrangement 
for a franchisee.          
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In addition to its evaluation of contract in theory as a means of self-regulation by the 
parties, this dissertation evaluates contract terms as an indicator of regulatory 
effectiveness overall.  Contract terms were sampled and these terms were compared 
and assessed with respect to the extent to which they indicate that the goals of 
regulation are being met.  The results of the content analysis of a sample of franchise 
contracts, and showed how the contract in practice does reflect an imbalance of power 
and high levels of uncertainty for a franchisee.  For example, the Independence of 
Franchisee clause allows a franchisor to attempt to avoid duties and responsibilities to 
its franchisees by disclaiming any relationship of partner, agent, joint venturer, or 
employee, but at the same time retaining tight control over the activities of 
franchisees.  The Scope of Grant clause delineates and effectively limits the rights of a 
franchisee, while specifically reserving rights, such as use of the intellectual property, 
and discretion to a franchisor.  The franchisee’s ‘right of renewal’ is not actually a 
right but rather a set of conditions restricting a franchisee’s ability to renew.  With 
respect to advertising each franchisee pays into the marketing fund but, a franchisor 
often has absolute discretion over how to spend the fund.  With respect to supply a 
franchisor controls supply requirements, while a franchisee agrees to comply to 
conditions it can neither control nor predict.  A franchisee must meet performance 
targets that are set and can be changed by franchisor at its discretion.  Many systems 
require that franchisee books, records, and computer systems are available to 
franchisor, though the reverse is not true.  In the event of transfer all rights and 
obligations of franchisee are personal to a franchisee, while a franchisor is unfettered 
in its ability to transfer rights and obligations under the contract.  A franchisee has 
specific obligations; if breached franchisor may terminate. Franchisor has vague 
obligations; there is little recourse for franchisee if franchisor does not perform.  
Franchisors in some systems can make changes to the agreement unilaterally. A 
franchisor can also change operations manual, computer systems, and may enjoy 
control over franchisee premises.  Franchisees must comply even if they do not agree.   
Chapter Five also briefly described the applicable case law and statutory regulation, 
usually consisting of requirements to disclose. The contract terms indicated that 
conditions of uncertainty and imbalance of power among the parties persist, despite 
attempts to regulate.  Chapter Six examined the reasons why disclosure fails to 
address the imbalance of power and the uncertainty for a franchisee.  Having outlined 
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the conditions of effective regulation by disclosure, it explained that disclosure does 
not meet these conditions. First, disclosure has a strong self-regulatory character; the 
parties themselves must be equipped to make it work.  The Franchising Code of 
Conduct relies on a franchisee to carry out regulatory function through its role in 
disclosure, which requires a prospective franchisee to be able to receive, understand 
and act upon the disclosed information.   For several reasons, however, a franchisee is 
constrained from playing its role.  Disclosure is only effective where a recipient 
receives accurate, reliable information and is equipped to act on that information. 
These and other conditions, such as proper monitoring, are not assured in the 
operation of disclosure in franchising.   
Chapter Six also revisited the standard form and relational qualities of the contract.  
Not only do these qualities exacerbate the imbalance of power and uncertainty in the 
contracting process as outlined in Chapter Four, but they also impair the fundamental 
purpose of disclosure, which is to allow the recipient to act on the information, 
usually to negotiate or to find alternatives.  The relational nature of the contract is also 
inconsistent with disclosure as a regulatory tool because significant parts of the 
contract are left unspecified, and therefore cannot be disclosed.  Disclosure as a 
regulatory strategy is therefore inconsistent with standard form and relational 
characteristics of the contract and for this reason disclosure may be less effective than 
it might be where other types of contract are used.  Because disclosure in franchising 
does not meet the conditions required for its effective operation, it is not effective in 
addressing the imbalance of power and the uncertainty for a franchisee in the 
franchise relationship.    
The governance of the franchise relationship involves self-regulation at the market 
and contract layers; direct intervention is also self-regulatory in character.  This 
dissertation has demonstrated that all these layers of governance set up and reinforce 
conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee.  The solution to the 
problems in the franchising relationship cannot lie in self-regulatory measures, such 
as market function or contract, or tools of direct intervention that are self-regulatory in 
nature such as disclosure.  Regulation cannot rely upon and reinforce self-regulatory 
instruments as a means to achieve ends that run counter to the conditions in those 
instruments, in this case imbalance of power and uncertainty.  
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Imbalance of power and uncertainty are inherent in the relationship. They are 
reinforced by private governance of the relationship.  In the franchising sector, given 
the characteristics of the contract and the context of the relationship, self-regulation 
cannot be effective unless all participants are assured a place in the regulatory 
process, at every level of governance.  It is illogical to resort to self-regulatory options 
unless the basic calculus of those self-regulatory options were to be made functional 
by a real effort to include franchisees.   
The failure to recognise and address the problems in the regulation of franchising is 
due to deficiencies in regulatory process.  In the existing regulatory process problems 
have been identified according to political pressures, anecdotal evidence, and surveys 
that emphasize the opinions of one half of the sector.  Objectives are generally and 
broadly stated.  Tools have been adopted largely from other jurisdictions, and they are 
often incompatible with the fundamental nature of the franchise contract and the sorts 
of problems it presents.  The history of the regulation of franchising is therefore 
inconsistent with best practice in regulation.   
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Because regulation as it is currently conceived is ineffective, this dissertation 
recommends a reframing of regulation of the franchise sector.  It explains the reasons 
why regulation requires a change in context starting with investment in collaborative 
process.  It also explores some steps that can be taken toward implementing this 
change.   
Such a reframing would have several benefits. By enlisting the participation of all 
stakeholders, franchisees as the protected interest would be better represented to the 
regulator and in every aspect of the governance of the relationship. The regulatory 
process would correct rather than contribute to the imbalance of power and 
uncertainty within the very process of regulation at all levels.  Full involvement of 
stakeholders would lead to better information, more accurate identification of 
problems and more effective use of wider range of tools.  With better information, 
reframed regulatory practice would fit more closely the needs of the sector and have 
greater legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness. Overall, regulatory practice 
would better conform to the ‘new learning’ of regulation.  
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7.2.1 The importance of franchisee participation in collaborative process 
The element that is most central to a reframing of process is described by Julia Black 
and others as democratic, participative and responsive regulation and characterized by 
Sparrow as collaborative process. As Chapter Two outlined, without clear proof and 
clear consensus, regulation lacks legitimacy and accountability. Best practice in 
regulation requires that regulatory processes be participative, responsive, and 
transparent; investment in collaborative partnerships is an integral part of the progress 
toward these ends.695   
In order to achieve this style of regulatory process in franchising there is a need to 
reframe the roles of and relationships among the regulator, stakeholders and trade 
association(s).  As Warren Pengilley observes, 
‘The fact of regulation has nothing to do with who does the regulation.  A 
regulator is any person with the power to regulate. Private parties may be 
regulators just as effectively as many government entities.’696 
The most fundamental and pervasive problem in the regulation of the franchising 
relationship at all levels is the lack of a fully-participative process.  The intention of a 
franchisee is not clear in the market interaction; a franchisee enters the relationship 
with misconceptions about the nature of the relationship.  A franchisee is then 
foreclosed from participating in the contracting process in which it acts as a consumer 
and as the weaker party to a standard form contract.  With respect to statutory 
regulation, even though it is the protected interest, a franchisee has a negligible voice 
at the table with government officials in formulating regulatory intervention.    
                                                 
695  While other methods have been proposed as a means to achieve legitimacy in regulation, they may 
not be suitable for the franchising context.  For example, Stephen Breyer has proposed the use of 
expertise as opposed to democratic policy-making, and due process participation. The problem here is 
generating the required level of interest and funding and harnessing the required expertise.  Because of 
the serious deficiency of reliable information about franchising, such expertise may be impossible to 
engage.  Also suggested is scientific proceduralism, a concept that in theory could work in the 
regulation of franchising, but that also has several practical disadvantages. Baldwin et al, 
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) 146-148; See Malcolm Sparrow 
‘Innovating in a Regulatory Environment’ (Speech delivered at the National Environmental 
Innovations Symposium, Kansas City, 6 December 2000 
<http://www.epa.gov/innovation/symposium/docs/sparrow.pdf> at 17 September 2007; Peter Vincent-
Jones, ‘Contractual Governance: Institutional and Organisational Analysis’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal 
Legal Studies 317; Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 1, and David Hess, ‘Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate 
Social Responsiveness’ (1999) 25(1) The Journal of Corporation Law 41. 
696Warren Pengilley, ‘Competition Regulation in Australia: A Discussion of a Spider Web and its 
Weaving’ (2001) 8 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 2, 51. 
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To the extent that collaborative process exists in the regulation of the franchise sector, 
it excludes a key stakeholder, the protected interest, that of franchisees.  A franchisee 
is marginalized in every aspect of the regulatory process, while a franchisor plays a 
central role in every aspect of the regulatory process and so dominates the governance 
of the relationship.  Imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee will persist 
as long as a franchisee is left out of every stage of the regulatory process.   
Adequate regulation depends on adequate representation of both franchisor and 
franchisee interests in rule-making fora.  The under-representation of franchisee 
interests in all the ‘layers’ of regulation is a major problem.  The focus of regulators 
and the evaluation of regulation has been on the supply side.  To improve the ability 
of franchisees to act on the disclosed information, the regulatory focus needs to shift 
from the supply side and consider more fully both the supply and the demand side.697  
In reference to the ‘new learning’ on regulation, Ramsay notes that,  
‘The distributional effects of this new architecture of regulation remain 
contested. Braithwaite and Drahos … argue that although there are opportunities 
for 'liberalising populism' within the new global order, business influence 
through states or international standardisation bodies is often disproportionate to 
that of consumers in the development of regulation.’698 
A franchisor’s activities are important, but regulators must take a balanced view of 
both sides of the contracting relationship, considering the efficacy of regulation from 
the point of view of the protected interest, a franchisee.  This is not what has been 
happening in the regulatory process to date.   
7.2.1.1 Obstacles to franchisee participation 
Collaborative process requires reframing the roles of all participants in all layers of 
the regulatory process; in particular the role of franchisees must be revised and more 
favourable conditions ensured for franchisees seeking to participate.  Franchisees 
cannot be expected to fulfil their role in regulatory process if they lack the ability and 
the tools to participate.  As Ramsay notes, regulatory programs, ‘often make heroic 
                                                 
697 Roundtable on Economics for Consumer Policy Summary Report, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Committee on 
Consumer Policy <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/38/39015963.pdf> at 28 July 2007. 
698 Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law 
Review 9 (2006). 
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assumptions about the ability of consumers to use and process information on market 
choices and their ultimate results remain uncertain and difficult to measure.’699  
There are significant constraints that impair the capacity of franchisees to act 
collectively.  This dissertation has discussed the limitations on the franchisee’s role in 
the regulation of the franchise relationship through private layers such as the market 
interaction and contract as well as through the public layer of statutory regulation.  
These limitations include the general conditions of imbalance of power and 
uncertainty for franchisees in the market interaction, in contract and in the process of 
direct intervention.   
Some of the same characteristics of franchisees that lead to their subordinate positions 
to franchisors also contribute to their under-representation in all layers of governance.  
Their independence and individualism isolates franchisees, and this isolation is 
exacerbated by the fact that dissatisfied franchisees that collaborate to effect change 
may face threats of defamation and potential violation of antitrust statutes.700  
Franchisee collective action is also thwarted in dispute resolution processes under the 
Code.  Procedures for collective action by franchisees have, until recently, not been 
provided under Code-mandated mediation.  With respect to litigation, in addition to 
the deterrent effect of  the ‘loser pays’ system, class actions have until recently been 
discouraged by Australian rules of procedure.701  Franchisees’ collective action may 
also be discouraged by the fact that courts may find a lack of good faith on the part of 
franchisees who communicate dissatisfaction with the system to other franchisees.702   
Franchisees need to find ways to overcome these conditions.  They cannot be passive 
if they want to move beyond ‘infantilization’, 
‘A decentred regulatory approach might include initiatives that aim to 
'responsibilise' both the supply and demand side of consumer markets…the new 
learning on regulation positions the consumer as an important regulatory subject 
                                                 
699 Ibid. 
700 Australian defamation laws generally have been less protective of free-speech oriented than are such 
laws in the US. 
701 This is to be remedied to some extent by recently introduced legislation, but the impact if that will 
not yet be apparent. 
702 The Privy Council determined in the Dymock’s case that a franchisee's conduct of stating, in a 
facsimile sent   to other franchisees, that it would not participate in franchisor activities was a 
repudiation of the franchise agreement.  See Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd, [2002] 
UKPC 50, [2004] 1 NZLR 289. 
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perceived as crucial to achieving national goals such as greater 
competitiveness.’ 
Franchisees cannot expect to be protected by the regulator, but must accept 
responsibility for their role in the regulation of the franchise relationship.    
7.2.1.2 The role of trade associations in enhancing franchisee participation 
Another factor in the lack of franchisee representation in the current regulatory 
process is their lack of representation in the principal trade association, the Franchise 
Council of Australia (the FCA).    Private and public interest groups have for many 
years had a significant role in regulatory process.703  The trend has been to rely 
heavily on sectoral involvement in industry ‘self-regulation’.704   This approach has 
appealed to regulators in cutting costs and shifting the onus of regulation to the 
participants.  Concomitant with the increased emphasis on industry self-regulation, in 
Australia the regulator has relied on the trade association as a principal participant in 
regulatory process.  This is a phenomenon that has since become somewhat 
discredited,705  but today the regulatory process still involves primarily the regulator 
and the trade association, the Franchise Council of Australia.  The Franchising Code 
of Conduct retains largely the same form as the original voluntary Code of the mid-
1990s. 
The arrangement of franchise industry groups often fails to reflect alignment of 
franchisor and franchisee interests.  In most countries the predominant trade 
association involved in promoting the sector, lobbying politicians, and educating 
constituents and others about the activities of the sector is the franchisor industry 
association.  Industry groups and associations in franchising have the power to 
engender greater participation of franchisees and to lobby on behalf of franchisees’ 
interests, but there is little evidence that they have done so, ‘It may be that “there's a 
sucker born every minute” but this does not excuse the conduct of abusive 
franchisors, nor the failure of franchisor trade associations to take a position in favour 
of fair dealing.’706   In order to improve relationships within the sector and to 
                                                 
703 Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992). 
704 Iain Ramsay, ‘Consumer Law, Regulatory Capitalism and the 'New Learning' in Regulation’, 28 
Sydney Law Review 9 (2006). 
705 Ibid. 
706  Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 316. 
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minimize opportunistic behaviour, franchisors’ and franchisees’ interests should be 
aligned as much as possible.707  The 1997 Reid Report recommended that the Code 
should ‘provide for adequate representation of franchisees in merchants’ 
associations.’708    
The Franchise Council of Australia (the FCA) is the only active industry association 
in the country.709  Though franchisees are encouraged to join,710 the majority of its 
members are franchisors.711  As its membership consists primarily of franchisors, the 
FCA promotes franchisor interests, often at the expense of the interests of franchisees.  
So, while the FCA is a franchising organization, symbolically it represents only one 
half of the franchise relationship.  Numerically, franchisors represent fewer than half 
of the participants in the franchise sector.   Even at reduced rates, membership is 
costly for many franchisees to maintain especially where they see few benefits of 
membership in an organization that serves primarily the interests of franchisors.   
The French Franchise Federation (the FFF) and the American ‘International Franchise 
Association’ (the IFA)712 are two national franchise organizations that are actively 
                                                 
707 Rod Wakefield, CEO of The Coffee Club, address to the FCA 23 October 2006. 
708  Recommendation 3.1 (paragraph 3.30), Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia 
(1997) House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology - 
Parliament of Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/isr/Fairtrad/report/appends.pdf> at 4 
December 2006. 
709 According to its website, the FCA was formed in 1983 as a not-for-profit trade association, with the 
following objectives: To establish standards of international best practice in business format 
franchising for Australian franchise systems; To provide information and education about franchising 
to existing and potential franchisees and franchisors; To lobby state and federal governments on issues 
relevant to the sector. Since 1983, these objectives have been further expanded to include the 
following: To develop a vital, strong and financially viable franchising sector; to advance the interests 
of members in Australia and in special interest markets such as the international franchise community, 
Franchise Advisory Councils, Small Business Forums and property leasing organisations (particularly 
shopping centres). To continually foster among consumers, governments and the business community, 
a broad-based understanding of the economic importance of having a strong franchising sector in 
Australia. To design efficient, identified, value-added services to members and assist them to be more 
effective in franchising. See Franchise Council of Australia (2006)  <http://www.franchise.org.au/ at 10 
June 2006. 
710 Lower priced categories of membership are available for franchisees, some without voting rights. 
See  <http://www.franchise.org.au/content/?id=2 accessed 10 June 2006. 
711  <http://www.franchise.org.au/index.cfm?fuseaction=list> at 4 May 2007. 
712 The International Franchising Association (the IFA) is the primary industry group in the US  The 
IFA’s new self-regulation program offers an ‘effective alternative to litigation and legislation, both of 
which are costly, time-consuming and potentially destructive to franchising’.  An important aspect is 
that it integrates franchisors and franchisees within the organization, enabling cooperation among 
interested parties to find effective solutions apart from litigation and government regulation.  Other 
related initiatives include streamlined enforcement; an ombudsman who, in the case of a dispute serves 
as the 1st point of contact; a reward/recognition program; and new educational programs (especially on-
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working to align the interests of franchisors and franchisees by unifying them as 
members in one association. The IFA, for example, offers a deeply discounted rate to 
franchisees who wish to attend the national convention; no such discounts are offered 
by the FCA.   
Another option is to ensure that franchisees can function collectively through 
franchisee associations that operate independently of the FCA.  There are various 
forms of franchisee organization. The two most common are franchising advisory 
councils (commonly referred to in the industry as FAC’s) and independent franchisee 
associations. The difference is that a franchising advisory council denotes a franchisee 
organisation that is set up and to a greater or lesser extent controlled by a 
franchisor.713  It may also be funded in part by a franchisor.  Because of this, an FAC 
may have less credibility among franchisees than an independent franchisee 
association.714  Franchisors prefer FAC’s because they enjoy participation and a level 
of control over such organizations that they do not have with independent franchisee 
associations.  Some consultants advise franchisors to set up a FAC’s in order to 
prevent franchisees instituting independent associations that are removed from 
franchisor control and are likely to have a more franchisee-proactive posture.   
Independent franchisee associations for particular systems are common in the US. 
Such groups, however, appear to be rare in Australia.  The Chairman of the FCA has 
suggested that the climate in franchising is more collegial in Australia than in the US 
and for this reason Australian franchisees are more likely to be adequately served by 
franchisor-organized FAC’s rather than independent franchisee associations. 
In addition to, or as an umbrella for franchisee associations for particular systems, 
franchisees that are under-represented by the FCA could form a national franchisee 
organization.  Franchisee associations, where they exist, tend to operate independently 
of franchisor associations with lower budgets, lower visibility and less political 
                                                                                                                                            
line education) to serve the needs of both franchisors and prospect franchisees.  See the International 
Franchise Association, IFA Self Regulation Program (2005) International Franchise Association 
<http://www.franchise.org/content.asp?contentid=770> at 31 December 2005. 
713 For Rupert Barkoff’s views on this distinction see 
<http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/downloads/FIVol3No2.pdf> at 15 February 2006. 
714 Sixty-five percent of Australian franchise systems surveyed report having an FAC or something 
similar.  C. McCosker, L. Frazer and D. Pensiero, An exploration of Franchise Advisory Councils: 
Expectations and relationships, in Welsh, DHB (ed), The International Challenge .. Towards New 
Franchising Relationships, Proceedings of the Society of Franchising Conference, (1995) 1-26. 
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representation.   Attempts at starting such organizations in Australia have met with 
little success.  As noted above, franchisors suggest that franchisees are already 
adequately represented, while the government’s attitude seems to reflect the 
franchisor’s mistrust of franchisee organizations.  Rather than encouraging franchisee 
participation,  
‘the Australian Government has signalled that it would not directly oppose the  
formation of a representative body for franchisees. In late June 2006,   
Australian Small Business Minister, Fran Bailey, stated that collective 
bargaining can help franchisees reach better deals with big business.  However, 
Bailey refused to comment specifically on franchisee representative 
associations. Meanwhile, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission has stated that, while it does not want an "ACTU-style" franchisee 
body, it would adopt a "pragmatic and informative approach" to franchisee 
interests if a voluntary association were to be created in Australia.’715 
This statement is perhaps not surprising since the government is lobbied heavily by 
the franchisor-dominated industry group at the same time that there is no franchisee 
group to lobby on behalf of franchisee interests.  This dissertation has demonstrated 
the conflicts of interest in the franchise relationship.  Franchisors cannot be relied 
upon to look after franchisee interests. As Procassini points out in his study of trade 
associations, however, 
‘a cooperative rather than a confrontational approach is the most 
productive…Not only is this important within a sector, but it should be carried 
through to other interest groups…the cooperative attitude may not necessarily 
help in reaching a solution to differences, but confrontation will definitely 
hinder any near-term solution, and possibly negatively affect future 
solutions.’716 
The protection of a franchisee is the overarching purpose of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct.  Addressing the imbalance of power and increasing certainty are among its 
stated goals.  The government’s choice of phrase, that it ‘would not directly oppose’ a 
franchisee representative body, however, highlights the government’s lack of support 
for such an organization, probably because politicians do not want to be seen to 
favour policies opposed by the influential FCA.  Franchisees’ participation to become 
more involved and to play a greater role in the process of regulating franchising needs 
government support, support that, for whatever reasons, currently does not exist. 
                                                 
715 The Australian Financial Review - ABIX via COMTEX, Jun 19, 2006.  Sent to ABA listserv by 
Paul Steinberg.  
716 Andrew Procassini, Competitors in Alliance (1995) 305. 
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7.2.1.3 The role of the regulator in enhancing franchisee participation 
If it imposes rules without the benefit of full participation, the regulator forfeits the 
opportunity to ensure appropriate regulation, and may hamper the healthy 
development of the sector.  In the new participative, democratic and responsive 
conceptions of regulation the regulator-as-rule-maker model is replaced by regulator-
as-facilitator-of-process.  This regulator oversees and coordinates regulation at every 
level, through the operation of the market, the parties’ agreements, court 
interpretations, and, if necessary, through legislation.   Black writes that, 
‘The dominant call is to develop procedures and institutional structures that will 
enhance deliberation and enable participation. Associated is the demand for 
regulation to shift from strategies of command to strategies of inducement, and 
for regulators to move from rulers to supervisors.’717   
Instead of command-and-control, a participative process offers an alternative to the 
regulator to the role of imposing rules, allowing it to more fully involve a franchisee 
and to better assist all stakeholders in the development, enforcement and monitoring 
of regulation.  The role of the regulator becomes one of mediator of process in a 
reflexive regulatory system.   
For the regulator a shift in emphasis from command to inducement to facilitation, 
from ruler to supervisor to servant/enabler of process does not mean a reduced role, 
but rather a more multi-faceted one.  The inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders 
creates multiple roles for the regulatory agency such as that of catalyst, facilitator, 
mediator, endorser, broker, and provider of framework rules and regulatory 
support.718   If self-regulation is hampered by a lack of necessary expertise, a regulator 
can supply this.  Though it may be ill-equipped to evaluate when to intervene in some 
forms of self-regulation that are already functioning in any given situation, such 
evaluation can be made cooperatively, taking into account the interests of all 
stakeholders at all stages through the various layers.  The regulator plays a 
coordinating role in ensuring the appropriate forms and levels of regulation for the 
particular industry context.  Regulators can assist participation by designing and 
facilitating procedures whereby efficient and effective regulation of the franchise 
industry comprehends and involves the interests of all stakeholders at all stages.   
                                                 
717 Julia Black, ‘Proceduralising Regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597. 
718 International Policy on Industry Self-Regulation, Australia, Appendix D, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1123/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=appd.asp at 20 July 2007. 
 357
To achieve this model it is necessary to revise the role of the regulator and the 
relationship between the regulator and stakeholders.   The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (the ACCC) is the agency charged with administering and 
enforcing the Franchising Code of Conduct.719   The ACCC has experimented with 
regulatory alternatives.  It has consulted with the community in efforts to test and 
review their performance, and it has responded to a number of perceived deficiencies.   
The fact remains, however, that the role of the regulator currently resembles the 
‘command-and-control’ model of regulation albeit with the heavy participation of the 
trade association.  Though a consultative panel meets periodically, there is not a 
transparent or regular process; and while several franchisor representatives and their 
trade association are always represented, meetings can be held with little or no 
representation of franchisee interests. 
Franchisees lack power at every stage of the franchise relationship, in the self-
regulatory layers of market and contract and in the co-regulatory initiatives of the 
ACCC.  Non-participation in regulatory processes contributes to the ‘infantilization’ 
of a franchisee not only by a franchisor but also by the regulator.   Franchisees’ 
interests are a stated priority; the protection of a franchisee is the overarching purpose 
of the Franchising Code of Conduct. Yet regulation of the sector in Australia has 
benefited from only minimal input from franchisees to inform whether statutory 
regulation is effective, whether it should be adjusted or reduced, and/or what further 
measures may be needed.  There is in Australia, as there has been in America, a 
‘conceptual disconnect between regulators and franchisees.720   
7.2.2 Meaningful measurements, identifying problems and selecting tools 
This chapter has outlined the importance of Sparrow’s third ‘core element’ which is 
investment in collaborative process.  The other elements are carried out through this 
                                                 
719 Original proposals envisioned a new, separate administrative body to oversee the Code.  Such a 
body was not set up.  As the regulatory agency charged with administering the Trade Practices Act 
(TPA) the ACCC administers and enforces mandatory industry codes established pursuant to s51AD of 
the TPA, unless the enabling legislation provides otherwise.   The functions of the ACCC encompass 
law enforcement and information dissemination.  Subject to external review by Courts, Tribunals, 
Parliament, independent reviews and the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the ACCC handles inquiries on 
all aspects of the Code; it is responsible for education about and enforcement of the Code, as well as 
many other federal regulations that affect franchising, such as consumer protection and competition 
law. 
720 Paul Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, ‘Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship’ 
(2004) 109 Penn State Law Review 105, 311.  
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collaborative process. Reframing starts with investment in collaborative process.  That 
process informs better measurements and information and follows through with the 
use of these measurements in the systematic identification of problems and the 
selection of tools to address them.  
Any regulatory program requires meaningful, accurate and reliable measurements to 
inform its process.  Reframing regulation of franchising toward process requires 
obtaining meaningful measurements to systematically identify problem(s) that need to 
be ‘fixed’.  Without good information it is not possible to formulate objectives, or to 
select appropriate tools. As Chapter Three explained, obtaining accurate and reliable 
data about the franchise sector is a major challenge in the regulation of franchising, an 
ironic state of affairs given the central role of disclosure in the regulation of 
franchising.    
Perhaps the greatest challenge in franchising regulation, then, is to remedy this 
insufficiency, and to put in place processes to ensure that reliable, objective 
information is available, not only to inform the participants at one stage of the 
relationship, but to inform regulatory process at all levels.   
7.2.2.2 Identifying problems  
Sparrow’s prescription for improving regulatory process requires the systematic 
identification of problems and expanded use of tools.   While this dissertation refutes 
the hypothesis that the Code is effective in the limited sense of not achieving some of 
its goals, it has not evaluated the appropriateness of these goals.  It suggests ways that 
goals might better be met, but it also leaves open the possibility that, through 
participative and democratic process, the existing goals may be replaced by new goals 
that are better tailored to the realities and needs of the sector.  What this dissertation 
does argue is that the identification of problems must be part of a process that fully 
includes all stakeholders.   
7.2.2.3 Collaborative process to enhance the effectiveness of regulation  
The regulation of franchising is low intervention; it relies heavily on self-regulatory 
methods, such as the parties’ self-regulation through contract and disclosure.  This 
dissertation has demonstrated that self-regulatory mechanisms that operate through 
market, contract and disclosure have not met the stated goals of regulatory 
intervention. The best way to ensure that the most appropriate regulatory tools are 
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selected, however, is to ensure proper regulatory process at all layers of governance.   
This is not proposed as an easy alternative.  The measures discussed in this chapter 
are not intended as a prescription, but as a starting point for the involved process of 
collaboratively generating new ideas about how the goals for regulation of franchising 
can better be met,  
‘Regulating conduct directly, rather than taking the easy approach of demanding 
more and more disclosure, requires far more thought and analysis of difficult 
questions on their merits.’721   
It is, however, precisely the fact that regulation is complex and difficult that makes 
the process of such critical importance.  There are many ways, however, in which 
collaborative process that fully includes all stakeholders can lead to improved 
regulatory alternatives in the market, in contract and in direct intervention. 
Collaborative process can enhance the role of franchisees in the market interaction.  
Reframing of franchisees’ roles in the market interaction can take several forms.  As 
Chapter Three outlined, a franchisee’s role is a complex mix of investor, employee, 
consumer, licencee among other roles, most of which are not those of equal 
participants in a business venture with a franchisor.    Franchisees need to understand 
the importance of their own participation and that their power potential is derived 
largely from their numbers in association.  Together franchisees can help each other to 
understand that their participation is indispensable to the franchise system.  
Collaborative process can be useful in providing information about reputation. It has 
several advantages over the prescribed disclosure process in that it is not mandated by 
legislation; there is no guesswork about what items of information need to be 
disclosed; it is cheaper; and there is greater legitimacy because of participation of the 
parties who use the information.  
Other tools that might be used could include franchisee evaluations of franchisors.  
Such evaluations could be instituted as part of management processes.  A franchisor 
might also provide a preliminary self-evaluation and would have an option to address 
the results of franchisee evaluations.  Franchisee exit surveys could be used to provide 
information about why former franchisees have left the system, how problems were 
                                                 
721 Susanna Kim Ripken, ‘The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation’ (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 148-149. 
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addressed, levels of satisfaction over time, and overall evaluations of the franchise 
experience without compromising confidentiality of dispute resolution procedures. 
In many ways, prior to signing the contract, a franchisor needs franchisees more than 
any individual franchisee needs a franchisor.  Once the contract is signed, a franchisee 
becomes dependent on and subordinate to a franchisor.   
Collaborative process can also enhance the role of franchisees in the contract layer of 
governance.  Franchisors, not surprisingly, resist the idea of collective initiatives of 
franchisees in contractual relationships.  Michael Seid, franchise consultant and 
author of Franchising for Dummies, writes,  
‘Franchising is a relationship between a franchisor and its franchisee.  It is not a 
communal contract nor should it be.  Granting the right or requiring collective 
bargaining has crippled US industry as we now know.  It has not done too well 
in France or elsewhere in Europe or in any of the first world markets.  I would 
hate to see unionism find its way into franchising as it certainly would suffer 
dramatically.’ 722   
As Chapter Two outlined, collaborative process involves all stakeholders working 
together to identify and address the issues in the sector. While collaborative process 
covers a broad spectrum of activity, however, it is not the same thing as collective 
bargaining.   In fact, collaborative process can vitiate the need for collective 
bargaining.  
Collective bargaining suggests adversarial rather than collaborative proceedings, a 
tool that is necessitated by the breakdown in communication between franchisors and 
franchisees.  It is probably not the most useful or appropriate method of initiating 
communication about issues in the franchising relationship.723  A collaborative 
approach to regulation is thought to be more inclusive than government intervention 
alone, to better represent stakeholder interests, and to offer a better chance of finding 
                                                 
722 Email sent by Michael Seid to the author 22 June 2006. 
723 See Robert Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1503 (1990) Emerson lists five reasons:  ‘First, most franchisees are not in the same legal or 
economic position as employees… Second, franchisee collective bargaining requires adequate 
safeguards, such as detailed and explicit legislative pronouncements. Otherwise, such rights -- by 
analogy or other creative legal interpretation -- could be used to alter, perhaps without any foresight, 
the law in many other areas… Third, there is very little history of franchisee-franchisor collective 
bargaining… Fourth, from both the franchisor's and franchisee's viewpoints, the use of franchising 
stems from legal, economic, and social considerations that run counter to those represented by a 
collective bargaining approach. …Fifth, collective bargaining may foster or exacerbate an unduly 
adversarial approach to franchisee-franchisor relations.’   
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a solution, with the possibility of collective bargaining to motivate some franchisors 
to engage in collaborative process.   
Clearer specification of criteria, conditions, rights of both parties is probably also best 
accomplished through collaborative processes that could be applied in scope of grant; 
for franchisee to exercise right of renewal;  supply; and amounts to be paid if a 
franchisor’s conditions damage a franchisee financially or put a franchisee out of 
business. 
Collective and collaborative initiatives can be used to establish greater reciprocity of 
obligation in areas such as scope of grant and the lack of restriction on franchisor 
encroachment as compared with restraint of trade clauses; minimum performance; and 
transfer. 
An interesting development from the US is the recent collective negotiation by 
franchisees with Culligan International.  To achieve their goal of aligning interests 
and addressing issues that had strained a franchisor’s relationships with its 
franchisees, franchisees collectively determined that,  
 ‘If they could not persuade their new franchisor to make significant 
concessions, they would leave the franchise system en masse and found a rival 
water treatment company of their own. …The resulting new agreement “reflects 
more of a true partnership, with shared decision-making, mutually supportive 
financial goals and, perhaps most importantly, mutual respect”. …[it] features 
shared commitments, responsibilities, and rewards, a departure from many 
franchise agreements designed to give the franchisor firm control over the 
business…Under the revised terms, franchisees who previously had little clout – 
something common in many franchise systems – now must be consulted on 
critical changes to the brand and hold some veto power.’ 
The new contract provides for a duration of 20 years (twice the length of previous 
contracts);  a franchisee right to renew; franchisor consultation with franchisees on 
major changes to the business; reduced prices on current equipment supplied by the 
franchisor;  franchisee approval of franchisor suggested retail prices; franchisee 
freedom from franchisor examination of customer lists; exclusive territories; and 
elimination of  franchisor right of first refusal with respect to franchisee transfer.724   
                                                 
724 Thursday, November 16, 2006,  Culligan's New Franchise Agreement Reflects "True Partnership" 
This posting was written by Peter Reap, editor of CCH Business Franchise Guide  
<http://traderegulation.blogspot.com/2006/11/culligans-new-franchise-agreement.html at 1 December 
2006. 
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Collaborative initiatives can help address imbalance of power in the relationship and 
lack of negotiation of the contract engendered by the standard form, as well as the 
problems engendered by relational contracting, such as the need for flexibility and the 
concomitant uncertainty that this can create for franchisees.   As the non-drafting 
party, a franchisee needs a vehicle to re-enter the process of design, drafting and 
negotiation of the standard form product.  Franchisees that, because of the standard 
form nature of the contract, cannot negotiate can be assisted through collective 
initiatives in negotiating with franchisors as well as education to improve their 
awareness of alternatives in the market. A process of consultation between franchisors 
and franchisees can reduce the one-sided, command-and-control qualities of the 
standard form that are inconsistent with the flexibility, cooperation and trust central to 
the successful function of a relational contract.  It can also help establish greater 
certainty for franchisees, without sacrificing uniformity and control that are central to 
the success of the sector.  
Collaborative initiatives to engender understanding of contract terms work best where 
there is a ‘contracting community’ and repeat transactions occur on both sides.   The 
contract then becomes well-known and understood throughout the sector by 
franchisees. In franchising, while the contract is widely used, it is only used 
repeatedly by franchisors; a franchisee typically enters such a contract on a one-time 
basis.   This measure might be effective, however, where franchisee organizations are 
in place to act collectively as one side of the ‘contracting community’.   This might 
seem like collective bargaining, but the focus of collaborative process can defuse the 
antagonism and enable mutually beneficial results.   
Collaborative participation that includes collective negotiation of certain contract 
terms need not unduly threaten uniformity.  A crucial factor in the continued success 
of franchising into the future will be its ability to achieve a high level of uniformity 
through means other than command-and-control.725   As the sector matures and our 
understanding of the role of uniformity in franchising develops, perhaps we can 
afford to take a more nuanced view.  Variations in the franchise contract will not 
                                                 
725 See Sanja S. Mehta and Lou E. Pelton, ‘Limitations of Existing Theories: A Need for “A General 
Theory of Franchise Relationships”’ (Paper presented at the 14th Annual International Society of 
Franchising, San Diego, February 19-20, 2000) for a discussion on interdependence theory, replacing 
command and control governance by franchisor.  Another option is to select another organizational 
form.  In cases where a franchisee must be treated differently for the system to survive (consider the 
Kodak model in China) then a distributorship arrangement may offer advantages.   
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always jeopardize the type of uniformity of operation that strengthens brand, 
especially if negotiation is conducted collectively.  A franchisor might well be less 
concerned about uniformity in some contract terms than others.726   Some parts of the 
contract may indeed be non-negotiable, even collectively, but other aspects of the 
contract might still be adjusted for the improvement of the relationship and the 
system overall.    
Franchisee participation of this kind mitigates the one-sidedness that allows unfair 
contract terms to persist, and can enhance the role played by franchisees without 
compromising uniformity in the contracts.  Greater participation by franchisees in the 
drafting of the agreement can also enhance understanding of the relationship and so 
help to build trust.   
In theory the contract is a tool for monitoring by a franchisee to protect against a 
franchisor’s abuse of control over assets provided by a franchisee.727   In practice, 
however, the contract and the structure of the relationship make a franchisee’s task of 
monitoring more difficult than that of a franchisor in monitoring a franchisee.  The 
contract written by a franchisor provides for monitoring by a franchisee only in 
limited ways.  Blair and Lafontaine predicate the ability of a franchisee to check 
franchisor opportunism of franchisee awareness of that opportunism, and ‘public 
knowledge’, conditions that at present are in short supply.728  For this reason 
franchisees’ effective monitoring of a franchisor can be significantly improved 
through collective involvement of franchisees.729    
Collaborative participation, franchisee advocacy groups, and other methods of 
stakeholder involvement in sector regulation hold promise also for improved judicial 
                                                 
726  According to a recent study in the US based on a sample of 170 franchise contracts, contract terms 
in franchising were often determined in a haphazard way.  Franchisors identified a few key 
requirements but commonly left much of the contract to be filled in with precedent.  Imitating what 
other franchisors have done might not be the best solution for their situation.  In one case a franchisor 
copied another major franchisor’s policy regarding exclusive territory, not realising that the provision 
had resulted in chronic litigation for the first franchisor. 
727 B. Elango and V.H. Fried, ‘Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis’ (1997) 35(3) 
Journal of Small Business Management 68, 74. 
728 Roger Blair and Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising (2005) 218. 
729  Jim’s franchise system contracts are unusual in providing a franchisee greater means of supervision 
over a franchisor’s behaviour, for example representation by franchisees on a board, and a council of 
franchisees to review franchisor. 
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interpretation of the contract.  There is a role to play in the negotiating process, in 
education, monitoring, enforcement, and in informing and structuring change. 
Cooperation and consultation among franchisors and franchisees, for example to 
formulate appropriate terms for both franchisor and franchisee to maximize returns;  
in making business plans; in matters involving supply such as measures that allow 
franchisees to play a role in negotiating supply contracts;  in franchisee buying 
cooperatives for larger systems, along with a franchise contract that authorizes 
franchisee to shop from among several franchisor approved suppliers; and in setting 
minimum performance standards that are more about a process that includes 
franchisees than about a franchisor unilaterally setting arbitrary standards which, if a 
franchisee fails to meet, constitute grounds for termination.  Finally, there should also 
be consultative processes for amendments to the system; the contract should ensure a 
franchisee’s involvement in the process. 
7.2.2.4 Expanding the range of tools used in direct intervention 
Direct intervention is another layer of governance through which the roles of 
participants can be revised and enhanced.   The need for a reframing of the roles of 
participants in the design of regulation was outlined at the start of this chapter.  The 
following section outlines some ways that collaborative process can provide better 
results in the selection of appropriate tools for use in direct intervention. 
In many countries with sector-specific legislation for franchising, as in Australia, such 
legislation features disclosure.  Disclosure is a procedural requirement, probably the 
most widely used tool in the regulation of franchising internationally. Along with 
mandatory mediation it is the principal tool used in the regulation of franchising in 
Australia.  As such it has been discussed at length in Chapter Six. 
Disclosure and other regulatory tools that may not perform optimally can be adjusted 
to improve results.   Chapter Six outlined some of the ways the function of disclosure 
can be enhanced, such as by better information from franchisees and franchisors about 
the nature of franchising generally including fuller representation of stakeholders on 
consultative panels; expansion of legitimate, independent research initiatives that 
include studies and surveys that accurately reflect all stakeholders’ interests; 
improving the quality, the timing and presentation of information made available to 
franchisees as well as education about and monitoring and enforcement of disclosure 
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provisions; registration of disclosure documents; systematic monitoring to ensure 
reliable information about particular franchise systems and in some cases more 
specific information such as more detailed information about payments, earnings, 
intellectual property, and tenancy;  consistency with other regulation, such as TPA 
section 52; greater transparency of process; and more complete information from 
dispute processes.   
Some of these measures to improve the function of disclosure can be conducted 
through collective and collaborative initiatives. Collaborative initiatives have the 
potential to improve dissemination of information generally, to ensure better 
franchisee education programs, to supply information about the general nature of the 
franchise relationship and the franchise agreement and to promote wide use and 
understanding of contract terms.  Collective initiatives could also provide a source of 
information to prospective franchisees about franchisor reputations. All these 
measures could also help to provide more meaningful measurements to inform 
regulatory process generally.   
Improvement to disclosure, however, is only one small measure towards better 
regulation, and it does not address the systemic problem.  Current theories of 
regulation and formulations of best practice require that regulatory process 
comprehend the dynamics and interactions among a versatile range of regulatory tools 
and that it take advantage of synergies among these tools to achieve regulatory 
objectives.730   Instead of relying on a very limited number of tools whose efficacy is 
unproven, regulators could, through a participative process, choose from a full range 
of regulatory instruments.   
Most jurisdictions that use disclosure as a regulatory tool also employ other tools.  In 
some jurisdictions disclosure is not relied upon so heavily and other tools are used in 
lieu of disclosure.731  The following sections describe some of the tools that are used 
in the regulation of franchising in various jurisdictions.  These tools fall into three 
categories, prescriptive standards, procedural regulation, and performance standards.  
                                                 
730 The work of Hugh Collins; Julia Black; Gunningham and Grabosky; Martin and Cave; and Baldwin, 
Scott and Hood; among others support Malcolm Sparrow’s call for the expansion, diversification and 
improved calibration in the use of regulatory tools 
731Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, Annex 3 to the UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Guide 
to International Franchise Arrangements (1998) UNIDROIT periodically updated at: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/franchising/1998guide/main.htm> at 31 December 2005.  
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Prescriptive standards mandate certain requirements, methods, or techniques and 
include mandatory warranties; confidentiality requirements; and prescription of the 
contents of the contract including specification of unfair terms, mandatory contract 
duration, and good faith requirements.  Prescriptive regulation may also prohibit 
certain practices.  In principle prescriptive standards may be incompatible with self-
regulation; because they are often quite specific and are viewed as requirements 
imposed on the sector rather than undertaken voluntarily, they tend to engender 
attitudes of ‘creative compliance’ rather than to encourage business to move beyond 
compliance.732  They are, nevertheless, widely used in franchise regulation.  
Procedural standards are often used where measurement is difficult; they include, for 
example, licensing and specified procedures for the parties’ interactions during 
contract formation and/or performance, such as disclosure.  Performance standards 
define the regulated interest’s responsibility in terms of the goal to be achieved; they 
include requirements of certain levels of performance of a franchise business before it 
can sell franchise units.   
Content control 
Content control generally refers to regulatory requirements of the content of contract 
documents; it is a prescriptive regulatory tool used in many jurisdictions that regulate 
franchising. Australia proscribes general indemnity of franchisor by franchisee.  
Albania and Lithuania require that the contract be in writing.733   Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Italy prescribe a contract minimum duration of five years, five years and three 
years respectively.  There are prohibitions on vertical restraints in Australia, Japan,734 
the European Community, and the US.735    
Some types of content control legislation have traditionally been limited to 
consumers, and only rarely extend to the protection of commercial actors. Content 
                                                 
732 Gunningham et al, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) 387-422. 
733 Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, Annex 3 to the UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT 
Guide to International Franchise Arrangements (1998) UNIDROIT periodically updated at: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/franchising/1998guide/main.htm> at 31 December 2005.   
734 In Japan if restraints go further than necessary to operate the franchised business, they may 
constitute abuse of a dominant position, as a tie-in, as dealing on restrictive terms or as retail price 
maintenance. 
735 Many jurisdictions impose these requirements through in competition law rather than franchise 
specific legislation.  Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, Annex 3 to the UNIDROIT, 
UNIDROIT Guide to International Franchise Arrangements (1998) UNIDROIT periodically updated 
at: <http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/franchising/1998guide/main.htm> at 31 December 
2005.   
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control provisions are commonly used to regulate standard form contracts, to protect 
the interests of the weaker party, which has not had the benefit of the process of 
negotiating contract terms, and in recognition of the overriding separation of parties’ 
interests.736    
Specificity is one strategy for dealing with some of the problems of the standard form. 
Collins suggests that legislation identify unfair terms,737 so that these terms amount to 
compulsory rules governing transactions with consumers in particular trade or 
sector.738 This measure effectively removes an aspect of self-regulation altogether as 
parties must conform to approved terms for the market sector.  Collins says it does not 
matter if such a proposal destroys the market for contract terms in cases such as 
franchising because no such market exists to start with.739   He suggests that it is better 
to regulate market sectors such as franchising by bringing together the two sides of 
the trade to negotiate standard terms.  Unfair terms legislation is used in consumer law 
applications in many jurisdictions, and could be one product of collaborative 
processes in the regulation of franchising.  In the UK ‘The Office [of Fair Trading] 
considers that a sectoral approach is the most cost effective method of bringing about 
change.’740 
The standard form renders the consumer/commercial distinction less meaningful. .  In 
the case of the franchise relationship the ‘contract as commodity’ of the standard form 
suggests that a franchisee takes on qualities of consumer of product, rather than an 
equal party to negotiation of terms.  A franchisee as an investor needs one set of 
protections.  A franchisee as a consumer needs others.  The use of the standard form 
contract in franchising lends force to a franchisee’s right as a consumer to reasonable 
quality, reasonable prices, and fair terms and justifies lawmakers’ consideration of 
                                                 
736 ‘From the previous analysis it results that, even if information regulation is the least interventionist 
measure and has the advantage to preserve the consumer’s choice, it has some limits. Therefore, 
product standards are necessary in order to correct market failures arising from information deficits and 
externalities. …When standards are not sufficient to correct market failures, prior approval might be 
used. To choose one of these techniques, it is necessary to assess their efficacy. Thus, the relevant 
question is: ‘how much regulation is efficient?’  See Alessandra Arcuri, 5130  Product Safety 
Regulation  (1999) <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5130book.pdf> at 4 December 2006. 
737 The European Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts see 93/13 OJL 95/29 5 April 1993. 
738 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 236. 
739 Id., 234. 
740 Iain Ramsay, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the ‘New Learning’ in Regulation’, 28 Sydney Law 
Review 9 (2006). 
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content control provisions for select terms.741   The fact that a franchisor is selling a 
product, a licence, and a franchisee is the consumer of that product, suggests that there 
should be some minimum protections for the consumer of that product.  No 
jurisdiction, however, is known to have instituted warranties for the sales of 
franchises.   
The exaggerated imbalance of power and uncertainty persist through the 
duration of the franchise relationship, so that regulation should address the 
power imbalance not only at formation, but also in the performance of the 
contract, as regulatory intervention has done in the case of consumer and 
employment contracts.742  
The standard form contract is a fact of life; it is admittedly indispensable to the 
containment of transaction costs in repeated commercial transactions.  Realizing this, 
regulators exercise caution in dealing with its abuses.  They should balance this 
caution with the need to protect parties that are not sufficiently able to protect 
themselves.  
Good faith   
The use of content control as a statutory implied term of good faith is documented in 
Canada, Korea, and Albania.743  There is no such requirement in the regulation of 
franchising in Australia, though it is true that the degree to which parties act in good 
faith is one of the criteria for determining of unconscionable conduct has occurred 
under TPA Section 51AC.  To bolster this provision a requirement of good faith also 
might be incorporated into unfair contracts legislation.   In Australia good faith to 
some extent is implied in the contract, in the unconscionable conduct statute at the 
federal level and some state fair trading legislation.  There have been several cases 
addressing good faith in the context of franchising.   In Burger King Corp v Hungry 
                                                 
741 For more on fair terms in contracts see John Tillotson, Contract Law in Perspective (3rd ed 1995) 
121-124.  For a discussion of content control in standard form contracts see John J. A. Burke, 
‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law [51] 
<http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elawithissues/v10n2/burke102_text.html> at 14 August 2003. 
742 Phillip P. Blumberg, ‘The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent 
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities’ (1996) 28 Connecticut Law Review 295, 344. Collective 
participation of franchisees also helps to ensure their protection, for example in the aspects of their role 
as employees.  The situation in Australia is similar to that in the US where,  ‘Franchisors and 
franchisees which today represent a major segment of the American economy most strongly raise the 
issue of the application of enterprise principles to collective undertakings resting on contract.’ 
743  Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, Annex 3 to the UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT 
Guide to International Franchise Arrangements (1998) UNIDROIT periodically updated at: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/franchising/1998guide/main.htm> at 31 December 2005.   
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Jack’s Pty Ltd744 the court applied an objective standard in deciding that Burger King 
Corporation's actions were neither reasonable nor for a legitimate purpose. The court 
referred to the Restatement (Second) section 205 (1981) which provides:   ‘Every 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.’   In Dymock’s Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v 
Todd,745 however, the court held that the express terms had imposed duties of 
cooperation which the franchisee breached, but did not say there was obligation of 
good faith,  
‘…In view of the continuing disagreement between the experts as to whether or 
not there is an obligation of good faith in a case such as the present, their 
Lordships also prefer the course of prudence and do not seek to answer the 
question since there is some other proper ground on which the appeal can be 
decided.’746   
Australian courts thus have not determined that there is a general obligation of good 
faith in franchise contracts.  A good faith requirement for the franchising sector was 
recommended by the 2006 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct, ‘recognition in the Code of a concept of good faith and fair dealing 
would provide positive reinforcement to the development of improved relationships 
and dealings between franchisors, franchisees and prospective franchisees.’747 This 
recommendation was rejected by the government. 
Procedural tools 
The cooling-off period required at contract formation in Australia and Malaysia is a 
procedural regulation as are the transfer and termination procedures that are used in  
Australian regulation and that of some US states.  Such procedures include 
termination safeguards and provide that a franchisor must not unreasonably withhold 
consent for franchisee to transfer a franchise.  Other recommendations from Chapter 
Five included procedures for franchisor’s changes to territory allocations, selection of 
franchisees, and matching franchisees to units and territories. 
                                                 
744 Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 (see also Hungry Jack’s v. Burger 
King [1999] NSWSC 112). 
 
745 Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd, [2002] UKPC 50, [2004] 1 NZLR 289. 
746 Ibid. 
747 See Recommendation 25, the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, October 2006,  
<http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cmscontent.cfm?objectID=6B99EC0B-BC2F-F60A-
CD6A9D32E1031993 at 14 May 2007. 
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Dispute resolution  
Dispute resolution procedures are also used such as mandatory mediation in Australia 
and Korea.  In Australia, mediation is a Code-mandated dispute resolution procedure 
thought to engender greater participation by franchisees in conflict resolution, greater 
transparency of conflict processes, and assistance to parties in understanding and 
utilising conflict management procedures.    
Other possible procedures include the used of an ombudsman, from the Swedish 
meaning ‘go-between’.  Traditionally used to represent citizens in disputes against 
administrative functions of government, ombudsmen now work in a variety of settings 
to provide a confidential, neutral and informal facilitation of equitable resolutions to 
disputes.  The service provides a resource for information and communication, 
feedback, advice, and dispute resolution.748 
Registration 
There was a registration requirement for franchise systems in Canada (Alberta, 
repealed); this requirement is still in place in Malaysia, Spain, and some US states.749   
Registration of intellectual property is required in Kazakhstan.  Korea and Japan have 
registration requirements for franchise consultants or brokers.   
(Registration of disclosure is discussed in Chapter Six) 
 
Procedures for monitoring and enforcement  
Some jurisdictions have set up a separate regulatory institution and/or a separate 
advisory entity for one or more functions.  Malaysia has an advisory board and a 
special agency to oversee regulation.   
Australia has a franchising consultative panel to enable the sector participants to 
consult with the regulator.  There is, however, no prescribed procedure for monitoring 
the effectiveness of the Code in Australia. There are occasional surveys; in 2006 the 
                                                 
748 Christina M. Kuta, ‘Universities, Corporations, and States Use Them Now It's Time To Protect 
Them: An Analysis of the Public and Private Sector Ombudsman and the Continued Need for a 
Privileged Relationship’, 27 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 389 (2003).  
749State laws generally define franchising similarly to the FTC Rule, but differences between the states’ 
definitions and exemptions can be crucial to determining whether a particular sale was or was not the 
sale of a franchise.  California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin require a 
registration or notice filing before offering franchises for sale, and pre-sale disclosure through twenty 
items in a prescribed format called a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC).  Also, Oregon 
requires pre-sale disclosure without a governmental filing. See Mark Miller, ‘Unintentional 
Franchising’ (2005) 19(2) St. Mary’s Law Journal 308. 
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Minister for Small Business embarked on a Review of Disclosure as part of the 
regulation of franchising.  Unfortunately, however, these reviews share the 
disadvantage of being limited in duration and scope, and based largely on surveys and 
anecdotal evidence.   In addition, the processes are not transparent.  
In the first nine years of the Code’s operation the ACCC initiated litigation against 
franchisors under the Code in only fifteen cases.750  This may be due in part to the fact 
that there is little substantive regulation that can be breached.  Also, with respect to 
the more self-regulatory aspects of the Code, such as disclosure and mediation, there 
is no monitoring of compliance.751 
The regulator could avail itself of a range of other analytic tools, including 
comparative risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis to 
inform, monitor and assess regulatory activity; ‘there is a broad consensus that [such 
tools] should be used to inform major regulatory decisions.’752  An important indicator 
of the effectiveness of statutory regulation is its impact on market function.   While it 
is difficult to measure the impact of regulation on the health of an industry, possible 
indicators might include prices, as in franchise fees, rents and royalties; trends in 
gross turnover; average length of the franchise relationship; number of franchise 
systems; and number of franchisee units, all of which must of course be adjusted for 
the effects of exogenous factors.   
Regulation of any kind requires appropriate incentives and enforcement to ensure 
effectiveness.   With respect to enforcement collaborative initiatives can help to 
ensure that regulation is indeed complied with.  Several items of the 2006 Review of 
                                                 
750 D. Lynch, Strength in Numbers for Franchisees, Australian Financial Review, (2006, 20 June).  
751 The burden of identifying breach rests with franchisees.  Their preference when taking legal action 
appears to be to rely on the broader provisions of the TPA section 52, rather than on the Franchising 
Code of Conduct.  The majority of the franchising cases that are litigated involve breaches of the TPA 
section 52. 
752 Fred Anderson et al, ‘Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Judicial Review’ (2000) 11 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 89. When 
multiple hazards are assessed within a common framework and combined into a single report, the 
phrase comparative risk assessment is used.  Cost-benefit analysis is a tool developed by economists 
and scientists to determine whether a proposed course of action is efficient compared to alternative 
courses of action. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost of a project is divided by a quantitative (yet 
non-monetary) measure of effectiveness, such as the number of years of human life saved or tons of 
pollution removed. The terminology, as defined above, is not universally accepted. Sometimes the 
phrase "risk analysis" is used as a broad umbrella to refer to all of these tools…. Risk assessment and 
cost-benefit analysis offer insight and intellectual discipline to the decision-making process. They can 
help to identify and evaluate decision options, and achieve more benefits at less cost than otherwise 
would occur.’ 
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Disclosure were rejected by the government in part or in whole on the grounds that it 
would be difficult or inappropriate for the ACCC to enforce.   
As the regulator is fulfilling a broad role with a limited budget, it makes sense to 
enable other stakeholders to assist with enforcement.    If the administrative burden is 
too great for the ACCC, then, as Rubin suggests, the monitoring of franchisors may 
require collective action by franchisees.753 
                                                 
753 P.H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’, 21 Journal 
of Law and Economics 223. 
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Performance standards  
Romania has minimum qualifications for franchisors.754  Fiscal solvency requirements 
must be met before registering franchise offerings in the US state of Virginia.755  
Minimum qualifications or accreditation are imposed in Korea for franchise 
transaction consultants.  Another performance requirement that has recently been 
promulgated in China and in Vietnam is that a franchise system must operate a certain 
number of pilot units for a certain number of years before it can sell franchise units. In 
China the requirement is the operation of at least two units for one year.756  In 
Vietnam a franchisor must have a store in operation for one year.  In Italy there is a 
requirement that the franchise concept must be tested in the market prior to the sale of 
franchise units.  These measures are similar in effect to accreditation but the focus is 
on performance rather than procedure.  Performance standards for franchising might 
also include Codes of Ethics and/or Practice, as used in New Zealand and the 
European Community.  There may be a greater role for performance standards, or 
perhaps procedures to enable performance review.  Again, there is overlap here with 
procedural standards such as the prescribed procedures for dispute resolution and 
termination.   
7.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Over a 30-year history of experimentation with the regulation of the franchise sector 
in Australia, regulators have preferred low-intervention, self-regulatory instruments 
with the participation of the trade association.  As Chapter Two’s review of the 
evolution the current regulation of the franchise relationship in Australia indicates, 
regulation of franchising has in many respects been inconsistent with best practice.  
This chapter proposes an alternative to current regulatory process for the franchise 
sector in Australia, a reframing of regulation.   
Because the problems of imbalance of power and uncertainty are pervasive, because 
the role of a franchisee has been so fundamentally marginalized, any effective 
                                                 
754 Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Franchising, Annex 3 to the UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT 
Guide to International Franchise Arrangements (1998) UNIDROIT periodically updated at: 
<http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/franchising/1998guide/main.htm> at 31 December 2005.   
755 The laws of individual US States are not considered in this table at the time of this writing, with this 
exception.  For more information on this requirement, please refer to the Division of Securities and 
Retail Franchising, Virginia State Corporation Commission.  
756 Andrew Terry, ‘A Census of International Franchise Regulation’, Paper Presented at the 21st 
Annual International Society of Franchising Conference (2007). 
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regulation of the sector must first ensure that it no longer excludes a franchisee at 
every stage in the regulatory process and in every layer of regulation.  What is most 
needed is a return to the fundamental process of regulating, a process such as that 
prescribed by Sparrow that is democratic, responsive, and participative. This chapter 
describes the benefits to the sector of collaborative initiatives in regulating. There are 
significant barriers to such initiatives; this dissertation suggests that a realignment of 
interests and roles among all stakeholders will be required to institute the needed 
changes. 
With respect to measurement information about what is happening in the sector must 
be sourced in a balanced way from all participants.  Using this information, the 
stakeholders/participants are in the best position to identify problems in the sector.   
With respect to tools this dissertation outlines some alternatives and describes a broad 
menu of tools that can be employed to regulate the franchise sector.  Here again 
stakeholders/participants should be involved in the process with the regulator. 
Reframing regulation would facilitate revision of patterns in the process of regulation 
and in the reviews and revision of this process that have grown stale, allowing 
regulatory practice to more closely resemble the ‘new learning’ of regulatory theory.  
As it requires better measurements and information, reframed regulatory practice will 
fit more closely the needs of the sector and have greater legitimacy, accountability 
and responsiveness.   Broader involvement of stakeholders will likely lead to better 
information and measurements, more accurate identification of problems and the more 
effective use of wider range of tools.  
Finally, as it will fully enlist the participation of all stakeholders, franchisees as the 
protected interest will be better represented to the regulator and in every aspect of the 
governance of the relationship thereby correcting rather than contributing to the 
imbalance of power and uncertainty within the very process of regulation at all levels. 
The regulator needs to work together with all stakeholders so that all participants 
better understand the deal and the true nature of the risks and rewards of the 
interaction.  Then there will be fewer franchisee complaints, fewer news stories and 
less need for inquiries into why regulation does not seem to be working.   
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Finally and fundamentally, franchisee involvement can help to unify the sector and its 
image and to prevent schisms from within that threaten the competitiveness of the 
sector as a whole.   
7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter has summarized the conclusions of this research and has explored some 
strategies for reframing the regulation of franchising.  The main points and 
recommendations are as follows:   
• In the franchise sector self-regulation not only sets up but reinforces 
conditions of imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee.  Regulatory 
intervention is often used to address inefficiencies and inequities in market 
interaction and other layers of governance.  The current regulatory strategy, 
however, is not meeting its stated goals.  Imbalance of power and uncertainty 
persist in the franchising relationship.  Franchisees are marginalized at every 
stage of regulatory process. 
• It is therefore necessary to explore alternative approaches to governance that 
can help to ameliorate the problems of imbalance of power and uncertainty in 
the franchise relationship. 
• The most important element is collaborative process, to reframe the roles of 
franchisee, franchisor and the regulator consistent with the ‘new learning’ 
about regulation that features participative, democratic process. 
•  Regulation of franchising should be reoriented toward process through 
collaborative approaches to meaningful measurements, identification of 
problems and selection of tools.  This is the avenue to a regulatory process that 
is most likely to redress imbalance of power and uncertainty for a franchisee 
because it addresses these problems structurally in every layer of regulation. 
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Chapter Eight 
Epilogue 
 
  
‘…things must happen when it is time for them to happen. A quest may not 
simply be abandoned; unicorns may go unrescued for a long time, but not 
forever; a happy ending cannot come in the middle of the story.’757 
 
The importance of ‘a fair go’ is a value we teach our children at an early age, but one 
we sometimes neglect as adults.   A ‘fair go’ is a hallmark of Australian cultural 
values, and the assurance of fair practice is also an essential component of 
competitive, efficient markets.758  This dissertation began with the premise that in 
Australia there is evidence of franchisee dissatisfaction and of conflict between 
franchisors and franchisees that warrants a closer look at the franchise relationship 
and at its regulation.  Franchising makes an important contribution to the economy of 
Australia, as it does to the economies of many countries, but there is reason to doubt 
whether the franchise sector in Australia is as efficient and competitive as it might be.  
Appropriate and effective regulation of the franchise sector can make it fairer and so 
should enhance its competitiveness.  The question this dissertation has sought to 
answer is whether the regulation of the sector is effective in achieving its stated goals, 
in balancing power and in enhancing certainty for franchisees so that the sector is 
fairer and so more competitive.  
An issue that quickly emerges in evaluating the effectiveness of the Franchising Code 
of Conduct is the lack of reliable information about the sector.  There are no baseline 
measurements.  There is no hard economic data.  There are many reviews and 
surveys, but questions must be posed as to whose opinions they reflect and who pays 
for and publicises them.  When independent research is carried out, questions again 
must be asked about who is paying for that research, and equally, who is paying to 
discredit it.   
                                                 
757 Peter S.  Beagle, The Last Unicorn (1991). 
758  The purpose of the Trade Practices Act is ‘to enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection.’  Louise Sylvan, 
‘Advancing Australia Fair and Competitive!’, Speech given at the Law Institute of Victoria (2004) 
<http://www.liv.asn.au/media/speeches/20040226_accc.html> at 15 June 2006.  See also M. Porter The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) discussed in Chapter Two. 
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This dissertation addresses the lack of information, first by identifying the problem, 
and second, in order to clarify some of the mystery surrounding the franchise 
relationship, by looking to the contract for evidence as to whether regulation achieves 
two of its stated goals, redressing imbalance of power in favour of a franchisor and 
reducing uncertainty for a franchisee.  The analysis evaluates whether the contract 
terms indicate that these goals have been reached.  If they do, then regulation is 
achieving those goals and to that extent it is effective.  Because the contract terms 
reflect imbalance of power and uncertainty, the results indicate that regulation of the 
franchise relationship is not achieving the stated goals of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct.   
This dissertation, however, does not simply consider regulation in the sense of direct 
intervention.  Concepts of regulation have changed; regulation is now conceived in 
the broad sense of governing, through multiple layers, privately by the parties 
themselves as well as through public means such as legislation.  While the goals 
being evaluated are the stated goals of the Code of Conduct, this research looks are 
how these conditions are influenced by regulatory measures at all layers of 
governance. 
At a fundamental private layer of regulation franchisors wield the power in the 
market interaction.  It is axiomatic that knowledge is power.  Franchisors and their 
trade association have the knowledge, but, because their first priority is to ensure that 
franchisees will want to buy what they have to sell, they do not always make 
available reliable, accurate information about the sector.  Publicity of the risks and 
problems in the sector would render their product less attractive, and would directly 
impact on the franchisor bottom line, so franchisors and their trade association spend 
significant resources in marketing not only their systems, but the business form, and 
in ensuring that any information that might cast a shadow over the sector is not made 
public or, if it is, that it is discredited.   Franchisees lack the power of knowledge in 
the franchising relationship largely because franchisors and their trade association 
make it their business to only selectively inform them.  Franchisees who try to inform 
themselves are discouraged by the many obstacles to unified communication, 
including threats of defamation; risk of breaching anti-trust provisions such as 
primary boycott;  franchisor claims of lack of good faith; and their own 
independence; even their own industriousness.  Other potential sources of information 
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also fall short, for example, information about dispute processes is unavailable 
because, for reasons of confidentiality, the Code-mandated process of mediation is 
opaque.  At the market layer of governance, franchisees are at a fundamental 
disadvantage because of their lack of information as well as other factors that can 
include inexperience, lack of expertise, isolation, lack of expert advice and modest 
financial resources.   Self-regulatory mechanisms such as markets for terms or dispute 
resolution systems, negotiation, and collective knowledge are ineffective at 
addressing the goals of regulation at this layer of governance. 
At a second private layer of governance, contract, franchisors again dominate the 
interaction.  Franchisors’ solicitors draft the standard form franchise contract to 
provide wide latitude to the franchisor and to reflect its interests.  The contract gives a 
franchisor extensive discretion, few obligations, and few limitations, such as the 
occasional reasonableness requirement.  Even then, some contracts include a 
collective agreement clause that allows a franchisor to change the terms of the deal 
unilaterally at its discretion.  Franchisors profit from selling the rights to use 
intellectual property in a certain location for a certain period of time.  They strictly 
control the use of that intellectual property.  They dictate the terms of the relationship 
and the operating procedures of franchisees.  They require franchisees to buy services 
and supplies that increase their own revenues, and collect marketing funding from 
franchisees that they spend at their discretion.  They have access to franchisee 
computer systems and premises, often control leases, own goodwill and impose 
extensive conditions on franchisee transfer.  They calculate franchisee profits, 
potentially to the narrowest of margins.  As if all this were not enough, contracts are 
written to accord a high level of discretion to a franchisor that spells uncertainty for 
franchisees.   The contract as a means of redressing imbalance of power and 
uncertainty for a franchisee is also ineffective.   
Private governance through market and contract is not only ineffective at achieving 
the stated goals of regulation, but in fact it sets up and reinforces imbalance of power 
and uncertainty in the franchise relationship.  Therefore, private governance cannot 
be regarded as a means to cut costs and to leave the sector to take care of itself.   
Public regulation, in the form of statutory intervention, also has not solved the 
problems in franchising.   The historical development of direct intervention in the 
franchise sector in Australia has been largely politically-motivated, employing 
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processes that are insufficiently transparent and accountable.  Regulation of the sector 
has not been informed by the measurements needed to determine where the problems 
lie..  Nor has it systematically identified problems in the sector, and expanded the 
range of tools available to address them; instead it relies heavily on the trade 
association model of regulation and self-regulatory tools which one of the parties is 
poorly equipped to use.  Even though it has consulted with the industry, it has not 
invested in fully-inclusive, collaborative partnerships to inform a shared purpose and 
enhance legitimacy throughout the process.   
Direct intervention was not the product of collaborative procedures to collect accurate 
data, systematically identify problems and select the appropriate tools. Instead, the 
Franchising Code of Conduct borrowed substantively from US legislation and was 
modelled on a style of regulation that is being revised in the UK.  Consisting of 
several substantive provisions, 759  and disclosure and mediation, the Code relies 
principally on the latter two self-regulatory tools without ensuring, in light of the 
imbalance of power in the relationship, that both sides of the relationship are 
represented and able to fulfil their roles in these self-regulatory procedures.  The 
analysis of direct intervention in this research has been focused primarily on 
disclosure.  Disclosure does not work because the information provided may be 
inadequate and because franchisees are not able to use what information they do 
receive.  Franchisees are unable to play their role in disclosure, just as they are 
marginalized throughout the various layers of the regulatory process, and indeed 
throughout the various stages of the franchise relationship. When one looks at the 
governance of the relationship at every layer, it is difficult to see how the low-
intervention, self-regulatory tools of disclosure and mediation can effectively address 
such deeply ingrained and systemic problems. 
Franchisors have an interest in keeping regulation low-intervention and self-
regulatory, and it is their voice that is heard by the regulator.  Franchisors participate 
in direct intervention to a much greater degree than franchisees.  They are well-
represented to the regulator through their trade association.   Franchisees are not 
usually members of this association and do not have their own association.  
                                                 
759 As shown above these substantive provisions are as follows:  a cooling-off period for franchisees, 
signed statements that a franchisee has been given advice, or has been told to seek advice but has 
decided not to seek it prior to signing the franchise contract, no general indemnity of franchisor by 
franchisee, no prohibition on franchisees’ freedom to associate with other franchisees, and some 
procedural provisions with respect to transfer and termination.   
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Franchisees encounter major barriers in communicating among themselves; there 
seems little hope that they can get together to agree to arrange collective 
representation.   In the regulation of franchising the marginalization of a franchisee at 
every stage of the relationship means franchisee interests are not served.   Regulation 
that seeks to curb opportunistic abuse of power in a market sector but that relies upon 
and consults only with those who engage in opportunistic practices and not those who 
experience them is inconsistent with the new learning on regulation, and it cannot be 
expected to be effective regulation.   
Imbalance of power and problems of uncertainty for a franchisee are not adequately 
addressed by regulation.  In fact regulation in its current form compounds the risks 
for franchisees, first because it reinforces the imbalance in stakeholder representation 
in the lack of balanced representation in the regulatory process and second, because it 
gives a false sense of protection that impairs a franchisee’s meagre self-protective 
capacities in the face of consolidated franchisor power.   
The failure of both private, self-regulatory measures and public, statutory intervention 
suggests a need for reframing regulatory process.  In order to promote ‘process, 
organization and distribution of rights and competencies’, regulation should enable 
self-referential capacities of institutions ‘to shape their own responses to complex 
social problems.’760  Regulation of franchising has enlisted the self-referential 
capacities of institutions, but the effectiveness of this approach is compromised by the 
nature of these institutions, primarily through their failure to establish a role for 
franchisees. ‘The success of self-regulation depends on the key stakeholders in a 
market agreeing, preferably on a fully-inclusive basis, to cooperate in such an 
approach.’761   The formulation of appropriate regulation is properly the product of a 
collaborative process that fully includes all stakeholders, in concert with the 
regulator.  The regulation of the franchise sector is not optimally effective, largely 
because it fails to involve key stakeholders on a fully-inclusive basis.   
Regulation of franchising can and should conform to current conceptions of best 
practice.  To do this it must ensure a vital component of regulatory process that is 
                                                 
760 Sanford E. Gaines and Cliona Kimber, ‘Redirecting Self-Regulation’ (2001) 13 Journal of 
Environmental Law 157, referring to American theorist Eric Orts. 
761 Olga Borissova (ed), Implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment, Best Practices in Europe, 
American University in Bulgaria, Sofia (2004) 36. 
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now lacking, reliable and accurate information.  Information is crucial about 
franchising generally, the nature of the relationship, the nature of the roles played by 
the participants.  The diversity of roles in the franchisor/franchisee relationship that 
attribute to a franchisee various qualities of employee, investor, consumer, and 
partner among others, cannot continue to be denied as well as negated by a contract 
provision that says franchisees are none of these things.  It is necessary to recognize 
how and where these dimensions of the relationship should inform interpretation and 
regulation.  Information and education is also crucial about the nature of the contract 
and the contract terms, as is accurate, reliable information about reputation of 
franchisors and other aspects of particular franchise systems.  Regulation of 
franchising must ensure the effectiveness of disclosure through monitoring and 
enforcement, including registration.  If the administrative burden is too great for the 
ACCC, then, as Rubin suggests, the monitoring of franchisors may require collective 
action by franchisees. The importance of franchising and its many benefits should not 
deter participants and observers from making a thorough and candid assessment of its 
costs as well as its benefits.   In fact it is precisely because the sector is important that 
the full story should be told.  An assessment of franchising with its warts as well as its 
many positive attributes will allow for a fuller understanding of the sector. Without 
such understanding, appropriate regulation to improve its competitiveness cannot be 
implemented.   
Other important elements in regulatory process include using this improved 
information to identify problems collaboratively and selecting appropriate tools.  
There is no reason why the same reforms to regulation that relies heavily on trade 
association participation in the UK might not be implemented in Australia.  
Commentators have suggested alternative measures that might be successful in the 
regulation of franchising, such as content control, unfair terms legislation, and 
markets for fair dispute resolution, as proposed by Collins; good faith as proposed by 
Hadfield; and collective understanding of terms discussed by Black and Wightman.  
It does not matter so much what the regulation is or what tools and strategies are 
selected, because conditions in the sector and capabilities of regulatory process will 
change.  What matters most is process that is fully-inclusive, participative and 
democratic. Currently, a franchisee is not a full participant in the regulation of the 
franchise relationship, but rather is subject to uncertainty and lacks power in each 
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layer of governance, market, contract and direct intervention. Franchisees remain 
marginalized, ‘infantilized’.  Power is always relative; if franchisees are infantilized, 
then franchisors’ power is virtually absolute.   
Given the imbalance of power and the uncertainty that prevail throughout the 
franchise relationship for franchisees, what started as the ‘promise’ of franchising for 
too many participants quickly becomes a nightmare.  As Sciarra noted, the protection 
of franchisees is debatable.  But the question should not be whether franchisees are 
protected, but rather whether they are equipped to protect themselves. The self-
regulatory emphasis in franchising regulation puts the onus on franchisees, seeming 
not to recognize that they are incapable of playing their roles throughout the layers of 
governance of the relationship.  
Ideally, a successful solution to the problems in franchising will come through 
collaborative process that includes franchisees and so recognizes and addresses the 
genuine needs and concerns of all the participants in the franchise relationship.  Only 
franchisees can accurately describe what they need, and whether regulation is meeting 
its objectives in protecting their interests.  This dissertation argues that franchise 
regulation in Australia should stimulate and encourage consultation, responsiveness 
and transparency and that it must implement improved cooperation and a realignment 
of roles in order to better address its objectives. 762  In reality, however, unity is 
power, and franchisees lack unity because they cannot freely communicate or secure 
collective representation.  To help franchisees become better organized and 
represented, there is a need for a greater role to be played by the regulator.  
Franchisors have been quite happy to divide and conquer; this includes dividing the 
regulator from franchisees.  Therefore the regulator cannot rely on the industry 
association and self-regulatory mechanisms; it must take the lead.   The first step of 
that leadership role is to reframe the regulatory process with better measurement, 
better identification of problems and tools, and, above all, collaborative process.  
This dissertation has been largely about the risks to franchisees from opportunism of 
franchisors that is left unchecked by regulation.  It highlights the power of franchisors 
                                                 
762 For example, Regulatory Reform lists tools or principals of public consultation as informality, 
circulation of regulatory proposals for public notice and comment, hearings, and  advisory bodies 
(Australia has done most of these and more, because have done monitor and review of legislation, 
complete with submissions and surveys) See Regulatory Reform (2006) Jacobs & Associates 
<http://www.regulatoryreform.com> at 24 November 2006. 
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in the franchise relationship and the potential for the abuse of that power by 
opportunistic franchisors.  The law has always recognized power, and has always 
required certain duties commensurate with power.  In franchising the power enjoyed 
by a franchisor has been balanced by few legally-imposed duties towards franchisees.  
Business format franchising has evolved for over sixty years. The sector has matured, 
and Ray Kroc’s franchising is an era that has passed.  What is needed today in order 
to minimize opportunistic behaviour, to improve relationships within the sector, and 
to improve the health of the sector as a whole, is to align franchisors’ and franchisee’ 
interests as much as possible.763    While today’s franchisor does need uniformity to 
protect the brand, system uniformity need not equate to a silencing of franchisees.  It 
used to be that franchisors could and did prohibit franchisees from communicating 
with one another. Now the Code prohibits this, but franchisors still have ways of 
silencing franchisees, isolating them and depriving them of information.  Franchisors 
consolidate their power, but are still able to avoid the concomitant responsibilities. 
The good news is that most franchisors are not opportunistic.  Good, quality 
franchisors sell a right to franchisees that is worth the price; franchisees in well-run 
systems can themselves enjoy handsome profits.  It is these well-run franchise 
systems that will benefit most from reframed regulatory process and renewed 
measures to prevent abusive practices that not only harm individual franchisees but 
also damage the image of the sector as a whole.  Franchisees and franchisors are part 
of the same system.   Empowering franchisees and increasing their participation at all 
layers of governance ultimately will help to unify the sector and its image.  Good 
franchisors actively seek out strong franchisees, because strong franchisees make for 
more profitable franchise systems for all participants and a healthier industry sector.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
763 Address to the FCA Plenary Session, October 2006 by Rod Wakefield, CEO of The Coffee Club.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
COMPARISON OF FORMER CODE OF PRACTICE TO CURRENT FRANCHISING CODE OF 
CONDUCT 
 
 Franchising Code of Practice, 1 January, 
1995, 3rd edition. 
(Voluntary code) 
Franchising Code of Conduct  
(effective 1 October 1998) 
(current, mandatory Code) 
Timing of 
Disclosure 
Franchisor must give you a Disclosure 
Document at least seven days prior to signing 
a Franchise Agreement, 9.2.  You must  
before execution of any Franchise Agreement 
have received and read them (Item 10.1). 
 
A Disclosure Document is also required on 
renewal of a Franchise Agreement, Item 9.2. 
A franchisor must give you a copy of the code and 
the disclosure document, in either electronic or 
hardcopy form, at least 14 days before you enter 
into the agreement or pay the non-refundable 
money, or at least 14 days before renewal or 
extension of the franchise 
Disclosure:   
Re Territory 
(Item 8 
Disclosure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See also 
Item 11 
Disclosure 
Franchisor must disclose particulars of any 
restrictions, eg. territorial…imposed on you.  
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (vi)(d)). 
 
 
 
 
 
8  whether the franchise is for an exclusive or non-
exclusive territory or limited to a particular site; 
whether the franchisor or its associates may operate 
a business that is substantially the same as the 
franchise in the franchised territory; 
whether the franchisor or its associates may 
establish other franchises that are substantially the 
same as the franchise in the franchised territory; 
whether you may operate a business that is 
substantially the same as your franchise outside the 
franchised territory; and 
whether the franchisor may change the territory. 
 
11 Sites or Territories 
11.1 The policy of the franchisor, or an associate of 
the franchisor, for selection of as many of the 
following as are relevant: 
(a) the site to be occupied by the franchised 
business; 
(b) the territory in which the franchised business is 
to operate. 
11.2 Details of whether the territory or site to be 
franchised has been subject to a franchised business 
operated by a previous franchise granted by the 
franchisor and, if so, details of the franchised 
business, including the circumstances in which the 
previous franchisee ceased to operate. 
11.3 The details mentioned in item 11.2 may be in a 
separate document and may be made available for 
inspection at a time and place mentioned in the 
disclosure document. 
 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Name, registered office, qualifications and 
business experience of Franchisor. 
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
details of the franchisor, including the business 
experience of the people running the franchise 
(Items 2 and 3); 
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Requirements”, (i), (ii), (iii)).  
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Details of debt, criminal or civil proceedings 
or bankruptcies/insolvency of Franchisor, 
Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (v). 
Details of any current unresolved litigation 
with any existing or former Franchisees. 
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (ix)). 
details of criminal, trade practices and other 
litigation in circumstances listed (Item 4); 
 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
 payments made to agents who recruit you (Item 5); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Details of number of Franchises terminated or 
not renewed, over the past year.  (Attachment 
A “Disclosure Document Requirements”, 
(ix)).    
details of existing franchises and those terminated 
— not renewed, transferred or bought back — by 
the franchisor, in the last three years (Item 6); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Examples of trademarks, logo, symbol etc and 
protection measures.  (Attachment A 
“Disclosure Document Requirements”, 
(vi)(b)). 
details of any trade mark, patent, design or 
copyright significant to the franchise system (Item 
7); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Summary of terms and conditions for 
purchase of goods and services and situation 
if source fails, including rebate comment.  
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (vi)(e)).    
details of goods and services you acquire or provide, 
including restrictions and obligations on where you 
buy (Items 9 and 10); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Basis of Franchisor’s involvement/approval 
for site selection,.  (Attachment A “Disclosure 
Document Requirements”, (vi)(f)). 
the franchisor’s policy on site selection and details 
on the history of the site (Item 11); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
 details on marketing and cooperative funds (Item 
12); 
 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Clear and in writing prepayment requirements 
(and refund of) before sign the franchise (Item 
11.1). 
 
Details of payments to be made and refund 
entitlement if terminate during ‘cooling off’ 
period.  (Attachment A “Disclosure 
Document Requirements”, (vi)(c)). 
details of money you are required to pay before you 
sign the franchise and when you are entitled to a 
refund (Item 13); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
List of establishment costs.  (Attachment A 
“Disclosure Document Requirements”, (vii)). 
 
details of establishment costs and other payments 
(Item 13); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Details of financial requirements, eg. non 
borrowed capital.  (Attachment A “Disclosure 
Document Requirements”, (viii)). 
details of the financing arrangements (Item 14); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Summary of main obligations of Franchisor.  
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (vi)(h)). 
summary of conditions of agreement that deal with 
both your obligations and those of the franchisor 
(Items 15 and 16); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Summary of termination, renewal, goodwill 
and assignment.  (Attachment A “Disclosure 
Document Requirements”, (vi)(g)). 
summary of conditions of the agreement including 
such things as the term of the agreement, variations, 
renewal and extension, termination, goodwill (if 
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any), transfer, mediation, franchisor’s right to 
inspect records and any restriction on your 
operations during and after the agreement (Item 17); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
 Obligation to sign related agreements including 
leases, hire purchase, security, confidentiality, 
restrictions on business  
(Item 18); 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
Franchistor’s viability statement, but not 
required if wholly owned subsidiary of public 
co.  (Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (iv) and Appendix 1). 
a statement about the franchisor’s liquidity situation 
(Item 20); and 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
You must certify you have received and read 
the Disclosure Document.  (Item 18) 
provision for acknowledging your receipt of the 
disclosure document (Item 23). 
Disclosure: 
Re Other 
Issues 
 The franchisor may attach a copy of the franchise 
agreement to the disclosure document. If the 
agreement itself discloses matters listed in Items 15, 
16 and 17 above, then the disclosure document need 
only refer to their inclusion in the agreement. 
Short-form 
disclosure 
 A franchisor proposing to enter, renew or extend a 
franchise with an annual turnover of less than $50 
000 may choose to provide short-form disclosure.  
This requires the inclusion of only 11 classes of 
information (annexure 2).  Franchisee may still 
request full disclosure under the requirements in 
annexure 1.  
Reas opp’ty 
to 
understand 
the code and 
the 
disclosure 
document, 
indep’t 
advice 
before 
entering the 
agreement764 
Franchisee must: 
(1) certify he had received and read: 
Disclosure Document, at least 7 days before 
signing the Franchise Agreement, 
FCC Guide, 
FCC Code of Practice, (Item 10.1); 
(2) provide a certificate from a legal advisor 
certifying explanation of the agreement or a 
statement that the agreement has been 
explained by a legal advisor, (Item 10.2). 
Franchisee must provide 
a written statement - have received, read and had a 
reasonable opportunity to understand the code and 
the disclosure document.  
signed statement - have been given advice by an 
independent legal adviser, business adviser or 
accountant, or have been told to seek that kind of 
advice but chose not to. 
Cooling 
off765 
Franchisee right to terminate within seven 
days from date of Franchise Agreement or any 
‘agreement to agree’.  Franchisee entitled to a 
refund of initial fees less reasonable expenses, 
(Item 11.2). 
Franchisee right to terminate the agreement within 
seven days of entering into the agreement; or (b) 
making any payment whichever is earliest 
….franchisee entitled to a refund, less the 
franchisor’s reasonable expenses if expenses or 
their method of calculation have been set out in 
the agreement., within 14 days. 
 
                                                 
764 does not apply to the renewal or extension of a franchise 
agreement with a franchisor; 
765 does not apply to the renewal or extension of a franchise 
agreement with a franchisor; 
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Franchisee 
Association 
 A franchisor cannot stop franchisees from forming 
an association or otherwise getting together 
Disclosure:   
Lease (If 
franchisee 
leases from 
franchisor or 
its associate) 
 Within one month after signing the lease, or 
agreement to lease, franchisor must provide  
 a copy of its lease or agreement to lease; or 
 written details of conditions of occupation; 
or 
 the documents giving you the right to 
occupy the premises. 
 
Disclosure:   
Marketing 
and other 
cooperative 
funds 
(DISCLOSUR
E) 
 
 
 
 
See also 
item 12 
disclosure 
 
 Where agreement reqs franchisee to provide money 
to any cooperative fund, the franchisor must:  
 each financial year, from the start of the 
code, prepare a financial statement of the fund’s 
receipts and expenses and the amount spent on 
production, advertising and administration; 
 have the statement audited within three 
months of the end of the financial year, unless 75 
percent of franchisees agree otherwise; and 
 give franchisee a copy of the statement 
within 30 days of your request. 
12 Marketing or other cooperative funds 
12.1 For each marketing or other cooperative fund, 
controlled or administered by or for the franchisor, 
to which the franchisee may be required to 
contribute, the following details: 
(a) the kinds of persons who contribute to the fund 
(for example, franchisee, franchisor, outside 
supplier); 
(b) whether the franchisor must contribute to the 
fund in relation to businesses owned or operated by 
the franchisor 
that are substantially the same as the franchised 
business and, if so, whether the contribution is 
worked out in the 
same way as for a franchisee; 
(c) how much the franchisee must contribute to the 
fund & whether other franchisees must contribute at 
a different 
rate; 
(d) who controls or administers the fund; 
(e) whether the fund is audited and, if so, by whom 
and when; 
(f) whether the fund’s financial statements can be 
inspected by, or will be given to, franchisees; 
(g) the kinds of expense for which the fund may be 
used; 
(h) the fund’s expenses for the last financial year, 
including the percentage spent on production, 
advertising, 
administration and other stated expenses; 
(i) whether the franchisor or its associates supply 
goods or services for which the fund pays and, if so, 
details of the 
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goods or services; 
(j) whether the franchisor must spend part of the 
fund on marketing, advertising or promoting the 
franchisee’s 
business. 
26.Transfer  Franchisee request for franchisor’s consent to 
transfer must be in writing. 
Franchisor cannot unreasonably withhold consent.  
    See Item 20(3): circumstances in which it is 
reasonable for a franchisor to withhold consent: 
(a) the proposed transferee is unlikely to be able to 
meet the financial obligations that the proposed 
transferee would have under the franchise 
agreement; or 
(b) the proposed transferee does not meet a 
reasonable requirement of the franchise agreement 
for the transfer of a franchise; or 
(c) the proposed transferee has not met the selection 
criteria of the franchisor; or 
(d) agreement to the transfer will have a 
significantly adverse effect on the franchise system; 
or 
(f) the proposed transferee does not agree in writing 
to comply with the obligations of the franchisee 
under thefranchise agreement; or 
(g) the franchisee has not paid or made reasonable 
provision to pay an amount owing to the franchisor; 
or 
(h) the franchisee has breached the franchise 
agreement and has not remedied the breach. 
 
If franchisor does not respond in writing that 
consent is withheld and giving reasons for 
withholding  — within 42 days — consent is taken 
to have been given 
Disclosure: 
Franchisor rt 
of 1st refusal 
 Must be disclosed  [Disclosure 17.1(l)] 
Disclosure:   
IP, Confid’l 
information 
 Disclosure 
Disclosure: 
Supply of 
Products by 
Franchisor 
Summary of terms and conditions for 
purchase of services, goods, fixtures and 
property from Franchisor or other if supply by 
Franchisor fails, (Attachment A, (vi)(e)). 
In Disclosure: 
9 Supply of goods or services to a franchisee 
9.1 For the franchisor’s requirements for supply of 
goods or services to a franchisee — details of: 
(a) any requirement for the franchisee to maintain a 
level of inventory or acquire an amount of goods or 
services; and 
(b) restrictions on acquisition of goods or services 
by the franchisee from other sources; and 
(c) ownership by the franchisor or an associate of 
the franchisor of an interest in any supplier from 
which the 
franchisee may be required to acquire goods or 
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services; and 
(d) the obligation of the franchisee to accept goods 
or services from the franchisor, or from an associate 
of the franchisor; 
and 
(e) the franchisor’s obligation to supply goods or 
services to the franchisee; and 
(f) whether the franchisee will be offered the right to 
be supplied with the whole range of the goods or 
services of 
the franchise; and 
(g) conditions under which the franchisee can return 
goods, and to whom; and 
(h) conditions under which the franchisee can obtain 
a refund for services provided by the franchisor, and 
from whom; 
and 
(i) whether the franchisor may change the range of 
goods or services, and if so, to what extent; and 
(j) whether the franchisor, or an associate of the 
franchisor, 
will receive a rebate or other financial benefit from 
the supply of goods or services to franchisees, and 
whether any rebate or financial benefit is shared, 
directly or indirectly, with franchisees. 
Note Before a requirement is made under paragraph 
(b) or (c), the franchisor may notify, or seek 
authorisation from, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (see Act, Part VII). 
In Summary materials: 
Third line forcing [ss. 47(6) and 47(7)]:   
Franchisor forces a franchisee to purchase goods or 
services from a third party, or provides a price 
incentive for someone to purchase goods or services 
from a third party. 
Franchisors may impose quality standards on 
franchisees. Franchisors can also nominate suppliers 
who meet these standards. However, franchisors 
cannot prevent a franchisee from acquiring goods or 
services from a supplier of the franchisee’s choice, 
if that supplier meets the franchisor’s quality 
standards. 
If a franchisor requires that specific equipment or 
software be used by a franchisee, even if this 
equipment supplier is at arm’s length from the 
franchisor, it will constitute third line forcing.  
(If any goods or services that the franchisee must 
acquire are subject to any registered patent, design, 
copyright or rights under the Circuits Layout Act 
1989, they may be subject to supply restrictions 
contained in the licence agreement in relation to 
those rights. Under these circumstances, if the 
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restriction genuinely relates to the intellectual 
property rights in goods or services, then prescribing 
a particular source may not be third line forcing. ) 
Disclosure: 
Supply of 
Products by 
Franchisee 
 10 Supply of goods or services by a franchisee 
10.1 For the franchisor’s requirements for supply of 
goods or services by a franchisee — details of: 
(a) restrictions on the goods or services that the 
franchisee may supply; and 
(b) restrictions on the persons to whom the 
franchisee may supply goods or services; and 
(c) whether the franchisee must supply the whole 
range of the goods or services of the franchise. 
Note Before a requirement is made under paragraph 
(a) or (b), the franchisor may notify, or seek 
authorisation from, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (see Act, Part VII). 
Pricing  Not in Code, but in explanatory summary:  When 
competitors reach an agreement to fix, maintain, or 
control the prices that they charge for goods and 
services. The agreement does not have to be in 
writing.  
Disclosure re 
pmts 
 13 Payments 
Prepayments 
13.1 If the franchisor requires a payment before the 
franchise agreement is entered into — why the 
money is required, how the money is to be applied 
and who will hold the money. 
13.2 The conditions under which a payment will be 
refunded. 
Establishment costs 
13.3 Details of the range of costs to start operating 
the franchised business, based on current practice, 
for the following matters: 
(a) real property, including property type, location 
and building size; 
(b) equipment, fixtures, other fixed assets, 
construction, remodelling, leasehold improvements 
and decorating costs; 
(c) inventory required to begin operation; 
(d) security deposits, utility deposits, business 
licences, insurance and other prepaid expenses; 
(e) additional funds, including working capital, 
required by the franchisee before operations begin; 
(f) other payments by a franchisee to begin 
operations. 
13.4 For item 13.3, the details for each payment 
must include: 
(a) description of the payment; and 
(b) amount of the payment or the formula used to 
work out the payment; and 
(c) to whom the payment is made; and 
(d) when the payment is due; and 
(e) whether the payment is refundable and, if so, 
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under what conditions. 
13.5 For item 13.4, if the amount of the payment 
cannot easily be worked out — the upper and lower 
limits of the amount. 
Other payments 
13.6 For each recurring or isolated payment payable 
by the franchisee to the franchisor or an associate of 
the franchisor or 
to be collected by the franchisor or an associate of 
the franchisor for another person: 
(a) description of the payment; and 
(b) amount of the payment or formula used to work 
out the payment; and 
(c) to whom the payment is made; and 
(d) when the payment is due; and 
(e) whether the payment is refundable and, if so, 
under what conditions. 
13.7 For item 13.6, if the amount of the payment 
cannot easily be worked out, the upper and lower 
limits of the amount. 
 
Disclosure:   
Franchisor’s 
oblig’ns 
Summary of the main obligations of 
Franchisor (including initial and ongoing 
training to be provided), (Attachment A, 
(vi)(h)). 
15 Franchisor’s obligations 
15.1 Summary of the conditions of the franchise 
agreement that deal with obligations of the 
franchisor (or references to the relevant conditions 
of the franchise agreement, if attached), including: 
(a) an obligation to provide training: 
(i) before the franchised business starts; and 
(ii) during operation of the franchised business; and 
(b) any obligation that continues after the franchised 
business 
ceases to operate. 
Disclosure:   
Franchisee 
operational 
oblig’ns 
 16 Franchisee’s obligations 
16.1 Summary of the conditions for the following 
matters: 
(a) site selection and acquisition; 
(b) requirements for starting the franchised business; 
(c) development of the site, premises, vehicles and 
equipment; 
(d) training: 
(i) before the franchised business starts; and 
(ii) during operation of the franchised business; 
(e) opening the franchised business; 
(f) complying with standards or operating manuals; 
(h) warranties and customer service; 
(i) territorial development and minimum 
performance criteria; 
(j) maintenance and appearance of premises, 
vehicles and equipment; 
(k) insurance; 
(l) marketing; 
(m) indemnities and guarantees; 
(n) participation requirements for the franchisee or 
its directors, management or employees; 
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(o) records and reports; 
(p) inspections and audit. 
Disclosure:   
Ongoing 
Disclosure 
req’ts 
Details of any materially relevant debt, 
criminal or civil proceedings or 
bankruptcies/insolvency of Franchisor, 
Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (v). 
Details of any current unresolved litigation 
with any existing or former Franchisees. 
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (ix)). 
18 Disclosure of materially relevant facts 
(1) If a disclosure document does not mention a 
matter mentioned in subclause (2), the franchisor 
must tell a franchisee or 
prospective franchisee about the matter, in writing, 
within a reasonable time (but not more than 60 
days) after the franchisor becomes aware of it. 
(2) For subclause (1), the matters are: 
(a) change in majority ownership or control of the 
franchisor; 
(b) proceedings by a public agency, a judgment in 
criminal or civil proceedings or an award in an 
arbitration against the 
franchisor in Australia alleging: 
(i) breach of a franchise agreement; or 
(ii) contravention of trade practices law; or 
(iii) contravention of the Corporations Law; or 
(iv) unconscionable conduct; or 
(v) misconduct; or 
(vi) an offence of dishonesty; 
(c) a judgment against the franchisor, other than for 
unfair 
dismissal of an employee, under: 
(i) section 127A or 127B of the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996; or 
(ii) section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 
of New South Wales; or 
(iii) section 276 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 
of Queensland; 
(d) civil proceedings in Australia against the 
franchisor by at least 10%, or 10, of the franchisees 
in Australia of the 
franchisor (whichever is the lower); 
(e) any judgment that is entered against the 
franchisor in Australia, and is not discharged within 
28 days, for at least: 
(i) for a small proprietary company — $100,000; or 
(ii) for any other company — $1,000,000; 
(f) any judgment that is entered against the 
franchisor in a matter mentioned in item 4.2 of 
Annexure 1 or item 3.2 of 
Annexure 2; 
(g) the franchisor becoming an externally-
administered body corporate; 
(h) a change in the intellectual property, or 
ownership or control of the intellectual property, 
that is material to the franchise system. 
19 Current disclosure document 
(1) A franchisor must give to a franchisee a current 
disclosure document within 14 days after a written 
request by the 
franchisee. 
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(2) However, a request under subclause (1) can be 
made only once in 12 months. 
Disclosure re 
Financing 
Details of any financial requirements by 
Franchisor to Franchisee, (Attachment A, 
(viii)). 
Financing 
14.1 The material conditions of each financing 
arrangement that the franchisor, its agent or an 
associate of the franchisor offers to the franchisee 
for establishment or operation of the franchised 
business. 
14.2 For item 14.1, the material conditions of a 
financing arrangement include the following: 
(a) any requirement that the franchisee must provide 
a minimum amount of unborrowed working capital 
for the 
franchised business; 
(b) any requirement that a franchisee must meet a 
stated debt to equity ratio in relation to the 
franchised business. 
Terminat’n – 
Franchisee 
in Breach 
(21) 
 Franchisor must give reasonable notice, 
telling you what needs to be done to fix the breach 
and  
allowing you reasonable time to fix it (max 30 
days). 
If you fix the problem the franchisor cannot 
terminate the agreement for this breach.  
Franchisee can use the dispute resolution part of the 
code to resolve disputes arising from this action. 
 
Terminat’n – 
Franchisee 
not in 
Breach (22) 
 Franchisor must give reasonable written notice and 
reasons. 
Franchisee can use the dispute resolution part of the 
code to resolve disputes arising from this action. 
This right of termination with reasonable notice 
does not affect any other contractual rights under the 
franchise agreement. (in summary but not in Code) 
A condition of agreement that a franchisor can 
terminate without the consent of the franchisee is 
not taken to be consent. 
Terminat’n 
without 
notice 
 Same as special circs (23) ? 
Terminat’n 
Special 
circumstance
s (23) 
 Franchisor does not have to comply with the 
termination requirements of 21 or 22  if franchisee: 
 no longer hold a licence needed to carry on 
your business; 
 become bankrupt or insolvent; 
 abandon the franchised business; 
 are convicted of a serious offence; 
 operate the business so that it endangers 
public health or safety; 
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 commit fraud in relation to the business; or 
 agree to terminate the franchise agreement. 
 
Dispute 
Resolution 
(Item 13). See Part 4 
Indemnity/E
xclusion 
Clauses/Disc
laimers  
Franchisor will not participate in 
unconscionable conduct (Item 12.1) and 
conduct unnecessary and unreasonable in 
relation to risks to be incurred by one party 
(Item 12.2(b). 
Agreement must not contain, or require a franchisee 
to sign, a general release of the franchisor from 
liability towards the franchisee. 
Disclosure:   
Re other 
conditions 
Summary of main particulars and features of 
franchise, (Attachment A, (vi)). 
17 Summary of other conditions of agreement 
17.1 Summary of the conditions that deal with the 
following matters: 
(a) term of the franchise agreement; 
(b) variation; 
(c) renewal or extension; 
(d) conditions the franchisee must meet to renew or 
extend the 
franchise agreement; 
(e) termination by the franchisor; 
(f) termination by the franchisee; 
(g) the franchisee’s goodwill, if any, on termination 
or expiry; 
(h) the franchisee’s obligations when a franchise 
agreement is 
terminated, expires or is not renewed; 
(i) the franchisor’s rights to sell its business; 
(j) transfer of a franchise; 
(k) mediation; 
(l) option or right of first refusal, if any, for the 
franchisor to 
buy the franchised business; 
(m) the franchisor’s rights, if any, to inspect 
financial and other 
records of the franchised business; 
(n) confidentiality of the franchisee’s records; 
(o) death or disability of the franchisee or a director 
or 
shareholder of the franchisee; 
(p) details of the operation or establishment of any 
franchisee 
representative body, eg Franchise Advisory Council; 
(q) restrictions on the franchisee’s operation of other 
businesses during or after the term of the franchise 
agreement; 
(r) operations manual; 
(s) choice of governing law. 
Disclosure: 
re related 
agreement 
 18 Obligation to sign related agreements 
18.1 Summary of any requirements under the 
franchise agreement for the franchisee or directors, 
shareholders, beneficiaries, owners or partners of 
the franchisee to enter into any of the following 
agreements: 
(a) a lease, sublease, licence or other agreement 
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under which the franchisee can occupy the premises 
of the franchised 
business; 
(b) a chattel lease or hire purchase agreement; 
(ba) an agreement under which the franchisee gains 
ownership of, or is authorised to use, any 
intellectual property; 
(c) a security agreement, including a guarantee, 
mortgage, security deposit, indemnity, loan 
agreement or obligation 
to provide a bank guarantee to a third party; 
(d) a confidentiality agreement; 
(e) an agreement not to carry on business within an 
area or for a time after the franchise agreement is 
terminated. 
Disclosure  
Earnings 
info and 
financials 
Franchisor’s viability statement, but not 
required if wholly owned subsidiary of public 
co.  (Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (iv) and Appendix 1). 
Projections, including basis and assumptions, 
(Attachment A “Disclosure Document 
Requirements”, (x)). 
19.2 Earnings information may be given in a 
separate document attached to the disclosure 
document. 
19.3 Earnings information includes information 
from which historical or future financial details of a 
franchise can be 
assessed. 
19.4 If earnings information is not given — the 
following statement: 
The franchisor does not give earnings information 
about a [insert type of franchise] franchise. 
Earnings may vary between franchises. 
The franchisor cannot estimate earnings for a 
particular franchise. 
19.5 Earnings information that is a projection or 
forecast must include the following details: 
(a) the facts and assumptions on which the 
projection or forecast is based; 
(b) the extent of enquiries and research undertaken 
by the franchisor and any other compiler of the 
projection or 
forecast; 
(c) the period to which the projection or forecast 
relates; 
(d) an explanation of the choice of the period 
covered by the projection or forecast; 
(e) whether the projection or forecast includes 
depreciation, salary for the franchisee and the cost 
of servicing loans; 
(f) assumptions about interest and tax. 
20 Financial details 
20.1 A statement as at the end of the last financial 
year, signed by at least 1 director of the franchisor, 
whether in its directors’ opinion there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the franchisor will be able to 
pay its debts as and when they fall due. 
20.2 Financial reports for each of the last 2 
completed financial years that have been prepared 
by the franchisor in 
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accordance with sections 295 to 297 of the 
Corporations Law. 20.3 Item 20.2 does not apply if: 
(a) the statement under item 20.1 is supported by an 
independent audit provided by a registered company 
auditor within 12 months after the end of the 
financial year to which the statement relates; and (b) 
a copy of the independent audit is provided with the 
statement under item 20.1. 
Comments/ 
Other 
provisions 
 Protect IP, protect franchisor’s rts to do biz & 
sell other franchises 
Sunk costs, lease commitment reduce franchisee 
free-riding & walk-away ???? 
Council 
membershi
p 
Representation: 5 Franchisees, 5 franchisors, 
2 service providers/advisers, 1 lawyer, 1 
chairperson and 1 government observer, (Item 
1.2).  
 
Council 
membershi
p term 
Two years, up to four only.  
Council 
meeting 
frequency 
Quarterly or more frequently.  
Role of 
Council 
(Item 1.6)  
(a) revise FCC as required. 
(b) advise on franchise policy and complete 
tasks for the Minister for Small Business. 
(c) administer registration to FCC. 
(d) review and monitor FCC and make 
improvement recommendations. 
(e) report annually to Minister for Small 
Business 
(f) deregister persons who fail to comply with 
Code. 
(g) appoint franchise conciliator(s). 
(h) exempt inappropriate compliance to FCC 
where appropriate. 
 
Funding of 
Council 
Initial establishment funding provided by 
Commonwealth.  
Full cost recovery of administration with 2 
years of commencement. (Item 2.1) 
 
Compliance 
Registration 
Fee 
Franchisors, Advisers and Service Providers 
to pay compliance upon registration and 
annually thereafter.  (Item 2.2). 
 
Recovery of 
Registration 
Fees by 
Franchisors 
Franchisors may recover portion of 
registration fee from franchisees as set by the 
Council.  (Item 2.3) 
 
Franchise – 
Def’n 
Item 3.1(a) 
“Franchise” is a contract that includes: 
Franchisee granted the right to use a mark 
recognised by the public to be associated with 
Franchisor; 
Franchisee conduct business in accordance 
A definition of franchise agreement is provided in 
clause 4(1) and is critical to the operation of the 
Code. That definition provides that:  
"A franchise agreement is an agreement:  
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with Franchisor’s marketing, business or 
technical plan or system. 
Franchisor provide ongoing marketing, 
business or technical assistance. 
Where the above obligations are not express 
then a contract will be deemed a franchise if it 
purports to be a franchise and includes any 
franchise covered by the Petroleum Retail 
Marketing Franchise Act 1980. 
(a) that takes the form, in whole or part, of any of 
the following:  
(i) a written agreement; 
(ii) an oral agreement; 
(iii) an implied agreement; and  
(b) in which a person (the franchisor) grants to 
another person (the franchisee) the right to carry on 
the business of offering, supplying or distributing 
goods or services in Australia under a system or 
marketing plan substantially determined, controlled 
or suggested by the franchisor or an associate of the 
franchisor; and  
(c) under which the operation of the business will be 
substantially or materially associated with a trade 
mark, advertising or a commercial symbol:  
(i) owned, used or licenced by the franchisor or an 
associate of the franchisor; or 
(ii) specified by the franchisor or an associate of the 
franchisor; and  
(d) under which, before starting business or 
continuing the business, the franchisee must pay or 
agree to pay to the franchisor or an associate of the 
franchisor an amount including, for example:  
(i) an initial capital investment fee; or 
(ii) a payment for goods or services; or 
(iii) a fee based on a percentage of gross or net 
income whether or not called a royalty or franchise 
service fee; or 
(iv) a training fee or training school fee;  
but excluding:  
(v) payment for goods or services at or below their 
wholesale price; or 
(vi) repayment by the franchisee of a loan from the 
franchisor; or 
(vii) payment for the wholesale price of goods taken 
on consignment; or 
(viii) payment of market value for purchase or lease 
of real property, fixtures, equipment or supplies 
needed to start business or to continue business 
under the franchise agreement." 
An agreement which satisfies this definition will be 
covered by the Code unless specifically excluded by 
another provision of the Code. A number of such 
exclusions are provided for in the Code. 
Significantly, clause 4(2)(b) of the Code also 
provides for a specific inclusion dealing with motor 
vehicle dealer agreements. A motor vehicle 
dealership is been defined in clause 3 of the Code:  
"motor vehicle dealership means a business of 
buying, selling, exchanging or leasing motor 
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vehicles that is conducted by a person other than a 
person who is only involved as a credit provider, or 
provider of other financial services, in the purchase, 
sale, exchange or lease." 
A definition of motor vehicle is also provided in 
clause 3.  
 
EXCLUSIONS 
The following are specific exclusions to the Code:  
under clause 4(3) a number of specified legal 
relationships are not in themselves to be 
considered a franchise agreement. These 
relationships include:  
an employer and employee relationship; 
a partnership relationship;  
a landlord and tenant relationship;  
a mortgagor and mortgagee 
relationship;  
a lender and borrower relationship;  
the relationship between the members 
of a cooperative that is registered, 
incorporated or formed under a relevant 
Australian law.  
the Code does not, in accordance with clause 
5(3)(a), apply to non resident franchisor where 
the franchisor:  
is not a resident, domiciled or 
incorporated in Australia; and  
grants only one franchise or master 
franchise to be operated within 
Australia.  
under clause 5(3)(b), the Code will not apply to 
a franchise agreement covered by another code 
which is prescribed as mandatory pursuant to 
the Australian Trade Practices Act.  
subject to one important proviso,15 the Code 
does not, in accordance with clause 5(3)(c), 
apply to a franchise agreement that:  
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relates to goods or services that are 
substantially the same as those supplied 
by the franchisee for at least 2 years 
immediately before entering into the 
agreement; and  
the sales of goods or services under the proposed 
franchise will not provide more than 20% of the 
franchisee's gross turnover for goods or services of 
that kind during the first year of the franchise 
agreement.  
Non-
Compliance 
to Code 
(Item 5.1)  
A registered party to the FCC will be removed 
if: 
(a) fails to renew registration or pay 
registration fees in time. 
(b) notifies no longer agrees FCC applies or 
ceased in business of franchising 
(c) removed by Council under Item 5.2. 
 
(Item 5.2) Council has power to remove a 
party if: 
(a), (b) not complying with Item 12 
‘Standards of Conduct’ and fails to show 
cause why it should not be removed within 21 
days. 
(c) where a subcommittee of the Council finds 
failure to show cause by party’s response, 
unless an appeal is lodged within 21 days of 
receipt of such notice.  
(d) where full Committee of the Council finds 
failure to show cause then within 7 days of 
notice. 
 
Publicity – 
Register of 
Compliance 
(Item 7.3)  
Register of compliance will be made available 
as a public document. 
 
Standards 
of Conduct 
of 
Franchisor 
and 
Franchisee 
(Unconscion
able 
Conduct) 
(Item 12) 
- Franchisors and Franchisees will not 
participate in ‘unconscionable conduct’ (Item 
12.1) 
- Franchisors and Franchisees will act ‘in an 
ethical, honest and lawful manner’ and 
persuing best franchise practice (Item 12.2). 
- In dealings with each other Franchisors and 
Franchisees should at least avoid the 
following conduct, when such conduct would 
cause significant detriment to either party’s 
business: 
(a) substantial and unreasonable overvaluation 
The Code was written with an awareness of the new 
section 51AC in the TPA…. (se RIS?) 
The mandatory Code no longer includes the 
provisions that were contained in the voluntary 
Code of Practice regarding fair conduct, etc766  
Section 51AC requires a court to consider of the 
provisions of any relevant industry codes in 
determining whether a conduct has been 
unconscionable.767  
 
                                                 
766 The voluntary code provision: 
While s51AC… 
See alsoTerry, Franchising Regulation in Asia 
767 Source: <http://www.selfregulation.gov.au/publications/PrescribedCodesOfConduct/background.asp 
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of fees and prices; 
(b) conduct which is unnecessary and 
unreasonable in relation to risk; 
(c) conduct that is ‘not reasonably necessary’ 
for the protection of the legitimate business 
interests of Franchisor, Franchisee or 
Franchise system. 
Service 
Providers 
compliance 
to Code 
- Banks and Financial Institutions that register 
under the Code agree to comply with the 
Code by providing customised finance 
packages to registered Franchisors (Item 
16.1).  
- Publishers and media that register under the 
Code agree to comply with the Code by 
ensuring that: 
(a) franchise advertisements comply with the 
requirements of the code, and 
(b) franchise opportunity advertisements are 
placed within a distinct classification section 
for registered Franchisors. 
 
 
 
Summary of differences: 
 
New code has increased disclosure obligations, e.g. advertising funds, supply, payments, 
intellectual property 
Termination and transfer requirements 
Franchisee association  
general release from liability 
Enforcement 
 
 
Differences: provisions in new Code, not in old code 
 
payments made to agents who recruit you (Item 5); 
details on marketing and cooperative funds (Item 12); 
Obligation to sign related agreements including leases, hire purchase, security, confidentiality, 
restrictions on business (Item 18); 
A franchisor cannot stop franchisees from forming an association or otherwise getting 
together 
Within one month after signing the lease, or agreement to lease, franchisor must provide  
 a copy of its lease or agreement to lease; or 
 written details of conditions of occupation; or 
 the documents giving you the right to occupy the premises. 
Where agreement reqs franchisee to provide money to any cooperative fund, the franchisor 
must:  
 each financial year, from the start of the code, prepare a financial statement of the 
fund’s receipts and expenses and the amount spent on production, advertising and 
administration; 
 have the statement audited within three months of the end of the financial year, unless 
75 percent of franchisees agree otherwise; and 
 give franchisee a copy of the statement within 30 days of your request. 
 
12 Marketing or other cooperative funds 
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10 Supply of goods or services by a franchisee 
13 Payments 
16 Franchisee’s obligations 
17 Summary of other conditions of agreement 
18 Obligation to sign related agreements 
 
In old code, not in new: 
Council membership 
Representation: 5 Franchisees, 5 franchisors, 2 service providers/advisers, 1 lawyer, 1 
chairperson and 1 government observer, (Item 1.2).  
Council meeting frequency 
Role of Council 
Funding of Council 
Compliance Registration Fee 
Recovery of Registration Fees by Franchisors 
Non-Compliance to Code 
Publicity – Register of Compliance 
Service Providers compliance to Code  
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APPENDIX B 
 
CONTRACT TERM:  TRANSFER 
 
F1 
 
Franchisee understand and acknowledges that the rights and duties set forth in this Agreement 
are personal to Franchisee and/or to any person(s) who holds a direct or indirect controlling 
interest in Franchises (whether as controlling shareholder or as a general partner), and that Sub-
Franchisor has granted the Franchisee in reliance on the business skill and experience, financial 
capacity and personal character of Franchisee and/or any such person(s). Accordingly, neither 
Franchisee nor any immediate or remote successor to any part of Franchisee's interest In the 
Franchise, nor any individual, partnership, corporation or other legal entity which directly or 
indirectly owns any interest in the Franchisee or in Franchisee shall sell, assign, transfer, 
convey, give away, pledge, mortgage, or otherwise encumber any direct or indirect interest in 
the Franchisee or the Franchisee (including, without limitation, shares of corporation stock of or 
general partnership interests in Franchisee, which constitutes direct or indirect ownership or 
control of Franchisee) without the prior written consent of Sub-Franchisor. Any such purported 
assignment or transfer of an interest in the Franchise by operation of law or otherwise, not 
having the written consent of Sub-Franchisor required by this Section 18 shall be null and void 
and shall constitute a material breach of this Agreement. Any such purported assignment or 
transfer of any interest in the Franchisee shall also constitute a material breach of this 
Agreement. F1 or Sub-Franchisor may in any such event then terminate without opportunity to 
cure pursuant to Section 16.3. Sub-Franchisor may withhold its consent for any of the reasons 
contemplated as being valid by the Franchising Code of Conduct as amended from time to time. 
 
18.2  Except in the case of a transfer of the Franchisee to a corporation formed for the 
convenience of ownership or in the case of a transfer by devise or inheritance, upon a permitted 
transfer of the Franchise, Franchisee shall pay to Sub-Franchisor a transfer fee of Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000).  
 
18.3 The foregoing provisions of Section 18.1 to the contrary notwithstanding, Franchisee may 
grant a security interest in the Store or in any of its assets in connection with a bona fide 
financing or refinancing of the Store relating to the acquisition, renovation, repair, replacement 
or operation of the Store or the Premises provided that the secured party agrees that in the event 
of any default by Franchisee under any documents related to the security interest. Sub-
Franchisor shall have the right and option to purchase the indebtedness secured by such security 
interest at a price equal  to the then unpaid balance of such indebtedness. 
 
18.4  No person or entity shall succeed to any of the rights of Franchisee under this Agreement 
by virtue of any voluntary or involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy, receivership, attachment, 
execution, assignment for the benefit of creditors or other legal process. 
 
18.5  The Franchisee acknowledges that the rights granted to it herein by the Sub-Franchisor 
are granted in pursuance of an express authority to do so by F1 and that such authority does not 
permit the Franchisee to appoint any Sub-Sub-Franchisee. Accordingly, the Franchisee shall not 
appoint nor shall it commit itself to appoint any Sub-sub-franchisee. 
 
 
F2  
 
The rights and obligations of the Franchisee under this Agreement are personal to the 
Franchisee.  Neither the Franchisee nor the Shareholders are entitled to: 
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(a) sell, assign, transfer or encumber in whole or in part its legal or beneficial entitlement or 
interest: 
(i) in this Agreement; or 
(ii) in the Franchisee; 
(b) sub contract or delegate the performance of any of its rights, duties or obligations under 
this Agreement except as provided for in this Agreement, 
to any person without the prior written consent of the Franchisor.   
 
20.4 Conditions of consent.   
The Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold its consent to an assignment under clause 20.3.  
The Franchisor's consent to a sale, assignment or transfer to a proposed transferee may be 
withheld absolutely or granted upon such conditions as the Franchisor in its discretion considers 
reasonably appropriate.  The Franchisor will provide its consent if: 
(a) the Franchisee is not in default or arrears in respect of any payments owing to the 
Franchisor; 
(b) the proposed transferee is in the opinion of the Franchisor a respectable, responsible, 
solvent and financially sound person with sufficient business experience to carry on the Business 
and to fully and expeditiously carry out the Franchisee's obligations under this Agreement; 
(c) the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor its full costs of the investigation of the proposed 
transferee its directors, officers, employees and shareholders and any person who proposes to 
give any guarantee, indemnity or other security in respect of the proposed transferee, together 
with the Assignment Fee (if any); 
(d) the proposed transferee signs: 
(i) an acknowledgement of receipt of the Franchisee's Disclosure Document; 
(ii) a new franchise agreement in the form of the Franchisor's then current franchise 
agreement; 
(iii) such agreement or agreements as are reasonably required by the Franchisor (to be 
prepared by the Franchisor's solicitors at the Franchisee's expense) under which the proposed 
transferee agrees to be bound and perform the Franchisee's obligations under this Agreement as 
if it were originally named in this Agreement; and  
(iv) each other document as may customarily be required by the Franchisor of other 
franchisees; 
(e) the proposed transferee obtains all guarantees, indemnities, covenants of restraint and/or 
other documents or securities as the Franchisor may reasonably require for the fulfilment of the 
proposed transferee's obligations under this Agreement; 
(f) the proposed transferee agrees at its cost to undergo or causes its Nominated Operator or 
employees to undergo any training programme prescribed from time to time by the Franchisor 
and pays to the Franchisor the full cost of doing so which cost is included in the Assignment 
Fee; 
(g) the Franchisee agrees to execute a general release of the Franchisor’s Authorised 
Representatives from all Claims that it may have against the Franchisor’s Authorised 
Representatives in respect of this Agreement, or the Business and agrees to remain liable for its 
pre-existing obligations under this Agreement; 
(h) the proposed transferee acquires all of the Franchisee's essential assets used in the 
Business and assumes all of the Franchisee's obligations in relation to it; 
(i) the Franchisee has given the Franchisor REASONABLE Notice of the proposed transfer 
to enable it to comply with its obligations under the Code;  
(j) the Franchisee has given to: 
(i) the prospective transferee; and 
(ii) the Franchisor, a copy of the Franchisee's Disclosure Document and the proposed 
transferee acknowledges receipt of it before the proposed transferee agrees to purchase the 
Business or the Franchise or any interest in the Franchisee; and 
(k) the proposed transferee agrees to take over occupation of the Premises in accordance with 
the Term of the Premises Agreement either by assignment of the lease, sublease or licence or the 
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grant of a new lease, sublease or licence to meet the then current requirements of the Franchisor 
and the Franchisee. 
 
F3 
 
S.35  Assignment 
 
S.35.1  Assignment by Franchisor 
The Franchisor may assign this agreement or any right arising out of this agreement to any 
company or other legal entity that agrees to assume all of the Franchisor's obligations under this 
agreement by giving 14 days notice to the Franchisee. 
 
S.35.2  Assignment by Franchisee 
The Franchisee must not assign or attempt to assign this agreement or any right arising 
out of this agreement unless: 
(a)  it complies with clause   
  (b)  the Franchisee is not in breach of this agreement; 
(c)  the Franchisee pays the Franchisor's an assignment fee of 10% of the proposed purchase 
price or such other fee as the Franchisor may publish from time to time; 
(d)  the Franchisee ensures that the assignee assumes all of the Franchisee's obligations under 
this agreement; 
(e)  the Franchisee pays all amounts owed to the Franchisor on or before the date of 
assignment; 
(f)  in the Franchisor's opinion the assignee is of good character and possesses the business 
experience and capability, credit standing, health, licences and financial resources necessary to 
operate the F3Business successfully and meets the criteria of the Franchisor for the selection of 
new Franchisees; 
(g)  the assignee has satisfactorily completed any training required by the Franchisor; 
   (h)  the assignee as Franchisee and each shareholder of the assignee as principal executes the 
Franchisor's then current franchise agreement (which has a term equal to  
the remaining part of the Term or any Renewal and which differs from this agreement as to 
material and non-material terms and conditions); 
(i)  the Franchisee provides all assistance requested by the Franchisor to enable the 
Franchisor to apply to cancel the registration of any registered user agreement between the 
Franchisor and the Franchisee relating to any Trade Mark;  
(j)  the Franchisee and each Principal comply with such other conditions as the Franchisor, 
acting reasonably, may impose; and 
   (k)  the Franchisee has paid to the Franchisor the Franchisor's costs in relation to the 
assignment, including but not limited to the Franchisor's then current published  
assignment costs and its costs of providing training to the assignee and legal and other costs 
incurred by the Franchisor in approving the assignment and the documents affecting the 
assignment. 
 
S.35.3  Change to board or voting rights of Franchisee 
Any transaction or series of transactions which results in a change of the composition of the 
board of the Franchisee, or the legal or beneficial ownership of or the power to exercise the 
voting rights of more than 24 percentum of the issued capital of the Franchisee if attempted shall 
be deemed to be an assignment of this agreement. 
 
S.35.4 Franchisee not to encumber 
The Franchisee must not encumber the Licence or any of the Franchisee's assets used in 
the F3 Business without the Franchisor's approval. 
 
24. Right of first refusal (Franchise) 
24.1 Franchisor to have right of first refusal 
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If at any time: 
  (a) the Franchisee wishes to assign the Licence to a third party; or 
  (b) a Principal wishes to transfer to a third party any shares in the Franchisee ('Shares') 
then, before entering into any agreement with the third party, the assignor must: 
  (c) notify the Franchisor of the terms, including the price, of the proposed transaction (a 'Sale 
Proposal'); 
  (d) provide the Franchisor with all other information reasonably requested by the Franchisor to 
evaluate the Sale Proposal; and 
  (e) provide the Franchisor with the Franchisor's then current Franchise application completed 
by the proposed assignee. 
 
24.2 Franchisor to give notice 
If within 30 days after receipt of the Sale Proposal and other information referred to in clause  0: 
  (a) the Franchisor gives notice to the assignor that it wishes: 
    (i) to operate the F3Business at the Location under the Approved Name, the parties will 
terminate this agreement and the Franchisor must pay the Franchisee in accordance with the Sale 
Proposal; or 
    (ii) to acquire the Shares, the assignor must transfer the Shares to the Franchisor on the terms 
set out in the Sale Proposal; or 
  (b) the Franchisor gives notice to the assignor that it does not wish to operate the F3Business or 
acquire the Shares or does not give any notice to the assignor, the assignor may assign the 
Franchise or the Shares to the person named in the Sale Proposal on terms no more favourable 
than those contained in the Sale Proposal and subject to satisfaction of the provisions of clause. 
 
24.3 Franchisor to purchase 
If the Sale Proposal includes: 
  (a) in the price payable by the purchaser consideration other than money, the price payable by 
the Franchisor for the Franchise or the Shares will be the monetary consideration specified in the 
Sale Proposal increased by the market value of the non-monetary consideration; 
  (b) an offer to acquire from the assignor assets used in the F3Business, and the Franchisor 
gives notice under clause  0, the Franchisor must buy those assets; and 
  (c) an offer to acquire from the assignor other assets, the Franchisor may elect to buy some or 
all of those assets.  The price payable by the Franchisor for those assets will be their market 
value. 
 
24.4 Submission of future Sale Proposals 
The Franchisor's election not to operate the Franchise or acquire the Shares in accordance with 
this clause does not affect the obligation to submit future Sale Proposals to the Franchisor. 
 
 
F4 
 
S. 7.1:  By Franchisor. The Franchisor mat at any time transfer the benefit and the burden 
(if any) of this Agreement to another person without notice to the Franchise. 
S. 7.2.  Transfer by Franchisee or Guarantor. The Franchisee’s and Guarantor’s 
Obligations under this Agreement cannot be transferred or assigned without the consent of the 
Franchisor and their Obligations under this Agreement will not be discharged, released or 
affected by a transfer or assignment of this Agreement. 
 
 
F5 
 
-Franchisee will not unreasonably withhold consent if--   
(a)  Franchisee is not in breach of the agreement or has remedied any breach.    
(b)  Franchisee has paid or made reasonable provision to pay all that is owing under the 
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agreement and any agreement relating to the franchise.  
(d)  the new Franchisee or the current Franchisee has paid the transfer fee.    
(e)   Franchisee is not in breach of lease, licence etc. and the LL has given consent to the sale 
of the business."    
 
Transfer of Franchise  
(f)  Franchisee has paid all money owing to suppliers.   
(g)  The proposed transferee is of good moral character, financially secure, has adequate 
experience and resources to operate a franchise and meets any other selection criteria imposed 
by the Franchisee."    
(h)  Franchisee has satisfied all obligations under the franchise code.   
(i)  The proposed Franchisee enters into an agreement or gives security.   
(j)  the proposed transfer does not have an adverse effect on the franchise system.  
 
F6  
 
15.1 By franchisor 
This Deed and all the rights and obligations created under or pursuant to this Deed is fully 
assignable by F6 to a suitably experienced, financially stable, and competent person or entity, in 
whole or in part and will continue to the benefit of any assignee or other legal successor to F6 
interest herein.  F6 will remain liable for any non-performance which occurred prior to the date of 
assignment.  The Franchisee must execute any assignment agreement or deed requested by F6 or its 
assignee within seven (7) Business Days of receiving such agreement or deed.  If the Franchisee 
fails to execute such agreement or deed within the period set out in this clause, the Franchisee 
appoints any director of F6 as its attorney and agent to execute on its behalf any such agreement or 
deed. 
 
15.2 By the franchisee 
 (a) The Franchise is personal to the Franchisee and may not be transferred or assigned in any 
way (whether in part or in whole) by the Franchisee, including, without limiting the generality 
thereof, by devolution on the death of the Franchisee to one or more beneficiaries of the 
Franchisee’s estate.  
 (b) Subject always to the right of first refusal referred to in clause 15.4, the Franchisee may sell 
or transfer the Local Assets to a third party (the “transferee”) subject to the written approval of 
franchisor.  F6 may withhold its consent to such sale or transfer if any of the following conditions 
are not complied with: 
 (1) the transferee meets franchisor requirements as to suitability, financial stability, ability, 
experience and compatibility; 
(2) the Franchisee pays to franchisor: 
  (A) all unpaid accounts in respect of purchases of Approved Ingredients;  and 
   (B) the amount of any commission or brokerage payable by F6 to any business broker, 
agent or consultant appointed by F6 to sell the Local Assets on  
   behalf of the Franchisee if so requested by the Franchisee and any costs incurred by F6 in 
advertising the Local Assets for sale on behalf of the Franchisee; 
 (3) the transferee executes documents required for effecting the transfer of the Local Assets, 
(including, without limitation, the business name and trademark documents); 
 (4) the Franchisee complies with the disclosure obligations contained in clause 12 of the Code; 
 (5) where the transferee is a corporation, the directors and the shareholders of the transferee 
providing guarantees and indemnities to F6 on terms acceptable to F6and the Nominated Manager 
of the transferee being acceptable to franchisor; 
 (6) F6 in writing approving the terms and conditions of the sale or transfer of the Local Assets; 
 (7) the proposed transferee or the guarantors proposed by the transferee (where the transferee is 
a  corporation) may not be or have been a franchisee or licencee of F6 or any of its master 
franchisees or have been connected with or had a direct or indirect interest in a franchisee or 
licencee of F6 or its master franchisees; 
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 (8) the transferee executing franchisor Standard Franchise Deed or Agreement (identified by 
franchisor) and such other documentation and agreements as are required by F6 at the time of the 
transfer of the Local Assets (which shall include the then current levels of franchise service fees, 
advertising contributions and other charges applicable to new franchises and franchisees) and the 
payment by the transferee of any Initial Fee charged  by franchisor. 
 (9) if required by franchisor the transferee agrees to upgrade, refurbish and redesign the 
Premises in order to ensure that the Premises conforms to and complies with the then current F6 
IMAGE, or such other image that F6 is required to conform with to meet the requirements of the 
lessor of the Premises. 
 (c) The Franchisee must within one (1) month of the completion of the transfer of the Local 
Assets provide to F6 a copy of its annual accounts (prepared in accordance with clause 8.1) for the 
period from the commencement of the financial year in which the transfer takes place until the date 
of completion of the transfer of the Local Assets. 
 (d) The Franchisee must within one (1) week of the completion of the transfer of the Local 
Assets, provide F6 with any reports not yet submitted in terms of clause 8.3 together with payment 
of any amounts due to franchisor. 
 (e) The Franchisee must ensure that immediately prior to any sale or transfer of the Local Assets 
taking place, all of the equipment, fixtures and fittings, signage, air conditioning, electrical fittings 
and wiring, plumbing and drainage, shop fittings and joinery and any other physical items which are 
included in the Local Assets and contained in the Premises and being transferred, are in proper 
working order and condition and are in a good state of repair and appearance. The Franchisee 
agrees that an amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the sale price of the Local Assets, but 
subject to a minimum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) must be deducted from the sale price of 
the Local Assets and paid by the transferee to F6 and held in a separate bank account.  Thirty (30) 
Business Days after the transfer of the Local Assets has taken place, the amount so held, less the 
REASONABLE cost of repairing or making good any Local Assets that are found not to be in 
proper working order and condition or in a state of disrepair, unserviceable or damaged 
immediately after the sale or transfer has taken place, and subject to the Franchisee and the 
transferee complying with all terms and conditions of clause 15.2(b), will be paid by F6 to the 
Franchisee. 
 Such portion of the cost of refitting the Premises after sale or transfer of the Local Assets to meet the 
then current F6 IMAGE, or to meet the lessor’s requirements, other than of a repair nature, shall not 
be deducted by F6 when the refund to the Franchisee in terms of this clause is made. 
 (f) Prior to the commencement of business by the transferee, the transferee and its Nominated 
Manager must complete a training program to the complete satisfaction of franchisor. 
 
15.3 Death of franchisee 
 
 (a) If the Franchisee is a natural person, then upon the death of the Franchisee, the executor or 
legal personal representative (“executor”) of his estate may only transfer the Local Assets 
(including, without limitation, a transfer of the Local Assets by devolution on the death of the 
Franchisee to one or more beneficiaries of the Franchisee’s estate) with the prior written consent of 
F6and on terms and conditions determined by F6in its absolute discretion. 
 (b) If the executor of the Franchisee’s estate wishes to sell or transfer the Local Assets to a third 
party (who is not a beneficiary of the Franchisee), the executor must within twenty-one (21) 
Business Days of the death of the Franchisee first offer the Local Assets in writing to F6at a price 
equal to the fair market value of the Local Assets and on such other terms as the third party is 
prepared to accept. Any dispute as to the determination of the fair market value will be referred to 
expert determination in accordance with clause 23. F6will have for a period of twenty-one (21) 
Business Days from the date of delivery of such offer, the right, but not the obligation, exercisable 
by written notice, and delivered to the executor to accept the offer to purchase the Local Assets at 
the fair market value and on the other terms set out in the written offer. 
 (c) F6 may deduct from the price any unpaid debts, including any unpaid Franchise Service Fees 
and Advertising Contributions owed by the Franchisee to F6 and may also pay out of the price any 
of the Franchisee’s unpaid trade or other creditors. 
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 (d) If F6fails to accept the offer within the period of time set out in this clause, then the executor 
will only be permitted to sell or transfer the Local Assets to the third party if and only if the 
executor (on behalf of the Franchisee) observes and complies with all the provisions of clauses 
15.2(b) to and including 15.2(f) which will be deemed to be expressly incorporated into this clause 
with the modifications as the contract requires. 
 (e) If the Franchisee is a corporation and any of the Guarantors die, or suffer permanent 
incapacity (the Franchisee or Nominated Manager (as appropriate) dies or becomes incapacitated 
(the latter of which will be deemed to have occurred if franchisor and the Franchisee receive 
written advice from a registered medical practitioner approved by if franchisor stating that such 
disability has continued or is likely to continue for a period in excess of six (6) weeks or that the 
Franchisee or Nominated Manager suffers from an illness or injury (whether physical or mental) 
of such nature that the time for cure or recuperation cannot be estimated) or are bankrupted (the 
“Incapacitated Guarantor”), the Franchisee must upon such acceptance notify F6in writing and  
within fourteen (14) Business Days of notifying F6in writing of the occurrence of any of those 
events: 
 (1) provide the name of a person or persons (the “Replacement Guarantor”) to assume all the 
duties and obligations of the Incapacitated Guarantor under or pursuant to this Deed and the Deed 
of Guarantee and Indemnity and prove to the satisfaction of F6that the proposed Replacement 
Guarantor is a suitable, sound, respectable, responsible, solvent and financially stable person with at 
least a similar level of ability and experience in operating a business such as the Franchised 
Operation as the Incapacitated Guarantor had; and 
 (2) procure that the proposed Replacement Guarantor enters into a covenant with F6in the form 
required by F6to the effect that he will duly perform and observe the covenants and provisions to be 
performed and observed by the Incapacitated Guarantor under this Deed and Deed of Guarantee and 
Indemnity; or 
 (3) advise F6that it wishes to sell or transfer the Local Assets to a third party, in which event the 
provisions of clause 15.3(b) and 15.2(e) will with the necessary modifications, apply. 
 
15.4 franchisor right of first refusal 
 
 (a) If the Franchisee at any time wishes to sell or transfer the Local Assets, the Franchisee must 
obtain a bona fide, executed written offer (the “Offer”) to purchase the Local Assets from a 
responsible and fully disclosed third party (who is not related or in any way associated with the 
Franchisee).  The Franchisee must submit an exact copy of the Offer, together with an itemised 
schedule of the Local Assets to be sold, to franchisor who shall, for a period of twenty-one (21) 
Business Days from the date of delivery of the Offer, have the right, but not the obligation, 
exercisable by written notice to the Franchisee, to purchase the Local Assets, for the price (less any 
sales commission which would have been payable as a result of the proposed sale) and on terms and 
conditions contained in the Offer. 
 
 (b)  F6 may substitute cash for any form of non-cash payment proposed in the Offer.  If there is a 
dispute as to the true value of any non-cash payment set out in the Offer  such dispute will be 
referred to expert determination in accordance with clause 23.  F6 may deduct from the purchase 
price any unpaid debts, including any unpaid Franchise Service Fees and Advertising Contributions 
owing by the Franchisee to F6 and may pay out of the price any of the Franchisee’s unpaid trade or 
other creditors.  In addition the conditions of clause 15.2(e) will apply. 
 
 (c) If F6 does not exercise its right of first refusal within the period of time set out in clause 
15.4(a), the Franchisee may sell or transfer the Local Assets to the transferee subject to the 
Franchisee complying with the provisions of clause 15.2(b) to and including 15.2(f) for a price 
which does not vary by more than five percent (5%) from the price set out in the written offer.  If 
the sale or transfer to the third party is not completed within two (2) months after delivery of the 
Offer to franchisor.  F6 shall again have the right of first refusal herein provided. 
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15.5 franchisor right of first refusal upon guarantor’s sale of shares 
 
 (a) Subject always to the provisions of clause 21.1, where the Franchisee is a corporation and 
the Guarantor or Guarantors wish to sell or transfer fifty percent (50%) or more of the issued share 
capital in the Franchisee, or transfer any number of shares in the Franchisee that will cumulatively 
result in fifty percent (50%) or more of the issued share capital having been sold or transferred to a 
third party (who is not related or in any way associated with the Guarantors or the Franchisee), the 
Guarantor or Guarantors must obtain a bona fide, executed written offer (the “Share Offer”) to 
purchase from the third party all the Guarantor’s shares  in the Franchisee (which will constitute all 
the issued share capital of the Franchisee).  The Guarantors must submit an exact copy of the Share 
Offer to franchisor, who shall, for a period of twenty-one (21) Business Days from the date of 
delivery of the Share Offer, have the right, but not the obligation, exercisable by written notice to 
the Guarantor or Guarantors, to purchase all the said shares, for the price (minus any sales 
commission which would have been payable as a result of the proposed sale) and on the terms and 
conditions contained in the Share Offer. 
 
 (b) F6may substitute cash for any form of non-cash payment proposed in the Share Offer.  If 
there is a dispute as to the true value of any non-cash payment  such dispute will be  referred to 
expert determination in accordance with clause 23.  F6may deduct from the purchase price any 
unpaid debts and unpaid Franchise Service Fees and Advertising Contributions owed by the 
Franchisee to F6or the Guarantor or Guarantors to  franchisor, and may pay any outstanding trade 
or other creditors of the Franchisee out of the price. In addition the conditions of clause 15.2(e) will 
apply. 
 
 (c) If  F6 does not exercise its right of first refusal within the period of time set out in clause 
15.4(a), the Guarantor or Guarantors may complete the sale of the said shares to the third party, 
(subject to the Guarantor or Guarantors and the Franchisee first complying with the provisions of 
clauses 15.2(b)(1) and (2) as if the third party were the transferee), and subject to the Franchisee 
complying with the provisions of clause 15.2(b) to and including 15.2(f) for a price which does not 
vary by more than five percent (5%)  from the price set out in the Share Offer but otherwise on the 
same terms and conditions.  The Franchisee and the Guarantor or Guarantors must procure the 
execution by the directors and shareholders of the third party of a deed of guarantee and indemnity 
in favour of F6 in the form stipulated by franchisor. If the sale to the third party is not completed 
within two (2) months after delivery of the Share Offer to franchisor, F6 shall again have the right 
of first refusal herein provided. 
 
 (d) Before the date of entry into such sale of shares to F6pursuant to clause 15.5(a), the 
Guarantor or Guarantors must provide F6 with a Statutory Declaration detailing all existing debts 
and liabilities of the Franchisee.  The Guarantor or Guarantors must indemnify and continue to 
indemnify F6 against any other debts or liabilities of the Franchisee which have not been disclosed 
in the Statutory Declaration. 
 
 
F7 
 
S. 29:  Assignment, Merger or Acquisition by franchisor 
 
S. 29.1:  Assignment: The Franchisor may transfer all or any part of its rights, interests, 
obligations or liabilities under this Agreement by assignment. 
 
S. 29.2:  Novation: The Franchisor may transfer all or any part of its rights, interests, 
obligations or liabilities under this Agreement by novation. 
 
S. 29.3:  Refinancing and Restructuring: The Franchisee and the Guarantor acknowledge 
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that the Franchisor may, in addition to or as part of an assignment or novation … 
  (a)  sell itself, its assets and any of the Intellectual Property which it owns to a third party; 
  (b)  engage in a private placement of some or all of its securities; and 
  (c)  undertake a refinancing, recapitalisation, leveraged buyout or other economic or financial 
restructuring. 
 
S. 29.4:  Acknowledgment and Agreement to Assignment: If the Franchisor elects to 
assign all or any part of its rights, interests, obligations or liabilities under this Agreement the 
Franchisee and the Guarantor must upon request by the Franchisor execute any deed, agreement 
or notice of assignment acknowledging and agreeing to such assignment by the Franchisor. 
 
S. 29.5:  Novation Agreement: If the Franchisor elects to transfer all or any part of its 
rights, interests, obligations or liabilities under this Agreement by novation to a third party the 
Franchisee and the Guarantor must upon request by the Franchisor execute a deed or agreement 
of novation, in a form prepared by the Franchisor substituting in place of the Franchisor a third 
party as being entitled and responsible for the rights, obligations and liabilities of the Franchisor 
under this Agreement. 
 
S. 29.6:  Merger: The Franchisor may purchase, merge, acquire or affiliate with an 
existing competitive or non-competitive franchise network, chain or any other business and:  
(a)  operate, franchise or licence those businesses to operate using the Marks and Intellectual 
Property of the Franchisor from premises which may be located within the Territory; and 
  (b)  require the Franchisee to use or cease to use any Marks, corporate colours, trade dress, 
décor, uniforms, designs, appearances or attributes in accordance with clause 19.6. 
 
S. 29.7:  Consent: The Franchisee and the Guarantor consent to the Franchisor at any time 
assigning any of its rights, interests, obligations or liabilities under this Agreement or 
undertaking any of the actions outlined in clauses 0, 0, 0 and 0 and: 
  (a)   waive any requirement for prior notice to the Franchisee or Guarantor of any such action; 
   (b)  expressly and specifically waive any claims, demands or damages arising from or related 
to the loss of the Marks or the System and/or the loss of association with or identification of the 
Franchisor as the franchisor under this Agreement; and  
  (c)  expressly and specifically waive any and all other claims, demands or damages arising 
from or related to a merger, acquisition or restructure and any other claim of divided  loyalty, 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, unconscionable conduct or unfair dealing. 
 
ASSIGNMENT AND OTHER DEALINGS BY FRANCHISEE 
S. 29.8:  Acknowledgment by Franchisee: The Franchisee acknowledges that: 
(a)  the Franchise has been granted to the Franchisee following a consideration by the 
Franchisor of the Franchisee’s character, business experience and capability and financial 
capacity; and 
  (b)  because of this there are important restrictions in this clause 0 on the Franchisee’s ability 
to deal with the Franchise and the Business. 
  
S. 29.9:  Prohibition against Assignment by Franchisee:  
  (a)  The Franchisee must not assign, sell or otherwise Dispose of its interest in the Franchise 
or the Business without first: 
     (i) offering to sell the Business to the Franchisor in accordance with clause 0; and 
     (ii) if that offer is not accepted, obtaining the     Franchisor’s consent which must not be 
unreasonably withheld if all of the conditions mentioned in clause 0 have been  
satisfied. 
  (b)  A request for the Franchisor’s consent under clause 0 must be made in writing. 
   (c)  If the provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct  are in force and mandatory as at the 
date the Franchisor receives a request under clause 00, the Franchisor will be treated as having 
given that consent if the Franchisor does not, within 42 days after the request is made, give to 
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the Franchisee written notice: 
     (i) that the consent is withheld; and 
     (ii) setting out why the consent is withheld. 
 
S. 29.10:  Conditions to be satisfied before Assignment can be approved: The Franchisor 
must not unreasonably withhold its consent under clause 0 if the sale, assignment or other 
disposal is of the whole of the Franchisee’s interest in the Franchise and each of the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
   (a) the Franchisee establishes to the Franchisor’s REASONABLE satisfaction 
that the proposed assignee: 
     (i) possesses the financial resources necessary to conduct and operate the Business as a 
franchisee and to service any borrowings it makes in order to  
acquire the Business; 
     (ii) is a reputable and responsible person having the business experience and capabilities 
necessary to operate the Business successfully; and 
     (iii) otherwise meets the Franchisor’s criteria for the selection of new ## Franchisees; 
    (b) the Franchisee pays to the Franchisor the Assignment Fee; 
    (c) the Franchisee, both when seeking consent to the assignment and when the 
assignment is to occur is not in default under this Agreement or any Related  
Agreement; 
    (d) at the option of the Franchisor, the assignee executes: 
(i) a franchise agreement in the form then used by the Franchisor (which may contain different 
terms and conditions to those set out in this Agreement) for the balance of the Term (including 
any existing right of renewal for a further term); or  
     (ii) a deed of assignment of the Franchisee’s rights and 
obligations under this Agreement to the assignee in a form required by the Franchisor, 
and the assignee executes any other documents then customarily used by the Franchisor 
for its ## Franchisees; 
    (e) where the assignee is a company: 
       (i) its directors and shareholders satisfy the criteria in clause 00; and 
(ii) those directors and shareholders nominated by the Franchisor each give a guarantee and 
indemnity in favour of, and in a form required by, the Franchisor in respect of the assignee’s 
obligations to the Franchisor; 
    (f) the assignee’s proposed manager is approved by the Franchisor and 
successfully completes the Franchisor’s training program for ## Franchisees; 
    (g) the Franchisee: 
(i) gives to the Franchisor all details of the proposed assignment including a copy of the contract 
for the sale of the Business and any other agreements between the Franchisee and the assignee; 
and 
       (ii) sells to the assignee all of the Franchisee’s essential assets used in the 
Franchise (including the assignment of any Occupancy Right); 
   (h) the Premises comply with the then prevailing Image; and 
(i) the Franchisee establishes to the Franchisor’s REASONABLE satisfaction that the proposed 
assignment will not have a significantly adverse effect on the ## System or the Network. 
S. 30.4: Franchisor’s Right of First Refusal 
   (a)  This clause 30.4 applies if: 
      (i) the Franchisee wishes to sell the Business; or 
      (ii) clauses 8.5, 25.6 or 26.7 apply. 
   (b)  For the purpose of this clause 30.4 “Offer Period” means the period of fourteen 
(14) days after the Franchisor receives the Offer Notice. 
   (c)  If the Franchisee wants to: 
      (i) sell the Business; or 
      (ii) allow the Disposal of shares or units to a person who is not an existing 
shareholder in the Franchisee or unitholder in the Trust, 
the Franchisee must first offer to sell the Business to the Franchisor by giving to the 
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Franchisor a written notice (“Offer Notice”) stating the price the Franchisee is willing to accept 
(“Offer  Price”) and the terms and conditions of sale. 
   (d)  The Franchisor may accept the offer contained in the Offer Notice by giving 
notice of acceptance to the Franchisee before the end of the Offer Period (“Acceptance Notice”). 
   (e)  If the Franchisee receives the Acceptance Notice during the Offer Period the Franchisee 
must sell and the Franchisor must purchase the Business for the Offer Price and upon  
the terms and conditions contained in the Offer Notice. 
(f)  If the Franchisor does not accept the offer contained in the Offer Notice within the Offer 
Period the Franchisee is entitled to sell the Business or allow the Disposal of shares or units to a 
third party within 60 days after the end of the Offer Period as long as: 
      (i) the Franchisee complies with clauses 0 and 0; and 
      (ii) the sale or Disposal is not made for less than the Offer Price or on terms and 
conditions more favourable to the third party than those contained in the Offer Notice. 
(g)  If the Franchisee does not sell the Business or allow the Disposal of shares or units within 
the period referred to in clause 0 the rights of the Franchisor are revived and the Franchisee must 
not permit any sale or Disposal without first offering the Business to the Franchisor in 
accordance with this clause 0. 
S. 30.5: No Encumbrances 
(a)  The Franchisee must not create or allow the creation of any Security Interest over this 
Agreement, the Franchise or the Business without first obtaining the Franchisor’s written 
consent. 
   (b)  The Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold consent if the Franchisee gives 
to the Franchisor an acknowledgment from its lender in the form set out in Annexure B. 
 
S. 30.6: No Sub-Franchises: The Franchisee must not lease, licence, franchise or part with 
possession of the Business or the Franchise without first obtaining the Franchisor’s written 
consent. 
 
S. 30.7: Restructuring by Franchisee 
If the Franchisee is made up of: 
   (a)  2 or more persons and one or more of them want to assign their interest in the 
Franchise to one or more of the others; or 
   (b)  one or more individuals who want to assign the Franchise to a company 
beneficially owned by them and incorporated by them for the sole purpose of conducting the 
Business, 
the Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold its consent to the assignment nor require 
payment of an Assignment Fee if each of the following conditions are satisfied: 
   (c)  the assignor assigns to the assignee all of its interest in the Franchise, the 
Business and any Related Agreement; 
   (d)  the assignment does not affect the assignor’s obligations to the Franchisor before 
the assignment; 
   (e)  the Franchisor has been given details of the proposed assignment and any other details 
requested by the Franchisor at least 30 days before the proposed assignment is to take  
effect; 
(f)  the person or persons who will make up the Franchisee after the assignment have the 
financial capacity and the ability to operate the Franchise successfully without the assignor’s 
involvement; 
(g)  if the assignee is a company, the directors and the shareholders nominated by the 
Franchisor execute a guarantee and indemnity in favour of, and in a form required by, the 
Franchisor in respect of the obligations of the assignee to the Franchisor; and 
   (h)  the Franchisee pays the Franchisor’s legal Costs (on a solicitor and own client or 
full indemnity basis, whichever is greater) in connection with the assignment. 
 
S 30.8: Death or Permanent Incapacity 
   (a)  If any of: 
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       (i) a natural person Franchisee (where there is one or more of them); or 
       (ii) a director or shareholder of any Franchisee which is a body corporate, 
dies or suffers permanent incapacity, that person (or the person’s executor or personal 
representative) must, within 4 months after the person dies or becomes permanently 
incapacitated, sell the Franchise and the Business or their interest in the Franchise and the 
Business. 
   (b)  The provisions of this clause 0 apply to any sale under clause 0. For example, this 
means that: 
      (i) if ownership of the Business is to be restructured in the manner 
contemplated by clause 0, that clause applies; and 
       (ii) otherwise: 
      (1)the Franchisor has a right of first refusal to acquire the Business under clause 0; and 
      (2) the sale must meet all the requirements of clause 0. 
  (c)  If the sale is not completed within the 4 month period referred to in clause 0 the 
Franchisor may terminate this Agreement and the Franchise by giving a written notice to the 
Franchisee. 
(d)  In this clause “permanent incapacity” happens if because of mental and physical infirmity 
the person cannot actively participate in the Business for a total of 60 days at any time or times 
during any consecutive 12 month period. 
 
S. 30.9: Temporary Operation 
   (a)  If: 
      (i) the Franchisee fails to keep the Business open during Business Hours; or 
      (ii) the Franchisee stops running the Business or abandons the Business or the 
Premises; or 
      (iii) clause 0 applies and there has been no sale of the Business as required by 
that clause, 
the Franchisor may, but does not have to, operate and manage the Business until the end 
of the Franchise or until a sale is effected in accordance with clause 0. 
(b)  The Franchisor must account to the Franchisee for all net income received by the 
Franchisor while operating and managing the Business less a REASONABLE management fee.  
The Franchisee must bear any losses incurred during the Franchisor’s operation and 
management of the Business. 
   (c)  The Franchisor is not liable to the Franchisee in any way for anything done by 
the Franchisor while it operates and manages the Business in accordance with this clause 0. 
 
S. 30.10: Temporary Management: If, in the opinion of the Franchisor, the Manager is unable to 
operate the Business through accident, ill-health, inability or for any other reason the Franchisor 
may, but does not have to, manage the Business on behalf of the Franchisee until the Manager is 
replaced and trained in accordance with clause 24. 
 
S. 30.11: Conditions of Management 
If the Franchisor manages the Business pursuant to clause 30.10: 
   (a)  the Franchisor shall not be liable to the Franchisee for any loss or damage 
suffered by the Franchisee arising out of such management by the Franchisor; 
   (b)  the Franchisee must indemnify the Franchisor and its employees and agents against all 
damages, sums of money, costs, charges, expenses, actions, claims, liabilities, injuries  
and demands made against or suffered by the Franchisor, its employees or agents which 
arise out of such management; and 
   (c)  the Franchisee must pay to the Franchisor REASONABLE fees prescribed by the 
Franchisor for managing the Business and any travelling, accommodation or other expenses  
in relation to such management. 
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5 Assignment 
 
5.1  Prior Written Consent and Franchisor’s First Right of Refusal – The Licencee shall 
neither sell, assign or transfer this Agreement or any right or interest therein or thereunder nor 
suffer or permit any such sale, assignment or transfer to occur without the prior consent of the 
Licensor first being obtained and subject to the Licensor’s right of first option to purchase 
contained Clause 5.2 
 
5.3  Terms and Conditions of Assignment – In the event the Licensor elects not to exercise its 
first option to purchase under Clause 5.2 the Licencee may sell or transfer its assets and the 
Licenced Operation to a bona fide purchaser for the price and under the same terms and 
conditions as previously offered to the Licensor upon the expiration of the Licensor’s twenty 
(20) day acceptance period only if: 
 
5.3.1 the Licencee is not in default under this Agreement or any other agreement between the 
Licensor and the Licencee; 
5.3.2  all debts due and payable by the Licencee to the Licensor are paid in full by the Licencee; 
5.3.3 the Licencee delivers to the Licensor complete details of the proposed Purchaser together 
with audited financial statements for the preceding two (2) years; 
5.3.4 where the Purchase is a corporation, the majority of shares are held by a natural person; 
5.3.5 the proposed Purchaser executes a Deed of Covenant to be bound by the Terms of this 
Agreement; 
5.3.6 the Licensor being able to conduct an interview with the proposed Purchaser at a location 
chosen by the Licensor; 
5.3.7 the Licensor, at its sole discretion, agreeing to the proposed Purchaser purchasing the 
Licenced Operation; 
5.3.8 the Licencee paying to the Licensor the Transfer specified in Schedule 13. 
 
Schedule Item 13: Transfer fee: 15% of the current Licence fee. 
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14.1 Sale or Encumbrance 
 
The Franchisee hereby acknowledges that the Franchisor has granted the rights granted to the 
Franchisee pursuant to this agreement because of among other things, the character, background 
and other qualifications and abilities personal to the Franchisee. Accordingly, the Franchisee 
hereby agrees that it will not sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate, encumber, 
donate or otherwise deal with either the rights granted it under this agreement or any part of the 
Business, to any person, corporation or other entity (in this clause 14, the "Recipient") without 
the prior written consent of the Franchisor, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing but subject to the provisions of the Lease, the Franchisee shall be 
entitled to mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or encumber all or any of the assets of the Business 
without first receiving the consent of the Franchisor if such mortgage, pledge, hypothecation or 
encumbrance is made to a bank which is licenced to carry on a retail banking business in 
Australia for the purpose of obtaining financing for the Business. For the purposes of 
determining whether or not the Franchisor will grant its consent as provided herein, if anyone or 
more of the following conditions are not complied with at the time of the completion of the 
proposed sale, assignment, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecation, encumbrance, donation or 
other dealing, any withholding of consent by the Franchisor as a result of such non-compliance 
shall be deemed to be a reasonable withholding of consent:  
 
(1)  with respect to any proposed sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other dealing 
(except in the circumstances provided in subclause (2) hereof): 
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(a)  the Franchisee shall submit an application in writing to the Franchisor requesting 
the Franchisor's consent. Such application shall set out: 
 
(i) the exact terms of the proposed sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other dealing and 
shall include as an appendix therewith a copy of any offer with respect thereto, 
 
(ii)  information relating to the business reputation and qualifications of the Recipient to carry 
on business, 
 
(iii)  suitable credit and financial information of the Recipient to allow the Franchisor to make 
a reasonable decision as to the credit worthiness and financial position of the Recipient, and 
 
(iv)  such other information as the Franchisee may have knowledge and would reasonably be 
considered of a relevant nature to the Franchisor in determining whether or not to grant its 
consent. 
 
The Recipient must arrange to have a face to face interview with the Franchisor, at the 
Recipient's or the Franchisee's sole expense, prior to consent of the sale. This face to face 
interview cannot be combined with the training session noted in clause 14.1 (1 )(b); 
 
(b) the Recipient must arrange to take all or such training in the operations of the 
Business, at his or the Franchisee's sole expense, as the Franchisor deems necessary; 
 
(c)  the Recipient must not have a financial or other interest of any type, directly or indirectly, 
in any business operating in competition with or similar to the Business or any business of the 
Franchisor; 
 
(d)  the Recipient shall enter into any and all agreements and covenants (including a new 
franchise agreement) which the Franchisor is requiring of new franchisees at the time of the 
proposed sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other dealing; further, if the Recipient is a 
corporation or other entity, the Recipient shall provide such personal guarantees or other 
assurances of its shareholders or members or others as the Franchisor may require; 
 
(e)  the Franchisee shall have discharged and/or satisfied all of its obligations (financial or 
otherwise) to the Franchisor as at the date of the completion of the said sale, assignment, 
transfer, donation or other dealing; 
 
(f) the Franchisee, any Guarantor hereto and if the Franchisee or such Guarantor is a 
corporation or other entity, their officers, directors, shareholders or members, shall execute and 
deliver to the Franchisor and F9, their officers, directors, shareholders, employees and their 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, a general release in a form approved by 
the Franchisor and F9, releasing the Franchisor and F9 and the aforementioned from all claims, 
demands, liabilities, actions, damages, costs or expenses which the Franchisee, any Guarantor or 
any of their officers, directors, shareholders or members may have as a result of this agreement, 
the Business, or the relationship of the Franchisor, F9 and Franchisee created by this agreement; 
 
(g)  the Franchisee paying to the Franchisor, an amount equal to the greater of $10,000 or 5% 
of the purchase price to be paid by the Recipient on account of such sale, assignment, transfer, 
donation or other dealing, such amount to cover all expenses (legal or otherwise) which may be 
incurred by the Franchisor in connection with the said sale, assignment, transfer, donation or 
other dealing; all expenses which may be incurred by the Franchisor in training or otherwise 
familiarising the Recipient with the F9 System; and generally to recognise the past efforts and 
contributions of the Franchisor. 
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(h)  all of the provisions of the Lease respecting sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other 
dealing shall be complied with; 
 
(i) any proposed sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other dealing must include all of the 
rights granted to the Franchisee hereunder and all of the assets of the Business; and 
 
(j) the Franchisee shall deliver to the Franchisor together with the Franchisee's application 
referred to in subclause (1 )(a) above, the sum of $1,000 to cover costs and expenses which may 
be incurred by the Franchisor in dealing with the said application of the Franchisee; such amount 
shall be non-refundable, but if the proposed sale, assignment, transfer, donation or other dealing 
is successfully completed, such sum shall be applied for the benefit of the Franchisee against the 
amount to be paid pursuant to sub-section (1)(g) above.  
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S2.12 The Franchisee must not transfer, assign, otherwise encumber or licence another entity to 
operate the Franchise Business, except for those circumstances as set out in Clause 10. 
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Surrender of Franchise in Favour of Named Person  
 
8.1 If the Franchisee desires to sell all or part of the Franchised Business as a going concern, 
it will surrender the Franchise to the Franchisor, and obtain a re-grant of a franchise to the 
purchaser. Conditions are as follows. 
Neither the Franchisee nor the purchaser, if a franchisee, are in breach of their Franchise 
Agreements. 
The Franchisee submits an accurate list of Regular Clients serviced (if any)  
The purchaser must satisfy all selection criteria of the Franchisor for the Franchise.  
 
All payments by the purchaser, including those for goodwill and client base (but not equipment, 
provided this is valued at a fair market price), will be paid to the Franchisor who will hold them 
in trust. No interest is payable on this money.  
After seven days the Franchisor may take out: 
any money owing to the Franchisor; 
any money owing to the bank for a business loan, where the Franchisor introduced the 
Franchisee to the lender or where the Franchisor is party, whether as surety or not; 
20% of the total payment, as a fee due to the Franchisor.  
 
After ten days the Franchisee will be given 50% of the total sum paid (minus any fees owed), if 
this much remains in trust, and provided they have eliminated all traces of signage on any 
retained vehicle or trailer, and presented these for inspection.  
 
The remaining money will be released at 45 days, minus the following:  
$4,000, where the Franchisee’s right to Work Guarantee has been terminated, but too few 
regular clients make a Successful Transfer to terminate the new Franchisee’s Work Guarantee. 
Or, where no Regular Clients are involved, $4,000 will be retained when the Franchisee’s gross 
turnover on average for each month over the previous six months (net of stock) has been less 
than the work availability guarantee set out in Item 17 of the Schedule. This money goes into the 
Advertising Account, and allows the Franchisor to rebuild the business. It does not apply where 
the Franchisor’s 20% fee is more than $4,000. 
 
(For businesses with Regular Clients) On or before signup by the Purchaser, a set number of 
regular clients must be identified as clients of the business. Where less than 90% of these clients 
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make a Successful Transfer, a fee based on the number short of the identified number, multiplied 
by the Client Good Will Value (Item 12 of the Schedule). For example, suppose that 100 clients 
are advertised and only 80 successfully transfer, and the value of a regular client is $200. The 
fee in this case is $200 by 20, or $4,000. This money will be returned to the purchaser on the 
Franchisee’s behalf, as compensation for the reduced value of the business. 
 
The Franchisor may also hold back a Security Bond (Item 26 of the Schedule) for a period of not 
more than twelve months. The Franchisor may spend all or part of this on rectifying faulty work 
carried out by the Franchisee. After twelve months, any remaining money will be returned to the 
Franchisee.  
The cost of re-spraying the Franchisee’s trailer and/or work vehicle, if retained, and if this has 
not already been done and presented for inspection. 
The Franchisor must provide the purchaser with a standard Work Availability Guarantee. 
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34 Assignment and Right of First Refusal 
 
34.1 Right of First Refusal – Subject to Clause 34.5, if the Coach decides to sell the 
Franchise and enters into a written agreement with a bona fide purchase, then the 
following conditions apply;- 
 
(a)  The Coach must make a written offer to Franchisor to sell the Franchise to 
Franchisor. The written offer must be accompanied by an exact copy of the signed 
agreement and a schedule of assets to be sold with the Franchise; 
 
(b) If Franchisor wishes to accept the offer, Franchisor must notify the Coach in 
writing for within fourteen (14) days of the date of delivery of the written offer to 
Franchisor; 
 
(c) If Franchisor accepts the offer, then it will purchase the business and the assets 
for the consideration stated in the written agreement with the purchase less any sales 
commission payable and otherwise on the terms and conditions contained in the written 
offer; 
 
(d)  Franchisor may allow a set off of any monies owing by the Coach to Franchisor 
or substitute cash for any form of payment proposed in the written offer. If there is any 
dispute as to the true value of any non-cash portion of the consideration then the value 
of the non-cash portion will be determined by a valuer appointed by the President of the 
Institute of Valuers in the State in which the Territory is situated; 
 
(e)  Until the expiration of the fourteen (14) days, the Coach must not proceed with 
the assignment unless the offer is in the meantime unconditionally rejected by 
Franchisor in writing. 
 
34.4 Conditions – Subject to Franchisor’ right of first refusal under clause 34.1, the 
Coach must not assign, sub-let or transfer this Franchise or part with possession of the 
Business without the prior written consent of Franchisor except consent must not be 
arbitrarily or unreasonably refused or withheld if conditions listed in 34.4 (a) to (l) 
applies. 
 
34.5 Schedule Item 8: Assignment Fee of $5,000 and Training of Purchase $5,000 is 
payable; a total of $10,000 – (Whether GST is excluded in this amount is not stipulated). 
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35 Assignment by Franchisor 
 
35.1 Conditions – Franchisor may assign this Agreement and Franchisor’ rights and 
obligations under this Agreement to any person who: 
  
(a) is financially responsible and economically capable of performing the obligations of 
Franchisor under this Agreement, and 
  
(b) expressly assumes and agrees to perform Franchisor’ obligations under this 
Agreement. 
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Schedule Item 12, Transfer Fee: $10,000 (Excl. GST) 
 
10.1 Transfer  
 
 10.1.1  The Franchisee cannot sublicence this agreement.  
  
10.1.2 The Franchisee must not transfer this agreement in whole or in part, or transfer 
any shareholding in any company that acts as Franchisee, without the Franchisor's consent.  
  
10.1.3  A request for the Franchisor's consent to a transfer must be in writing.  
  
10.1.4  The Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold consent to a transfer of the whole 
agreement.  
  
10.1.5  Circumstances in which it is reasonable for the Franchisor to withhold consent to 
the transfer of the whole agreement include:  
 
10.1.5.1  if the proposed transferee is, in the Franchisor's opinion, unlikely to be able to 
meet the financial obligations that the proposed transferee would have under this agreement;  
10.1.5.2   the proposed transferee does not meet an obligation required by this 
agreement;  
10.1.5.3   the proposed transferee has not met the selection criteria of the 
Franchisor (as specified in the Manuals or otherwise specified at any time by the Franchisor);  
10.1.5.4   the proposed transferee is not appropriately qualified to carry on the 
Business;  
10.1.5.5   agreement to the transfer will have an adverse effect on the " " System;  
10.1.5.6   the proposed transferee does not agree in writing to comply with the 
obligations of the Franchisee under this agreement;  
10.1.5.7   the Franchisee has not paid or made reasonable provision to pay an 
amount owing to the Franchisor; or  
10.1.5.8   the Franchisee has breached this agreement and has not remedied the 
breach.  
 
10.2 Requirements for transfer  
 
10.2.1  Before a transfer of this agreement, in whole or in part is effected: 
 
10.2.1.1  The Franchisee must pay to the Franchisor the Transfer Fee. The Franchisee 
acknowledges that this amount is reasonable to cover the Franchisor's cost of the transfer;  
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10.2.1.2  The proposed transferee or the proposed transferee's Nominated Operator must 
complete to the Franchisor's satisfaction any education and training courses the Franchisor 
considers necessary;  
 
10.2.1.3   The proposed transferee must sign:  
 
10.2.1.3.1  an agreement in a form acceptable to the Franchisor under which the Franchisor 
consents to the assignment to the proposed transferee of this agreement and the Franchisee's 
rights and obligations under this agreement; OR  
10.2.1.3.2  at the Franchisor's sole discretion, a new franchise agreement on the Franchisor's 
then current terms; and  
10.2.1.3.3  any other documents the Franchisor requires the Authorised Representative to 
sign.  
 
These requirements in no way limits the Franchisee's obligation to comply with this agreement 
before transfer;  
10.2.1.4   The proposed transferee must provide to the Franchisor a statutory 
declaration that the proposed transferee is not an undischarged bankrupt;  
10.2.1.5  The proposed transferee must acquire all of the Franchisee's essential assets used 
in the Business and assume all the Franchisee's liabilities in respect of the Business;  
10.2.1.6   The Premises must comply with the current “ “ Image;  
10.2.1.7   The Franchisee must provide to the Franchisor a copy of the sale 
agreement for the Business at least 7 days before signing by any party;  
10.2.1.8   The terms of sale agreement between the Franchisee and the proposed 
transferee must be acceptable to the Franchisor.  
 
10.2.2  Clause 12.1, 12.3, 12.5 and 12.7 of this agreement apply to the Franchisee upon transfer 
of this agreement, as if the agreement expired or terminated.  
 
10.2.3  The Franchisee must assist the transferee for a period of 90 days after the transfer of the 
agreement by:  
  
10.2.3.1 introducing the transferee to as many of the clients of the Business as possible; and  
 
  10.2.3.2 assisting the transferee to learn the Franchisor's procedures and policies 
 
 
10.3 Franchisor's right of first refusal  
 
10.3.1  If the Franchisee wishes to sell the Business or any part of it (referred to hereafter in this 
clause as "the Business"), the Franchisee must obtain an executed written offer (showing the 
name of the offeror) in that regard and deliver a copy of that offer to the Franchisor.  
 
10.3.2  Within 21 days after delivery, the Franchisor may give notice to the Franchisee that the 
Franchisor will buy the Business on the same terms as the offer. However:  
  
10.3.2.1  The price is reduced by any sales commission saved by the Franchisee;  
 
10.3.2.2 The Franchisor may substitute cash for any non-cash consideration proposed in the 
offer. If the Franchisor and the Franchisee do not agree the value of non-cash  
consideration, the Franchisor may appoint an independent valuer to decide the value. The valuer 
is an expert, not an arbitrator. The decision of the valuer binds the Franchisor and the 
Franchisee. The Franchisor and the Franchisee must each pay one half of the valuer's fees;  
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10.3.2.3 The Franchisor may deduct from the price any debt of the Franchisee to the Franchisor 
or the trade creditors of the Business.  
  
10.3.3  If the Franchisor does not give notice within 21 days, the Franchisee may proceed with 
the offer (even if the price is reduced by up to 5%).  
 
10.3.4  If the sale is not complete within 90 days after Franchisee's delivery of the offer, this 
clause applies again as if a new offer to the Franchisee has been made.  
 
10.3.5  The Franchisee may agree to sell the property subject to the previous clause and this 
clause.  
 
10.3.6  If the Franchisor gives notice under clause 10.3.2, the Franchisee may elect, by written 
notice to the Franchisor, to withdraw the property from sale. If that occurs the Franchisee must 
not at any time afterwards sell the property or any part of it without first complying with this 
clause.  
 
10.4 Transfer by Franchisor  
 
10.4.1  The Franchisor may transfer or encumber its interest this agreement in whole or in part.  
  
10.4.2  The Franchisee's consent to such transfer or encumbrance will not be required and to the 
extent necessary, and provided that the Franchisor obtains a commitment or  
undertaking that the transferee will abide by the Franchisor's obligations pursuant to this 
agreement, the Franchisee hereby consents to any such transfer.  
 
10.4.3  This agreement is fully transferable (without requiring the consent of the Franchisee) by 
the Franchisor in whole or in part and shall (upon the Franchisee being notified of the transfer) 
continue to the benefit of any transferee or other legal successor to the interest of the Franchisor 
provided that the Franchisor shall, subsequent to any such transfer, remain liable for any non-
performance of its obligations contained in this agreement and incurred to the date of transfer. 
Upon the transfer, the Franchisor is released from all liability under this agreement arising on 
and after the date the transfer takes effect.  
 
10.4.4  If requested by the Franchisor or the transferee, the Franchisee must sign and return 
within 14 days after receipt a transfer agreement acceptable to the Franchisor. 
 
 
F13 
 
S9.1  Request for transfer -Franchisee must forward a request for consent to the transfer in 
writing and must also give Franchisee a written offer as Franchisee have offered the other 
person. 
 
S117  Franchisee may transfer interest in this agreement. Upon transfer Franchisee will no 
longer be liable under the terms of the agreement provided that another Franchisee can be found 
who agrees to bound by agreement to Franchisee. Withholding consent re: transfer                                 
S126 h) Franchisee has satisfied all obligations under the franchise code.  
 
S9.2  Within 30 days, Franchisee will advise in writing of if it will accept the offer.          
 
S9.3  Despite s9.1 and s9.2, Franchisee may enter into contract of sale which is conditional 
upon Franchisee failing to accept the offer.            S9.4 Even if Franchisee does not accept the 
offer, Franchisee must not transfer or attempt to transfer without Franchisee’s written consent -- 
Consent will not be unreasonably withheld.    
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S9.5  F13 may withhold consent if: 
   
(a) The proposed transferee is unlikely to be able to meet the financial obligations; or 
(b) The proposed transferee has not met the selection criteria of the Franchisee;  
(c) Agreement to transfer will have a significantly adverse effect on the franchise system; or 
(d) The proposed transferee does not enter into a confidentiality agreement at the time 
nominated by the Franchisee. 
(e) The proposed transferee does not agree in writing to comply with Franchisee’s obligations 
under the franchise agreement  
(f) Franchisee has not paid or made reasonable provision to pay an amount owing to Franchisee  
(g) Franchisee has breached the agreement and has not remedied the breach.       
 
F14 
 
Schedule Item 16: Transfer Fee: An amount equal to 4% of the price for which you sold the 
Business 
 
43. If you wish to sell your Business the following provisions shall apply: 
 
Must offer Business to us first 
 
(a)  you must first offer the Business to us by writing to us and stating the price that you wish 
to sell your Business and the terms for payment of the price. Within 21 days of receiving your 
letter we will advise you in writing: 
 
(1)  whether we will accept your offer; or 
(2)  alternative terms upon which we would be prepared to purchase your Business ("a 
counter offer"); or 
(3)  whether we are agreeable to you placing the Business on the open market for sale. 
 
(b)  If we do not respond to your letter of offer within 21 days we will agree to you placing 
the Business on the open market for sale.  
 
(c)  If we submit a counter offer, you must within 14 days of receiving our counter offer 
advise us in writing whether or not you accept the counter offer. If you do not accept the counter 
offer we will agree to you placing the Business on the open market for sale.  
 
(d)  If we accept your offer or you accept our counter offer a binding contract will come into 
existence once such acceptance is communicated to the other party. Despite this, we will engage 
our solicitors to prepare a formal contract recording the terms negotiated which each of us will 
sign within 7 days of such formal contract being presented for signing.  
 
Conditions on sale to third party 
 
(e)  Any sale of your Business must be conditional upon our approval of the purchaser as a 
franchisee. We may withhold such approval if any of the circumstances described in Section 
20(3) of the Code exist. We will not unreasonably withhold such approval provided all of the 
circumstances described in Section 20(3) of the Code do not exist and; 
 
(1)  You and the purchaser demonstrate to us that the purchaser (and if the purchaser is a 
company, its directors and shareholders) are reputable, responsible and solvent; 
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(2)  The purchaser (and if the purchaser is a company, its directors and shareholders) have in 
our opinion sufficient experience and completed sufficient training to enable them to adequately 
run a F14 Business and comply with the terms of the franchise agreement then being used by us; 
 
(3)  Either:  
 
(A)  a deed of assignment of this franchise in a form approved by us is executed by you, the 
purchaser and us (supported by a guarantee executed by the directors and shareholders of the 
purchaser, if the purchaser is a company); or 
 
(B)  we and you enter into an agreement in a form approved by us terminating the franchise 
granted under this Agreement and we and the purchaser entering into a new franchise agreement 
on the terms then offered by us to franchisees (supported by a guarantee executed by the 
directors and shareholders of the purchaser, if the purchaser is a company) for a term ending not 
prior to the date the term of this Agreement would otherwise have come to an end; 
 
(4)  The owner of the Business Premises consents to the purchaser commencing business as 
our franchisee from the Business Premises (if such consent is necessary under the terms of our 
lease of the Business Premises ); 
 
(5)  You pay us at or prior to the completion of the sale: 
 
(A)  the transfer fee specified in Item 16; and 
(B)  an amount equal to all legal costs and expenses we incur arising out of the sale of your 
Business; and 
(C)  any money which you owe us; and 
(D)  an amount necessary to enable us on your behalf to repay any debts owed to your 
suppliers. 
 
F15 
 
Schedule Item 14:  $15,000 Transfer Fee. 
8.3  Transfer Fee. In the event that: 
 
(a)  the Franchisee wishes to assign the Franchised Operation in accordance with Clause 9, 
the Franchisee shall pay to the Franchisor the Transfer Fee to the Franchisor;  
 
(b) the assignment does not for any reason whatsoever proceed, then the Franchisor shall 
refund to the Franchisee the Transfer Fee less such reasonable costs and expenses (including 
legal costs) of the Franchisor associated with the training of the proposed Assignee or the 
preparation of documentation to give effect to the assignment. 
 
9.  ASSIGNMENT 
 
9.1  Not assign. The Franchisee is not entitled to and covenants that it will not assign or 
purport to assign this Franchise or sell the Franchised Operation without the prior consent in 
writing of the Franchisor, which consent and approval shall not be unreasonably withheld in the 
case of a reputable, responsible, solvent Assignee who is capable of operating a F15 Shop and 
complying with the terms of the franchise agreement and who successfully completes the Initial 
Training. 
 
9.6  Transfer Fee. In the event of a proposed assignment the Franchisee shall pay to the 
Franchisor the Transfer Fee together with the reasonable costs of and incidental to such an 
assignment, the deeds of covenant and guarantee referred to in Clause 9.5 prior to the 
commencement of any training by the proposed assignee and shall pay to the Franchisor prior to 
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the date of the assignment a Performance Bond which shall be used to payout any outstanding 
liabilities of the Franchisee. The balance of the Performance Bond shall be paid to the 
Franchisee within one (1) month of the assignment or such reasonable time thereafter having 
regard to the purpose of the Performance Bond. Should liabilities exceed the Performance Bond, 
then the Franchisee shall pay to the Franchisor, such additional amounts, within seven (7) days 
of the written request from the Franchisor or its solicitor. 
 
12.13 Franchisor Assignments. The Franchisor retains the right to sell any or all of the Names 
and Marks and retains the right to assign its rights in and to this Agreement upon such 
terms as it deems appropriate in its absolute discretion subject to the assignee assuming 
all the future obligations due to the Franchisee under this Agreement and written notice 
by the Franchisor, of such assignment, to the Franchisee, will be conclusive and official 
evidence of such assignment. 
 
F16 
 
PART 13 ASSIGNMENT 
 
13.1 Franchisor’s consent required 
 
Franchisee acknowledge that the rights and duties created by this agreement are 
personal to the Franchisee, and that the Franchisor has entered into this agreement in 
reliance upon the individual or collective character, skill, aptitude, attitude, business 
ability and financial capacity of the Franchisee and/or its owners. Accordingly, the 
Franchisee must not: 
 
(a) purpose or purport to effect any sale, transfer, mortgage, charge, assignment, 
sub-licence, declaration of trust or any other legal or equitable disposition of the 
Franchisee’s rights or any part thereof. 
 
(b) If the Franchisee is a corporation, suffer any change in or appointment of 
directors of the Franchisee; 
 
(c) If the Franchisee is a corporation, resolve to or permit the issue of allotment 
of any shares in the Franchisee or approve the registration of the transfer of any shares 
in the Franchisee if this would result in a change of effective control of the Franchisee 
from that existing on the date of this agreement; 
 
(d) If the Franchisee is a trustee of a trust, permit the transfer of any units or 
beneficial interest in the trust if this would result in a change in the effective control of 
the trust from that existing on the date of this agreement. 
 
13.2 Franchisor must not unreasonably withhold its consent to an assignment where 
the following conditions are met: 
 
(a) the assignee meets the Franchisor’s selection criteria, is likely to be able to 
meet the financial obligations under the Master Franchise Agreement and has met all the 
reasonable requirements of the Franchisor; 
 
(b) the Master Franchisee pays to the Franchisor its costs of evaluation of the 
proposed transferee, its directors, officers, employees, shareholders and proposed 
guarantors. 
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(c) Where it is proposed that the specified person will change, the proposed new 
specified person must have been approved by the Franchisor and have successfully 
completed training. 
 
(d) The Franchisee must not be in default under this agreement and must have 
paid in full all amounts owed. 
 
13.3 Right of First Refusal 
 
If any assignment is proposed, the Franchisee must first offer the interest to the 
Franchisor on no less favourable terms. 
 
13.4 Death or disability of Franchisee 
 
Upon the death or permanent disability of the Franchisee or the specified person, the 
Franchisor may in its sole and absolute discretion allow the Franchise to continue to 
operate provided a competent manager is retained to run the Franchise pending sale or 
transfer of the Franchise and that Manager becomes the Specified Person. 
 
13.5 If Franchisee wishes to advertise by any media for the purpose of effecting an 
assignment, sale or other disposition, the Franchisee shall, prior to any such advertising 
submit the form and/or text of any proposed advertisement for the written approval of 
the Franchisor, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
13.7 Assignment by Franchisor 
 
The Franchisor may transfer or assign some or all of its rights, benefits and obligations 
under this agreement, together with the benefit of any guarantees given on account of 
the Franchise and the same will enure to the benefit of any assignee or other legal 
successor to the interest of the Franchisor. 
 
F17  
 
29.9  Sale of your business - A sale and purchase of your business under this Part will be on the 
following terms unless waived in writing by us:  
 
• the price and its apportionment is to be the agreed price and/or apportionment between 
you and us or the relevant price and apportionment as decided by the expert under this Part;  
• the sale is to be made under the standard contract for the sale of a business approved by 
the real estate institute of the state or territory in which your business is located or if there is no 
such contract, the standard contract of sale of business approved by the Queensland Law Society 
with any necessary changes and with any special conditions needed to give effect to this Part 
and on the basis that the contract is subject to the buyer arranging finance from a bank in a sum 
reasonably sufficient to settle the relevant dealing and if we require, including a condition 
requiring you to surrender your interest in this franchise agreement and/or a transfer or surrender 
of your sublease;  
• the contract for the sale of your business is to include a general release on terms we 
approve releasing and discharging us and our associates from any liabilities, claims or actions 
that you or your associates may have against us, our associate, our directors, shareholders or 
employees in connection with the original acquisition of your business and/or your franchise 
and/or the investment made by your associates in connection with your business and/or your 
franchise or for any loss or damage suffered by you or your associates in connection with your 
business or dealings or transactions made under or in connection with this agreement or the 
transaction documents;  
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• you must do everything and sign all documents to transfer your business to us or our 
nominee free of encumbrances;  
• settlement of the contract for the sale of your business is to happen within 60 days of a 
contract for the sale of your business being received by you and the price and its apportionment 
having been agreed or decided by the expert under this Part.  
 
 
PART 34 DEALINGS - EG SALE OF YOUR BUSINESS  
 
34.1  Restrictions  
 
Unless allowed under this agreement, you and your associates must not, during the 
franchise term, without our consent: 
  
• part with, share possession or sell your business or the store;  
• transfer or charge your store premises agreements or grant a sublease, licence or 
sublicence or other rights to anyone else to possession, use or occupation of the store;  
• create or allow to come into existence a mortgage, charge or encumbrance over you, your 
business, your assets or the ownership interest of your associates except under the permitted 
encumbrances; and  
• sell, allot, issue, mortgage or deal with any of the ownership interests of you or your 
associates in you or your associates or in trusts of which you or your associates are a trustee or 
in any trust that hold interests in any of those trusts.  
 
34.2  For the purposes of this agreement, a dealing in the ownership interest in you includes the 
registration of any transfer of shares, the amendment to the memorandum or articles of 
association which increases your unauthorised capital, creates a new class of shares or varies the 
rights attaching to any shares or the issue of any shares to anyone who was not previously a 
shareholder or any change in the beneficial ownership of shares.  
 
34.3  Right of first refusal  
 
If during the franchise term, you or your associates wish to sell your business, your assets, or the 
ownership interests of one or more of your associates to a third party, you and/or your associates 
(as the case requires) must first give us a sale notice. If we are interested in exercising our right 
of first refusal, we may require you to give us full details in writing of all terms of the proposed 
dealing together with the names of the proposed buyer and other parties to the proposed dealing. 
You or your associates are to provide us with any information we reasonably require to evaluate 
any offer from a third party if we request it within 14 days of getting details of the proposed 
dealing. We may, by delivering written notice within 30 days from delivery to us of all 
necessary details about the proposed dealing, tell you whether we or our nominee wish to buy 
your business, your assets or the ownership interests of one or more of your associates for the 
price and on the terms referred to in the sale notice or in the other documents that have been 
supplied to us. If we wish to exercise the right of first refusal, we will reasonably consider 
requests which you or your associates may make as to the methods of settling the proposed 
dealing but we do not have to complete a dealing involving the sale of your business in a form 
other than an asset purchase. If we exercise our right of first refusal, we will have at least 60 
days to prepare for completion of the dealing and the relevant contract will be subject to finance 
for an amount reasonably necessary to complete the transaction and will, if we require, include a 
condition requiring you to surrender your interest in this agreement.  
 
34.4  6 month sale period  
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If we or our nominee do not exercise the right of first refusal in clause 34.3, you and your 
associates will have 6 months to complete a sale of your business or your assets or a sale of the 
ownership interests of one or more of your associates to someone approved by us in line with the 
requirements for dealings in this Part 34. If a contract for the sale of your business or a contract 
for the sale of an ownership interest of your associates does not settle within the said 6 months 
or if the terms of the dealing previously disclosed to us are substantially and materially changed, 
we or our nominee will again have a right of first refusal on the same terms as in clause 34.3 
with any necessary changes.  
 
34.5  We will not exercise a right of first refusal with respect to a proposed transfer of an 
ownership interest of less than 20% to a member of the immediate family of any of your 
associates where the transfer is due to the death or disability of anyone or more of your 
associates.  
 
34.6  Dealings  
 
We will not unreasonably withhold consent to a proposed dealing under clause 34.1. It will be 
reasonable for us to withhold our consent to a proposed dealing until the following conditions 
are met.  
 
To the full extent permitted by law, a proposed dealing will be subject to the rights of first 
refusal or options to buy your business or an ownership interest of one or more of your 
associates.  
 
To obtain our consent to a proposed dealing:  
 
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must give us 30 days written notice of each 
proposed dealing;  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must give us the details of all the parties to 
each proposed dealing we require. Details we may require may include the name of the parties to 
the proposed dealings, their business address, references, statements of assets and liabilities, 
company and trust documents;  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must give us a copy of all agreements for 
each proposed dealing between you, your associates and all parties to each proposed dealing;  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must pay us a reasonable administration 
charge of up to $750 plus GST to consider the proposed dealing irrespective of whether the 
proposed dealing proceeds. This administration charge may be deducted from the sale fee if the 
proposed dealing is completed;  
• the parties to each proposed dealing must be able to meet the financial obligations 
that the parties to each proposed dealing have or will assume as a result of each proposed 
dealing;  
• you or the parties to each proposed dealing must prove to us that any proposed new 
franchisee meets the selection criteria for a new franchisee of a F17 store in Australia and that 
any associates of any proposed new franchisee also meets the selection criteria applicable to 
associates of a new franchisee of a F17 store in Australia:  
• you or your associates must not be in default under this agreement, the transaction 
documents or any other agreement with us, your creditors or suppliers before and on settlement 
of each proposed dealing;  
• you must pay us all the money due to us under this agreement and the transaction 
documents at the completion of each proposed dealing or make provision to pay all money due 
to us in a way satisfactory to us; you or a party to each proposed dealing must prove to us that a 
proposed new franchisee, its associates and each party to each proposed dealing:  
o are of good character, reputable, responsible and solvent:  
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o have the necessary resources and abilities to own and properly operate your 
business 
o will comply with the obligations that they will assume as part of each 
proposed dealing.  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must prove to us that each proposed dealing 
will not have a significantly adverse effect on the system:  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must prove to us that all the parties to each 
proposed dealing have complied with their obligations at law. in connection with each proposed 
dealing including any disclosure obligations for each proposed dealing:  
• you or a party to each proposed dealing must pay all reasonable legal costs incurred 
by us for each proposed dealing and the cost of preparation of any contracts or equipment for 
each proposed dealing:  
• you or a party to the proposed dealing must pay the sale fee on or before the 
settlement of each proposed dealing where the dealing involves the transfer of your business or 
the transfer of a substantial ownership interest of one or more of your associates. If you have 
paid the reasonable administration charge referred to earlier, this may be deducted from the sale 
fee that may be required to be paid under this agreement;  
• you and the parties to each proposed dealing must sign a contract or agreement for 
each proposed dealing on the conditions we reasonably approve.  
 
34.8 Sale fee  
A sale fee is payable to us under this Part in consideration of the costs of handling the proposed 
dealing and in consideration of us agreeing to consent to the proposed transfer or other dealings 
and/or us or our associates entering into a new franchise agreement and/or transaction 
documents with a new franchisee, its associates and other parties to any dealing.  
 
 
F18 
 
 
14 Transfer Assignment 
 
14.1  F18 may at any time transfer or assign its rights pursuant to this Agreement and this 
Agreement shall enure to the benefit of any transferee or assignee, and to any subsequent 
successors in title. The Franchise Owner shall on request execute any assignment or novation 
documentation requested by F18. 
 
14.2  The Franchise Owner shall not sub-licence or sub-contract the rights or responsibilities of 
the Franchise Owner under this Agreement. 
 
14.3  The Franchise Owner shall not sell, transfer, mortgage, charge, encumber or otherwise 
deal with the Franchise without the prior written consent of F18, which consent will not be 
unreasonably withheld. In the case of a sale or transfer F18 will not withhold its consent 
provided: -  
 
(a)  the transfer or assignment includes all of the Income Stream from the Franchise Owner's 
Designated Contracts and is part of a bona fide sale of the Income Stream to a purchaser, and is 
documented by a contract which provides the purchaser with the protection of an appropriate 
restrictive covenant and is in accordance with the standard F18 precedent sale agreement; 
 
(b)  the proposed assignee or transferee is a responsible and solvent person with sufficient 
financial and business capacity to properly deal with the Designated Contracts and meets the 
Standards and criteria prescribed by F18 for new Franchise Owners; 
 
 429
(c)  the proposed new Franchise Owner and the proposed new Nominated Representative first 
obtain all accreditations, qualifications, licences, authorities and permits required to operate the 
Franchised Business in accordance with this Agreement and undertake at the cost of the 
Franchise Owner all training programs required by F18 of new Franchise Owners;  
 
(d)  the Franchise Owner first pays to F18 the reasonable legal, training and other costs of the 
assignment;  
 
(e)  the proposed new Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative first execute F18's 
then current standard Franchise Agreement, all Collateral Agreements, any associated 
guarantees and otherwise comply with any pre-conditions to the grant of a Franchise imposed 
upon existing or new Franchise Owners of F18;  
 
(f)  the Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative are not in default under any 
provision of this Agreement or any other agreement between F18 and the Franchise Owner and 
the Nominated Representative and shall have substantially complied with all the terms and 
conditions of such agreements during the terms thereof;  
 
(g)  there are no monies outstanding owed by the Franchise Owner or the Nominated 
Representative to any company within the F18 Group under this Agreement or any other 
agreement with the Franchise Owner, the Nominated Representative or any of the Principals.  
 
14.4  Any change or changes in ownership, shareholding, unitholding, beneficial interest or 
expectancy, directorship or control of any Franchise Owner that is a corporation which 
themselves or in aggregate result in a change of majority beneficial ownership or control of the 
Franchise Owner from that existing on the Commencement Date shall be a deemed transfer and 
automatically subject to the foregoing requirements. Any such deemed transfer must satisfy the 
requirements contained in clause 14.3 . 
 
 
F19 
 
19. TRANSFER OF BUSINESS 
 
(a)  The Company may Transfer this agreement. 
 
(b)  The Member may not Transfer the Business or offer or attempt to Transfer the Business 
to any person except in accordance with the terms of this clause 19.  
 
(c)  The Member must not Transfer this agreement without the prior written consent of the 
Company, which consent must not be unreasonably withheld by the Company subject always to 
the provisions of the Code.  
 
(d)  It shall be reasonable for the Company to withhold its consent to any proposed Transfer 
of this agreement if:  
(i)  the proposed transferee is unlikely to meet the financial obligations that the 
proposed transferee would have under this agreement; or  
 (ii)  the proposed transferee does not agree in writing to comply with the obligations 
of the Member under this agreement; or  
(iii)  the proposed transferee fails to meet the Company's then current selection criteria 
to become a Member.  
 
(e)  If the Member intends to Transfer the Business (or any part of the Business) during the 
Term, the Member must notify the Company of its intention to Transfer ("Transfer Notice").  
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(f)  The Transfer Notice must attach a business sale agreement (“Business Sale Agreement") 
with the proposed transferee ("Member's Nominee") which contains all the terms and conditions 
upon which the Member wishes to sell the Business including:  
(i)  the total purchase price of the Business; 
   (ii)  the apportionment of the purchase price among the assets of the Business;  
(iii)  the proposed settlement date;  
(iv)  provisions in relation to the assignment of the Lease (if any), stock, employees, 
adjustments;  
(v)  if applicable, an obligation on the Member's Nominee to assume (in a form 
requested by the Company) the obligations of this agreement or execute an agreement in the 
same or similar form as this agreement; and  
(vi)  provisions in relation to other matters usually dealt with in business sale 
agreements.  
 
(g)  The terms and conditions contained in the Business Sale Agreement must not be any 
more onerous than the terms and conditions upon which the Member would offer to Transfer the 
Business to any person if not for the terms of this clause 19.  
 
(h)  Within 28 days from the day the Company receives the Transfer Notice ("Nomination 
Period") the Company must notify the Member ("Transfer Response") that:  
 (i)  the Company consents to the Transfer of this Agreement to the Member's 
Nominee; or  
 (ii)  the Company does not consent to the proposed Transfer to the Member's 
Nominee.  
 
(i)  In the event that the Company does not consent to the proposed Transfer to the Member's 
Nominee, the Company may attach to the Transfer Response a notice nominating a third party to 
whom the Member must offer to Transfer the Business on substantially the same terms as the 
Business Sale Agreement ("Nomination Notice”)  
 
(j) Nomination Notice must contain the following information: 
 (i)  the full name of the person nominated by the Company (“the Company's 
Nominee");  
 (ii)  the residential address (if a natural person) or the registered office address (if a 
company) of the Company's Nominee;  
(iii)  the address for the service of notices to the Company's Nominee.  
 
(k)  The Member must within 28 days of receiving the Nomination Notice offer to Transfer 
the Business to the Company's Nominee Officer").  
 
(I)  The Offer must:  
 (i)  be given to the Company's Nominee at the address for service specified in the 
Nomination Notice;  
 (ii)  be given together with 3 copies of the Business Sale Agreement duly executed by 
the Member; and  
(iii)  contain a statement to the effect that the Member offers to sell the Business to the 
Company's Nominee on the terms and conditions contained in the Business Sale Agreement.  
 
(m)  The Offer must state the period for which it is open for acceptance by the Company's 
Nominee ("Acceptance Period"). The Acceptance Period must not be less than 28 days from the 
date the Company's Nominee receives the Offer.  
 
(n)  During the Acceptance Period, the Member must:  
(i)  co-operate with the Company's Nominee;  
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 (ii)  provide to the Company's Nominee all accounts, financial statements, 
information and documents of the Business; and  
(iii)  give the Company's Nominee reasonable access to the Location and the assets of 
the Business  
  
in order for the Company's Nominee to assess whether or not to accept the Offer.  
 
(o)  Any notice given by the Company's Nominee will be taken to be given in accordance 
with this clause 19 if the notice is given in accordance with the notices provision (clause 21) of 
this agreement.  
 
(p)  If, in the Transfer Response:  
 (i)  the Company does not nominate a person as the Company's Nominee;  
 (ii)  the Company notifies the Member of a Company Nominee and the Company's 
Nominee fails to accept the Offer within the Acceptance Period; or  
(iii)  the Company notifies the Member of a Company Nominee and the Company's 
Nominee rejects the Offer;  
 
the parties agree that:  
 
(iv)  within 28 days of the last to occur of the events in clause 19(p)(i), (ii) or (iii) the Member 
may execute the Business Sale Agreement with the Member's Nominee and notify the Company 
of this event and of the scheduled date for completion under the Business Sale Agreement 
("BSA Completion Date");  
 (v)  this agreement shall terminate upon receipt of the notice by the Company of the 
BSA Completion Date; and  
(vi)  not withstanding the termination of this agreement the Member will continue to pay to the 
Company the Membership Fees under this agreement in respect of the period to the end of the 
Term or to the first anniversary of the BSA Completion Date, whichever is the first to occur.  
 
(q)  If, in the Transfer Response, the Company consented to the proposed Transfer to the 
Member's Nominee the Member may proceed to Transfer the business to the Member's Nominee 
on the following basis:  
(i)  within 28 days of receipt by the Company of the Transfer Notice the Member must 
execute the Business Sale Agreement with the Member's Nominee and notify the Company of 
this event and of the scheduled date for completion under the Business Sale Agreement ("BSA 
Completion Date"); and  
(ii)  on or before the BSA Completion Date the Member will, procure the Member's Nominee 
to assume (in a form requested by the Company) the obligations of this agreement or execute an 
agreement in the same or similar form as this agreement.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
CONTRACT TERM:  TERMINATION 
 
F1  
 
Franchisee shall be deemed to be in default under this Agreement, and all rights granted to 
Franchisee herein shall automatically terminate without notice to Franchisee, if Franchisee shall 
become insolvent or make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors: or if a petition in 
bankruptcy or winding-up is filed by Franchisee or such a petition is filed against Franchisee and 
not discharged within thirty (30) days; or if Franchisee is adjudicated a bankrupt or insolvent; or 
if a bill in equity or other proceeding for the appointment of a receiver of Franchisee or other 
custodian for Franchisee's business or assets is filed and consented to by Franchisee; or if a 
receiver, liquidator or other custodian (permanent or temporary) of Franchisees assets or 
property, or any part thereof, is appointed by any court of competent Jurisdiction or by a secured 
creditor of Franchisee or if proceedings for a composition with creditors under any state or 
federal law should be instituted by or against Franchisee; or if a final judgment against 
Franchisee affecting the Store remains unsatisfied or of record for thirty (30) days or longer 
(unless supersede as bond is filed); or if Franchisee is dissolved; or if execution is levied against 
the Store and not removed within thirty (30) days; or if suit to foreclose any lien or mortgage 
against the Premises or its equipment is instituted against Franchisee and not dismissed within 
thirty (30) days; or if the real or personal property of the Store shall be sold after levy thereupon 
by any bailiff, sheriff, marshal or constable; or if any security over the Premises or other 
property in the State is enforced. 
 
Franchisee agrees to perform and comply with all of the obligations under the Lease and to pay, 
when due, all rent and other charges payable under the Lease. Franchisee acknowledges that the 
selection of the Premises as a Store location is an integral part of  the System and that 
continuation of the Lease is essential to the Franchise. Failure to comply with the provisions of 
the Lease will, at F1' or Sub-Franchisor's election, constitute a breach of this Agreement. If the 
Lease is terminated for any reason, and F1 or Sub-Franchisor have given the Franchisee 
reasonable notice that F1 or the Sub-Franchisor propose to terminate the Agreement because of 
the breach, and have informed the Franchisee of what F1 or the Sub-Franchisor require to be 
done to remedy the breach, and that breach has not been remedied within a reasonable time but 
in no circumstances more than thirty (30) days, this Agreement will terminate immediately. 
 
Franchisee shall be deemed to be in default under this Agreement upon the occurrence of any of 
the following events, and F1 or Sub-Franchisor may, at its option, terminate this Agreement and 
all rights granted Franchisee hereunder, without affording Franchisee any opportunity to cure the 
default, effective immediately upon receipt of notice by Franchisee. 
 
If Franchisee fails to close and suspend operation of the Store when required by F1 or Sub-
Franchisor under the terms of Section 8.4; 
 
If Franchisee at any time ceases to operate or otherwise abandons the Store (any unapproved 
closure of 24 hours or more shall be deemed to be an abandonment), or loses the right to 
possession of the Premises, or otherwise forfeits the right to transact business in the Jurisdiction 
where the Store is located; provided, however, that if, through no fault of Franchisee, the 
Premises are damaged or destroyed and repairs or reconstruction cannot be completed within 
ninety (90) days thereafter, then Franchisee shall have thirty (30) days after such event in which 
to apply in such form as F1 may reasonably require for F1' approval to relocate and/or 
reconstruct the Premises, at Franchisee's sole expense, which approval shell not be unreasonably 
withheld, but may be conditioned upon the payment by Franchisee of an agreed minimum 
royalty during the period in which the Store is not in operation; 
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If Franchisee or any officer of Franchisee involved in the business of the Store is convicted of a 
felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or any other crime or offence that F1 believes is 
reasonably likely to have an adverse effect on the System or the Products, the Proprietary Names 
and Marks, the goodwill associated therewith, or F1' interest therein; 
 
If Franchisee permits the use of the Store or Premises for any illegal or unauthorised purpose, 
including, without limitation, palming or passing off or substitution of Products under the 
Proprietary names and Marks or  other marks of F1; 
 
 If a threat or danger to public health or safety results from the maintenance or operation of the 
Store or the  Premises; 
 
If Franchisee offers for sale or sells unauthorized Products or services from the Store; 
 
If Franchisee or any partner or shareholder in Franchisee purports to transfer any rights or 
obligations under this Agreement or any interest in Franchisee to any party without F1' and Sub-
Franchisor's prior written consent, contrary to the terms of Section 18; 
 
If Franchisee fails to comply with the covenants set forth in Section 15; 
               
If, contrary to the terms of Section 5.4 or Section 11, Franchisee discloses or divulges trade 
secret provided to Franchisee by F1 or Su b-Franchisor to their material detriment, as 
determined by them, in their sole discretion: 
 
If an approved transfer is not effected within a reasonable time following a relevant person's 
death, disability or mental incapacity, as required by Section 19; 
 
If Franchisee knowingly maintains false books or record, or knowingly submits any false reports 
to F1 or to Sub-Franchisor; 
 
If Franchisee, after curing an individual event of default pursuant to Section 16.4, commits the 
same default again, whether or not cured after notice; 
 
If Franchisee repeatedly is in default under section16.4 for failure substantially to comply with 
any of the requirements imposed by this Agreement, whether or not cured after notice; or 
 
If any other F1 franchise agreement entered into by Franchisee is terminated by reason of 
Franchisee's  default  thereunder. 
 
Except as otherwise provided in Sections 16.1 to 16.3, or unless Franchisee agrees to immediate 
termination of the Agreement, upon any default by Franchisee, F1 (or Sub-Franchisor with the 
concurrence of F1) may terminate this Agreement by giving Franchisee reasonable written 
notice of termination stating the nature of the default and indicating what Franchisee must do to 
remedy that default. F1 (or Sub-Franchisor) will give Franchisee reasonable time, but in no 
circumstances more than thirty (30) days, to remedy that default. Franchisee may avoid 
termination by curing the default within reasonable period of time and by promptly providing 
proof of cure to F1. If any default is not cured within reasonable time, this Agreement shall 
terminate without further notice to Franchisee on expiration of the reasonable period of time. 
Examples of events which will lead to termination under this Section include; 
 
If Franchisee fails to comply in good faith with any of the requirements imposed upon it by this 
Agreement or fails to comply with the Standards; 
 
If Franchisee fails, refuses or neglects promptly to pay any monies owed by it to F1, Sub-
Franchisor or Lessor, or their subsidiaries or affiliates, when due, to make contributions or 
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expenditures for advertising as required under this Agreement, or to submit the financial or other 
information required by F1 or Sub-Franchisor under this Agreement ; 
 
If Franchisee fails, refuses or neglects to obtain any prior written approval or consent as required 
by this Agreement ; 
 
If Franchisee misuses or makes any unauthorised use of the Proprietary Names and Marks, or 
otherwise impairs the goodwill associated therewith or F1' rights therein; 
 
If Franchisee engages in any business or markets any service or product under a name or mark 
which, in F1 opinion, is confusingly similar to the Proprietary Names and Marks; or if 
Franchisee fails to obtain execution of the covenants required under Section 15.9. 
 
Franchisee recognises that the Store is one of the large number  of F1 stores within the System 
selling similar Products and services to the public; hence, Franchisee's failure to comply with the 
terms of this Agreement would cause irreparable damage to F1, Sub-Franchisor and to the 
System. Therefore, in the event of a breach or threatened breach by Franchisee of any of the 
terms of this Agreement, Sub-Franchisor and/or F1 shall forthwith be entitled to an injunction 
restraining such breach and/or to a decree of specific performance, without showing or proving 
any actual damage or irreparable harm or lack of an adequate remedy at law, and without the 
requirements for the posting of bond, or other security for costs the same being hereby waived 
by Franchisee, until a final determination is made by a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
foregoing remedy shall be in addition to all other remedies or rights which Sub-Franchisor or F1 
might otherwise have by virtue of any breach of this Agreement by Franchisee. 
 
If Franchisee fails to do or perform any thing or act required on its part after thirty (30) days 
written notice of default, Sub-Franchisor shall also have the right (but shall not be obligated) to 
cause such thing or act to be done, and Franchisee shall pay all costs incurred by Sub-Franchisor 
in the performance thereof. 
 
The parties agree that the Franchising Code of Conduct as amended from time to time may take 
precedent over any of the above sub-clauses. 
 
 
F2  
 
Termination for Breach.   
The Franchisor is entitled to terminate this Agreement by Notice if: 
 
(a) the Franchisee has breached the terms of this Agreement; 
 
(b) the Franchisor has given a Notice to the Franchisee to remedy the breach in accordance 
with Clause 21; and 
 
(c) the Franchisee has failed to remedy that breach within the time period prescribed in the 
Notice. 
 
22.2 Termination - special circumstances.   
 
The Franchisor is entitled to immediately terminate this Agreement without having to comply 
with the provisions of Clauses 21.2 and Clause 22.1 if the Franchisee: 
 
(a) no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to operate the Business; 
 
(b) becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or an externally administered body 
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corporate;  
 
(c) voluntarily abandons the Business or the Franchise relationship; 
 
(d) any of its directors is convicted of a serious offence as defined in the Code; 
 
(e) operates the Business in a way that endangers public health or safety; 
 
(f) is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business; or 
 
(g) agrees to the termination of this Agreement. 
 
 
22.3 Termination by Franchisee.   
If: 
 
(a) the Franchisee is in substantial compliance with this Agreement; 
 
(b) the Franchisor breaches a material term of this Agreement; and 
 
(c) the Franchisee: 
 
(i) informs the Franchisor of the breach; 
 
(ii) gives REASONABLE Notice that it proposes to terminate this Agreement because of the 
breach; 
 
(iii) provides details of the breach and what it requires the Franchisor to do to remedy the 
breach; and 
 
(iv) allows the Franchisor thirty days to remedy the breach; and 
 
(d) the Franchisor fails to remedy that breach within thirty days after receiving 
Notice from the Franchisee of that breach, 
 
then the Franchisee may terminate this Agreement by delivering 14 days Notice 
 
 
F3 
 
The following are Events of Default: 
 
if the Franchisee: 
- submits to the Franchisor a licence application or supporting information containing false or 
misleading statements or omissions of fact; 
- does not open the Location for business within three months after the date of this agreement; 
- does not rectify any failure to operate and maintain the F3Business strictly in accordance with 
this agreement as required by a notice from the Franchisor requiring rectification; 
- sells or provides at or from the F3Business any products or services not approved by the 
Franchisor and continues to do so for five days after receiving notice from the Franchisor 
requiring the Franchisee to stop selling those products and to stop providing those services; 
- does not provide items required by the Franchisor and continues to fail to do so for five days 
after receiving notice from the Franchisor requiring those products to be provided; 
- does not pay any sum due under this agreement within seven days after receiving notice from 
the Franchisor requiring payment; 
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- assigns or purports to assign the Licence without complying with clauses 
- becomes bankrupt, unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or enters into any form of 
insolvency administration; 
- encumbers or purports to encumber the Licence without the Franchisor's approval; 
- does not maintain the licences (including any liquor licences) necessary to operate the 
F3Business; 
- abandons the F3Business or ceases or threatens to cease to operate the F3Business or to occupy 
the Location, without the Franchisor's approval; 
- breaches any other provision of this agreement and fails to remedy the breach within seven 
days after receiving notice requiring it to do so; 
- engages in any conduct, that in the Franchisor's opinion may adversely affect the System or the 
F3Business; 
by the Franchisee's inaction adversely affects, in the Franchisor's opinion, the System or the 
F3Business; 
- fails to maintain a good credit rating by failing to pay promptly undisputed invoices from 
suppliers of goods and services to the F3Business;  
- fails to make any payments due to the Franchisor in excess of $24,000 whether under this 
agreement or otherwise within 14 days of becoming due; or 
- fails to comply with one or more requirement of this agreement or the Operations Manual 
whether or not that non-compliance is corrected after notice on two or more occasions within 
any three month period. 
 
if in the Franchisor's reasonable opinion the transfer of any interest in any share of the 
Franchisee or the variation of the rights attaching to the shares of the Franchisee results in the 
effective control of the Franchisee being transferred to a competitor of any F3Business. 
 
Termination for default 
If an Event of Default occurs and: 
the Event of Default is not a breach of this agreement, the Franchisor may, by giving a 
reasonable period of notice, setting out the reasons for termination of this agreement, terminate 
this agreement upon expiry of the notice; and 
the Event of Default is a breach of this agreement: 
the Franchisor may give the Franchisee a notice: 
- specifying the Event of Default and that the Franchisor proposes to terminate the agreement 
because of the breach; 
- identifying what the Franchisor requires the Franchisee to do to remedy the Event of Default; 
and 
- nominating a reasonable period which need not exceed 30 days (Cure Period) to remedy the 
Event of Default, and 
- if the Event of Default is not remedied, in accordance with paragraph (B) within the Cure 
Period, the Franchisor may, by a further notice, terminate this agreement. 
 
F4 
 
S.29  Termination 
 
S. 29.1  The Franchisee may terminate this Agreement within any mandatory cooling off 
period required by law to be given to the Franchisee by the Provision of written notice by the 
Franchisee to the Franchisor. 
 
S. 29.2:  If this Agreement is terminated in accordance with clause 29.1, the Franchisor 
will refund to the Franchisee any payments made by the Franchisee to the Franchisor less an 
amount not exceeding $15,000.00 plus GST to cover the Franchisor’s reasonable costs and 
expenses of: 
    (a) evaluating the Franchise 
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    (b) The negotiation, preparation, execution and stamping of this Agreement, the 
Disclosure Statement, lease of the Premises and any other documents; 
   (c) Training the Franchisee or its Nominated Manager or other representatives; 
    (d) Evaluation and carrying out any works to the Premises. 
 
S. 29.3:  The Franchisee may terminate this Agreement by written notice to the Franchisor 
if: 
    (a) the Franchisor is materially in breach of any of the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement; 
(b) the Franchisee gives a written notice to the Franchisor specifying the failure to comply, if 
capable of remedy, specifying how the breach can be remedied and requiring remedy within a 
reasonable period not exceeding 30 days having regard to the nature of the breach; and  
    (c) the Franchisor fails to remedy the same within the required period. 
 
S.29.4:  The Franchisor may terminate this Agreement by written notice to the Franchisee 
if: 
    (a) the Franchisee fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement or the Operations Manual; and 
(b) the Franchisor gives a written notice to the Franchisee specifying the failure to comply, if 
capable of remedy, specifying how the breach can be remedied and requiring remedy within 30 
days; and the Franchisee fails to remedy the same within 30 days. 
 
S. 29.5:  The Franchisor may terminate this Agreement immediately upon delivery of 
written notice of termination to the Franchisee if the Franchisee or any Guarantor commits, 
permits or suffers any of the following acts, events or omissions: 
    (a) no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to carry on the 
Franchised Business; 
    (b) becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or an externally-
administered body corporate; 
    (c) voluntarily abandons the Franchised Business or the franchise relationship. 
    (d) is convicted of a serious offence; 
    (e) operates the Franchised Business in a manner that presents a health or safety 
hazard to its customers, employees or the public; 
    (f) is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Franchised Business; or 
    (g) agrees to termination of this Agreement. 
 
S. 29.6:  In addition, the franchisor may terminate this Agreement upon reasonable written notice 
of termination to the Franchisee if the Franchisee or any Guarantor commits, permits or suffer  
any of the following acts, event or omissions each of which shall constitute a material breach of 
this Agreement, including if the Franchisee or Guarantor: 
(a) files or is the subject of a petition for voluntary or involuntary winding up or it any 
resolution is passed or proceedings commenced for its winding up; or 
   (b) a liquidator, provisional liquidator, receiver, receiver and manager or administrator is 
appointed to or exists in relation to any of its assets or undertaking; or 
   (c) has served or suffers service of any execution, levy, or distress against the assets of 
the Franchised Business; or 
(d) makes an assignment or any other arrangement for the benefit of creditors of the Franchised 
Business or makes any composition or arrangement with such creditors or is unable to or 
deemed to be unable to pay its debts; or 
   (e) makes an assignment of the Franchise Agreement without first complying with the 
provisions of the Agreement; or 
(f) abandons or surrenders or transfers control of its Franchised Business or fails actively to 
carry on the Franchised Business and such condition continues for only two days after notice of 
such default is given, unless the following occurs: 
    (i) war or civil disturbance; 
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    (ii) natural disaster; 
    (iii) labour dispute; or 
    (iv) other event beyond the Franchisee’s reasonable control. 
(g) permits to occur or suffers a substantial change in the management, or any change in the 
ownership or control of the Franchisee which is not first disclosed to and approved in writing by 
the Franchisor; or 
(h) declares any trust otherwise creates any beneficial interest in its Franchised Business or any 
part of the assets of its Franchised Business without the prior written consent of the Franchisor; 
or 
   (i) any Guarantor dies of suffers permanent incapacity; or 
(j) fails or refuses to submit any report, financial statement or other financial information or 
supporting records required pursuant to this Agreement, or submits such reports more than seven 
days late on more than three occasions during any twelve month period; or 
(k) submits any financial report which understates Gross Sales unless the Franchisee 
demonstrates to the Franchisor’s satisfaction that such an understatement is a result of genuine 
and honest mistake; or 
   (l) fails or refuses to pay any amount(s) owed to the Franchisor under the terms of this 
Agreement within 3 days of the due date for payment; or 
(m) sells or offers for sale, displays or holds anywhere in Australia for sale, any similar products 
to the Franchisor’s Products and fails to cease such sale or offering for sale or fails to remove 
such products from the Premises any where else where the products are being sold, displayed, or 
held within three days following receipt of notice from the Franchisor requiring it to do so, or, 
having ceased to do so recommences to do so at any time following receipt of such notice from 
the Franchisor. 
 
 
F5 
 
If you: fail to make any payment to us under this or any other agreement, or 
fail to submit any report when required, or 
any of the persons identified in item 16 breach their non competition covenant,  
then we may: 
 (i)  give you notice specifying the breach; 
(ii) tell you what we require to be done to remedy that breach; and  
(iii) tell you that we propose to terminate the agreement if you do not remedy the breach as 
required by us within 14 days. 
If the breach is a failure to perform any other obligation under this or any other agreement we 
may give you notice specifying the breach, telling you what we require to be done to remedy the 
breach and telling you that we propose to terminate the agreement if you do not remedy the 
breach as required by us within 30 days or lesser period as is deemed by us to be reasonable and 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
If the breach is not remedied within the designated time limit we may, by notice to you, end this 
agreement. 
Notwithstanding 139, 140 and 141, we may end this agreement immediately by notice if you: 
- no longer have  a right to occupy the premises for the conduct of the franchise business; or 
- become bankrupt, insolvent under administration, or an externally administered body 
corporate; or 
- voluntarily abandon the franchise business or the franchise relationship, or 
- are convicted of a serious offence; or 
- operate the franchise business in a way that endangers public health or safety; or 
- are fraudulent in connection with the operation of the franchise business; or 
- agree to the termination of this agreement. 
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F6 
 
Automatic termination 
 
F6 may immediately terminate this Deed without any notice if the Franchisee: 
 
(a) no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to carry on the Franchised 
Operation; or 
 
(b) becomes bankrupt, insolvent, under administration by an externally administered body 
corporate; or 
 
(c) voluntarily abandons the Franchised Operation or the Franchise relationship; or 
 
(d) is convicted of a serious offence; or 
 
(e) operates the Franchised  Operation in a way that endangers public health or safety; or 
 
(h) is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Franchised Operation; or 
 
(i) agrees to the termination of this Deed. 
 
16.2 Other franchisee breaches 
 
F6may give notice to the Franchisee proposing to terminate the Franchisee’s appointment under 
this agreement  after any one of the following events occur: 
 
(a) the Franchisee, Nominated Manager or any of the Guarantors commits an act of 
bankruptcy; 
 
(b) the Franchisee has a Liquidator, Provisional Liquidator, Receiver or Receiver and 
Manager, Official Manager, Scheme Manager or other custodian (either temporary or 
permanent) appointed of its assets or any of them; 
 
(c) the Franchisee or any of the Guarantors makes any assignment for the benefit of its 
creditors or makes any composition or arrangement with such creditors; 
 
(d) the Franchisee or any of the Guarantors has any of its property seized under any distress 
or execution; 
 
(e) any report, financial statement or other information or supporting record is submitted by 
the Franchisee on more than two (2) occasions at any time during the Term which understates 
the Gross Revenue for any period unless the Franchisee demonstrates that such understatement 
resulted from inadvertent error; 
 
(f) there is a failure or refusal by the Franchisee to submit any report, financial statement or 
other information or supporting records required herein or the Franchisee submits such reports 
more than one (1) week late on more than two (2) occasions during any twelve (12) month 
period; 
 
(g) there is a failure or refusal to pay an amount owed by the Franchisee to F6under this 
Deed or any other agreement within seven (7) days after its due date for payment (or, if no due 
date is expressed in this agreement, within 7 days after F6issues a demand for payment), or the 
Franchisee fails to honour on more than two (2) occasions during the Term cheques presented 
for payment; 
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(h) the Franchisee sells or offers for sale any unauthorised merchandise or service on more 
than two (2) occasions during any six (6) month period; 
 
(i) a violation of any law, ordinance, rule or regulation of any relevant authority in 
connection with the operation of the Franchised Operation and failure to correct such violation 
promptly after notification thereof from any source unless there is a bona fide dispute as to the 
violation or status of such law, rule or regulation and the Franchisee promptly resorts to the 
courts or other forms of appropriate jurisdiction to contest such violation or status; 
 
(j) default of the licence or the lease entitling F6or the head lessor to possession of the 
Premises or otherwise parts with possession excepting in the case of destruction of the Premises 
caused by factors beyond the Franchisee’s control; 
 
(k) the Franchisee does or attempts or purports to do any act or thing, where the consent of 
F6is required without first obtaining such consent; 
 
(l) the Franchisee fails to comply with any term or provision of this agreement (other than a 
term relating to the payment of any money) or any provision of the Confidential Operations 
Manual and does not remedy such failure within fourteen (14) days after written notice of such 
failure to comply (which shall describe the action that the Franchisee must take) is delivered to 
the Franchisee; 
 
(m) the Franchisee, Nominated Manager or any of the Guarantors is convicted of any criminal 
(non-traffic) offence (other than a driving under the influence offence); 
 
(n) any attempted Assignment or purported Assignment other than pursuant to clause 15.2; 
 
(o) subject to clause 15.3, the death of the Nominated Manager or a  Guarantor; 
 
(p) a creditor enforces any security over any of the assets of the Franchisee; 
 
(q) the Franchisee is unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due, stops, suspends or 
threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or any of its debts; 
 
(r) the Franchisee committing an act or undertaking a course of conduct which F6considers 
as unsatisfactory performance of the Franchised Operation, as bringing F6into disrepute or as 
otherwise detrimentally affecting FRANCHISOR. 
 
(s) the Franchisee or the Nominated Manager failing to complete the initial training 
programme referred to in clause 10.1 to the REASONABLE satisfaction of FRANCHISOR. 
 
(t) the Franchisee failing to execute and have the Guarantors execute the licence by the 
Commencement Date. 
 
(u) the Franchisee failing to commence operating the Premises by the Commencement Date. 
 
16.3 Rectification of franchisee default 
 
(a) This clause applies if: 
 
 (1)  the Franchisee breaches this agreement; and 
 
 (2)  F6gives a notice to the Franchisee under clause 16.2 proposing to 
terminate this agreement. 
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(b) F6must: 
 
 (1) give to the Franchisee REASONABLE notice that F6proposes to terminate the 
Franchise agreement because of the breach; 
 
 (2) tell the Franchisee what F6requires to be done to remedy the breach; and 
 
 (3) allow the Franchisee a REASONABLE time to remedy the breach. 
 
(c) In relation to paragraph (b)(3): 
 
 (1) F6does not have to allow more than 30 days in the case of any breach; 
 
 (2) if  the same breach occurs more than once within a period of 12 months, F6does 
not have to allow more than 7 days in respect of the second breach; and 
 
(3) if  the same breach occurs more than twice within a period of 12 months, F6does not have 
to allow more than 3 days in respect of the third or any subsequent  such breach. 
 
(d) Where a breach is incapable of remedy, the Franchisee must within 30 days after 
receiving a notice of breach take whatever action F6reasonably directs to be taken in order to 
restore F6to a position no less favourable than F6was in before the breach occurred. 
 
(e) If the breach is not remedied in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c), or the Franchisee 
does not comply with FRANCHISOR’ direction in accordance with paragraph (d), F6may 
terminate this agreement by notice to the Franchisee. 
 
17. TERMINATION BY FRANCHISEE 
 
If the Franchisee is in substantial compliance with this Deed and F6breaches a material term of 
this Deed and fails to correct such breach within fourteen (14) Business Days after written 
notice, sent by security post describing such breach is delivered to it, the Franchisee may 
terminate this Deed effective one (1) month after delivery to F6of a written notice of 
termination.  Any termination of this Deed by the Franchisee, except in accordance with this 
clause, shall be deemed to be a termination without proper cause and will be treated by F6as a 
material breach or repudiation of this Deed by the Franchisee. 
 
 
F7 
 
Termination by the Franchisor for Franchisee’s Default 
The Franchisor may terminate this Agreement and the Franchise if: 
- a Default Event occurs; and 
- the Franchisor gives to the Franchisee a written notice which: 
- specifies the Default Event; 
- tells the Franchisee what the Franchisor wants the Franchisee to do to remedy the Default 
Event; 
- gives the Franchisee a REASONABLE time (which need not be more than 30 days) to remedy 
the Default Event; and 
 -states that the Franchisor proposes to terminate this Agreement and the Franchise if the Default 
Event is not remedied within that time. 
If the Franchisee remedies a Default Event in accordance with, and within the time allowed by, a 
notice issued under clause 0, the Franchisor cannot terminate this Agreement because of that 
Default Event. 
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Default Events 
A Default Event occurs if: 
- the Franchisee repudiates this Agreement; 
- the Franchisee does not pay on time any money payable to the Franchisor under this 
Agreement or any Related Agreement; 
- the Franchisee breaches any covenant, warranty, agreement or obligation contained or implied 
in this Agreement or a Related Agreement or imposed by law to be observed and performed by 
the Franchisee; 
- any of the following occurs in respect of a body corporate which is a Franchisee or a 
Guarantor: 
- an application is made, proceedings are initiated or a meeting (whether of shareholders, 
creditors or directors) is called with a view to winding it or any part of its undertaking up or 
placing it or any part of its undertaking under administration; 
- an application is made or an action is initiated with a view to cancelling its registration or 
appointing an inspector or other officer to investigate any of its affairs, pursuant to any Law; 
- it is unable to pay its debts from its own money as and when they fall due; or 
circumstances exist which would enable the court upon application to order its winding up 
pursuant to section 461 of the Corporations Act; 
- in the case of a Guarantor which is a body corporate, it becomes an externally-administered 
body corporate; 
- if the Franchisee is a partnership, it is dissolved otherwise than in accordance with this 
Agreement or an application to a court for its dissolution is made; 
- a Guarantor becomes a bankrupt or an insolvent under administration; 
- a Guarantor is convicted of a serious offence; 
 -distress is levied or an order, judgment or other process is issued against the Franchisee or a 
Guarantor or any of their assets for an amount exceeding $5,000.00 which is not satisfied within 
28 days; 
- the Franchisee’s Occupancy Right is terminated due to some act or default on its part or the 
Occupancy Right expires and the Franchisee does not relocate the Business under clause 9.11; or 
- an event occurs entitling the Franchisor to terminate this Agreement under any other provision 
of this Agreement. 
- The Franchisee and the Guarantor must immediately notify the Franchisor of the occurrence or 
likely occurrence of any Default Event. 
- The Franchisee and the Guarantor must prevent the occurrence of a Default Event. 
 
Immediate Termination 
The Franchisor: 
- may terminate this Agreement and the Franchise immediately by giving the Franchisee written 
notice; and 
- does not have to comply with clauses 21 or 22 of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 
if the Franchisee: 
- no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to carry on the Business; or 
- becomes a bankrupt, an insolvent under administration or an externally-administered body 
corporate; or 
- voluntarily abandons the Business or the Franchise; or 
- is convicted of a serious offence; or 
- operates the Business in a way that endangers public health or safety; or 
- is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business; or 
- agrees to the termination of this Agreement and the Franchise. 
 
Franchisor may rectify Franchisee’s Default 
- If the Franchisee does not perform or observe any obligation under this Agreement the 
Franchisor may, but does not have to, remedy that default.  In doing so the Franchisor is entitled 
to rely on the power of attorney in clause 37. 
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9 Termination or Expiry 
  
 9.1  Upon the termination or expiry of this Agreement for whatever reason: 
 
 9.1.1 The Licencee shall at its own cost deliver to the Licensor any signs, Manuals, 
instructions, notes, writings and other documents relating to the Licenced Operation. 
  
9.1.2 all rights granted by this Agreement with respect to the Marks and any other 
Intellectual Property shall revert to the Licensor; 
 
9.1.3 The Licencee shall if require by notice in writing given by the Licensor remove, 
obliterate or destroy (as appropriate) any or all of the signs colour schemes and other features 
associated with the Licencee whether appearing at the premises from which the Licenced 
Operation is conducted or otherwise or shall permit the Licensor by its officers and agents to do 
so at the Licencee’s costs; 
  
9.1.4 the Licencee shall not be entitled to claim compensation from the Licensor or to receive 
any rebate or refund of any moneys expended by the Licencee for advertising or any other 
activates with respect to the Licenced Operation including moneys in any advertising fund or for 
the goodwill or any goodwill or which the Licencee may have established by its activities 
hereunder; 
  
9.1.5 the Licencee pay any moneys due by the Licensor under this Agreement; 
  
9.1.6 The Licencee shall pay the supplier of any Stock supplied to the Licencee and then 
remaining unpaid and such payment shall be made not later than seven (7) days after the date of 
termination of this Agreement; 
  
9.1.7 the Licensor and the Licencee shall cooperate in the execution of any and all instruments 
necessary to complete the termination of this Licence; 
  
9.1.8 the Licensor shall cease forthwith to use or display (whether by advertising or otherwise) 
any Business Name or any trade name or any of the Marks or any Intellectual Property or any 
imitation or approximation thereof in particular on the Premises, Signs, stationery or otherwise; 
  
9.1.9 the Licence must supply to the Licensor the names of all persons being serviced or 
enquiring or requesting Products or Services forthwith on application being made by the 
Licensor; 
  
9.1.10 the Licencee must return to the Licensor all copies, including all translated copies of the 
Manuals that are in the Licencee’s possession or control; 
  
9.1.11 the Licencee must return to the Licensor all stationery, promotional material, signs and 
other items in the Licencee’s possession or under its control used in connection with the 
Licenced operation which bears the Business Name and/or any of the Marks and any of the 
Software Products provided by the Licensor to the Licencee. 
 
9.2 The Licencee must not, after expiry or termination: 
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 9.2.1 make or use in any manner any of the Marks or any name, slogan or device similar to the 
Marks or which may be confusing therewith or which may be reasonably  
considered to impute any association with the Licensor; 
  
   9.2.2 use directly or indirectly any Marks or Intellectual Right of the Licensor; 
  
 9.2.3 use or duplicate the Licenced Operation or the get-up or appearance of the Licenced 
Operation; 
  
9.2.4 use for the benefit of the Licencee or other third any part of the Manual or any 
Confidential Information. 
  
9.2.5 service or supply any product or service whatsoever offered by the Licensor on any 
similar product or service to any customer or potential customer of the Licenced Operation and 
refer all such customers or potential customers to the Licensor. 
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8.5 Early Termination - If the term of the Lease or the Sublease terminates on a date more 
than 6 months prior to the date of termination of the original Term of this agreement as set out in  
clause 4.1 hereof, the Franchisee shall, provided it has not otherwise breached or, violated any of 
the provisions of this agreement and provided it has served notice to renew the agreement 
pursuant to the provisions of clause 4.2 hereof, have a period of 6 months from the date of the 
termination of the Lease or the Sublease, within which to relocate and again commence business 
from a location approved by the Franchisor, using the rights granted it pursuant to this 
agreement. If the Franchisee is unable to relocate and again commence such business within the 
aforesaid period, this agreement shall terminate and be of no further force or effect effective as 
of the end of the said 6 month period, and the Franchisee and the Guarantor agree that the 
Franchisor shall not be responsible for any losses, damages, costs or expenses whatsoever 
incurred by them as a result of such termination, it being hereby acknowledged that the Term of 
this agreement will not necessarily coincide with the term of the Lease or the Sublease. If the 
Franchisee is able to relocate, the Franchisee shall be required to obtain all prior consents and 
approvals of the Franchisor as provided by this agreement and this agreement and all of its 
provisions shall apply. All costs and expenses incurred with respect to any such relocation and 
recommencement of business shall be borne solely by the Franchisee. Otherwise, if the Lease or 
the Sublease terminates within a date 6 months prior to termination of the original Term of this 
agreement, and the Lease has not been renewed, then the Term shall be deemed to expire on the 
date of the termination of the Lease or Sublease, as the case may be, notwithstanding the 
termination date set out in clause 4.1 hereof and i notwithstanding that the Franchisee has served 
notice of its intention to renew as I provided by clause 4.2. 
 
12.1  Franchisee may terminate during Cooling Off Period  
(1) The Franchisee may terminate this agreement and the Franchise by giving to the 
Franchisor a written notice of termination before the end of the cooling off period. 
 
 
13.  EFFECT OF TERMINATION 
 
13.1  Effect 
 
Forthwith upon the termination of this agreement for any reason whatsoever save and except in 
the event of termination pursuant to clause 8.3, 8.4 or 9.3(2) of this agreement wherein the 
provisions of the said clause 8.3, 8.4 or 9.3(2) shall apply, the following provisions shall apply: 
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(1)  all rights of the Franchisee under this agreement, including without limitation, the right to 
use the F9 System and the Trademark, shall cease forthwith, and thereafter the Franchisee shall 
cease conducting the Business or holding itself out to the public as being part of the F9 System, 
and shall cease using the Trademark for any purposes whatsoever; 
 
(2)  the Franchisee shall forthwith deliver up to the Franchisor, the Manual and all other 
forms, documents, or information provided to the Franchisee pursuant to this agreement together 
with all copies thereof; 
 
(3)  the Franchisee shall forthwith cease use of all telephone numbers and listing services in 
any way connected with the Business, and subject to the direction of the Franchisor, the 
Franchisee shall immediately cancel such numbers and listings or direct that same be transferred 
to the Franchisor, who then shall have the exclusive right to use such numbers and listings 
and/or authorize others to use same; if the Franchisee shall fail or refuse to cause the foregoing 
to be done, the Franchisee hereby irrevocably appoints the Franchisor as its lawful attorney to 
instruct the telephone company or listing service. to cancel or transfer all such numbers or 
listings to the Franchisor or as it may direct; 
 
(4)  the Franchisee shall forthwith cease to use all advertising, promotional or other material 
or identifying characteristics whatsoever identified with the F9 System and/or the Trademark 
and shall return same to the Franchisor upon request; 
 
(5)  without limiting any other rights or remedies to which the Franchisor may be entitled, the 
Franchisee shall pay all amounts owing to the Franchisor pursuant to this agreement up to the 
date of termination; 
(6) (a) in the event the Franchisor holds the right to occupy the Premises as lessee or otherwise 
in the first instance, the Franchisee shall vacate the Premises forthwith upon the date of 
the said termination and until such time as the Franchisor determines whether or not it will 
exercise its option to purchase all or any part of the Products, Equipment and movable 
Leasehold Improvements or other assets hereinafter for the purposes specifically of this clause 
13 to be referred to collectively as the "Property") as provided by clause 13.2(1) hereof, 
the Franchisee shall not remove same from the Premises. If the Franchisor does not exercise its 
said option to purchase all of the Property, the Franchisee shall then have 7 days from 
the receipt of notice from the Franchisor within which to remove all or that part of the Property 
from the Premises not being so acquired, failing which, the Franchisor may keep the 
Property on the Premises and use same itself or allow others to use such Property, or cause the 
same to be removed and stored at the sole cost and expense of the Franchisee; 
provided that if the Franchisee does not claim such Property within 30 days of receipt of such 
notice, the Franchisee shall lose all rights with respect thereto and the Franchisor shall be 
free to dispose of such Property as it shall desire without incurring any liability;  
 
(b) in the event the Franchisee holds the right to occupy the Premises as lessee or otherwise in 
the first instance, the Franchisor shall (if same has not previously been done) have the option, 
such option to be exercised in writing delivered to the Franchisee within 21 days of the date of 
the termination of this agreement (for the purposes of this clause, the said 21 day period to be 
referred to as the "Option Period"), to require the Franchisee to assign its interest in the Lease to 
the Franchisor or as the Franchisor may in writing direct. If the Franchisor does exercise its said 
option, the Franchisee shall execute and deliver such forms of assignment as the Franchisor may 
require, and unless the Franchisee has already vacated the Premises as provided hereinafter, the 
Franchisee shall vacate the Premises, within 3 days of the date that the Franchisor delivers its 
said notice. Subject to the decisions of the Franchisor as to whether or not it will exercise its 
option to have the Lease assigned to it as provided above and its option to purchase all or any 
portion of the Property pursuant to the provisions of clause 13.2, the Franchisee shall not remove 
any Property from the Premises, other than for the sale of those Products usually sold to the 
public in the ordinary course of the Business;  
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(c) in the event the Franchisor does not exercise its option to have the Lease assigned to it and 
the Franchisee remains in possession of the Premises, the Franchisee shall make such changes 
and modifications in the physical appearance and structure of the Premises (including the 
removal of all signs and other distinctive replica of the F9 System and the Trademark) so that 
there will be no similarities to the design, physical appearance or structure of other locations of 
the Franchisor or of locations of other franchisees of the Franchisor using the F9 System, and/or 
such other changes or modifications as the Franchisor may in its discretion otherwise require. If 
the Franchisee shall fail to make changes and modifications as required herein, then the 
Franchisee grants the Franchisor an irrevocable licence to enter the Premises and to make such 
changes and modifications at the Franchisee's sole cost, which said cost the Franchisee shall pay 
to the Franchisor forthwith upon demand;  
 
(d) notwithstanding anything otherwise contained above, and without limiting any rights or 
remedies to which the Franchisor may be entitled as a result of such termination, the Franchisor, 
without prior notice, may, but shall not be obligated to, enter upon and occupy the Premises and 
use all or any part of the Premises, Equipment, Leasehold Improvements or other assets located 
thereon and used in connection with the Business entirely free of charge. Upon any such entry 
by the Franchisor, the Franchisee shall leave the Premises forthwith and the Franchisor shall not 
be liable for trespass or any other tort or for any damages arising therefrom. The Franchisor shall 
have the right to remain in possession and operate the Business for the Option Period and if the 
Franchisor exercises its options, to have the Lease assigned to it as provided above and to 
purchase the Property as referred to in clause 13.2, for the period following the Option Period up 
until the Franchisor completes the purchase (the "Closing Period"). During the Option Period 
and if such is the case, the Closing Period, the Franchisor shall operate the Business for its own 
account and it shall be entitled to receive all monies, profits or other benefits from such efforts, 
and it shall pay all debts or other liabilities which may be incurred during such periods. Further, 
and notwithstanding the foregoing, the Franchisor shall have the right in its sole discretion to 
payout of any amounts so received by it, the claims of any creditors of the Franchisee in respect 
of the Business, and the Franchisee shall be responsible to repay to the Franchisor, immediately 
upon demand therefor, the amount of any such payments. The Franchisor shall have no 
obligation to retain any employees of the Franchisee nor honour any other contractual 
obligations of the Franchisee in respect of the Business. The responsibility for any payments to 
or for the benefit of any employees so retained by the Franchisor shall arise only upon the 
Franchisor's commencing to operate the Business, and all obligations (including unpaid salary, 
vacation pay and other employment benefits) owing to such employees prior thereto or to any 
employees not so retained shall be the sole responsibility of the Franchisee. The occupation by 
the Franchisor of the Premises shall not be construed in any way to be an assignment or 
reassignment or subletting or re-subletting of the Premises and the Franchisor's only 
responsibility with respect thereto shall be to pay any rent which may be owing once the 
Franchisor enters and occupies the Premises. All rent and other amounts owing prior thereto 
shall continue to be the responsibility of the Franchisee.  
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Termination by the Regional Franchisor  
 
12.5 If the Franchisee fails to perform any of its obligations under this Agreement the 
Regional Franchisor may serve a notice of demand setting out the alleged breaches and the 
action required to be undertaken by the Franchisee to rectify such breach. 
 
12.6 Where the Regional Franchisor has served a notice pursuant to Clause 12.5 above, the 
Regional Franchisor may terminate this Agreement if at the expiration of twenty-eight (28) days 
from the date the notice is served, the Franchisee has not totally rectified such breach in 
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accordance with the notice to the satisfaction of the Regional Franchisor. 
 
Termination without notice 
 
12.7 The Regional Franchisor may terminate this Agreement immediately upon the occurrence 
of any of the following: 
- If the Franchisee commits an act of Bankruptcy within the meaning of the law in the 
jurisdiction in which the Franchise Business operates, 
- If the Franchisee fails to contest within the requisite time for service, any petition in 
bankruptcy or application for winding up; 
- if the Franchisee fails to contest or satisfy within fourteen (14) days of service any execution, 
levy or distress against the assets of the Franchisee; 
- if the Franchisee fails to contest and have removed within fourteen (14) days of appointment, a 
receiver, and manager or other custodian of the Franchise or any part of the Franchisee's assets; 
- if the Franchisee makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or makes any composition or 
arrangement with creditors other than with the consent of the Regional Franchisor; 
- if the Franchisee purports to assign, charge or encumber the Franchise other than pursuant to 
this Agreement; 
- if the Franchisee operates the Franchise so that the safety or property of any person, including 
the Franchisee, is in the reasonable opinion of the Regional Franchisor endangered or 
threatened; 
- if the Franchisee voluntarily abandons the franchise or the franchise relationship resulting in 
failure to actively conduct the Franchise Business. 
- If trade or other licences required by law have been revoked, cancelled or otherwise suspended. 
- if the Franchisee fails to commence operating the Franchise within twenty-eight (28) days of 
the execution of this Agreement;  
- If the Franchisee provides any report, financial statement or other material required by this 
Agreement which is misleading unless the Franchisee demonstrates that this was the result of 
inadvertent error; 
- if the Franchisee sells or offers for sale any unauthorised goods or unauthorised Services to any 
client of the Business, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld; 
- if the Franchisee breaches any law, ordinance, rule or regulation in connection with the 
operation of the Franchise (whether directly or indirectly) and: 
i) does not refrain from continuing to breach those laws ordinances or regulations, or 
ii) fails to rectify the breach; 
 within seven (7) days of being notified by the Regional Franchisor or by the responsible 
authority of that violation; 
iii) if the Franchisee submits any information or material to the Regional Franchisor before or 
during the Term which the Regional Franchisor reasonably believes to be untrue or misleading 
or deceptive;  
where the Franchisee is in default of a business loan obtained with the assistance of the Regional 
Franchisor for the purposes of establishment of the Franchise Business and has failed to rectify 
that default; 
- if the Franchisee and/or any officers of the Franchisee is convicted of any offence which is 
reasonably likely to adversely affect the System, or the National Franchisor's Intellectual 
Property(including any goodwill attached thereto). 
- if the Franchise or a director, shareholder, principal or partner, as the case may be, breaches 
any covenant against competition or any covenant against misuse of confidential information;  
- if the Franchisee misuses or permits the misuse of the National Franchisor's Intellectual 
Property or does any act or permits the doing of any act which harms the goodwill and 
reputation attached to the Intellectual Property, and the Franchisee fails to remedy the default 
within twenty four (24) hours of notice from the Franchisors;  
execution of any legal process is levied upon the Franchisee or its property and such legal 
process is not stayed or satisfied within seven (7) days;  
any person entitled to exercise any form of security over the assets of the Franchisee exercises 
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such security; or 
- if the Franchisee is unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due. 
- The Franchisee has received more than six (6) complaints in six (6) months on three (3) 
separate occasions during the term of this Agreement. 
- The Franchisee does not have the required insurance cover as described in Clause 7.55. 
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Termination of Territory rights:   If the Franchisee declines to take new leads from the Territory 
for forty days or more in any sixty-day period, unless this is for clearly temporary reasons such 
as illness or accident, their right of first refusal may be terminated on 28 days’ notice. Notice 
will be withdrawn if the Franchisee offers for sale no less than half their territory for 25% of the 
Initial Franchise Fee as advertised for a new franchise in the Region.  
 
Conditions of termination of Work Availability Guarantee:  Work Availability may be 
terminated if any of the following conditions apply. 
- This Franchisee has refused work outside Territory on at least four days in a week (excluding 
illness or injury), eight times, or is employing someone at least 20 hours per week.  
- In any six month period, the proportion of Client Leads resulting in work done is less than 60% 
of the Service Success Ratio (Item 9 of the Schedule). In other words, the Franchisee is well 
below average in converting leads to jobs, which usually reflects poor customer service. 
- The territory has been changed, at the request of the Franchisee 
- A misleading statement has been made as to clients given free services, unless inadvertently 
- (Mowing only), a Franchisee has Regular Clients which, if done once, would earn 1.75 times 
the Work Availability Guarantee.  
 
Termination by the Franchisor with notice  
The Franchisor may serve a notice of demand setting out a breach by the Franchisee of this 
Agreement, including but not limited to: 
- Failing to actively conduct the business. 
- Failing to pay money owed, whether to the Franchisor or any other entity 
- Lacking the required insurance cover  
- Lacking trade or other licences required by law. 
- Receiving more than six complaints in six months on three separate occasions  
 
If not rectified within 28 days, the Franchise may be terminated. If before the expiry of this 28 
days, the Franchisee agrees to sell the Franchise at a fair market price, the Franchisor will do 
their best to arrange this rather than terminate. The Franchisor may require that the Franchise is 
caretaker until a sale can be made, in which case no ongoing fees need be paid.  
 
Termination by the Franchisor without notice 
The Franchisor may terminate this Agreement immediately if the Franchisee: 
loses financial control of their business (such as through bankruptcy or having a receiver 
appointed). 
is convicted of a criminal offence, or of any breach of law or regulations relating to the business.  
acts so that, in the reasonable opinion of the Franchisor, the safety or property of any person is 
endangered (including the Franchisee). 
 
Provides written information that is misleading, unless inadvertently. 
Acts in a way that would bring the company into disrepute. Examples include failure to fix client 
complaints promptly and courteously as directed by the Franchisor, public drunkenness, and 
repeated incidents of foul language or aggressive behaviour. 
 
Effect of termination 
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Upon termination the Franchisee must: 
- cease to provide Services to Clients, or to any person within twenty km of the Territory for two 
years. If it continues to provide Services, the Franchisee must pay to the Franchisor the full 
amount of fees that would be payable had the Contract continued to operate until the date the 
Franchisee ceases to provide the Services. 
- cease to hold itself out as a Franchisee, or display any sign of the trade mark and signage used 
in the business. This will normally involve a total re-spray of the trailer and/or work vehicle, if 
retained.   
- transfer to the Franchisor any phones or phone numbers used in the Business; 
- return all copies of the Manual, proprietary computer programs, etc. 
- pay any money owed to business creditors, including the Franchisor 
- provide a complete list of Regular Clients (if any) 
 
Option to purchase the assets of the Franchise 
Within thirty days of termination, the Franchisor may choose to purchase the trailer and/or 
equipment for its original purchase price minus 20% per annum depreciation. 
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37 Termination 
 
37.1 Special Circumstances – if the Coach: 
 
 (a) No Licence – no longer holds a licence that the Coach must hold to carry on the 
Business; 
 (b) Company Liquidation – being a company: 
  (i) is placed under official management; 
  (ii) enters into an arrangement with its creditors (except for the purposes of 
reconstruction or amalgamation); 
  (iii) has receivers or receivers and managers appointed to any of its assets; or 
  (iv) is wound up either compulsorily or voluntarily; 
 (c) Arrangement or Composition – being a natural person: - 
  (i) commits an act of bankruptcy; 
  (ii) makes an arrangement with his creditors or others; 
 (d) Abandons Business – voluntarily abandons the Business or Franchise relationship; 
 (e) Serious Offence – is convicted of a serious offence as defined in the Code; 
 (f) Endangers Public – operates the Business in a way that endangers public health or 
safety; 
 (g) Fraud – is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business; or 
 (h) Agreement to Terminate – agrees to the termination of this Agreement, then 
Franchisor may, in addition to other rights and remedies conferred on it at law or in equity: - 
  (i) sue the Coach for money due and payable under this Agreement; and/or: 
  (ii) sue the Coach for damages for breach of contract; and/or 
  (iii) sue the Coach for specific performance of the contract; and/or 
  (iv) terminate this Agreement and sue the Coach for damages for breach of 
contract in which case its obligations to the Coach will cease at the date of termination; 
 but Franchisor will not exercise its rights under clause 37.1 if this Agreement is 
terminated under clause 37.1(h). 
 
37.2 Breach – If the Coach breaches a term of this Franchise Agreement, then Franchisor 
must: - 
 (a) give the Coach reasonable notice that Franchisor proposes to terminate this 
Agreement because of the breach; 
 (b) tell the Coach what Franchisor requires to be done to remedy the breach; and 
 (c) allow the Coach a reasonable time to remedy the breach; 
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 but if the Coach does not remedy the breach within that time then Franchisor may 
exercise its rights as set out in Clause 37.1 
 
38 Termination by franchisee 
 
38.1 If Franchisor breaches any of its substantial obligations under this Agreement and fails to 
remedy the breach after receiving a notice specifying the breach from the Coach, the Coach may 
by notice terminate this Agreement and this Agreement will be deemed terminated from the date 
of that notice. Before the Coach can terminate this Agreement the Coach must with clause 37.2 
Mutalis Mutandis. 
 
39 Action upon termination 
 
39.1 Action Upon Termination – If this Agreement ends for any reason the Coach must : - 
 (a) cease to enjoy all rights and privileges granted to it by Franchisor; 
 ... 
 (g) cease to carry on the business; 
 (h) not at any future time in any manner or for any purpose directly or indirectly use any of the 
Intellectual Property, procedures, techniques or materials acquired by the Coach under this 
Agreement; 
 (i) not be entitled to any payment for goodwill 
 ... 
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11 TERMINATION  
 
11.1 By Franchisee  
  
11.1.1  The Franchisee may terminate by written notice to the Franchisor within 90 days 
after the earlier of:  
  11.1.1.1  entering into the agreement; or  
11.1.1.2 paying any money under the agreement.  
  
11.1.2  On termination under clause 11.1.1, the Franchisor must repay to the Franchisee 
all moneys paid under the agreement less the Franchisor's reasonable expenses in respect of:  
  11.1.2.1  education and training costs;  
11.1.2.2 advertising costs;  
11.1.2.3 legal costs;  
11.1.2.4 employee deployment in respect of the Franchisee; and 11.1.2.5 out of pocket expenses, 
breaches a material term of this agreement and fails to correct such breach  
within 30 days after receiving a dispute notice from the Franchisee describing such breach, sent 
by security post , the Franchisee may terminate this agreement effective 30 days after delivery 
by security post to the Franchisor of a written notice of termination with the parties hereby 
agreeing that the amount to cover the Franchisor's expenses will be a maximum of 25% of the 
Licence Fee.  
 
11.1.3  This clause does not apply where the Franchisee has purchased the Business or has 
operated the Business under a previous agreement. 
 
 
11.2 By Franchisee for Breach  
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11.2.1  If the Franchisee is in compliance with this agreement and the Franchisor breaches a 
material term of this agreement and fails to correct such breach within 30 days after  
receiving a dispute notice from the Franchisee describing such breach, sent by security post, the 
Franchisee may terminate this agreement effective 30 days after delivery by security post to the 
Franchisor of a written notice of termination.  
 
 
11.3 By Franchisor for Breach in Special Circumstances  
 
 11.3.1  If the Franchisee:  
 
no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to carry on the Business; becomes 
bankrupt or insolvent under administration; voluntarily abandons the Business  or the licence 
relationship; is convicted of a Serious Offence; operates the Business in a way that endangers 
public health or safety; is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business; agrees to 
termination of this agreement; or does or permits any act that would entitle the Franchisor to 
terminate this agreement and the licence without providing the Franchisee with a notice to 
remedy . 
 
THEN the Franchisor may, without providing any notice to remedy to the Franchisee, 
immediately terminate this agreement and the licence by written notice to the Franchisee. 
Termination does not affect the Franchisor's existing or other rights.  
 
 
11.4   By Franchisor for Breach  
 
11.4.1 If: 
 
11.4.1.1 the Franchisor reasonably determines during, or on the completion of any training 
programme, that the Franchisee or the Nominated Operator has not satisfactorily completed the 
training programme; 
 
11.4.1.2 there is any breach by the Franchisee of any agreement between the Franchisee and the 
Franchisor or an associate or related body corporate of the Franchisor;  
 
11.4.1.3 there is any breach by the Franchisee of any agreement which relates to or is concerned 
with the Business;  
 
11.4.1.4 during a continuous period of three (3) calendar months or more, the Franchisee 
is not accredited to sell any of the Products or Services;  
 
11.4.1.5 the Franchisee, being a company: 
 
11.4.1.5.1  has a receiver or receiver and manager of any of its assets appointed;  
 
11.4.1.5.2  has a mortgagee or an agent appointed by a mortgagee enter into possession of its 
assets; or  
 
11.4.1.5.3  commits an act of bankruptcy or has its property seized under any distress or 
execution;  
 
 11.4.1.6  subject to clause 10.5; the Franchisee or the Nominated Operator becomes 
incapable of or unable or unwilling to conduct or manage the Business or is absent from the 
Business without the written approval of the Franchisor for any cause for a period in excess of 
28 days;  
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11.4.1.7          subject to clause 10.5, the Franchisee or the Nominated Operator dies or is 
incapable of satisfactorily performing its obligations under this agreement;  
 
11.4.1.8  the Franchisee makes any material misrepresentations in the course of or relating 
to the acquisition of the Business or engages in conduct which reflects unfavourably in a 
material way on the operation of the licence or the reputation of the "  " System;  
 
11.4.1.9  the Franchisee of or the Nominated Operator is convicted of any criminal offence 
involving dishonesty or engages in conduct which reflects unfavourable in a material way on the 
operation of the licence or the reputation of the  "  " System;  
 
11.4.1.10  the Franchisee damages the name or reputation of the Franchisor, the Franchisor's 
subsidiaries or the "  " System;  
 
11.4.1.11  the Franchisee breaches any other obligation under this agreement;  
 
11.4.1.12  the Franchisee loses its right to occupy the Premises other than as a direct result 
of any act or omission of the Franchisor which comprises a breach of the  
Franchisor's lease of the Premises;  
 
11.4.1.13  the Franchisee breaches any of its obligations under any finance arrangement 
relating to the acquisition of the Business or this agreement; THEN  
 
   11.4.2  The Franchisor will:  
 
11.4.2.1  give the Franchisee reasonable notice that the Franchisor proposes to terminate this 
agreement because of the breach;  
 
11.4.2.2  tell the Franchisee what the Franchisor requires to be done to remedy the breach; and  
 
   11.4.2.3 allow the Franchisee a reasonable time to remedy the breach. 
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S. 11: Termination Before End of the Period: 
 
S. 11.1: Without prejudice to any other remedy F13 may have against you, if any of the events 
set out in clause 11.2 occur, F13 may terminate this agreement immediately without giving 
notice to you. 
 
S. 11.2: The events referred to in 11.1 are if you, or one of your directors: 
  (a) becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or an externally administered body 
corporate; 
  (b) are convicted of an indictable offence; 
  (c) are fraudulent in connection with the franchised operation; 
  (d) voluntarily abandon the franchised operation or the franchised relationship. If you lose the 
right to occupy the location or otherwise to operate the franchised operation for at least 3 
consecutive days without notifying F13, you shall be deemed to have abandoned the franchised 
operation for the purposes of this clause; 
  (e) cease to hold any licence, registration or authority required by this agreement; 
  (f) operate the franchised operation in a way that endangers public health or safety; or 
  (g) take, or omit to take, any action which is at the time listed in the Code as a ground for 
immediate termination of a franchise agreement. 
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S. 11.3: F13 may terminate this agreement where:- 
  (a) you have breached a provision of this agreement; and 
  (b) F13 has given written notice of:- 
    (i) the breach; and 
    (ii) F13’ proposal to terminate the agreement as a result of a breach unless it is rectified within 
a reasonable period; 
    (iii) the action required by F13 to rectify the breach; and 
    (iv) the reasonable period (not more than 30 days) in which you have to rectify the breach; 
and 
  (c) you fail to rectify the breach within the reasonable period. 
 
S. 11.4: If you breach a provision of this agreement on more than two occasions in any 12 month 
period and you have in each case received written notice of breach under this agreement, the 
reasonable period of notice required by this agreement and the Code for any subsequent breach 
of the same or similar provision is 2 business days. 
 
S. 11.5: If F13 determines on reasonable grounds that any breach of this agreement has been 
deliberate and calculated to cause damage to F13, the parties agree to accept that the reasonable 
period of notice required under this agreement and the Code is seven (7) days or such shorter 
period as F13 determines necessary to avoid F13 suffering loss or damage. 
 
S 11.6: F13 may terminate this agreement by written notice effectively immediately if:- 
  (a) the breach is incapable of being remedied and F13 has suffered or is likely to suffer 
substantial loss or damage; 
  (b) you act in a manner which would permit immediate termination at law. 
 
 
F14 
 
Termination by us 
 
53. If you: 
(a) no longer hold any licence or authority that you may require to carry on the Business 
or your right to occupy the Business Premises is terminated; 
 
(b) enter into any form of insolvency administration, such as voluntary administration, 
receivership, liquidation, bankruptcy or any arrangement under Parts IX or X of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1966 (Cth); 
 
(c) voluntarily abandon the Business or the franchise relationship between you and us; 
 
(d) are convicted of a serious offence (namely, any offence which you would be liable, 
on first conviction, to imprisonment for a period of not less than 5 years); 
 
(e) operate the Business in a way that endangers public health or safety; 
 
(f) are fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business; 
 
(g) agree to termination of this Agreement, 
 
we may at our option immediately terminate this Agreement by giving you written 
notice to that effect. 
 
54 If you breach any other term of this Agreement (being a term not referred to in the 
preceding clause) and: 
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(a) we have given you written notice specifying the breach, informing you what you must do to 
remedy the breach and stating that if you do not remedy the breach within the time specified in 
the notice we will terminate this Agreement; and  
 
(b) you do not remedy the breach within the time specified in the notice, we may at our option 
immediately terminate this Agreement by giving you written notice to that effect.  
 
The time to remedy the breach that we will specify in any notice given under subclause 
(a) will be reasonable, but will not in any event exceed 30 days. 
 
Rights and obligations of the parties on termination 
55. Upon termination of this Agreement for any reason whatsoever: 
Your obligations 
(a) you and the Guarantors must: 
 
(1) Immediately vacate the Business Premises (leaving them in the same condition as that on the 
date you commenced trading from the Business Premises after allowing for fair wear and tear) 
and leave all fixtures, fittings, plant and equipment used by you in running the Business in the 
Business Premises; 
(2) Immediately deliver to us all keys to the Business Premises;  
(3) Immediately cease using any signs, stationery or other material which may give the public 
the impression that you remain or are in any way connected with us;  
(4) Immediately return to us the original and any copies of the Manual, recipe books, 
newsletters, or any other written material produced by us; 
(5) Immediately cancel the registration of the Business Name; 
(6) Immediately cease using our Trademarks and Intellectual Property; 
(7) Immediately pay to us all money which you owe us; 
(8) Compensate us for the reasonable costs we incur in reinstating the Business Premises to the 
same condition as that on the date you commenced trading from the Business Premises after 
allowing for fair wear and tear; 
(9) Sell to us such of your fixtures, fittings, plant and equipment used in connection with the 
Business that are not already owned by us and as we choose if we exercise our option to 
purchase contained in clause 55(b);  
(10) Comply with clause 27 of this Agreement. 
 
F15 
 
11 .1  Events of Default and Termination. 
 
 11.1 (A) In circumstances where Clause 23 of the Code does not apply the Franchisee 
shall commit an Event of Default where:  
 
 (a)  the Franchisee fails to pay any sum of money due under this Agreement by it to 
the Franchisor within seven (7) days from the due date of payment; 
(b)  the Franchisee being a natural person becomes of unsound mind or infirm;  
(c)  the Franchisee or any of the Guarantors shall have its property seized under any 
distress or execution or makes an arrangement with or assignment for the benefit of its creditors 
or becomes bankrupt or (being a company) is the subject of any winding up proceedings or 
makes any arrangements or composition with its creditors; 
(d) the Franchisee or any of the Guarantors is convicted of any criminal offence; 
(e)  the Franchisee (being a corporation) has a receiver or a receiver and manager 
appointed over the whole or any part of its property or undertaking or has an administrator, 
official manager or other controller appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Corporations 
Law or any legislation or companies ordinance dealing with or regulating the incorporation, 
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operation and affairs of companies in Australia or the state or Territory in which the Franchisee 
was incorporated; 
(f)  the Franchisee being a partnership:  
(i)  changes its membership without the prior written approval of the Franchisor; or 
(ii)  is terminated or dissolved; 
(g)  the Franchisor serves upon the Franchisee pursuant to Sub-Clause 11 .1 (A) (t), two or 
more written notices for a breach of the covenants and conditions contained in and on the part of 
the Franchisee to be observed and performed under this Agreement notwithstanding that any 
breach is capable of being or has been or is being remedied;  
(h)  the Franchisee is a corporation and control of the Franchisee by the Shareholders who are 
Shareholders at the date of this Agreement is passed by them to other persons or corporations 
without the consent in writing of the Franchisor;  
(i) the Franchisee breaches any other agreement it has entered into with the Franchisor or the 
terms of the Sub-Lease it has entered into with the Leasing Company or, pursuant to Subclause 
12.7(a) (vii), generally fails to pay its debts to the Franchisor, or any suppliers or fails to pay 
monies payable under the terms of any Sub-Lease as they become due;  
(j) the Franchisee is a party to the doing of any act matter or thing, which is either without 
the consent of the Franchisor or not allowed by the terms of the Agreement, whereby any of the 
Intellectual Property used in connection with the System, including but without limitation the 
Franchised Operation, may be prejudicially affected; 
(k)  the Franchisee declares or purports to declare that it holds the Franchise or the Franchised 
Operation upon trust for another person other than on behalf of a trust approved by the 
Franchisor, in existence at the date of this Agreement or where the trust is or is not disclosed to 
the Franchisor and the consent in writing by the Franchisor is not granted to that trust; 
(I)  the Franchisee sells any unauthorised products or supplies or uses any 
unapproved equipment, fittings or fixtures in the operation of the Franchised Operation; 
 (m)  the Franchisee fails to submit when due, any 
report required by the Franchisor whether pursuant to this Agreement or otherwise;  
(n) the Franchisee wilfully or fraudulently misrepresents any fact, condition or report 
required to be made by this Agreement; 
(o) the Franchisee for a reason other than clerical error, understates the Gross Sales for any 
Accounting Week by more than two percent (2%) or by reason of clerical error or otherwise, 
understates the Gross Sales for any Accounting Week by more than two percent (2%) on more 
than two (2) occasions in any twelve (12) month period; 
(p)  the Franchisee, without the prior written consent of the Franchisor, obtains or 
seeks to obtain a licence to operate a business similar to or in competition with the F15 Shop; 
(q)  the Franchisee without the prior written consent of the Franchisor, gives any security 
interest in any equipment, goods or chattels of the Franchised Operation or sells any of such 
goods or chattels except in the normal course of business, such that the foregoing materially 
impairs the Franchised Operation or the rights of the Franchisor to acquire them upon the 
termination or expiration of this Agreement. 
(r)  the Franchisee is a company, it grants a charge over its Assets without first obtaining the 
Franchisor's consent; 
(s)  the Franchisee admits in writing its inability to pay debts generally as they 
become due; 
(t)  if and whenever there shall be a breach or non-observance or non-performance of any of 
the covenants and conditions herein contained on the part of the Franchisee to be observed and 
performed and such breach continues for fourteen (14) days after service of a notice in writing 
on the Franchisee requiring it to remedy same providing that the Franchisor advises the 
Franchisee what the Franchisor requires to be done to remedy the breach; 
(u)  if the Franchisee is unable, to the absolute satisfaction of the Franchisor, or 
unwilling to complete the Initial Training in accordance with this Agreement; 
 (v) in the event that the Franchisee acts in the capacity as the trustee of any Trust, 
upon the occurrence of any of the additional grounds of termination stipulated in Clause 15(e); 
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(w)  if the Franchisee or the Guarantor undertakes any act that prejudices or damages 
the image of the System or the Franchised Operation.  
 
11.2 (A)  Grounds for Termination by Franchisee. The Franchisee may terminate this 
Agreement if:  
(a)  the Franchisee is in substantial compliance with this Agreement; and 
(b) the Franchisor breaches a material term of this Agreement and fails to correct that breach 
within fourteen (14) days after written notice, sent by security post or courier describing such 
breach is delivered to it. 
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Termination requirements are listed in Part 14. 
 
The Franchisor is entitled to terminate by thirty (30) days notice if the franchisee (14.1) 
• fails to perform any obligation imposed by this agreement 
• fails to meet the requirements of the Development Schedule 
• attempts or purports to make an assignment 
• is not contactable for a continuous period of ten (10) days 
• commits a breach 
• misuses, makes or allows any authorised use of the Marks or impairs the goodwill 
associated with the Marks 
• engages in any business under a name or mark that is confusingly similar to the Marks 
• no longer has the ability to property service sub-franchisees 
• has been made three (3) or more unacceptable conduct of a serious nature with a 
complaint being made 
• commits wilful and repeated deception 
• has been written notice, three times within any period of three (3) consecutive months in 
regard to an essential term 
The Franchisor is entitled to make an immediate termination by giving written notice of 
termination to the Franchisee, following the occurrence of all or any of the following (14.2) 
• Franchisee being convicted of a serious offence that is substantially related to the 
Business which is reasonably likely to adversely affect the System, the Marks or the 
goodwill 
• Franchisee being convicted of any serious offence that is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment 
• Franchisee ceases to carry on or voluntarily abandons its business or a substantial part 
• Franchisee is fraudulent in connection with operation of the Franchised business 
• Franchisee no longer holds a licence that the Franchisee must hold to carry on the 
business 
• Franchisee operates the business in a way that endangers public health or safety 
• Franchisee agrees to termination of the Franchisee agreement 
The Franchise agreement will immediately terminate upon the occurrence of any of the 
following events without the necessity of a notice (14.3) 
• Franchisee (being a corporation) being in a winding-up 
• Franchisee (being an individual) commits an act of bankruptcy 
• Franchisee is dissolved 
• An appointment of a receiver 
• Execution of a final judgment not stayed or satisfied within seven days 
• The Regional Master Franchisee is or states that is unable to pay its debts when they fall 
due 
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14.4 If the Franchise has been given written notice by the Franchisor under 14.1 three times 
within any period of three (3) consecutive months and in each of such case the Franchisee has 
complied with the notice and duly remedied the default, then, upon the happening of any event 
specified in Part 14.1 within a three (3) month period commencing upon the date upon which the 
last of the said notice was complied with, the Franchisor may by thirty (3) days written notice to 
the Master Franchisee terminate this and any related agreement and the Sub-licence forthwith. 
 
14.6 Effect of termination: Upon surrender, termination or expiration of this agreement, the 
Franchisee shall immediately cease to operate as the Franchisee, and the Franchisee shall  
have no right to licence any person to establish or operate any Franchise area for which a 
Franchise Agreement has not been executed by the Franchisee at the time of termination. 
 
14.7 Legal Costs: In the event of any default by the Franchisee whether or not such default 
gives rise to termination of this agreement, the Franchisor shall be entitled to recover  
from the Franchisee reasonable legal fees, costs and expenses on a solicitor and client 
basis incurred by the Franchisor as a result of such default. 
 
14.10.1 Option to Purchase: Upon expiration or termination of this agreement, the Franchisor 
may by written notice to the Franchisee, elect to purchase free from encumbrances any or 
all of the assets of the Business. 
 
F17 
 
26.7 It is a default, even if it is not in your or your associates' control if: you or your 
associates:  
• repudiate this agreement or any of the transaction documents;  
• breach an essential or fundamental term of this agreement or the transaction documents;  
• you or one or more of your associates or guarantors do not comply with this agreement, 
the transaction documents or any other agreement with us after having received 
reasonable notice in writing to remedy a default. We consider 14 days to be reasonable 
notice. We do not have to in any case allow more than 30 days reasonable notice to 
remedy a default:  
• you and/or your associates have in connection with your application for your franchise 
made any false or misleading misrepresentation to us or our associates with respect to a 
material particular;  
• you undertake a dealing eg the sale of your business restricted by this agreement without 
our consent and in a manner not permitted by this agreement;  
• without reasonable cause, you do not open and start running your business after 14 days 
written notice from us to start your business so long as the notice is not given before the 
start date;  
• for more than 30 days, you do not, without reasonable cause, give us any reports that you 
are required to give by this agreement after a written request by us for the relevant reports 
or documents;  
• you or your associates knowingly maintain false accounts and/or give to us reports that 
are false with respect to a material particular;  
• you or any of your associates:  
• hide sales or understate or falsify your turnover by more than 3% in any week during the 
franchise term, unless you or your associates prove to us that the understatement was due 
to an honest but  
• inadvertent error by you, your associates or your employees;  
• make or allow unauthorised disclosures or use of the manuals or the confidential 
information;  
• attachment, distress, execution, order, final judgment or other process of the crown, 
authorities or courts, is issued against, levied or enforced for $10,000 inclusive of GST or 
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more against you, your business or your assets and is not set aside or satisfied within 30 
days or more (unless an application, appeal or proceedings (proceedings) within that 
period have been started or made in good faith with a court or other body of appropriate 
jurisdiction to stay, set aside or appeal the relevant execution, judgment or other process 
and so long as the relevant proceedings are pursued diligently by or for you and so long 
as we are kept reasonably informed of the progress and outcome of the relevant 
proceedings and so long as we are given if we require and to no cost to us, copies of all 
relevant proceedings and supporting affidavits, documents, correspondence and material 
filed or used in those proceedings and so long as we are paid our reasonable legal costs in 
connection with those matters);  
• you give or allow to exist encumbrances (except permitted encumbrances) over this 
agreement, your store premises agreement, you, your business or your assets;  
• an insolvency happens to you or any guarantor except that in the case of the insolvency of 
a guarantor 30 days will be allowed for appropriate and reasonable arrangements to be 
made with us or our associates for the provision of a new or substitute guarantor 
reasonably suitable to us and our associates and for the signing and completion by that 
new or substitute guarantor of a guarantee and indemnity or other sufficient security 
satisfactory to us or our associates to secure the relevant obligations that are or were 
being secured by the guarantor to which the insolvency happened:  
• without our consent, which consent will not be unreasonably refused:  
• you stop being a subsidiary or a company stops being your subsidiary; you or a guarantor 
that is a company reduces its share capital;  
• a resolution is passed that makes your uncalled share capital unable to be called up except 
in your winding up;  
• there is a change in the ownership or control of you or your associates (as either a 
director, shareholder, unit holder or in the case of a trust, the trustee or the appointor) 
which leads to an effective change in the ownership or control of you or your associates:  
• a notice deregistering you or a guarantor is given under the Corporations Law and is not 
withdrawn or remedied within 30 days of getting it (unless an application or proceedings 
(proceedings) within that period have been started or made in good faith with a court or 
other body having appropriate jurisdiction for the reinstatement of the relevant company 
and so long as those proceedings are pursued diligently by persons having the necessary 
interest and so long as we are kept reasonably informed of the progress and outcome of 
the relevant proceedings and given as we require at no cost to us, copies of all relevant 
proceedings and supporting affidavits, documents. correspondence and material filed or 
used in those proceedings and so long as we are paid our reasonable legal costs in 
connection with those matters):  
• without our consent, a receiver, controller or administrator (as defined in the Corporations 
Law) is appointed or a secured creditor takes possession of you. your business. or a 
substantial, significant or material part of your assets or the assets of a guarantor;  
• you abandon or vacate the store or your business for more than 7 continuous days or you 
stop or suspend the operation of your business for more than 7 continuous days except 
due to a force majeure or except in a way allowed by this agreement or except on public 
holidays when your business is not required to be open and trading;  
• you allow your debts and accounts with your creditors to be overdue for more than 60 
days (unless the relevant debt or account is the subject of a genuine dispute made in good 
faith and so long as reasonable action is taken to resolve or have the dispute decided by a 
court or other body of appropriate jurisdiction by the parties to the dispute and so long as 
we are kept reasonably informed of the progress and outcome of the relevant dispute or of 
any proceedings taken to have the matter decided by a court or other body and so long as 
if we ask, we are  
• given at no cost to us, copies of all relevant proceedings and supporting affidavits, 
documents, correspondence and material relevant to the dispute or the proceedings and so 
long as we are paid our reasonable legal costs in connection with those matters;  
 460
• you breach a relevant or material law that affects you, your business or your employees 
and do not remedy the breach within 30 days after written notice from us, the crown, any 
authority or anyone else to do so;  
• you or any of your key associates commit a criminal offence the subject of a final 
conviction which conviction has not been overturned or stayed pending an appeal and 
that offence is punishable by a term of imprisonment for more than 1 year and the offence 
involves serious dishonesty or moral turpitude in connection with your business or the 
dealings of you or your associates;  
• one of your key associates or guarantors dies or is unable to run your business for any 
reason including because of severe or serious physical or mental disability and your 
business or the ownership interest of your key associates is not sold or dealt with under 
Part 35 (Death or disability);  
• you do not sign and return your store premises agreement and any documents in 
connection with it within 30 days after they are received by you or your lawyers for 
signing by you:  
• any superior store premises agreement expires or ends and as a result your store premises 
agreement expires or ends or for any other reason you lose your right to possession, use 
or occupation of the store and a further right to possession, use or occupation of the store 
cannot be reasonably obtained by or for you and you do not move your business to a new 
location within 2 km radius from the centre of the store approved by us or our associates, 
which consent will not be unreasonably refused.  
 
 
26.10 Ending of your franchise by you  
 
During the franchise term, you cannot end this agreement without our consent nor can you 
suspend payments of franchise fees or marketing levies, except if:  
• we go into official liquidation for more than 3 months (but not in the case of voluntary 
administration, deed of company arrangement, any court approved scheme of company 
arrangement or receivership)  
• we have not remedied a breach of an essential term of this agreement after 90 days written 
notice to us from you to remedy that breach so long as the notice to remedy sets out full and 
reasonable details of the grounds and details of the breach and the action required by us to 
remedy the breach.  
 
 
PART 27 EFFECT OF YOUR FRANCHISE EXPIRING OR ENDING  
 
27.1  Payments  
If this agreement expires or ends, you must pay within 14 days in the following order, all money 
owing to:  
• us and our associates in connection with this agreement and the transaction documents;  
• your unpaid creditors to whom payment has been guaranteed or secured by us or our 
associates;  
• your unpaid creditors in the way or order we tell you to.  
 
27.2  Other obligations  
if this agreement expires or ends for any reason, you and your associates must, if we require by 
written notice to you and/or your associates, in connection with you, your business or the store 
do the following:  
• suspend, wind down and end if and in the way we tell you or your associates the:  
• use and display of your business name, trade names, trade marks, F17 intellectual property 
including all such names, marks or items that are displayed on the store, fixtures, furniture, 
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chattels, signs or anything else used in connection with your business, the store, or vehicles 
used by you, your associates, your employees or contractors;  
• running of your business under the trade name, the system and the image;  
• use of the distinctive, characteristic or identifying features of the system, the image or a F17 
store;  
• use of any F17 food and beverage menus, marketing materials, uniforms, clothing, dress and  
• name tags used by you, your associates or your employees;  
• within 14 days return and deliver to us:  
o translated. authorised and unauthorised copies of all manuals in the control of you, 
your associates or your employees;  
o unused F17 food and beverage menus, serviettes, food or beverage brochures, 
forms, stationery (including weekly or monthly reports), business cards, letterheads, 
printed material, ticketing, F17 name tags, posters, packaging and carry bags and 
other items used in connection with your business or the store which display or 
contain the trade names, trade marks or that relate to the system or the image;  
o all current and old stock of F17 food and beverage menus;  
o unused stock control lists, vouchers, promotional leaflets, advertising and catalogue 
material and order books that display the trade names or trade marks or that relate to 
the system or the image;  
o all marketing materials, signs, banners and umbrellas that relate to the system, the 
image, the trade names or the trade marks;  
o all copies of all licenced software and databases kept by or for you and make sure 
that you deliver at least 1 uncorrupted and working copy of each of them;  
o all lists and records of names, addresses and other details of your customers and all 
application forms, records and databases connected to F17 VIP club members or 
customers;  
• within 14 days give us a report detailing your turnover to the last day of 
trading or such other date we reasonably state:  
• if we ask, you must sell us all your unused and remaining stock of paper 
goods, ticketing, posters, menus, promotional material and all other items 
containing the trade name or the trade marks at the lower of their cost or net 
realisable value;  
• cancel or transfer (as we require) all registrations in the name of you or your 
associates of the trade names, the trade marks or the phone services;  
• make sure that your registration as an owner or user of any trade name, 
business name or trade mark is removed from all Commonwealth, State or 
local. city or government registers anywhere in Australia:  
• fill in, sign and register with the ASIC or any other register or person we 
reasonably require documents needed to change your company and your 
business name to leave out the trade names or trade marks:  
• within 30 days to our reasonable satisfaction:  
o de-image and de-identify the store and make changes to the layout, 
appearance, get-up and decor to the inside or outside of the store, 
fixtures, furniture, chattels and signs, including the removal of signs 
connected with a F17 store so that all those items are all clearly and 
substantially different from the same or similar items that are or 
were used in the store or other F17 stores or that are part of the 
system or the image:  
o take down and remove from the inside and outside of the store, 
fixtures, furniture, chattels, signs connected with the store, the trade 
names, trade marks, the decor or other items that incorporate any 
distinctive characteristics or identifying features of a F17 store or 
that are part of the system or the image:  
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o make any changes to the designs, layout, appearance, get-up and 
decor of the store we require to clearly and effectively distinguish 
the store from the image used by any other F17 store in Australia:  
 
• within 30 days to our reasonable satisfaction alter, change or take down as we require:  
o any distinctive, characteristic or identifying lighting or signage used in connection with the 
store and that are or can be connected with a F17 store;  
o the paintings, prints, posters, logos that are or have been used in your business or that relate 
to the system or the image;  
o the service counter, furniture, tables and chairs used in the store and replace them with 
substantially different materials;  
o vacate the store and remove from the store the personal belongings of your associates or the 
guarantors which do not form part of your assets;  
 
27.3  If this agreement expires or ends for any reason, you and your associates must not try to 
claim that the benefit of any store premises agreements held by us or our associates, are held 
under any express or constructive trust for the benefit of you, your associates or anyone else.  
 
27.4  Our rights  
 
If this agreement expires or ends, we or our associates may at any time enter the store, without 
being liable for trespass, civil wrongs or a breach of other laws, to make sure you and your 
associates have complied with this agreement and the transaction documents and to make sure 
that changes to the store, fixtures, furniture, chattels, signs and other assets that are required to 
be made under this agreement have been or will be properly made.  
 
27.5  If for any reason this agreement expires or ends (and your franchise is not renewed or 
renewable). we or our associates may develop, open or own another F17 store or allow anyone 
else to develop open or own another F17 store near the current or any former site of the store or 
anywhere in the protected franchised area or the right of first refusal area, irrespective of any 
rights that have previously been given to you or your associates, even if those other F17 stores 
compete with you, your business, your former business or anyone else including any business 
run at any current or former site used by your former business.  
 
27.6 Acknowledgments  
You and your associates agree that after this agreement expires or ends:  
• "despite billing or other arrangements with any of the phone companies and 
despite you or your associates being a subscriber or user of the phone services, we or our 
nominee can take over and get a transfer of the phone services so that we or our nominee are or 
become the sole subscriber or user of those phone services; we may tell the phone companies 
how to direct or deal with calls to the phone services;  
• you and your associates must when we ask do everything and sign and give us all 
documents we or the phone companies may require to transfer to us or our nominee the phone 
services that are or have been used by you or your associates in connection with your business;  
• if we ask, you and your associates must suspend or end the use of the phone 
services in connection with your business;  
• if we ask, by 14 days written notice to you, you will do everything to make sure 
that for at least 2 years that:  
• calls and faxes to the phone services are redirected or diverted at our cost and in 
the manner we require;  
• a recorded message is placed on the phone services which informs the caller to 
call us or any other F17 store operator we may state.  
 
27.7  We may require transfer of your store premises agreement  
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If we ask in writing, you must on or after a default that entitles us to end this agreement, the 
expiry, end, surrender or non-renewal of this agreement for any reason and without requiring 
any money, compensation or premium do everything needed to fill in, sign and register all 
agreements or documents needed to transfer to us or our nominee your store premises 
agreements as soon as reasonably possible after our request for a transfer. You must use your 
best efforts to get the consents of all relevant lessors and mortgagees to the transfer of your store 
premises agreements to us or our nominee.  
 
27.8  Acknowledgments  
 
To the extent allowed by law, you and your associates agree that on the expiry, end, surrender or 
non-renewal of this agreement or any of the transaction documents for any reason:  
• neither you nor your associates will get money or compensation from us or our 
associates for goodwill or benefits connected with the system, the trade names, the trade marks 
or your business name;  
• any goodwill or benefits connected with the system, the trade names or the trade 
marks belong or revert to the relevant superior owner of the relevant part of the system, the trade 
names or the trade marks;  
• you and your associates waive and release all your and your associates' rights at 
law for compensation, indemnity, losses because this agreement or any of transaction documents 
expires, ends or is not renewed except for fraud or negligence by us.  
 
 
 
 F18 
 
2.3  The Franchise shall be subject to the following qualifications and restrictions 
 
…(f)  If F18 decides for whatever reason that it no longer wishes to continue with the franchise 
arrangements for the whole of the Network in the format contemplated by this Agreement (as 
opposed to not wishing to continue with the franchise agreements for the Franchise Owner or a 
small group of Franchise Owners), F18 will be entitled to terminate this Agreement by giving 
six months notice in writing to the Franchise Owner, but conditions in (i) and (ii) applies. 
 
2.5  F18 shall be entitled to refuse to grant the Franchise, or to terminate the Franchise if it has 
already been granted, by written notice effective immediately, if there has been any failure to 
comply with any of the foregoing pre-conditions. 
 
 
15 Termination 
 
15.1  F18 may terminate the Franchise by written notice effective immediately if either the 
Franchise Owner or any of the Principals: 
 
(a)  has any bankruptcy or other trustee, provisional liquidator, liquidator, administrator, 
receiver, receiver-manager, mortgagee, mortgagee's agent or other insolvency administrator or 
third party appointed over any assets or enters into any assignment, arrangement or composition 
concerning any creditors;  
 
(b)  is, or any Nominated Representative, director, officer, employee or agent of the Franchise 
Owner is, convicted of a criminal offence carrying a gaol term of six (6) months or more, or an 
offence involving fraud, deception, dishonesty or misleading conduct;  
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(c)  has any licence, accreditation or authority required by this Agreement cancelled, revoked, 
suspended or allowed to lapse;  
 
(d)  breaches any provision of this Agreement and, where the breach is capable of being 
remedied, fails to remedy the breach within thirty (30) days after F18 has given written notice of 
the breach to the Franchise Owner;  
 
e)  commits any breach of any of the Collateral Agreements which would entitle the relevant 
company within the F18 Group to terminate the agreement and, where the breach is capable of 
being remedied, fails to remedy the breach within the time period allowed by such agreement, or 
if any of the Collateral Agreements involving the Franchise Owner or the Nominated 
Representative is terminated; 
 
(f)  acts in a manner which requires F18 or any company within the F18 Group, pursuant to 
any law, regulation, or code of conduct or any instruction, direction, requirement or request 
made by any statutory, governmental, industry or regulatory body, to revoke any authority or 
licence to operate the Franchised Business or any other business activities granted to the 
Franchise Owner or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents, to sell or supply any of 
the Approved Products or the Approved Services, or to take any other disciplinary action against 
them; 
 
(g)  is required, or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents who are engaged in the 
selling of insurance or financial services products are required by any law, regulation, code of 
conduct or any instruction, direction, requirement or request made by any statutory, 
governmental, industry or regulatory body, to hold an authority or licence from a company 
within the F18 Group, and that company is prohibited by such law, regulation, code of conduct, 
standard or requirement to issue or to renew an authority or licence to any of such persons; 
 
(h)  fails, or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents fails to comply with any law, 
regulation, or code of conduct or any instruction, direction, requirement or request made by any 
statutory, governmental, industry or regulatory body, or fails to act in accordance with F18's 
specified standards of ethics and business practice; 
 
(i)  breaches any provision of this Agreement or any of the Collateral Agreements where the 
Franchise Owner has within the previous two years received two or more prior notices of breach 
and had been given the opportunity to remedy the breaches; or  
 
(j)  fails to achieve the Minimum Performance Criteria for any six month period, and fails to 
rectify the failure during the subsequent period of six months. 
 
15.2  F18 shall be entitled by written notice to the Franchise Owner to immediately suspend the 
Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative from carrying on the Franchised Business 
pending rectification of any breach where the Franchise Owner has been served with a notice of 
default pursuant to clause 15.1 (d) or referred to in clause 15.1 (e) and F18 believes that there is 
a risk that the Franchise Owner may prejudice the goodwill or reputation of the F18 System, the 
F18 Image or F18 or will not adhere to the F18 Standards during the period, or where the best 
interests of the Clients of the Franchise Owner make such action desirable. 
15.3  F18 shall be entitled by written notice effective immediately, in lieu of terminating the 
Franchise, to terminate the Franchise in respect of certain of the Approved Products and/or the 
Approved Services. The relevant company within the F18 Group shall then be entitled to 
terminate or vary the particular Distribution Agreement with the Franchise Owner and/or the 
Nominated Representative relating to such Approved Products and/or Approved Services. 
15.4  Whenever F18 is entitled to terminate the Franchise pursuant to Clause 15.1 (d), it may 
elect to accept compensation for the breach in lieu of termination, but F18 shall have the sole 
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and absolute discretion in determining whether or not to accept compensation, and in 
determining the amount of such compensation. 
15.5  In addition, as stated in clause 2.3(f) of this Agreement, if F18 decides for whatever 
reason that it no longer wishes to continue with the Franchise arrangements for the whole of the 
Network in the format contemplated by this Agreement (as opposed to not wishing to continue 
with the franchise agreements for the Franchise Owner or a smaller group of Franchise Owners) 
F18 will be entitled to terminate the Franchise by giving six months notice in writing to the 
Franchise Owner, but [subject to conditions stipulated by (a) to (d)] 
15.6  A Franchise Owner may terminate this Agreement by giving to F18 six months prior 
notice in writing. Upon such termination the provisions of clauses 16 and 18 of this Agreement 
shall apply. 
15.7  If the Franchise Owner is Branded and elects to terminate this Agreement under clause 
15.6 then on termination the Franchise Owner must pay to F18 an amount which bears the same 
proportion to the cost to F18 of the Branding as the length of the time from the date of 
termination of this Agreement until the end of the Term bears to the Term of this Agreement. 
 
16 Consequences of Termination 
 
    16.1 Where the Franchise expires or is terminated for any reason or by any event:-  
(a)  the Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative shall immediately upon 
termination or expiration of the Franchise or earlier sale of the Income Stream cease to operate 
the Franchised Business, cease to use the F18 Image, the F18 System, the Marks and Intellectual 
Property, and thereafter not directly or indirectly represent to the public or hold itself out as a 
Franchise Owner or representative of F18 or as being in any way associated with F18.  
 
(b)  the Franchise Owner and the Nominated Representative shall immediately upon 
termination or expiration of the Franchise or earlier sale of the Income Stream return to F18 all 
copies of the Manual, any computer software or hardware belonging to F18, any customer 
listings or other Confidential Information, all stationery, brochures, publications and other 
materials, and any other items belonging to any company within the F18 Group.  
 
(c)  F18 shall not be obliged to provide any support, services or benefits to the Franchise 
Owner as part of the Franchise. F18 shall however continue to provide the Franchise Owner 
with all usual product and commission information in relation to the Designated Contracts, and 
will not jeopardise the Franchise Owner's interest in the Designated Contracts and ability to 
service the Clients.  
 
(d)  F18 shall be entitled to cease to pay, and to notify other companies within the F18 Group 
to cease to pay, any commission, allowance or entitlement to the Franchise Owner or Nominated 
Representative as from the earlier of the settlement date for any sale to a third party pursuant to 
clauses 17, 18 and 19, the signing of a contract of sale with F18 pursuant to clause 17, 18 and 
19, or the expiration of two years from the date of termination of the Franchise.  
 
16.2  F18 shall continue after termination to fulfil its obligations under all of the Designated 
Contracts. If the Franchise Owner is not serving the Clients, F18 may service them and shall be 
entitled to retain from any commission allowances or other entitlements due to the Franchise 
Owner or the Nominated Representative any moneys owing to F18 including any unrecovered 
transitional allowance as described in Schedule F of the Distribution Agreement and any 
advances of commission allowances or entitlements together with a reasonable fee to cover the 
costs of servicing the Clients.  
 
16.3  Subject to 16.4, the Franchise Owner shall on termination be entitled to sell all or part of 
the Income Stream pertaining to the Franchise Owner's Designated Contracts strictly on the 
conditions and terms set out in clause 17.1 of this Agreement.  
 
 466
16.4  The Franchise Owner shall on giving F18 six months written notice of its intention to 
terminate this Agreement in accordance with clause 15.6 be entitled to sell all or part of the 
Income Stream pertaining to the Franchise Owner's Designated Contracts strictly on the 
conditions and terms set out in clause 18.1 of this Agreement.  
 
16.5  Unless the Franchise Owner is legally unable to continue to Service the Client pending 
sale of the Income Stream or final termination of this Agreement the Franchise Owner may to 
continue to do so.  
 
16.6  The Franchise Owner or the Nominated Representative shall be entitled, subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement, to continue to exclusively receive commissions in relation to the 
contracts which were Designated Contracts of the Franchise Owner or the Nominated 
Representative as at the date of termination for a period of two years from the date of 
termination.  
 
16.7  Where F18 has to provide services to the Designated Contracts of the Franchise Owner 
due to the failure or inability of the Franchise Owner to do so, F18 shall be entitled to retain 
from any commission, allowances or other entitlements due to the Franchise Owner or the 
Nominated Representative a reasonable fee to cover the costs of dealing with the Designated 
Contracts direct.  
 
16.8  Where in any circumstances F18 or any other Franchise Owner buys the Income Stream 
from the Franchise Owner the Franchise Owner covenants with F18 or such other Franchise 
Owner as a condition of such acquisition and as an agreed reasonable requirement to protect the 
goodwill in such Income Stream that the Franchise Owner, the Nominated Representative and 
all directors or shareholders of the Franchise Owner will not sell any insurance or financial 
product or service to any of the Franchise Owner's past or current Designated Contracts for a 
period of two years from the date of acquisition by F18 or any third party purchaser. It shall be a 
pre-condition of any sale contract that such a covenant be included.  
 
 
 
F19 
 
15. TERMINATION RIGHTS 
 
(a)  Either party may terminate this agreement by giving notice in writing to the other 
party if the other party breaches a term of this agreement and, if the breach is capable of being 
remedied, fails to remedy the breach within thirty days of receiving notice from the other party 
requiring them to remedy the breach.  
 (b)  The Company may terminate this agreement without cause by giving at least 6 
months notice in writing to the Member.  
 (c)  The Company may, by giving notice to the Member, immediately terminate this 
agreement and all other agreements and arrangements between the Company and the Member:  
(1)  if the Member no longer holds a registration or approval (whether temporarily or 
permanently) that the Member must hold to carry on the Business, including for example:  
 (i)  registration as a pharmacist under the Pharmacists Act;  
 (ii)  approval of the Location by the Pharmacy Board under the Pharmacists Act;  
 (2)  if the Member becomes bankrupt, insolvent under administration or an 
externally-administered body corporate;  
 (3)  if the Member voluntarily abandons the Location, the Business or the relationship 
under this agreement;  
 (4)  if the Member is convicted of a "serious offence" as defined in the Code;  
 (5)  if the Member operates the Business in a way that endangers public health or 
safety;  
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 (6)  if the Member is fraudulent in connection with the operation of the Business;  
 (7)  in the following circumstances to which the Member has agreed:  
(i)  if, in relation to the Member, an order is made for its winding up, a 
receiver, receiver and manager, official manager, trustee, administrator or similar official 
is appointed over any of its assets or undertaking, a provisional liquidator or liquidator or 
official manager is appointed, it is or is deemed by law to be unable to pay its debts, it 
becomes bankrupt or it makes any arrangement, compromise with its creditors or 
members or with any class of its creditors or members, it is dissolved or otherwise ceases 
to exist, it becomes incapable of performing its obligations under this agreement, or a 
principal is involved in anything that may damage the good name of the Retail Brand 
(including without limitation any criminal offence or unethical behaviour).  
(ii)  the Company serves 3 or more notices on the Member for breach of the 
same term of this agreement over any 12 month period, regardless of whether the 
Member rectifies each breach;  
(iii)  the Member breaches any conditions to which the approval of the 
Location under the Pharmacists Act is subject;  
(iv)  if the Member ceases to be a pharmacist for. any reason or is suspended 
from practising as a pharmacist for any reason;  
  (v)  if a mortgagee or its agent takes possession of all or part of the Member's 
assets or undertaking;  
(vi)  if the lease over the Location is terminated or possession of the Location 
is lost due to the act or default of the Member;  
(vii)  if the Member or its manager fails to operate or is absent from the 
Business for more than 2 weeks, without the Company's prior consent;  
(viii)  if the Member makes any material misrepresentations relating to the 
entering into of this agreement;  
(ix)  the Member:  
 
(a) on 2 or more occasions, fails to honour cheques presented for payment; or  
 
(b) on 4 or more occasions during any 12 month period, fails to pay any amount payable under 
this agreement when due (whether or not a formal demand is made);  
 
  (x)  the Member uses the Trade Marks other than as permitted under this Agreement;  
   (xi)  the Member fails to adopt and/or departs from the Program Guidelines;  
(xii)  the Member fails to obtain the Company's consent when required; or  
  (xiii)  if permitted under any other provisions of the Code; or  
(xiv)  if the Member acts in a manner which the Company, in its discretion, considers likely to 
bring the Company or the Retail Brand into disrepute.  
(d) A Member who is not a Healthy Member may terminate this agreement without 
cause by giving at least 6 months notice in writing to the Company.  
 
 
16. EFFECT OF TERMINATION 
 
(a)  Upon termination or expiration of this agreement, the Member will not be entitled to any 
payment from the Company in respect of the termination including without limitation any 
payment for goodwill and regardless of the length of the Term.  
(b)  Upon the termination of this agreement, the Member must:  
(1)  cease carrying on business under the name and style of the Retail Brand including 
without limitation ceasing to use the Business Name, the Trade Marks and any other Retail 
Brand identifiers;  
(2)  take immediate steps to cancel the registration of the Business Name, and change the 
name, style and identification of the premises where the Business is conducted and remove and 
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destroy all distinctive signs, colour schemes and other features associated with the Retail Brand 
so that the premises no longer resemble or are identified as the Retail Brand; and  
(3)  return to the Company the Program Guidelines and any manuals, point of sale, 
promotional, or other materials provided by the Company to the Member including without 
limitation pelmets and soffits, Retail Brand signage for soffits and gondola caps, information 
systems Retail Brand prescription signage, external signage, internal hanging department signs, 
A-frame signs, uniforms and stationery, provided that the Company shall reimburse to the 
Member the cost of such materials, less a depreciation at a rate advised by the Company from 
time to time and any appropriate deductions for loss, damage, wear and tear.  
(c)  In consideration of the right to use the word(s) of the Retail Brand in the Business Name, 
the Member hereby irrevocably appoints each director and secretary of the Company severally 
its attorney authorised upon termination of this agreement to sign whatever documents are 
necessary for the sole purpose of cancelling the registration of the Business Name if the Member 
fails to take immediate steps to cancel the registration.  
(d)  If the Member fails to comply with its obligations under clause 16(b) within 30 days of 
the date of termination, the Member hereby authorises a representative or agent of the Company 
to enter the premises where the Business is being conducted to remove the Retail Brand 
identifiers and signs and materials referred to in that clause at the expense of the Member.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
CONTRACT TERM:  RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
 
 
F1 
 
15.3  The Franchisee further covenants that, except as otherwise approved in writing by 
Franchisor, the Franchisee shall not, for a continuous and uninterrupted period, 
commencing upon the termination or expiration of this Agreement and continuing for 
two (2) years thereafter, either directly or indirectly, for Itself, or through, on behalf 
of, or in conjunction with any person, persons, partnership or corporation, own, 
maintain, operate, engage in, or have any Interest in any business which is the same 
as similar to the Store and which is located at the Premises or in the building or group 
of buildings in which the Premises are located or within a circle having a radius of 
one kilometer and its centre at the  Premises. 
 
Sections 15.2 and 15.3 shall not apply to ownership by the Franchisee as a passive 
Investor of less than a one percent (1%) beneficial interest in the outstanding equity 
securities of any publicly-held corporation listed on a national stock exchange.  
 
Each of the foregoing covenants shall be construed as, independent of any other 
covenant or provision of this Agreement. If all or any portion of a covenants in this 
Section 15 is held unreasonable or unenforceable by a court or agency of competent 
jurisdiction in an unappealed final decision to which either Baskin- Robbins or the 
Sub-Franchisor is a party, the Franchisee expressly agrees to be bound by any lesser 
covenant subsumed within the terms of such covenant that imposes the maximum 
duty permitted by law, as if the resulting covenant were separately stated in and made 
a part of this Section 15.  
 
Franchisor shall have the right to reduce the scope of any covenant set forth in 
Sections 15.2 and 15.3, or any portion thereof, without Franchisee's consent, effective 
Immediately upon receipt by Franchisee of written notice thereof; and Franchisee 
shall comply with any covenant as so modified. 
 
 
F2 
 
The Franchisor must ensure that neither it nor any of its other franchisees establish or operate 
another business in the nature of the Business at any  location in the Territory.  (no post 
termination covenants???) 
 
24. RESTRAINT OF TRADE 
 
24.1 Definitions.   
In this clause:  
 
(a) “restraint period” means all of any of: 
 
the Term of this Franchise; 
 
(i) 1 year after a relevant event; 
(ii) 2 years after a relevant event; 
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(iii) 3 years after a relevant event; 
(b) “relevant event” means all or any of: 
(i)  the settlement date of the sale by the Franchisee of the Business; 
(ii) the date this Agreement expires or ends; 
(c) “relevant capacity” means as: 
(i) sole trader;  
(ii) partner; 
(iii) director or shareholder; 
(iv) manager; 
(v) employee; 
(vi) trustee, beneficiary or unit holder of a trust; 
(vii) consultant; 
(viii) lender or Security provider; 
(ix) franchisor or franchisee; 
(x) landlord; 
(d)       “restraint area” means all or any of: 
(i) the Territory; 
(ii) the master franchised territory of any of the master franchisees in Australia; 
(iii) the area within a 5 kilometre radius of any franchisor system business in 
which either the Franchisor or any other F2 Franchisee operates; 
(iv) the State or Territory of Australia in which the Territory is located; 
(v) the State or Territory of Australia in which a master franchised territory of 
any of the other master franchisees or Franchisees in Australia is located; 
(e)       “relevant interest” means all or any of: 
(i) a legal or beneficial interest; 
(ii) a financial interest; 
(iii) a proprietary interest; 
(f) “relevant person” means all or any of: 
(i) the Franchisee; 
(ii) any one or more Authorised Representatives; 
(iii) a shareholder of the Franchisee; 
(iv) a guarantor of the Franchisee; 
(v) a relative of the Franchisee; 
(g) “relevant business” means all or any of: 
(i) a business that is the same or substantially the same as the Business or the 
former business as conducted by the Franchisee under this Agreement; 
(ii) an ice creamery business the same or substantially the same as the Business 
conducted by a Franchisee (whether operated under Franchise or not); 
(h) “relevant goods” means all or any: 
(i) goods that are the same or substantially the same as those goods that were 
actually supplied by the Franchisee for use in the Business; 
(ii) Franchisor system Products, Base Mix and Frost Tops; 
(i) “relevant services” means all or any services that are the same or 
substantially the same kind as those services that were actually supplied by the 
Franchisee in connection with the Business; 
 
24.2 Trade restrictions.  
 
The Franchisee and the Guarantor and any relevant person must not without the 
Franchisor’s consent: 
(a) own or have a relevant interest, in a relevant capacity, in a relevant business, 
in a restraint area during a restraint period; 
(b) carry on or be engaged in a relevant capacity, in a relevant business, in a 
restraint area during a restraint period; 
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(c) be employed, concerned or interested in a relevant capacity, in a relevant 
business, in a restraint area during a restraint period; 
(d) lend money, provide financial assistance to or act as security provider to a 
relevant person to allow a relevant person to: 
(i) own or have a relevant interest in a relevant capacity, in a relevant business, 
in a restraint area during a restraint period; 
(ii) carry on or be engaged in a relevant capacity, in a relevant business, i a 
restraint area during a restraint period. 
 
24.3 Copyright.   
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person must not in a relevant capacity, in a relevant 
business, in a restraint area and during a restraint period use, allow any one else to 
use, copy or sell or deal with:  
(a) the Franchise System or the Corporate Image; 
(b) the distinctive or identifying get up used to identify a Franchisor Ice 
Creamery delivery van; 
(c) the Intellectual Property; 
(d) the trade names or trade marks; 
(e) the Confidential Information or the know how; 
(f) the Confidential Information about the Commercial Customers; 
(g) the Manuals or the confidential or proprietary information contained in the 
Manuals; 
(h) marketing materials or copyrighted works prepared or sponsored by the 
Franchisor that are used to market the supply of goods or services by the Franchisee 
to Commercial Customers; 
(i) the Products; 
(j) special or proprietary methods that are owned or developed by the Franchisor 
that may be used to make, handle, store, sell, deliver or use the Products; 
(k) any uniforms, footwear, protective clothing or equipment that display the 
trade names or trade marks; and 
(l) the Software, any databases or the information kept or obtained from or on 
them. 
 
24.4 Separate restrictions.   
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person separately agree with the Franchisor to enter 
into each of the restrictions resulting from combining separately each relevant 
capacity, with each relevant business with each restraint area with each restraint 
period. Each of these restrictions is an independent and separate restraint imposed 
upon the Franchisee and any relevant person under this Agreement. If any restriction 
in this clause is or will be unenforceable that does not affect the validity or 
enforceability of other restrictions under this Agreement, which remain binding on 
the Franchisee and any relevant person. 
 
24.5 Confidential Information.   
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person must during each restraint period after the 
date of settlement of the sale of the Business or the date this Agreement expires or 
ends keep secret and confidential and not publish, disclose nor use or attempt to use 
the Confidential Information or know how. 
 
24.6 Solicitation of a relevant franchisee.  
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The Franchisee and any relevant person must not solicit, canvass, entice or try to 
solicit, canvass or entice a franchisee, in a restraint area and for a restraint period with 
the purpose of offering to supply or supplying that franchisee with either or both 
relevant goods or relevant services. 
 
24.7 Solicitation of employees.  
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person must not during a restraint period entice or 
attempt to entice any employee of the Franchisor from continuing to be employed by 
it. 
 
24.8 No aiding and abetting others to breach restrictions.   
 
Neither the Franchisee nor any relevant person must knowingly counsel, procure, aid 
or abet the Franchisee or any relevant person to breach or to help the Franchisee or 
any relevant person breach any of the restrictions in this clause. 
 
24.9 Person who may enforce the restrictions.  
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person agree that the restrictions in this clause are 
given for the benefit of the Franchisor and Franchisees that own or operate a 
Franchisor Ice Creamery business in Australia. As the Franchisor is a party to this 
Agreement, it may enforce these restrictions against the Franchisee and any relevant 
person at any time.  The persons that are not parties to this Agreement may obtain the 
benefit of the restrictions agreed to under this Agreement by Notice to the Franchisee 
and any relevant person stating that a person elects to take and accept the benefit of 
all or any of the promises and restrictions agreed to by the Franchisee and any 
relevant person that are contained in this clause 24. This Notice may be given during 
and after the Term of this Agreement. However, a person that is not a party to this 
Agreement may only enforce a restriction in this part against one or more of the 
Franchisee and any relevant person, if that person has our written consent to enforce 
the restriction.24.10 Exceptions to the restrictions.   
The restrictions in this clause 24 agreed to by the Franchisee and any relevant person 
do not apply to the extent that they obtain the Franchisor’s written consent to 
undertake the restricted activity.  Subject to the proviso below, the restrictions do not 
prevent the Franchisee and any relevant person, during or after this Franchise from 
owning, holding or acquiring a relevant interest in the issued securities of a listed 
corporation, which owns or operates: 
(a) a business the same or substantially the same as the Business or the 
Franchisee’s former business in Australia (whether under franchise or not); 
(b) a business the same or substantially the same as the business operated by a 
master franchisee or Franchisee in Australia (whether under franchise or not). 
However, this exclusion only applies if the total securities of that listed corporation 
held by the Franchisee or any relevant person alone or when added together do not 
equal or exceed 5% of the total issued securities in the listed corporation. Also, the 
exclusion only applies if the Franchisee or any relevant person are, during a restraint 
period of any applicable restriction, not directors, employees, consultants or advisers 
of or to that listed corporation.  The restrictions do not prevent the Franchisee or any 
relevant person from: 
(a) carrying on, engaging in or owing a relevant interest in its business during 
this Franchise; 
(b) carrying on, engaging or owing a relevant interest in a business operated by 
the Franchisee or any relevant person under a master franchise with the Franchisor or 
under Franchise documents with the Franchisor or other Franchisees in Australia. 
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24.11 Acknowledgment.  
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person agree that each restriction in this clause 24 is 
fair and REASONABLE and is intended to help protect or preserve legitimate 
interests. These include:  
(a) the Franchisor’s relationship with its master franchisees and Franchisees; 
(b) the revenue earned by the Franchisor from its business or the business 
conducted by its master franchisees or Franchisees; 
(c) the Franchisor’s goodwill, the goodwill of its master franchisees and 
Franchisees; 
(d) the trade names and the trade marks and the goodwill connected to them; 
(e) the Confidential Information and the know how; 
(f) the Franchise System and the Corporate Image; 
(g) the Intellectual Property; 
(h) the common trade names or business names used to identify the Franchisor, 
its business, its master franchisees and Franchisees; and 
(i) the Franchisor’s ability to grant a master franchise or a Franchise or the 
ability of the master franchisees to grant a Franchise. 
 
24.11 Restrictions.   
 
The Franchisee and any relevant person agree that the restrictions in this clause: 
(a) are given for good consideration; 
(b) are reasonably needed to protect legitimate interests; 
(c) will not impose undue hardship on the Franchisee or any relevant person; 
(d) are separate, severable and independent restrictions imposed on the 
Franchisee or any relevant person; 
 
(e) apply irrespective of the reason this Agreement ends or is not renewed; 
 
(f) will not affect any restrictions contained in any other agreements. 
 
24.12 Acknowledgement.   
 
If the Franchisor gives its consent to the Franchisee and any relevant person under 
clause 24.2, then the restrictions in this clause will not apply to the restriction the 
Franchisor has consented to. 
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S28 2yrs and 1 yr, 15,10 and 5 km…interesting construction (s28.5) 
 
S.28 Restrictions on competition 
 
S. 28.1 Restraint of trade 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, Managing 
Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any Principal will directly 
or indirectly (within the Restraint Area, during the Term and for the Restraint Period 
without the prior written consent of the Franchisor be concerned or interested in:  
  (a) any Italian themed restaurant or café; 
  (b) any business that involves the supply or provision of any of the products or 
services authorised for sale in the course of the Franchisor Business; or 
  (c) any form of business similar to that of the Franchisee's business or the 
Franchisor's business, 
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or damage the goodwill of the Franchisor or the Franchisor Business. 
 
S.28.2 Conditions of restraint of trade 
The Franchisee and its directors, shareholders, Managing Director and any other key 
employee of the Franchisee and any Principal shall be deemed to have breached 
clause  0 if any of those persons has an interest in a business described in clause  0 on 
its own account, or jointly or with or on behalf of any other person, firm or 
corporation, or is an employee, independent contractor, partner, joint venturer or 
agent of such a business, or has an interest in such a business through any firm, trust 
or corporation in which the Franchisee, its directors, officers or shareholders or any 
Principal may be interested as director, officer, shareholder, beneficial owner of 
shares, lender, advisor or otherwise. 
 
S.28.3 Concurrent conditions of restraint of trade 
Clause  0 shall be construed and take effect as if it were a number of concurrent 
separate clauses.  Each such clause shall be produced by construing one of the limbs 
of the definition of 'Restraint Period' and one of the limbs of definition of 'Restraint 
Area' until all possible combinations are exhausted.  Each such clause shall be 
severable from the other clause. 
 
S.28.4 Definitions 
In clause  0: 
  (a) Restraint Period means: 
    (i) the period of two years; and 
    (ii) the period of one year, 
    (iii) after the termination of this agreement; and 
  (b) Restraint Area means: 
    (i) the area of 15 kilometres surrounding the Location; 
    (ii) the area of 10 kilometres surrounding the Location; and 
    (iii) the area of five kilometres surround the Location. 
 
S.28.5 Clauses enforceable 
If any of the separate clauses resulting from the construction of clause  0 in the 
manner referred to in clause  0 is void or unenforceable for any reason, that voidness 
or unenforceability shall not prejudice or in any other way affect the validity or 
enforceability of any other such clause. 
 
S.28.6 Franchisee's warranty for System 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, Managing 
Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any Principal will at any 
time, either in Australia or overseas, appropriate, use or duplicate the System. 
 
S.28.7 Warranty for non-solicitation of customers or employees 
The Franchisee covenants that neither it nor its directors, shareholders, Managing 
Director nor any other key employee of the Franchisee nor any Principal will at any 
time within 2 years after the termination of this Agreement: 
  (a) solicit customers or former customers of the Franchisor Business with the intent 
of taking their custom for  a similar business; 
  (b) employ or offer to employ any person who: 
    (i) immediately before such employment or offer of employment was employed by 
the Franchisor; 
    (ii) immediately before such employment or offer of employment was employed by 
any person who was at that time operating a business according to the System; 
    (iii) employs or offers to employ any person who was so employed at any time 
during the 2 years preceding such employment; or 
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    (iv)directly or indirectly induce any such person to leave his or her employment. 
 
S.28.8 Directors, shareholders and Principals covenant 
The Franchisee must ensure that all directors and shareholders of the Franchisee (in 
the case of a company being the Franchisee) and the Principal enter into direct 
covenants of similar content to those contained in clauses  0 -  0 and  0 -  0 above with 
the Franchisor. 
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S32:  max time and area enforceable by law (5,3,2 or 1 yr)… 
 
Non competition 
 
S32.1  The Franchisee and the guarantor jointly and severally covenant and agree with the 
Franchisee that: 
(a) During the term of this agreement; and 
(b) for either 5,3,2 0r 1 years thereafter (whichever is the greatest period enforceable 
at law). 
Neither the Franchisee or Guarantor(s) shall within the area referred to in s32.3 
directly or indirectly, either alone or in partnership, or as a director or shareholder of 
any company, or as trustee or beneficiary of any trust, or as an EE, consultant, lender, 
rep., agent, adviser or otherwise: 
(i) be engaged in or carry on business substantially the same or similar to the 
Franchise pursuant to the agreement or involving the sale of any goods of the same 
kind as, similar to or competitive with any of the Products; and (ii) employ any EEs 
or former EEs who were employed in the Zise or by the Franchisee in a business 
referred to at (i). 
 
S32.2  The area of restraint shall be: 
(a) The franchise delivery area; and (b) The area within a radius of 10, 5,3,2,1 or ½ 
kms (whichever is the greatest area enforceable at law) from the premises or any store 
operated by the Franchisee. 
 
S32.3  The Franchisee also covenants to ensure that the Nominated Manager does similarly 
engaged (in any capacity) in any such like or conflicting businesses to the Franchise. 
 
S32.5  The Franchisee and the guarantor agree that the restraints contained in s32 are fair 
and reasonable to protect the efforts of the Franchisee in developing the system and 
Intellectual  
property and the business of other Franchisees  and that the Franchisee and the 
guarantor have received adequate consideration for these restraints. 
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S. 75  Covenant not to compete 
 
You and the covenantor jointly and severally agree that during the term of this 
agreement, and for a period of 12 months after its termination you and the covenantor 
will not, in any capacity whatsoever, carry on any business substantially the same as 
the franchise business or involving the sale of any goods similar to or competitive 
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with any of the authorised products within the territory or within the territory of any 
other franchise granted by us in Australia or New Zealand. 
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34.1 Extent of Restraint 
 
For the purpose of protecting FRANCHISOR’s Business and the FRANCHISOR 
SYSTEM and in consideration of the benefits to be derived by it from this agreement 
the Franchisee covenants to and with FRANCHISOR that it, the Guarantors and the 
Nominated Manager shall not (and where the Franchisee is a corporation it covenants 
to procure that each related body corporate shall not) during the term of this 
agreement and for a period of : 
 
(a) 1 year from the Termination Date; 
(b) 9 months from the Termination Date; 
(c) 6 months from the Termination  Date; 
 
without the prior written consent of FRANCHISOR, carry on or be engaged in the 
Restricted Activities within  
 
(d) 2 kilometres of the Premises; 
(e) 1 kilometre of the Premises; 
(f) 1/2 kilometre of the Premises; 
(g) the shopping centre, shopping strip or shopping mall within which the 
Premises are located. 
 
It is intended that the primary restraint is set out in paragraphs (a) and (d) and that:  
 
(1) paragraph (b) is a separate alternative to be applied only if paragraph (a) 
constitutes an invalid restraint; 
(2) paragraph (c) is a separate alternative to be applied only if paragraphs (a) and 
(b) constitute an invalid restraint. 
(3) paragraph (e) is a separate alternative to be applied only if paragraph (d) 
constitutes an invalid restraint; 
(4) paragraph (f) is a separate alternative to be applied only if paragraphs (d) and 
(e) constitute an invalid restraint. 
(5) paragraph (g) is a separate alternative to be applied only if paragraphs (d), (e) 
and (f) constitute an invalid restraint. 
 
For the purpose of clause 34.1: 
 
(a) “any capacity” means  acting on a person’s  own account as a principal, 
agent, owner. joint venturer, partner, shareholder, unit holder, director, secretary, 
company officer, trustee, manager, employee, adviser, consultant or otherwise, 
whether jointly with or on behalf of any other person or by means of an agent, 
independent contractor or employee of any person in which the person  may be 
interested as an employee, officer, shareholder, beneficial or legal owner of shares, 
lender or adviser or otherwise;  
 
(b) “engaged” means engaged in any capacity whether directly or indirectly, on 
the Franchisee’s own behalf or on behalf of any other person; 
 
(c) “Restricted Activities” means: 
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(1) soliciting or endeavouring to solicit or entice away from 
FRANCHISOR or its franchisees any officer, manager or employee 
of FRANCHISOR or any person who later becomes and officer, 
manager or employee of FRANCHISOR or its franchisees, whether 
or not that person would commit any breach of that person’s contract 
of employment; 
 
(2) employing any person who being a director, manager, employee of or 
consultant to FRANCHISOR or its franchisees during the Term of 
this agreement who is in possession of any confidential information 
or trade secrets relating to:  
 
  (A) FRANCHISOR’s business; or 
  (B) the customers of FRANCHISOR; 
 
(3) soliciting or accepting business for the supply of any goods or 
services of the general descriptions of any of those supplied by 
FRANCHISOR’s Business within 12 months before the Termination 
Date from any person that has dealt with or transacted business with 
FRANCHISOR or its franchisees: 
 
  (A) at any time during the 2 years prior to the Termination Date; 
  (B) at any time during the 18 months prior to the Termination 
Date; 
  (C) at any time during the 12 months prior to the Termination 
Date; 
  (D) at any time during the 6 months prior to the Termination 
Date, 
 
and it is intended that the primary restraint is set out in 
paragraph (A), that paragraph (B) is a separate alternative to 
be applied only if paragraph (A) constitutes an invalid 
restraint, that paragraph (C) is a separate alternative to be 
applied only if paragraph (B) constitutes an invalid restraint, 
and that paragraph (D) is a separate alternative to be applied 
only if paragraph (C) constitutes an invalid restraint; 
 
(4) disclosing to any third party or using at any time any trade secrets, 
product information or confidential information of FRANCHISOR’s 
Business and FRANCHISOR SYSTEM which is generally not 
known or available in the market place or which but for a breach of 
this clause 34.1 would not be generally known or available in the 
market place; 
 
(5) being engaged or concerned or interested, whether directly or 
indirectly, in any capacity in any company, firm or business which is 
or is about to be engaged in, or whose principal business is the 
business of retail selling of furniture; 
 
(d) “Termination Date” means the date of termination or expiration (for any 
reason) of the Franchisee’s appointment under this agreement. 
 
34.2 Extent of restraint 
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(a) The Franchisee and FRANCHISOR consider each of the restraints contained 
in clause 34.1 to be REASONABLE for the purposes of protecting the proper 
interests of FRANCHISOR in FRANCHISOR’s Business and intend the 
restraints to operate to the maximum extent. 
 
(b) If these restraints: 
 
 (1) are void as unreasonable for the protection of the interests of 
FRANCHISOR; and  
 
 (2) would be valid if part of the wording was deleted or the period or 
area was reduced, 
 
 the restraints will apply with the modifications necessary to make them 
effective. 
 
(c) The restraints contained in clause 34.1 are separate, distinct and several. If 
any restraint is unenforceable, it may be severed without affecting the 
remaining enforceability of the other restraints. 
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27.2 Franchisee Must Not Compete Unfairly 
The Franchisee and the Guarantor (if any) jointly and severally agree with the 
Franchisor that neither the Franchisee nor any Guarantor will, during the Restraint 
Period and within the Restraint Area, directly or indirectly do any of the following 
things: 
 
1. engage or be concerned or interested in any business that: 
  (a) supplies products or services the same as or similar to those at any time supplied 
in the Business; or 
  (b) could be reasonably regarded as a market competitor of the Network or any ## 
Business; or 
 
2. canvass or solicit with a view to supplying any product or service the same as or 
similar to those at any time supplied in the conduct of the Business, any person who 
is or has been in the 12 months before the end of the Franchise a customer of the 
Business or of any other ## Business; or 
 
3. employ or engage any person who is or has been in the 12 months before the end of 
the Franchise employed by the Franchisor, the Franchisee or any other ## Franchisee, 
without first obtaining the Franchisor’s written consent.  
 
27.3 Restraint Applies to Conduct of Franchisee in any Capacity 
 
The agreement by the Franchisee and the Guarantor in clause 27.2 applies to any of 
them acting: 
either alone or in partnership or association with another person; 
as principal, agent, representative, director, officer or employee; 
as member, shareholder, debenture holder, noteholder or holder of any other security; 
as trustee of or as a consultant or adviser to any person; or 
in any other capacity. 
 
Separate Restraint Agreements 
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Clauses 27.2 and 27.3 have effect as comprising each of the separate provisions 
which results from each combination of a capacity referred to in clause 27.3 and a 
category of conduct referred to in clause 27.2.  Each of these separate provisions 
operates concurrently and independently.  If any separate provision is unenforceable, 
illegal or void that provision is severed and the other separate provisions remain in 
force. 
 
The Franchisee must ensure that the Manager and any of its key employees 
nominated by the Franchisor enter into service or employment contracts in a form 
approved by the Franchisor which contain a similar REASONABLE restraint as 
imposed on the Franchisee and Guarantor pursuant to this clause 27. 
 
F8 
 
3 Licencee’s duties 
 
3.7 Run a similar business – The Licencee shall not during the Term either 
directly or indirectly carry on any business similar to the Licenced Operation 
whether on the Licencee’s own account or as nominee, agent, servant, 
representative, employee, shareholder or director in any firm or corporation 
conducting such a business. 
 
 3.8 Non Competition Covenant – The Licencee shall: 
  3.8.1 if it is a corporation, procure its directors and shareholders from time 
to time; or 
  3.8.2 if it is a partnership, procure its partners from time to time; or 
  3.8.3 if it is a trustee 
  enter into a covenant with the Licensor in the terms of the covenant annexed 
to this Agreement marked “a”. 
 
3.9 The Licencee shall use the Licencee’s best endeavours to ensure that staff 
employed do not engage (in any capacity) in any similar business to the 
Licenced Operation during the Term. 
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11.1  Engagement in Similar Business -   
 
The Franchisee hereby acknowledges that the business reputation of the Franchisor 
and Franchisor, the methods and procedures used by the Franchisor and Franchisor, 
the training to be provided, the Franchisor System among other things, the 
opportunities and experiences acquired or to be acquired by the Franchisee hereunder 
are of considerable value and benefit. Accordingly, the Franchisee hereby 
acknowledges and agrees as follows: 
 
(1)  during the Term, the Franchisee shall not, either directly or indirectly, 
individually or as a director, officer, employee, shareholder or member of any 
corporation or other entity, or in any other capacity whatsoever, engage in, be 
concerned with or interested in, advise, lend money to, guarantee the 
obligations of, or permit its name to be used in: 
 
(a)  any business which is the same or similar to, or otherwise is 
operating in competition with, the Business and/or 
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(b) any business (whether of a wholesale or other nature) where the 
prime source of income of such business is or is to be derived from 
the sale of popcorn or popcorn related products; 
 
(2) upon the termination of this agreement for any reason whatsoever, or if the 
Franchisee sells, assigns, transfers: or otherwise disposes of its interest in the 
Business, then for a period of 1 year following such termination, or sale, 
assignment, transfer, or disposal, Franchisee shall not, either directly or 
indirectly, individually or as a director, officer, employee, shareholder or 
member of any corporation or other entity, or in any other capacity 
whatsoever, engage in, be concerned with or interested in, advise, lend 
money to, guarantee the obligations of, or permit its name to be used in, any 
business which is the same or similar to, or otherwise is operating in 
competition with, the business formerly conducted by the Franchisee and 
which is located anywhere within a 5 mile radius of the Premises, or within a 
5 mile radius of any location of the Franchisor Franchisor or of any location 
of a franchisee of the Franchisor or of Franchisor from which a business is 
being operated using the Franchisor System and the Trademark;  
 
(3)  that all information (whether oral or written) disclosed to the Franchisee by or 
on behalf of the Franchisor or Franchisor pursuant to this agreement or the 
Franchisor System has been disclosed to the Franchisee in the strictest of 
confidence and/or as trade secrets and accordingly, the Franchisee agrees that 
it will not, either during the Term or at any time thereafter, disclose any 
information with respect to the Business, or any system, procedures, 
documents, methods or otherwise that it may obtain from or on behalf of the 
Franchisor or Franchisor pursuant to this agreement, nor will the Franchisee 
for its own purposes or any other purposes, disclose to anyone any 
information or knowledge it may acquire with respect to the Franchisor 
System or the Franchisor's or Franchisor's business.  
 
11.2 Change of Geographical Area or Time Period –  
 
The Franchisor and the Franchisee agree that if a court of competent jurisdiction shall 
limit, restrict or otherwise change the geographical area or time period referred to in 
this clause 11, that the limited, restricted, or changed geographical area or time period 
determined by the said court shall, for the purposes of this clause 11, be deemed to be 
the geographical area and/or time period referred to in this clause 11, as if they were 
the original geographical area and time period set out herein.  
 
11.3 Non Competition and/or Non Disclosure Acknowledgment –  
 
If the Franchisee or any Guarantor hereto is a corporation or other entity (other than 
an individual person), the Franchisee and/or such Guarantor agree to deliver to the 
Franchisor at such time as the Franchisor may request, the written acknowledgment 
of such directors, officers, shareholders, members or employees of the Franchisee 
and/or the Guarantor, as the Franchisor shall in its discretion require, acknowledging 
that such director, officer, shareholder, member or employee has reviewed the 
provisions of this clause 11 and that he, she or it agrees to be bound by all of such 
provisions of this clause 11 as the Franchisor may specify. The form of 
acknowledgment to be executed pursuant hereto shall be in such form as may be 
required by the Franchisor from time to time.  
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F10 - Old 
 
Covenant against competition 
 
7.1 The Franchisee must not during the term of this Agreement and for a period of twelve 
(12) months after the termination or expiration of this Agreement commence, engage 
in, conduct, carry on, have any direct or indirect interest in, be employed or retained 
in any capacity by a Business or other enterprise offering the same or similar services 
as the Franchise Business and which is located or operating: 
- in the Territory; or 
- within an area being within a radius of 20 kilometers of the territory 
Franchised Business, or any other Franchised Business. 
 
7.2 Where the Franchisee is a body corporate, each and every director of the Franchise 
agrees and undertakes to be bound by the covenant referred to in Clause 7.1 of this 
agreement and undertaking shall be evidenced by the guarantee given by each and 
every director in Annexure B to this Agreement. 
 
7.3 The Franchisee agrees and declares that it shall not hire or employ or otherwise 
engage employees of the Franchisors or other franchisees or induce such employees 
to leave their employment during the term(s) of this Agreement and for a period of 
twelve (12) months thereafter. 
 
7.4 The Franchisee: 
covenants and declares that Clauses 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 shall survive this Agreement 
should it be terminated or come to an end; and 
agrees that if, for any reason whatsoever, those clauses are rendered void, 
unenforceable or otherwise ineffective that shall not affect the enforceability or 
effectiveness of any other terms or conditions of this Agreement. 
 
7.5 In Clauses 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, a reference to the Franchisee includes a reference to 
its directors, shareholders, partners or beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
F10 - Proposed 
 
Covenant against competition - During the term of this Agreement, the Franchisee must not 
be involved with any business offering similar services within twenty kilometers of the 
territory. 
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30 Restraints 
 
30.1 Employment – The Coach, the Guarantors (if any) and the Manager must not during 
the Term or for six (6) months after the Term, without the written consent of Franchisor: 
 
 (a)  employ or offer to employ any person who was employed by Franchisor or an 
Franchisor Coach within the twelve (12) month period immediately prior to the offer of 
employment; or 
 (b)  directly or indirectly induce any person to leave his employment with 
Franchisor or a Franchisor Coach 
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30.2 Restraint During Term – the Coach, the Guarantors (if any) and the Manager must not 
during the Term either: - 
 
 (a)  alone; 
 (b)  jointly with or on behalf of any other person, firm or corporation or as an 
employee, independent contractor, partner, joint venturer or agent; 
 (c)  as an officer of any person, firm or corporation; 
 (d)  as a shareholder of any corporation; or 
 (e)  as trustee of any trust, 
 
be engaged, concerned or interested in or permit his name to be used in connection 
with any other business which competes with the Business except without the prior 
written consent of Franchisor, which must not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
30.3 Restrain After Term – The Coach, the Guarantors (if any) and the Manager must not 
for any of the periods mentioned in this clause either: - 
  
(a)  alone; 
 (b)  jointly with or on behalf of any other person, firm or corporation or as an 
employee, independent contractor, partner, joint venturer or agent; 
 (c)  as an officer of any person, firm or corporation; 
 (d)  as a shareholder of any corporation; or 
 (e)  as trustee of any trust 
 
be engaged, concerned or interested in any business which competes with Franchisor’ 
Business or permit his name to be used in connection with any such business in 
Australia or if the Coach did not have Clients throughout Australian then in the area 
where the Coach provided the majority of Services during any of the following 
periods: - 
  
 (i) the period three (3) years commencing on the Completion Date; or 
 (ii) for a period two (2) years commencing on the Completion Date; or 
 (iii) for a period of one (1) year commencing on the Completion Date. 
 
If any part of this clause is held or found to be void or unenforceable, it will be 
severed from this clause to the extent of the voidness or unenforceability and the 
remainder of this clause will remain in full force and effect. 
 
30.4 Past Business –  
 
The parties acknowledge that the Coach and the Guarantor (if any) have in the past 
conducted businesses which were similar to but not competitive with Franchisor’  
business. The Coach and/or the Guarantors may wish to continue those businesses 
after the end of this Agreement. Nothing in this Clause 30 is meant to prevent the 
Coach from carrying on the other business which is not directly meant to prevent the 
Coach from carrying on the other business which is not directly in competition with 
the Franchisor’ Business. As the Business is not in competition with the Franchisor’ 
Business, the terms of Clauses 30.2 and 30.3 will not apply. 
 
30.5 Reasonable –  
 
The parties acknowledge that the restraints contained in this clause 30 are reasonable 
and necessary to protect the goodwill of Franchisor. 
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8.5 No Competition 
 
8.5.1 The Franchisee and the Nominated Operator must not, during the Term, 
whether as principal, employee, consultant, agent, partner, shareholder or 
director, carry on, be engaged in, or be directly or indirectly associated with, 
any other business or activity: 
  8.5.1.1 Similar to or competitive with the Business; 
  8.5.1.3 Which competes with the Franchisor in its marketing and distribution 
of the Products and the Services; 
  8.5.1.4 Which competes with any other Franchisee of the Franchisor. 
 
8.5.2 The Franchisee must not during the Term and for one (1) year after the Term 
seek to employ or engage any employee or agent of the Franchisor or any 
employee of another the Franchisor’s Franchisees. 
 
11.7  No Competition  
 
 11.7.1  The Franchisee must not, as principal, employee, consultant, advisor, 
shareholder, representative, agent, director or otherwise:  
  
11.7.1.1  market, procure supply of or supply to a Client products or 
services similar to or competitive with products or services marketed, 
procured or supplied by a business similar to the Business:  
 
11.7.1.1.1  within 2 years after the expiration or earlier 
termination of this agreement;  
11.7.1.1.2  within 1 year after the expiration or earlier 
termination of this agreement;  
11.7.1.1.3  within 6 months after the expiration or earlier 
termination of this agreement.  
 
11.7.1.2 within the following areas:  
 11.7.1.2.1  the State of Queensland;  
11.7.1.2.2  within a 50km radius of the Premises;  
11.7.1.2.3  within a 20km radius of the Premises  
11.7.1.2.4 within a 5 km radius of the Premises  
 
11.7.2  Clause 12.3.1 is read as if each possible combination of:    
 
11.7.2.1   the capacities in clause 12.3.1;  
11.7.2.2   a conduct in clause 12.3.1.1:  
11.7.2.3   a period in clauses 12.3.1.1.1 to 12.3.1.1.3; and an 
11.7.2.4   area in clauses 12.3.1.2.1 to 12.3.1.2.4,  
 
is a separate clause. All these combinations apply cumulatively. Each 
combination must be read down to the extent necessary to be valid. If any 
combination cannot be read down to that extent, it must be severed.  
 
11.7.3  For the purpose of clause 12.3.1, a Client is a person who:  
   
11.7.3.1  has used or uses a financial related service introduced by the 
Franchisee during the Term in respect of which the Franchisee has 
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received in the period of 24 months prior to the expiration or earlier 
termination of this agreement, any commission, fee or other 
remuneration.  
   
11.7.4  The Franchisee acknowledges and agrees that the restraints contained in this 
agreement and each combination of them are reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the  
"  " System and the Franchisor's Business and that the Franchisor's interests 
(given its widest possible interpretation) would suffer loss or damage by 
competition with the Franchisee (or related entities of the Franchisee) if these 
restraints had not been imposed, and further that the Franchisor may not be 
adequately compensated for such loss or damage only by the payment of 
damages. 
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S12.3  Except as a shareholder, and during the specified period after the end of this 
agreement: 
(A) Franchisee and Franchisee’s directors, if Franchisee is a corporation, must not 
conduct on Franchisee’s own acct or be concerned or interested in any firm or corp 
conducting a business similar to the Zise within the specified area and whether 
directly or indirectly as an agent, representative, servant, employee, shareholder or 
director. 
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Restraints in respect of other businesses 
 
26 You and the Guarantors must not during the term of this Agreement carry on or in 
any way be involved in any other business without our prior written consent. We will 
not unreasonably withhold our consent if we are satisfied that the conduct of such 
other business will not interfere with the proper operation of your Bakers Delight 
Business in accordance with this Agreement and will not affect our legitimate 
business interests. 
 
27 You and the Guarantors must not for a period of 2 years after the termination of this 
Agreement carry on or in any way be involved in any business of a like or similar 
nature to a Bakers Delight Business within a radius of 5 kilometres of any Bakers 
Delight Business (whether owned or operated by us or by a franchisee). You 
acknowledge that this restraint is reasonably required to protect our legitimate 
business interests and those of our franchisees. You also acknowledge that by the 
insertion of a similar clause in other franchise agreements you will gain the benefit of 
the prohibition on other former franchisees from competing with you. 
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6.  FRANCHISEE'S GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
6.1  Not to compete. The Franchisee hereby covenants and agrees with the 
Franchisor for the benefit of the Franchisor as follows: 
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(a) (i) The Franchisee acknowledges that the success or otherwise of the 
System, the Franchised Operation and the Business relies heavily on the 
personal efforts of the  
Franchisee and or the Guarantors and or the Nominated Person (as 
the case may be), the intent being that the Franchisee and or the 
Guarantors and or the Nominated Person (as the case may be) will 
devote and direct their time, effort, energy and expertise towards the 
efficient and profitable operation of the Business. 
 
(ii)  To that end, the Franchisee and each of the Guarantors (and if more 
than one, then jointly and severally), covenant and agree with the 
Franchisor, for the benefit of each other, and all other franchisees in 
the System that they will not, as officers,  shareholders, manager, 
servant, agent, partner or otherwise, either directly or indirectly 
during the Term, be involved in, or carry on any business of a like or 
similar nature to the Business, the Franchise or the System without 
the prior consent in writing of the Franchisor; 
 
(iii)  The Franchisor's consent shall not be unreasonably refused to any 
request of the Franchisee for a relaxation of the restraints imposed 
herein in circumstances where the Franchisee can demonstrate to the 
complete satisfaction of the Franchisor that such a relaxation will not 
effect the efficient and profitable conduct of the Franchised 
Operation including the Business and will not be to the detriment of 
the System, the Franchisor or other Franchisor franchisees. 
 
(iv)  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Franchisee and the Guarantors 
acknowledge that the restraints contained in this Clause 6.1 (a) (iii) 
are no more than are reasonably required to protect the interests of 
the Franchisor and all franchisees in and the goodwill attaching to, 
the System, the Intellectual Property, the Names and Marks; 
 
(v)  The provisions of Clause 6.1 (a) (iii) and the restraints imposed do 
not apply to the circumstance where the Franchisee owns, operates, 
manages or is the nominated person in respect of another Franchisor 
franchise or franchised operation (with the consent of the Franchisor) 
during the Term. 
 
(b) the Franchisee and each of the Guarantors (if more than one, jointly and 
severally) agree that they will not directly or indirectly and whether solely or 
jointly with or as Director, manager, agent or servant of any person or 
corporation carry on or be engaged or interested in any business of the nature 
of the Franchised Operation within and during the Non Compete Area and 
Period after the termination or expiration of this Agreement. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Franchisee and the Guarantors acknowledge that 
the restraints contained in this Clause 6.1 (b) are no more than are reasonably 
required to protect the interests of the Franchisor and all franchisees in and the 
goodwill attaching to, the System, the Intellectual Property, the Names and Marks.  
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8.12  Non-Competition (an executed Deed is required - Annexure E) 
 486
 
(a) The Master Franchisee agrees that during the Term and any renewal thereof the 
Master Franchisee shall not engage in or have any direct or indirect interest whether 
as an owner, partner, director, shareholder, officer, employee, agent, consultant, 
representative, contractor or sub-contractor or in any other capacity direct or indirect, 
in the provision of home services within the Master Franchise Area or within any 
Area in any state or Country in which another James’ Home Services franchise is 
operating. 
 
(b) ... The parties hereby expressly agree that the order of priority of the restraints is as 
follows: 
Upon surrender, expiry or termination of this agreement for any reason the Master 
Franchisee shall not for a period of – 
(a) two (2) years; 
(b) one (1) year; 
(c) six (6) months, 
after such surrender, expiry or termination have any direct or indirect interest 
whether as – 
(d) owner; 
(e) partner; 
(f) director; 
(g) employee; 
(h) agent; 
in the business of – 
(i) acting as a Franchisor, a State Master Franchisee, a Master Franchisee or in a 
capacity similar to a Franchisor, State Master Franchisee or Master 
Franchisee in relation to the provision of Home Services or a Home Service 
Business; 
(j) mobile car cleaning; 
(k) carpet cleaning and pest control; 
(l) windows and exterior house cleaning; 
(m) lawn and garden care; 
(n) interior house care 
(o) hydrobath and pet grooming; 
(p) mobile ironing and laundry service 
within – 
(q) the Master Franchise Area; 
(r) James’ Home Services State or Regional Master Franchise Areas or 
Franchise Areas that adjoin the Area; 
(s) within a radius of five hundred (500) kilometres from the premises (as at the 
date of termination); 
(t) within a radius of two hundred (200) kilometres from the premises (as at the 
date of termination); 
(u) within a radius of fifty (50) kilometres from the premises (as at the date of 
termination); 
(v) within the radius of twenty (2) kilometres from the premises (as at the date of 
termination). 
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10.11 Restrictions 
  
During the franchise term, you must not at or in connection with your business or the 
store, without our consent:  
- trade under a trade or business name we have not approved;  
- supply food, beverages, goods or services that are not approved in the manuals, do 
not meet the system standards or that may damage the system, the image or our or 
your reputation;  
- use ingredients in the making of food or beverages after the recommended 
ingredient life of the item has expired;  
- do anything that may give rise to industrial action against you or other operators of 
Franchisor stores; use, publish, sell or distribute marketing materials that we have not 
approved;  
- permit the broadcast from TVs, videos or audio equipment within the store of any 
material that is obscene or illegal;  
- keep vending machines, gaming or pinball machines, video games or rides;  
- make material changes to the inside and outside of the store, its decor, get up or 
appearance; and display or use trade names, trade marks, signs, decor or getup that 
we have not approved.  
 
PART 30 NON-COMPETITION  
  
30.1  Restrictions on running other coffee shops or cafes during your franchise 
term  
 
During your franchise term, you and your associates must not, without our 
consent, whether on your or your associates own account or together with or 
for anyone else or as a sale trader, partner or employee of any partnership or 
as a shareholder, director, officer, employee, consultant, manager of a 
company (in its personal capacity or as trustee), as a trustee, beneficiary or 
unitholder of a trust, own, have a legal, beneficial, proprietary or financial 
interest in, carry on, engage in, be employed in any other coffee shop or cafe 
that is the same as, substantially or sufficiently similar to your business if 
those other similar competing coffee shop or cafe is or are located or operated 
anywhere within:  
 
• all or any of a 3km, 2km, 1 km or 1/2km radius from the centre of: the site(s) 
then currently used by your business; and/or  
• any former site(s) used by your business in the 2 years before your business 
started trading from its latest or then current site(s); and/or  
• the site(s) of any other Franchisor store that is open and trading at the time 
that you or your associates start or undertake any of those restricted activities 
referred to in this clause 30.1 if the relevant other Franchisor store(s) is or are 
located or operated anywhere within:  
• the city or town in Australia in which your business is then currently located 
or operated; and/or  
• the state or territory in Australia in which your business is then currently 
located or operated; and/or Australia;  
• the same building(s), shopping centre(s) or complex(s) in which your 
business is then currently located or operated;  
• permit your directors and employees to assist in the management or operation 
of anyone or more of those  
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• similar competing coffee shop or cafe referred to in clause 30.1 above.  
• Restrictions on running other coffee shops or cafes after you sell your 
business or after your franchise term expires or ends  
• For all or any of 3 years, 2 years or 1 year after the settlement of the contract 
for the sale of your business or the expiry or end of this agreement, you and 
your associates must not, without our consent, whether on your or your 
associates own account or together with or for anyone else or as a sale trader, 
partner or employee of any partnership or as a shareholder, director, officer, 
employee, consultant, manager of a company (in its personal capacity or as 
trustee) or as a trustee, beneficiary or unitholder of a trust,  
• Own, have a legal, beneficial, proprietary or financial interest in, carry on, 
engage in, be employed in, a coffee shop or cafe that is the same as, 
substantially or sufficiently similar to your business or your former business 
(a similar competing coffee shop or cafe) if any such competing coffee shop 
or cafe is or are located or operated anywhere within:  
• all or any of a 3km, 2km, 1 km or 1/2km radius from the centre of:  
• the site(s) of your business or your former business at the time the contract 
for the sale of your business was made or immediately before the date of 
expiry or ending of this agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your business or your former business in the 2 years 
before the contract for the sale of your business was made or the date of 
expiry or ending of this agreement; and/or  
• the site(s) of any other Franchisor store(s) that is or are open and trading at 
the time that you or your associates start or undertake any of those restricted 
activities referred to in clause 30.2 if the relevant other Franchisor store(s) is 
or are located or operated anywhere within:  
• the city or town in Australia in which your business is located or operated or 
your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• the state or territory in Australia in which your business is located or operated 
or your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• Australia; and/or  
• the same building(s), shopping centre(s) or other complex(s) in which:  
• your business is located or operated from or from which your former business 
was located or operated from at the time the contract for the sale of your 
business was made or immediately before the date of expiry or ending of this 
agreement; and/or  
• the site(s) of any other Franchisor store{s) that is or are open and trading at 
the time that you or your associates start or undertake any of those restricted 
activities referred to in clause 30.2 if the relevant other Franchisor store{s) is 
or are located or operated anywhere within:  
• the city or town in Australia in which your business is located or operated or 
your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• the state or territory in Australia in which your business is located or operated 
or your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• Australia; and/or  
• the site(s) of your business or your former business at the time that the 
contract for the sale of your business was made or immediately before the 
date of expiry or ending of this agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your former business in the 2 years before the contract for 
the sale of your business is made or the date of expiry or ending of this 
agreement; or  
• engage in or be employed in a whole, substantial, or material part in the 
preparation and retail selling of coffee beverages or other foods or beverages 
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that are the same as, substantially or sufficiently similar to those that are or 
were actually sold from your business or your former business in, for or from 
a coffee shop or cafe, for consumption mainly within the coffee shop or cafe 
or any nearby dining or eating area serviced by the coffee shop or cafe (a 
similar competing coffee shop or cafe) to the customers that are or were your 
existing or established customers at or at any time 1 year before the contract 
for the sale of your business is made or the expiry or ending of this agreement 
where any such similar competing coffee shop or cafe is or are located or 
operated anywhere within:  
• all or any of a 3km, 2km, 1 km or 1/2km radius from the centre of:  
• the site(s) of your business or your former business at the time that the 
contract for sale of your business was made or immediately before the date of 
expiry or ending of this agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your business or your former business in the 2 years 
before the contract for the sale of your business is made or the date of expiry 
or end of this agreement; and/or  
• the same building(s), shopping centre(s) or other complex(s) in which your 
business is located or operated or your former business was last located or 
operated; and/or  
• the site(s) of your business or your former business at the time that the 
contract for the sale of your business was made or immediately before the 
date of expiry or ending of this agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your former business in the 2 years before the contract for 
the sale of your business is made or the date of expiry or ending of this 
agreement; and/or  
• engage in or be employed in a whole, substantial, or material part in the 
preparation and retail selling of coffee beverages, foods or other beverages 
that are the same as, substantially or sufficiently similar to those that are or 
were actually sold from your business or your former business in, for or from 
a coffee shop or cafe (a similar competing coffee shop or cafe) to the 
customers that are or were the existing or established customers of any other 
operator of a Franchisor store whose store(s) is or are located or operated 
anywhere within:  
 
30.4  For all or any of 3 years, 2 years or 1 year after settlement of the contract for 
the sale of your business or the expiry or the end of this agreement, you and 
your associates must not, without our consent, whether on your or your 
associates own account or together with or for anyone else or as a sale trader, 
partner or employee in any partnership or as a shareholder, director, officer, 
employee, consultant, manager of a company (in its personal capacity or as 
trustee) or as a trustee, beneficiary or unitholder of a trust, do anything 
restricted by clause 30.5 in, for or from a coffee shop or cafe that is the same 
or substantially similar to your business or your former business (a similar 
competing coffee shop or cafe) if that similar competing coffee shop or cafe 
is or are located or operated anywhere within:  
 
all or any of a 3km, 2km, 1 km or 1/2km radius from the centre of:  
 
• the site(s) of your business at the time that the contract for the sale of your 
business was made or immediately before the date of expiry or ending of this 
agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your former business in the 2 years before the contract for 
the sale of your business is made or the date of expiry or end of this 
agreement: or  
 490
• the site(s) of any other Franchisor store that is open and trading at the time 
that you or your associates start or undertake any of the restricted activities 
referred to in clause 30.5. if the relevant other Franchisor store(s) is or are 
located or operated within:  
• the city or town in Australia in which your business is located or operated or 
your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• the state or territory in Australia in which your business is located or operated 
or your former business was last located or operated: and/or  
• Australia; and/or  
• the same building(s), shopping centre(s) or other complex(s) in which:  
• your business is located or operated from or your former business was last 
located or operated from; or the site(s) of any other Franchisor store that is 
open and trading at the time that you or your associates start or undertake any 
of those restricted activities referred to in clause 30.5, if the relevant other 
Franchisor store(s) is or are located or operated within:  
• the city or town in Australia in which your business is located or operated or 
your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• the state or territory in Australia in which your business is located or operated 
or your former business was last located or operated; and/or  
• the site(s) of your business at the time that the contract for the sale of your 
business was made or immediately before the date of expiry or ending of this 
agreement; and/or  
• any site(s) used by your former business in the 2 years before the contract for 
the sale of your business is made or the date of expiry or end of this 
agreement.  
• You and your associates must not:  
• solicit, canvas or entice any customers that are or were your existing or 
established customers in connection with your business or your former 
business at or at any time 1 year before the contract for the sale of your 
business is made or before the expiry or end of this agreement, with the 
object of, purpose or intention of offering to sell or selling to those existing or 
established customers coffee beverages or other food or beverages that are the 
same as or substantially similar to the coffee beverages or other food or 
beverages that are or were actually supplied from your business or your 
former business at any time 1 year before the contract for the sale of your 
business is made or the expiry or end of this agreement;  
• solicit, canvas or entice any customers that are or were the existing or 
established customers of any other operator of a Franchisor store referred to 
in clause 30.4 above, at or at any time 1 year before the contract for the sale 
of your business is made or before the expiry or end of this agreement, with 
the object of, purpose or intention of offering to sellar selling to those 
existing or established customers coffee beverages or other food or beverages 
that are the same or substantially similar to the coffee beverages or other food 
or beverages that are or were actually supplied from your business or your 
former business at any time 1 year before the contract for the sale of your 
business is made or the expiry or end of this agreement;  
• use, allow anyone else to use, copy or sell:  
• the distinctive, characteristic or identifying features of the system or the 
image of a Franchisor store; the Franchisor intellectual property or any 
colourable imitation of it: and/or  
• the trade names or trade marks; and/or  
• confidential information about your customers; and/or  
• confidential information about customers of other operators of Franchisor 
store whose store(s) is or are located or operated in Australia; and/or  
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• the confidential information or the know how; and/or  
• your databases, in particular any customer database including any 
commercially sensitive information kept on any of your databases; and/or  
• plans and/or the layout of a Franchisor store including kitchen and equipment 
design and layout: and/or  
• colour patterns or combinations, get up, decor or appearance of or used in a 
Franchisor store; and/or any current or former Franchisor food or beverage 
menus used in a Franchisor store; and/or  
• the manuals including all Franchisor food and beverage manuals; and or  
• the licenced software (if any); and/or  
• the proprietary copyrights (if any) developed by or for us or our associates for 
use in connection with the system, the image or a Franchisor store; and/or  
• the distinctive characteristics or identifying advertising or promotions used to 
market or promote the sale of coffee. food or beverages sold from a 
Franchisor store; and/or  
• special, proprietary or secret recipes, formulas used to make, prepare, present 
or serve food or beverages listed in the Franchisor food or beverages menus; 
and/or  
• the methods or procedures used to prepare, cook, pack and sell food and 
beverages approved for sale from a Franchisor store;  
• the Franchisor uniforms, dress styles or costumes that are or were used in 
connection with a Franchisor store by its managers, chefs, kitchenhands and 
employees; and/or  
• name, address or other details of your present or established customers at or 1 
year before the contract for the safe of your business is made or the expiry or 
end of this agreement; and/or  
• sell, disclose or use the confidential information or know how kept or 
obtained from your database including any details of your customers 
maintained on any database kept by or for you; and/or  
• sell, disclose or use the confidential information or know how for the possible 
benefit of a competing franchisor, subfranchisor or other operator of a coffee 
shop or cafe that is the same as, substantially or sufficiently similar to or in 
competition with your business or your former business.  
 
 
31.2 Restrictions on use of confidential information  
 
"Subject to clause 31.3, during and after the franchise term, you and your 
associates must not for any purpose or for anyone else directly or 
indirectly allow disclosure, communication, use, reproduction, 
memorisation, copying, retrieval, printing, reverse engineering, sale or 
other dealing of or with the confidential information not authorised by 
this agreement or by us in writing. 
 
 
PART 32 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR BREACHES OF NON-COMPETITION 
AND CONFIDENTIALITY  
 
32.1  If there is an actual or threatened breach of a duty under Part 30 (Non-
competition) or in Part 31 (Confidential information) by you or your 
associates, we, our associates or any other beneficiary entitled to enforce the 
relevant promises and who has been or is likely to be affected may seek and 
have the right to a temporary or interim injunction (pending trial) restraining 
anyone or more of you or your associates from breaching the duties under 
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either or both Part 30 or Part 31 without having to show or prove on the 
hearing of any application or motion for an injunction, a proprietary right or 
any special or actual damage has been or will be sustained or incurred. This 
right will be in addition to any other relief or orders that a court may order to 
secure or support compliance by you or your associates under either or both 
Part 30 or Part 31.  
 
 
32.2  During and after the franchise term, in connection with proceedings by us or 
our associates or other beneficiaries entitled to enforce the relevant promises 
for a temporary or interim injunction (pending trial) for a breach of the duties 
under either or both Part 30 or Part 31, you and your associates will not seek 
any order for security for cost from us or our associates in connection with 
any proceedings for a temporary or interim injunction except for the usual 
undertaking as to damages required by the rules of the court to which a 
motion or application for an injunction or other relief has been made. 
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No restrictions post termination of the Franchise Agreement have been stipulated, i.e. no set 
amount of years before the Franchisee can “open-up shop” elsewhere. However the following 
covenants are stated. 
 
2.3  The Franchise shall be subject to the following qualifications and restrictions 
 
(c)  Colonial reserves the right to appoint new Franchise Owners, agents or 
representatives without restriction. 
 
33.5 Furthermore the Principals personally covenant and acknowledge as follows: 
 
(a)  That they will not act in a manner which, if they were the Franchise Owner or 
the Nominated Representative, would be a breach of this Agreement or the 
Collateral Agreements by the Franchise Owner or the Nominated 
Representative, and accordingly the Principals guarantee their own due and 
prompt performance and observance of any and all covenants obligations 
terms and conditions contained in this Agreement or any of the Collateral 
Agreements; 
 
(b)  that Colonial will be entitled to apply for and obtain temporary or permanent 
injunctions, declarations and orders for specific performance in the event of 
any breach or threatened breach of any covenant or provision of this clause. 
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13 Conduct of Business and Staff 
… (b) The member must not carry on the Business at any premises other than the 
Location without first obtaining the written approval of the Company which may be 
given withheld by the Company at its discretion or given subject to conditions, 
including without limitation, conditions in relation to the manner in which the 
premises is identified as the Retail Brand. 
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